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INTRODUCTIONLena JONSON
Lena Jonson, Senior scientific employee, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Stockholm, Sweden).
A basic assumption of the Stockholm conference was that the events in Chechnia are of concern not only to the Russian Federation but also to the international community. Three issues were discussed: what possible Russian strategies exist for (a) stabilizing Chechnia and (b) stabilizing the immediate neighborhood; and in what possible ways and forms can the international community contribute to a peace process? What is happening in Chechnia has consequences for the security of wider Europe and the international community therefore has an obligation and a responsibility to act. By the international community is meant, first, international organizations, such as the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU), and, second, nongovernmental organizations and multinational corporations.
The Russian authorities justified the military campaign against Chechnia in 1994 with the threat posed by Chechnia as a bastion of “crime and lawlessness.” The campaign of 1999 was initially justified by the threat posed by terrorism emanating from Chechnia. These labels are simplifications which do not properly describe the character of the conflict. At the same time they reflect the drastic changes which took place in Chechen society during the 1990s. Part of the tragedy of the conflict is the fact that the Russian war machine destroyed Chechen society during the first war of 1994-1996 by breaking down the economic, political and social structures. The weak and fragmented Chechen leadership was not capable of restoring society. As a result Chechnia turned into a “failed state” within the Russian Federation, where no state authority could guarantee the law or the security of its citizens, and a strong terrorist component entered the Chechen conflict.
Moscow’s behavior toward Chechnia during the 1990s reflects a lack of strategy. As has been pointed out by many Russian and Western commentators Russian policy toward Chechnia early became a hostage to the struggles for political advantage, and Russian policy making was ad hoc, personalized and improvizational. A first abortive Russian effort at a military invasion of Chechnia took place after Chechnia declared its state sovereignty in November 1991. At that time President Yeltsin’s declaration of a state of emergency was quickly reversed by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and a standoff at Grozniy airport was averted when Moscow’s troops were withdrawn. After three years of passivity, Russian policy changed in 1994. Contrary to recommendations by specialists that political and economic instruments should be used in order to isolate Chechnia, Moscow opted for a policy of assassinating or overthrowing Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudaev. In spite of warnings from high-ranking Russian military officers that the use of military force would be counterproductive, Yeltsin decided to invade with military forces on 11 December, 1994.
The task of taking back control of Chechnia immediately turned out to be a more complicated task than the federal authorities had expected. After five months of heavy fighting Russian troops controlled only two-thirds of the overall territory of Chechnia and small, mobile Chechen armed groups were engaged in a guerrilla war in the south and south-east of the republic. The first war ended with the Khasaviurt ceasefire agreement, signed on 31 August, 1996. As a result Russian federal troops were withdrawn and the political status of Chechnia was to be decided in negotiations within a period of five years.
Russian policy between 1996 and 1999 was again characterized mainly by passivity. No serious negotiations on the status of Chechnia, as prescribed in the Khasaviurt agreement, took place, since both sides were stuck in their positions and were not open for compromises. Russia chose not to support the relatively moderate elected Chechen President, Aslan Maskhadov, against his more radical challengers. When Chechen terrorist and criminal activities expanded outside Chechen territory after 1996, the Russian federal authorities left it to the local authorities of Russian regions and republics to respond to the new threats to their security emanating from Chechnia. At the beginning of 1999 the federal authorities started to strengthen the administrative border of Chechnia. However, the intrusion by Chechen rebels 1999 into Daghestan in August, supported by local Daghestani Islamists, created a completely new political situation.
Vladimir Putin came on the scene as part of the struggle for power in Moscow. His determined military campaign against Chechnia, initiated in September 1999, lacked a clear strategy as pointed out by………………….
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