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THE POWER STRUCTURES AND THE MASS MEDIA DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN KAZAKHSTANRozlana TAUKINA
Rozlana Taukina, Correspondent on Kazakhstan for the newspaper Associated Press, and president of the Central Asian Independent Mass Media Association
On the eve of the parliamentary elections in 1999, it was essentially impossible to register any new print media in Kazakhstan which were intended to become a tribune for potential deputy candidates. Isolated private advertising publications, which obtained certification from the Ministry of Information and Public Consent, were subjected to tough bureaucratic probing to verify their loyalty to the existing authorities. Therefore, no publications of any substance have appeared, and the opening of new television companies or radio stations has ceased altogether. For two months before the election race, the parliament, under pressure from the government and president, hurriedly adopted a new law on the mass media. The minister himself, A. Sarsenbaev, believes the law to be “very democratic,” but this is in truth far from the case.
Of course, the most scandalous article was removed from the law, which gave the Ministry of Information and Public Consent the right to close any mass media agency at its own discretion. But this concession does not mean a thing, since recent practice shows that any publication can be closed whenever necessary on the basis of a biased court decision. The law contains a great many controversial and ambiguous articles. We will not discuss all its shortcomings, but one significant detail deserves mention: Art 3 of the Law on the Mass Media says, “Legislation on mass media shall be based on the Republic of Kazakhstan Constitution, shall consist of this law and other legal acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan.” This loophole, which exists in most of Kazakhstan’s laws, gives government officials the right to issue any number of orders, decrees, or resolutions they want in order to regulate not only the mass media, but anything they consider needs a firm hand. So it does not surprise anyone that another law has appeared in defiance of Art 2 of the Law on the Mass Media, which permits freedom of speech, etc., which prohibits any discussion in the press of the president’s health and the state of his family. The list then goes on to include certain officials, who journalists are not allowed to scrutinize until the authorities themselves permit it. Therefore, some print media note that journalists and their public organizations have concluded that this law was primarily adopted for the officials, and not for the journalists. The entire ministry can be fed on national money for writing any number of regulatory acts, but most important, on the eve of the elections, the authorities have obtained the legal right to control and put pressure on the mass media, the consequences of which are plain to see.
The Ministry of Information and Public Consent began executing this law with an audit of departmental newspapers and magazines. It closed 37 newspapers and magazines, most of which were putting out material in the languages of the ethnic groups residing in the republic. It is always easier to control a fewer number of print media, especially since the journalists working at them have begun focusing increasing attention on urgent problems and making bolder analyses of the situation and the failures in the country’s development and foreign policy.
The employees of many radio information services have also been made redundant, after a decision was adopted to drastically cut the number of these services. So now, only information from official sources is broadcast on the air. Five technicians are still working at the Karavan radio station, which now only engages in re-broadcasting programs from Russian radio.
High-ranking officials declared war on the national newspaper Nachnem s ponedelnika (with a circulation of 53,000 copies), who decided to bring eleven lawsuits against it. On 15 September, 1999, the newspaper’s director, Ramazan Iesergepov, and its editor-in-chief, Valeria Marchenko, made a political statement on this account, “Corrupted officials are taking an increasingly tough stance against the newspaper Nachnem s ponedelnika. After the article ‘Kazakhstan Must Not Become a Bandit Police State,’ all kinds of high-ranking charlatans are using the judicial power branch as a weapon of revenge. A total of eleven lawsuits have been brought against the paper, suing it for several millions of dollars... We declare our lack of confidence in the entire power system” (Nachnem s ponedelnika, No. 37(258) of 15 September, 1999).
The editorial board of Nachnem s ponedelnika has been conducting an adamant fight against corruption by publishing several malicious and acrimonious articles which, as could only have been expected, did not go down well with the officials. Based on a claim by Open Joint-Stock Company Almatymetrokurylys, the Almaty City Court issued a decision to ban the newspaper and freeze its account. The newspaper had accused the joint-stock company’s director, Ukshebaev, of large-scale embezzlement. In response, he sued the newspaper for $1,700,000. In addition, he sued the newspaper in the district court for another $350,000. And all these lawsuits are for libel. Three claims were lodged in various district courts for a total of approximately $700,000 by former head of the Almaty juridical medical experts’ examination, Nusupbaev, who, according to the newspaper, illegally sent the organs and tissues of deceased people to Germany without the permission of their relatives. The republic’s Interior Ministry has still not finished investigating the criminal case against Nusupbaev, but the newspaper is being fined in his favor. The leaders of the Kazakhstan PEN Center, who, as the newspaper wrote, squandered $500,000 allotted by President Nuruslan Nazarbaev for the development of domestic literature, sued the newspaper for $200,000. And a lawsuit in the name of the Republic of Kazakhstan Union of Judges for $350,000 takes the cake, since the newspaper never once mentioned this Union of Judges. The claim does not even indicate the specific names of the plaintiffs, which is juridical nonsense, but the district court is nevertheless deciding the claim in favor of the plaintiffs.
The use of scare tactics against independent newspapers and putting pressure on them if they publish scandalous information is becoming the norm in provincial cities where there is a great deal of tyranny. So it is no accident that most print media, newspapers, and television companies have been forced to make compromises.
The incident involving RIK radio station and Serik Medetbekov, who was its president for five years, came as no surprise to anyone. RIK is one of the radio stations remaining on the air after an unfair and illegal tender in 1997, when 30 television and radio companies were closed in Kazakhstan. The radio station was registered exclusively as a music station with no political programs. According to the conditions of the tender, Medetbekov paid a lump sum of more than $30,000 for the frequency, followed by an annual fee of $1,500 for the airwaves he occupied, not including all the other expenditures.
Six months after the tender, General Director of TV Media Holding Company Artem Iarikov offered to service RIK’s advertising field, then transmit Russian Radio from Moscow. The TV Media Holding Company includes most of Almaty’s television companies and radio stations, whereby many of them are national. Dariga Nazarbaeva is the official director of the holding company. When RIK began acquiring a significant profit, the directors of the holding company simply decided to take the radio station away from Medetbekov. In order to do this, the holding company fabricated the appearance of an internal enemy, who was inundated with various threats. This heinous scheme was not long in yielding its effect. Serik Medetbekov was forced to leave his homeland, but before his departure, he managed to draw up documents to transfer his radio station to three new founders, the Central Asian Independent Mass Media Association, the Politon Independent Information Center, and the Sauranbaia Public Foundation. Thus, the first public radio station has appeared, the founders of which decided to revive such live journalistic programs as “The Open Zone” and “Opinion Pyramid.” Under the pretense of conducting technical servicing, the authorities closed the radio down for three days. A few days later, without a court case or investigation, the Ministry of Information and Public Consent clandestinely, without consulting the tender commission, re-registered the frequency license (without confiscating the license from the former owners) in the name of the Dala television plant. The latter obtained the right to broadcast on airwave 104.7 MHz, whereby Dala did not pay either the lump sum, or the annual fee for use of this frequency. As a result, a public radio station was stolen right from under everyone’s nose with the help of the state power structures, but reporting any information on this incident was categorically banned, and the courts refused for a long time to accept any claims on this account.
Editor of the oppositionist newspaper 21 Vek B. Gabdullin, did not hide his desire to occupy a parliamentary seat in the near future. This is probably why Gabdullin was discredited in the eyes of the population. On 21 July of last year, a video tape of dubious origin was shown on KTK, a channel which belongs to the notorious TV Media holding company and carries out orders from the authorities, in which the editor of 21 Vek was receiving cash from someone. No one would have thought twice about a private newspaper receiving money, but the statements made by the commentator made television viewers think that oppositionist Gabdullin was receiving money from employees of the national security committee. This attempt to blacken the name of a potential candidate to a parliamentary post and at the same time sow seeds of doubt in the minds of party colleagues did not succeed. Journalists and the public immediately smelled a mouse, and when the facts were checked into, they could not be confirmed.
The republic’s print media can mainly be divided into three groups: pro-government, oppositionist, and neutral.
On the eve of the parliamentary elections, the weekly total circulation of pro-government newspapers exceeded one million copies. And the weekly total circulation, conventionally speaking, of neutral newspapers amounted to a little more than three hundred thousand copies. The weekly total circulation of oppositionist and allied newspapers was about one hundred thousand copies. This ratio graphically shows the unequal opportunities of deputy candidates.
In Kazakhstan, there are influential groups and individuals who control the press. These are primarily the president’s relatives and his close aides. In addition, there are representatives of the oil, tax, and commercial structures, who have ties with the president’s family. They control several television companies, and are the directors of popular newspapers and radio stations.
Mr. Mashkevich controls several isolated publications founded by various financial groups. Akezhan Kazhegeldin finances the oppositionist press.
In August, on the pages of Kazakhstan’s newspapers and magazines, there were no prominent articles about the deputy candidates. Against this background, a report on how the US Congress Human Rights Commission had a negative opinion of the situation in Kazakhstan made a particular impression. Only the neutral newspapers Vremia po and Nachnem s ponedelnika were bold enough to publish this report. Official sources tried to clamp down on this information by throwing several pointed remarks at Pokolenie leader Irina Savostina, who spoke before the US Congress. No one batted an eyelid at the ridiculous statement by Kabaziev (one of the leaders of the Working Movement) that Savostina was a CIA agent and had received remuneration from America in gold ingots. Irina Savostina presented a report before the Congress on the status of pensioners in Kazakhstan.
In September, the situation changed. Political parties began engaging in intensified propaganda efforts. The most active was the Civilian Party of Kazakhstan (CPK).
The newspapers Express K, Kazakhstanskaia pravda, Panorama, Delovaia nedelia, etc., published a lot of articles about this party. In addition, programs were shown on all the TV channels about how the CPK was helping various groups of the population. In one of these programs, the party members were unloading refrigerators, televisions, audio and video equipment, tape recorders, musical instruments, sports equipment, and building material at the Chundzhun frontier post for a contingent of border guards. The party members gave presents to ambulance crews, war veterans, and invalids. At the end of September, several articles criticizing the CPK appeared in the press by the leaders of other political parties. In his statement in Panorama of 1 October, 1999, Nikolai Drozd accused the Civilian Party of violating election legislation. The author, referring to information obtained from G. Abilsiitov, said that the Civilian Party had already spent 1 million dollars during the election campaign, while, according to the legislation, “parties were allowed to spend no more than $300,000.”
The power party, Otan, also took active part in the election advertising marathon.
The entire national press, as well as private print media with ties to the presidential family’s empire, were full of reports on the successes of the Otan Party and Civilian Party.
At the same time, the power party was subjected to very harsh criticism in the oppositionist and neutral press. The newspapers, 21 Vek, Nachnem s ponedelnika, Panorama, etc. published several critical articles on the actions of this party. Articles were printed in the newspapers Soldat, 21 Vek, and 451o po Farengeitu on the Kazakhstan Republican People’s Party. This party attracted the interest of journalists by its extreme radicalism and open provocation of the current authorities. The party leader is ex-premier Akezhan Kazhegeldin. In the press, there were lively discussions about the possibilities of registering the KRPP’s party list, which included, among others, leader Akezhan Kazhegeldin, who has two administrative violations for participation in the For Honest Elections movement. Madel Ismailov also featured on this list, who spent one year in prison for offending the president’s honor and dignity. To crown the election marathon, the population received information about KRPP leader Kazhegeldin being detained at Moscow airport on an accusation by Kazakhstan Prosecutor General Iu. Khitrin.
In Almaty, members of the KRPP organized a picket at the Russian embassy, where three activists were placed under arrest for several days. The mass media took great satisfaction in relating these events. Essentially, the authorities have created an image campaign for the KRPP with their own hands, by giving it the aura of a persecuted party. For less than two weeks before the elections to the Majlis, the Kazakhstan Republican People’s Party voluntary left the race, stating that it was removing its candidacy from the elections by party list in order to “boycott the elections.”
A total of three articles appeared in the press about the Agrarian party, “The Union of Women’s Organizations May Help Political Allies to Attract Female Voters to the Elections” (Panorama of 20 August, 1999); “The Leaders of the Agrarian Party are Placing Their Stakes on the Rural Population” (Panorama of 8 October, 1999); and “The APK: Introduction of Private Land Ownership Is Premature and a Danger to Society” (Kazakhstanskaia pravda of 10 September, 1999). This party most likely focused mainly on provincial publications and material printed in the Kazakh language in its advertising activity. The same number of articles was published about the Communist Party. Serikbolsyn Abdildin, the leader of this party, maintains that the authorities are preventing the appearance of articles about the Communist Party in the media, since the party is very popular. A few articles appeared about the Kazakhstan People’s Congress Party. All the other parties were essentially beyond the electorate’s field of view.
If we recall that the Otan Party and Civilian Party spent a vast amount of money on conducting their election campaign in the mass media, as well as on charity work, we cannot help but wonder if the Central Elections Commission has objective information on the amount of money spent by these parties during the election campaign. And whether it has been following the entire advertising campaign during the election period. Will parties who exceeded the limit be brought to court?
Delovaia nedelia of 1 October, 1999, wrote, “Our prediction came to pass, truly independent mass media were again unable to earn money on political advertisements to the same extent as the Russian. The main percentage of funds (including budget) went to official and pseudo-independent mass media controlled by the oligarchs.” Such newspapers as 21 Vek, Nachnem s ponedelnika, 451o po Farengeitu, Panorama, and Vremia po were unable to improve their financial affairs. This is happening because neutral and oppositionist print media are not included in the distributive income system, which is becoming an increasingly important part of our daily lives.
During the election campaign, political parties spent $974,102 on advertising television clips alone. Parties and candidates spent a total of tens of millions of dollars on the election campaign.
There was an active struggle among self-nominated candidates and those nominated by parties, trade unions, and youth organizations in one-mandate districts. A total of more than 580 candidates were nominated for 67 seats. On 1 October, 1999, Delovaia nedelia wrote about these candidates as follows: “The candidates are making a lot of promises... But the closer it gets to the elections, the more tarnished these magnanimous promises become around the edges, which for the most part are all identical and conventional... The candidates for deputy are all essentially carbon copies of each other, spewing out the same trite statements about stability, peace in the home and in our hearts, anything but real plans and workable systems which can raise the standard of living. There is essentially no one to choose from. The candidates often create the impression that they do not understand themselves what they are saying in front of the television camera. We are certain that those from this homogenous mass who are elected to parliament will forget about the voters the very next day and will not lift a finger for us.”
In most of the election districts, eight, and in the southern capital 15-16, candidates rivaled for one seat. It was difficult for the ordinary voter to find his bearings among such a large number of contenders. Analytical articles and commentaries with comparative analyses of the platforms and programs offered disappeared from the press. The population had to content itself with the declarations of the candidates themselves, being deprived of any other source of information. The absence of critical information made the voter’s choice dependent on the degree and frequency to which he was influenced by a particular candidate’s advertising. Advertising clips on television cost the candidates an average of one to three thousand dollars, which far from every contender could afford.
Twenty candidates alone, who were balloting in the districts of Almaty and the Almaty Region, invested $420,662 in the advertising business. Whereby the budget of Mr. Omarov, a member of the Otan Party, exceeded the permitted limit set forth by the Law on Elections five-fold. A deputy of the previous convocation, A. Batalov, also ignored the laws by exceeding the expenditure ceiling 3.5-fold. Nor was well-known businessman I. Alimzhanov stingy with the money he invested in his victory, his budget also exceeded the norm stipulated by the law three-fold. It was revealed that self-nominated candidates Fedoseev, L. Baiseitova, Utin, Abylkasymov, and K. Moldakhmetov, as well as those listed above, did not particularly bother themselves with observing the set limit.
During the elections, a new method for evaluating the candidate’s capabilities was used for the first time, debates organized and conducted on the initiative of the Central Asian Independent Mass Media Association. In an article “Public Debates for Deputy Candidates Are Becoming an Everyday Event in the Country’s Political Life” in the newspaper Panorama of 1 October, 1999, Iaroslav Rasumov noted, “In contrast to previous undertakings of this kind, these debates were close to the real thing, rather than a contest of wits and resourcefulness, possibly because they were not held for a student auditorium. The debate topics were traditional, covering a broad range of the country’s current problems, although there were also some original elements...”
By comparing the candidates’ arguments and programs, the voters had the opportunity to determine their sympathies. The debates demonstrated the abilities of the contenders as public politicians. They revealed those who were relying only on themselves and truly had the desire to make changes in the life of the country. The oppositionist representatives and independent self-nominated candidates fell into this category. Many of those nominated by the authorities avoided participation in the debates for various reasons. It is characteristic that current deputies Raisa Sher and Sharip Omarov, Otan Party members Bergimbaeva and M. Ospanov, former labor minister Krepak, leader of the For Kazakhstan’s Future movement M. Raganin, and several others refused to participate in the debates. A notable phenomenon were the extra-time live television debates between party leaders. As it was explained later, the Central Elections Commission paid quite a large amount of money to organize these television debates, whereby spending a great deal of time persuading the national television directors. The newspaper Delovaia nedelia of 8 October, 1999, described this event as follows, “On the whole, the television debates resulted in something the organizers could hardly have predicted. It became clear to the viewers that the Communists constitute the only real opposition in the country today. The Communist Party was represented by dynamic Serikbolsyn Abdildin, whose statements were brief and to-the-point, and expressed respect for the interests of the ordinary people. All the other parties did not fair so well under the television lie detector. It is a pity that the Republican People’s Party and its leader Akezhan Kazhegeldin were absent, since he would have looked quite effective paired against Mr. Abdildin, and the debates themselves would have been all the more authentic...”
It was these figures who became the main target of opposition from the local authorities and administrative agencies. They passed on these directives to the district election commissions. As a result, there was a mass falsification of the election results throughout Kazakhstan.
Only this can explain the appearance of the large amount of articles criticizing the elections in such newspapers as Panorama, Delovaia nedelia, Express K, etc.
The broadcasting of all Russian television channels throughout the republic was cancelled for two days. This was because of the discussion in the Russian press of Nazarbaev’s Swiss bank accounts. The Kazakhstan authorities decided to protect the population from such touchy information.
Representatives of political parties, public movements, human rights organizations, and non-government organizations held a forum to present a political evaluation of the elections in Kazakhstan. The democratic community demanded that the elections be considered invalid and criminal proceedings be instituted against the Central Elections Commission and the leaders of the election commissions at all levels. The information and reports presented at the forum were published in the press.
I would like to close this review with a quote from the front page of Delovaia nedelia of 5 November, 1999. “If the elections were illegitimate, it would be best to admit this sad fact and schedule new ones... It is already clear that the new parliament has no intention of doing anything to help the people. A few days ago, many of the old members of the new parliament voted with no qualms in favor of canceling benefits for the people of Semipalatinsk and Aralsk, as well as abolishing other social benefits. The parliament today serves the government, and not the people, and for this reason its presence or absence on the political arena is of no particular significance.”
The opinion is widespread in Kazakhstan society that the state has renounced the democratic reforms and, by crudely falsifying the results of the elections to the senate and Majlis, creating an information vacuum, and introducing customs duties on all newspapers and magazines coming into the republic, is trying to establish an authoritarian regime and police state. People fear that harsh repression of the opposition and the press is soon to follow.
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