Gulshan Pashayeva, Ph.D. (Philos.), Head of the Foreign Policy Analysis Department, Center for Strategic Studies (Baku, Azerbaijan).



The author discusses several aspects of the geopolitical context in which the Southern Caucasus has found itself after the 2008 August events in Georgia. The warmer climate between Russia and the West is expected to further reduce the regional instability created by certain external forces and stir up the efforts to finally settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.


For a long time, political and economic circles remained convinced that for certain objective and subjective reasons small countries must remain in the sphere of influence of a large country and were doomed to play a secondary role on the international stage. Today, ongoing globalization and the resultant rapidly increasing interdependence of countries and nations have given some of the smaller countries a chance, no matter how slim, to have an impact on the foreign policy of the heavyweights. The world is no longer divided into two opposing blocs, which allows the voice of the smaller countries to be heard in numerous international organizations; they have mastered the art of playing on the global and regional disagreements between the world powers. At first glance, the new world order looks much fairer than the old one; however, no longer dominated by two superpowers, it has become much less predictable. This means that some of the smaller countries (the independence of which dates back to the end of the Cold War and collapse of the bipolar world) are still concerned about national security and long-term foreign policy orientations.

The South Caucasian countries—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia—are no exception. The relatively favorable (in the geopolitical respect) Soviet period ended to leave them face to face with the need to build stable national states, effective market economies, democracy at home, and national security, in short with numerous highly challenging tasks.

The still unsettled armed conflicts in and the still diverging foreign policy orientations of the three South Caucasian states mean that there is no geopolitical unity in the region. With respect to the precarious balance of world and regional forces, it has been described as one of the least stable parts of “intermediate Europe.”1 As one of the geographic parts of the “buffer zone” between Russia and the West, the Southern Caucasus is waiting for the “external forces” to end their confrontation in the region. This adds special importance to the gradual warming between Russia and the West, which might change the region’s geopolitical context and improve the prospects for settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Russia and the West: Cooperation Prospects

Russia’s much stronger military-political position in the Southern Caucasus and the protocol on continued deployment of the 102nd military base in Gumri it signed with Armenia revived an interest in Russia’s long-term political priorities in the Southern Caucasus and the region’s role in the international strategies of the West, Iran, and Turkey. So it comes as no surprise that the expert community has not yet abandoned the old stereotypes and still analyzes the developments in the Southern Caucasus (and the CIS, for that matter) through the prism of Russia-the West confrontation.

This “traditional” approach, which would have been more relevant during the Cold War, remains very much alive because of the “partial” recognition of the independence of Kosovo and of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008. Russia and the West have not yet arrived at an agreement on the Balkan and South Caucasian events; they stick to their opposite positions, which means that there is no agreement on practical interpretations of the basic principles of international law.2 Nadezhda Arbatova has written that the absence of a concerted opinion on the contradiction between the principle of territorial integrity and the right of nations to self-determination (which she describes as one of the fundamental issues of the post-bipolar age), as well as the highly selective application (based on political expedience) of the Helsinki principles, interferes with effective settlement of the old and even breeds new conflicts.3

It should be said in all justice that at no time has international law been perfect; however its faults came to the fore as a negative factor of international relations when the NATO-WTO opposition disappeared. The Helsinki Final Act was signed when the main powers had to come to a consensus on divvying up the spheres of influence; today there is no agreement between Russia and its Euroatlantic neighbors on the issue.4 Alexander Rahr of the German Council on Foreign Relations describes the geopolitical prospects for the Near Abroad as follows: “The West does not want Russia to become a hegemon and to have a special influence on Ukraine, Central Asia, or the Southern Caucasus;” this, he goes on to say, is “the central conflict which has not yet been resolved and which creates a danger of more conflicts.”5

It comes as no surprise that some of the Soviet successor-states regarded NATO as an effective instrument of their national security which, according to Prof. Terekhov of MGIMO (U), explains the fact that “there is no shortage of countries wishing to join the Alliance, while its enlargement is explained not only by pulling new members into it, but also by their own insistent desire to acquire this status.”6 The August 2008 crisis is largely explained by Georgia’s desire to “acquire this status;” which placed the West and, most important, Russia face to face with the need to look for new security factors in the European part of the post-Soviet expanse. According to experts from the Institute of Contemporary Development (Russia), Russia can offer the CIS members alternative security guarantees: “It should stress, at the top level, its role as the key and, in particular, most influential guarantor of territorial integrity and sovereignty of its CIS neighbors if they stick to their military-political neutrality.”7 The authors headed by Sergey Karaganov, who in 2009 wrote a report for the Special Russian-American Session of the Valdai International Discussion Club, invited Russia and the United States “to agree on the rules and limits of competition in the post-Soviet space. They must mark out the ‘red lines,’ crossing which would threaten the important or vital interests of either side.” The Russian experts believe that “these rules stipulate mutual restraint:” Russia should “renounce the use of military force to restore Russia’s historical zone of influence.” The United States should reject attempts to trigger Russia’s confrontation with … post-Soviet countries through their involvement in NATO, as well as attempts to develop bilateral military-political partnership with them. The authors argue that this approach will help resolve some of the still smoldering conflicts, something which all the interested sides need. “This compromise will not entail concessions on any of the sides’ vital interests.”8

The West, the United States in particular, is aware that it needs balanced and pragmatic Russian policies. The “resetting” policy announced by President Obama has spread to America’s policy in the post-Soviet expanse. Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor of Russia in Global Affairs, has aptly described this as “half-realistic” and pointed out: “Under Obama the entire system of Washington’s priorities has changed; the post-Soviet expanse is now regarded as a periphery.” This happened “not because America wants to please Russia, but because it reassessed its possibilities.”9 The United States has not abandoned its previous practices of supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors,10 however it is demonstrating much less zeal in this respect. Philip Gordon, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State, specified the American position in relation to the CIS countries: “We want to get beyond the notion that European diplomacy and security is a ‘zero-sum’ game” and that countries in the region “need to choose whether they’re going to be pro-Russian or pro-American.”11

Encouraged by the warming climate in the relations between Russia and the West, the expert community has been saying more and more frequently that this “choice” is no longer needed. In his article “Call Off the Great Game,” Thomas de Waal, British expert on the Caucasus, has written that it is wrong to look at the Caucasus as a “‘Great Chessboard’ where the big powers push the locals like pawns to serve their own goals.”12 In their program article “Reimagining Eurasia,” Samuel Charap and Alexandros Petersen likewise describe this approach as unconstructive: “When the United States tries to best Russia in geopolitical tit-for-tat in Eurasia, both Washington and the region lose,” and conclude: “The only way for Washington to ‘win’ is not to play the game.”13

“Resetting” should not be interpreted as the United States’ unconditional withdrawal from the region or as the absence of real contradictions between Russia and the West. This is explained, first and foremost, by the fact that Russia still regards attempts to add global functions to NATO’s force potential and move its military infrastructure to its borders as unacceptable. The official documents adopted in Russia in 2008-2010 (The Foreign Policy Conception,14 the National Security Strategy,15 and the Military Doctrine16) proceed from this conviction.

In his lecture at MGIMO (U), NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in particular: “We do not think Russia will attack NATO. We have stopped worrying about that and Russia should stop worrying about that as well.”17

Still, the final document entitled NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement18 prepared by the “wise men” led by Madeleine Albright confirms that the Alliance accepts the fact that “NATO members, when asked, may vary in their descriptions of Russia while still seeing eye to eye on their prescription for engagement with that country” and “experience teaches, however, that NATO and Russian leaders do not always view the same set of facts in the same way.” Indeed, they do not see eye to eye on NATO enlargement to the post-Soviet expanse, which the 2008 Bucharest Summit of NATO pushed indefinitely to the backburner. NATO cannot abandon its “open doors” policy, but it has become abundantly clear after Victor Yanukovich’s advent to power in Ukraine and the Caucasian crisis of August 2008 that it should be stalled for some time. Steve Levine, Foreign Policy Editor, still believes that Georgia is the likeliest candidate; he has to admit, however, that Russia’s determined position and the West’s desire to avoid conflicts with Russia over this touchy issue make, for the time being, Georgia’s membership unreal.19

The Abkhazian and South Ossetian issues no longer stand between the West and Russia: this much became evident at the NATO Lisbon Summit. Their closer positions might warm up the international climate needed for the Astana OSCE Summit and for the discussions of a new European Security Treaty initiated by the President of Russia.20

The developments of 2009-2010 showed that this initiative was accepted as an item on the Euroatlantic security agenda and stirred up an interest in many European capitals.21 On the one hand, peace and security obviously and largely depend on the actions (or inaction) of individual and, more likely, the most powerful states. This means that the security problem belongs not only to the architecture of existing institutions, but also to the way they are used.22 On the other hand, Russia’s initiative can be described as positive not so much because it calls for a new Treaty (designed as legal confirmation of the existing political obligations), but because the talks may end in signing important documents in the “soft security” sphere. The draft Treaty, on the other hand, deals with the military-political side of security, otherwise known as hard security.23 The European Security Treaty is very important for the Southern Caucasus dotted with still unsettled conflicts; Russia’s success greatly depends on whether common approaches to the settlement of the post-Soviet conflicts and universal rules applied to all crisis situations in the region are formulated within the discussions of the new Treaty.

We should bear in mind, however, that, as distinct from Russia, the West is more “concerned not with restructuring the European security architecture but with improving the existing security system by adding the mechanisms of confidence and control between the West and Russia,”24 up to and including the Russia-NATO and Russia-EU dialogs. Some experts, however, go even further by saying, “Russia should join NATO.”25 It is also suggested that an “Alliance of Europe” stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific be set up to ensure close coordination of Russia’s and the EU’s foreign and security policy.26 This will finally change Russia’s attitude to the Eastern Partnership program seen, so far, in the context of the notorious confrontation between Russia and the West. Moscow believes that the program might consolidate the anti-Russian states and force them to choose between the EU and Russia.27 On the other hand, parallel integration of Russia and the post-Soviet states in the Euroatlantic structures will decrease the destabilizing impact of external forces and create a much more favorable context for crisis settlement in the region.

A joint NATO-Russian missile defense architecture can be described as one of the most promising directions of cooperation. The idea is actively supported by NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen who said in Rome on 17 September, 2010: “Territorial missile defense can become a security roof under which all Allies find shelter, not just some. And I am convinced that this roof can be wide enough to include other European countries as well, including Russia.”28 Part of the expert community and the independent Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) launched by the Carnegie Endowment look favorably at this idea. Former Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov, now one of the EASI co-chairmen, believes that even though “the ABM problem has long been one of the strongest irritants in the relations between Russia, on the one hand, and NATO and the U.S., on the other,” its resolution might help us to set up a common Euroatlantic security system of the 21st century.29

Today, Russia and the United States have repeatedly confirmed their intention to cooperate on the ABM issue. In his interview with the Danish Broadcasting Corporation, President Medvedev said in particular: “Moscow has long advocated a system of ‘global’ protection which defends not only one country or a group of countries and which responds to the interests of the international community.”30 In his interview with Interfax, President Obama expressed similar ideas by saying: “We will be more able to address these threats together, and that’s why I am a strong proponent of cooperating with Russia on developing missile defense systems.”31 The NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement made in Lisbon confirmed: “We agreed to discuss pursuing missile defense cooperation. We agreed on a joint ballistic missile threat assessment and to continue dialogue in this area… the NRC should develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defense cooperation.”32

Back in 2007 at the G-8 Summit in Heiligendamm (Germany), Vladimir Putin invited the United States to use the Qabala radar along with the Russian Federation (in 2002 the Azerbaijan Republic leased the radar to Russia for ten years). Today, in 2010, when the idea of a common European missile defense system has returned to the foreign policy agenda of the leading countries, the possible use of the Qabala radar has been revived. In his interview with Interfax, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, ahead of talks with Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in Washington, said: “We have been interested in the Qabala radar.”33

Russian Academic Sergey Markedonov was probably right when he wrote back in 2007 in connection with Putin’s invitation to use the Qabala radar in the context of fruitful cooperation between Russia and the United States in the Caucasus that “while in respect to Georgia our (Russia’s.—G.P.) relations with Washington are far from a consensus, in respect to Azerbaijan (as well as to the security problems in Central Asia, for that matter, because as a coastal state Azerbaijan is one of the bridges leading to this region) we can and should bring our positions closer.”34 Joint projects in the Southern Caucasus stimulate cooperation between Russia and the West in the sphere of regional stability and security. According to Dale Herspring, Foreign Policy Analyst at the American Council on Foreign Relations, it is “hard to imagine the possibility of cooperation between Russia and the U.S. in the security sphere, while Nagorno-Karabakh and other conflicts in the region remain unresolved.”35 The opposite is equally true; neither settlement of the “frozen” conflicts in the post-Soviet expanse nor a stable European security system is possible without efficient Russia-the West cooperation.

Russia and the West: Mediation Prospects

From the very first days of Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s independence, Russia and the West have been involved in the mediation efforts designed to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the two countries. It should be said, however, that on 20-23 September, 1991, while the Soviet Union was still alive, a mission headed by President of the Russian Federation Yeltsin and President of Kazakhstan Nazarbaev visited the region; the two heads of state then signed the so-called Zheleznovodsk Communiqué.

In March 1992, when the Soviet Union had already fallen apart, the CSCE joined the process to convene a conference in Minsk, under its aegis, expected to set up a permanent negotiation structure to settle the crisis by peaceful means in full accordance with the CSCE’s principles, obligations, and provisions.

It should be said that cooperation between Russia and the West within the CSCE was never plain sailing. Vladimir Kazimirov, then head of the Russian mission for Nagorno-Karabakh, blamed the United States determined to squeeze Russia out of the region.36 The former head of the Russian mission has written that “Russia was actively involved in mediation on its own right and as a member of the Minsk Group (MG) of the CSCE which spontaneously came into being in June 1992.”37

In December 1994, in line with the decisions of the Budapest OSCE Summit, a co-chairmanship of the Minsk Conference was set up for more effective and fruitful coordination of mediation and negotiations. The co-chairmen were entrusted with the task of conducting “speedy negotiations for the conclusion of a political agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict, the implementation of which will eliminate major consequences of the conflict for all parties and permit the convening of the Minsk Conference.”38 In 1997, there appeared an institution of triple co-chairmanship (Russia-France-the United States), however the years of mediation and suggestions have failed to push the negotiations forward.

The August 2008 events, which changed the geopolitical situation in the Southern Caucasus, ushered in a new stage. Regional and global actors moved forward with new suggestions, which revived an interest in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. Here I have in mind the Moscow Declaration39 of 2 November, 2008 and the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey registered by the Zurich Protocols.

The Moscow (otherwise known as Mayendorf) Declaration initiated by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev is the first document signed by the sides since the cease-fire of 1994. Since 2008, the three presidents have met seven times within the Russian president’s initiative; the latest of such meetings took place on 27 October, 2010 in Astrakhan at which the sides signed a declaration on confidence-building measures, exchange of POWs, and return of bodies.

It should be said that President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev spoke highly of the Russian president’s unprecedented personal involvement in the process: “At no time in the past have the leaders of the Co-Chair countries shown similar involvement and, most important, efficiency.”40

Turkish-Armenian rapprochement likewise revived international interest in the settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict and demonstrated that the two processes should be addressed simultaneously and that Azerbaijan’s position should be taken into account. At a joint press conference of President of Azerbaijan Aliev and Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the latter clearly stated, “We cannot think in a different way than Azerbaijan.”41

Russia’s active involvement led to closer coordination or even rapprochement of the MG positions. This is testified by the joint statements of the presidents of Russia, the United States, and France on Nagorno-Karabakh in 2009-201042; the leading settlement actors achieved unanimity on the settlement particulars and their realization. It should be said, however, that the mediators are still not ready to put pressure on the conflicting sides and prefer vague statements: “The Heads of Delegations of the Co-Chair countries reviewed their commitment to support the sides in reaching a peace agreement, but reiterated that the primary responsibility to put an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still remains with the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders.”43 Baku is convinced that this approach will protract the talks indefinitely, something that Erevan, which has found itself in a “geopolitical Zugzwang,”44 needs. Armenia still insists on the utopian principle “territories in exchange of independence;” this probably explains why, unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia has so far failed to produce unambiguous answers to the so-called revamped Madrid Principles.

Today is has become obvious that conflict escalation and the very real danger of renewed hostilities are the only alternative to the status quo and that these possible developments are fraught with geopolitical destabilization in the region. It seems that the negotiations should be given a new boost. Armenia should be persuaded to accept the revamped version of the Madrid Principles according to which the occupied territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh should be returned to Azerbaijan; the region itself should receive an intermediate status which would guarantee its security and self-administration; a corridor should be created between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh; the decision on the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh should belong to the legally binding expression of its people’s will; all internally displaced persons and refugees should be allowed to return to the places of their previous domicile; and there should be international security guarantees, including a peacekeeping operation.

Although the talks are confidential, it is more or less clear that Armenia has not yet responded to the MG initiatives because the revamped principles do not contain a guarantee that Nagorno-Karabakh will be detached from Azerbaijan. Today it is impossible adopt this decision, let alone implement it, without Azerbaijan’s involvement and agreement.45 Azerbaijan does not intend to simulate negotiations to preserve the status quo; Baku hopes that the co-chair countries will rely on their authority and influence to finally convince the Armenians that the MG proposals should be jointly discussed to be able to move directly toward a peace treaty.46

It is extremely important for the co-chair countries to officially recognize the need for unconditional return of the occupied territories adjacent to Karabakh to Azerbaijan in exchange for corresponding security measures, something which has been already registered by international organizations (including the 1993 resolutions of the SC U.N.). If the U.S., Russia, and France accept this as an obvious fact, the Armenian side will have much less leeway for its unconstructive maneuvering, while the negotiations will be given a fresh boost.

As a follow-up to the Astrakhan Summit, the presidents instructed their foreign ministers to draft and coordinate general principles of the settlement to be presented to the OSCE Summit in Astana.47 President Medvedev was “cautiously optimistic” about the settlement prospects, which breeds certain hopes; otherwise, the Astana Summit might close not merely the “Russian” stage of mediation, but also reduce to naught all positive achievements of the Prague Process seen in Azerbaijan as the last chance for a peaceful settlement.48

By Way of a Conclusion

In the 1990s, everything the Western countries did in the Southern Caucasus, particularly their efforts to strengthen security and develop democracy, was invariably accompanied by efforts to push Russia out of the region. It was firmly believed that Russia was pursuing its old “imperial” policy and using the “frozen conflicts” to preserve its influence in the region.

This obvious confrontation cannot but affect the foreign policy orientation of the South Caucasian countries. In the wake of the Rose Revolution, Georgia moved toward prompt integration into the Euro-Atlantic space, while Armenia, true to its “historical” tradition, associated its security with Russia and a close military alliance with it. Today, when the world is moving toward “no polarity” (according to American political scientist Nikolai Zlobin)49 Azerbaijan’s more balanced strategy looks much more preferable. The country, which by the mid-1990s had achieved internal stability, is skillfully using oil and gas resources to build a national security system through diplomatic means. It is pursuing a multivectoral foreign policy designed to make Azerbaijan a field of fruitful cooperation among the world and regional actors. Some believe that Azerbaijan has managed, on the one hand, “to confirm its independence in its relations with Russia and its status of an equal partner,” while, on the other, it is free “to deal with third players, be it Europe, Turkey, the U.S., or the participants in the Eastern Partnership program and the Nabucco project, without risking irritating Moscow too much.”50

Today, when Russia and the West are drawing closer once more (hopefully forever), this pragmatic approach can help the South Caucasian countries join “big” politics on an equal footing; settle the conflicts; and contribute, as much as they can, to building a European security system. This alone will make the region an inalienable part of Europe rather than perpetuate its “intermediate Europe” status.

1 “Intermediate Europe” is one of the descriptions of the states lying between the European Union and Russia (from the Baltic to the Caspian). It includes the three South Caucasian states (see: P. Schultze, “Politika kooperativnoy bezopasnosti v Evrope: Stsenarii i shansy,” Vestnik analitiki, No. 1 (39), 2020, p. 47), available at [], availability of all Internet resources verified as of 1 November, 2010.—G.P.). Back to text
2 See, in particular: Vystuplenie D. Mevedeva v Narodnoy skupshchine Serbii, 20 October, 2009, available at []. Back to text
3 See: N. Arbatova, “Zamorozhennye konflikty v kontekste evropeyskot bezopasnosti,” Indeks bezopasnosti, No. 3 (94), 2010, available at []. Back to text
4 See: Rossiyskie politicheskie praktiki monthly, No. 1 (35), 2010, pp. 15-16, available at []. Back to text
5 A. Rahr, “Zapad ne khochet rasprostraneniya vliyaniya Rossii na postsovetskom prostranstve,” Russkie novosti, No. 42, 29 October, 2009, available at []. Back to text
6 V.P. Terekhov, “Formirovanie novoy arkhitektury evropeyskoy bezopasnosty kak faktor narozhdayushcheysya mnogopolyarnosti v mire, pozitsia Germanii,” Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta, No. 6 (9) 2009, pp. 38-44, available at []. Back to text
7 Arkhitektura evro-atlanticheskoy bezopasnosti, ed. by Prof. I.Yu. Yurgens, Academician A.A. Dynkin, Corresponding Member V.G. Baranovskiy, Ekon-Inform, Moscow, 2009, p. 115, available at []. Back to text
8 Reconfiguration, Not Just a Reset. Russia’s Interests in Relations with the United States of America, June 2009, Moscow, available at []. Back to text
9 F. Lukyanov, “Realizm vpolsily,” Gazeta.Ru, 26 June, 2010, available at []. Back to text
10 See: The National Security Strategy of the United States, May 2010, p. 44, available at []. Back to text
11 Ph. Gordon (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs), Special Briefing on the Secretary’s Upcoming Travel, Washington, DC, 29 June, 2010, available at []. Back to text
12 Th. de Waal, “Call Off the Great Game. It’s Time to Stop Seeing the South Caucasus as a Geopolitical Chessboard,” Foreign Policy, 13 September, 2010, available at []. Back to text
13 S. Charap, A. Petersen, “Reimagining Eurasia. A New ‘Great Game’ will not Increase U.S. Influence in Russia’s Backyard,” Foreign Affairs, Published by the Council on Foreign Relations, available at []. Back to text
14 See: Kontseptsia vneshney politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii, available at []. Back to text
15 See: Strategia natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda, Section “Obshchie polozhenia,” Point 17, available at []. Back to text
16 See: Voennaia dokrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii, Section “Voennye Opasnosti i voennye ugrozy Rossiiskoy Federatsii,” Point 8a, available at []. Back to text
17 NATO Secretary General Completes Visit to Russia (Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations), 17 December, 2009, available at []. Back to text
18 See: “NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement,” available at []. Back to text
19 See: Yuzhny Kavkaz ne yavlyaetsya prioritetnym voprosom v kontekste vneshney politiki Zapada, Interview of Editor of Foreign Policy Steve Levine with The First News Information Agency, 24 September, 2010, available at []. Back to text
20 See: Proekt Dogovora o evropeyskoy bezopasnosti, 29 November, 2009, site of the President of Russia (, available at []. Back to text
21 See: A. Gromyko, “Proekt pan’evropeyskoy sistemy bezopasnosti: pervye rezultaty,” Indeks bezopasnosti, No. 3 (94), 2010, available at []. Back to text
22 See: H.-J. Spanger, “I snova o ‘kholodnoy voyne’: uroki proshlye i nyneshnie,” Vestnik analitiki, No. 1 (39), 2010, p. 62. Back to text
23 See: D. Medvedev Speech at the World Policy Conference, 8 October, 2008, available at []. Back to text
24 I.A. Istomin, “Novaya sistema evropeyskoy bezopasnosti: istoki i perspektivy kontseptsii,” in: Sovremenny krizis sistemy mezhdunarondnoy bezopasnosti: vyzovy i otvety: sbornik nauchnykh dokladov, ed. by V.V. Grokhotova, B.N. Kovalev, E.A. Makarova, the Yaroslav the Wise Novgorod State University, Velikiy Novgorod, 2009, p. 30, available at []. Back to text
25 Ch.A. Kupchan, “NATO’s Final Frontier,” Foreign Affairs, No. 3, May-June 2010. Back to text
26 See: Towards an Alliance of Europe, Analytical Report by the Russian Group of the Valdai International Discussion Club, 31 August-7 September, 2010, available at []. Back to text
27 See: Stenogramma vystuplenia i otvetov na voprosy SMI Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S. Lavrova na sovmestnoy press-konferentsii po itogam peregovorov s Ministrom inostrannykh del Polshi R. Sikorskim, Moscow, 6 May, 2009, available at []. Back to text
28 “Success Breeds Success: The Next Steps with Russia,” available at []. Back to text
29 “‘Nachat s sozdania obshchey sistemy PRO,’ Eks-glava MID RF Igor Ivanov rasskazal ‘Ú,’ kak zapustit mekhanizm globalnogo strategicheskogo partnerstva RF s Zapadom,” Kommersant, No. 171 (4471), 16 September, 2010, available at []. Back to text
30 Interview to the Danish Broadcasting Corporation DR, 26 April, 2010, available at []. Back to text
31 “Barack Obama Interview with Interfax News Agency,” 25 June, 2010, available at []. Back to text
32 NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement, 20 November, 2010, available at []. Back to text
33 []. Back to text
34 S. Markedonov, “Gabalinskaia initsiativa,” 15 June, 2007, Russkiy zhurnal, available at []. Back to text
35 I. Levine, U.S. expert: “The South Caucasus’ Future will Depend on the Overall Relationship between Moscow and Washington and NATO,” 13 September, 2010, available at []. Back to text
36 See: V.N. Kazimirov, Mir Karabakhu, Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia Publishers, Moscow, 2009, p. 36. Back to text
37 Ibid., p. 319. Back to text
38 Ibid., p. 348. Back to text
39 See: Declaratsia Azerbaidzhanskoy Respubliki, Respubliki Armenia i Rossiiskoy Federatsii, 2 November, 2008, Moscow, available at []. Back to text
40 Sovmestnaia press-konferentsia po itogam rossiisko-azerbaidzhanskikh peregovorov, 3 September, 2010, Baku, available at []. Back to text
41 []. Back to text
42 See: Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict by U.S. President Obama, Russian President Medvedev, and French President Sarkozy at the L’Aquila Summit of the Eight, 10 July, 2009, available at []; G8 Summit: Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict by Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, and Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic. Muskoka, 26 June, 2010, available at []. Back to text
43 Joint Statement by the Heads of Delegation of the Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 17 July, 2010, available at []. Back to text
44 G. Pashaeva, “Geopoliticheskiy Zugzwang,” Echo, 14 January, 2010. Back to text
45 See: Vystuplenie I. Alieva na zasedanii Kabineta ministrov, 13 July, 2010, available at []. Back to text
46 See: Interview I. Alieva azerbaidzhanskim zhurnalistam, Istanbul, 8 June, 2010, available at []. Back to text
47 See: Otvety D. Medvedeva na voprosy zhurnalistov po itogam vstrechi s prezidentami Azerbaidzhana i Armenii, 27 October, 2010, available at []. Back to text
48 See: Rech I. Alieva na otkrytii Tsentralnogo shtaba azerbaijanskoy obshchiny Nagorno-Karabakhskogo regiona, 6 July, 2010, available at []. Back to text
49 See: N. Zlobin, “Miroporiadok: Vozmozhnosti disintegratsii,” Vedomosti, No. 174 (2196), 16 September, 2008, available at []. Back to text
50 Interview direktora Moskovskogo tsentra Carnegie Dmitria Trenina informatsionnomu agentstvu Day.As, 11 August, 2009, available at []. Back to text

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