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AN INCONGRUOUS WAR IN THE VALLEY OF POISON. The Religious Conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan

Orozbek MOLDALIEV

Orozbek Moldaliev, Director of the Bureau of International Trade and Security (Kyrgyzstan).

When the cold war ended and the Communist system collapsed, the international situation and global security underwent a dramatic change. New independent states appeared on the geographical map, and the world entered an era of dynamic geopolitical transformations.

The geopolitical status of Central Asia also changed, giving rise to new regional “ axes” and a variety of “ polygonal configurations.” This region has become a battle-ground on which the interests of international and regional powers continue to clash, and a new high-stake game is being played for control over the energy resources of this strategically important region located between Russia, China, and the Islamic world. But not every state, military-political, or financial power has enough economic potential to establish its influence in the region. For this reason, some of them are choosing less civilized and more dangerous methods to achieve their goals, including under the cover of Islamic slogans.

When Kyrgyzstan achieved its independence, it obtained new opportunities for choosing its own model of development. It also faced difficult problems, which required ingenious solutions. One of these was the problem of guaranteeing the republic’s national security.

At the initial stage of independence, many Kyrgyz believed that the conditions of the new, post-confrontational world would allow the “ island of democracy” to significantly reduce (even eliminate) its armed forces in order to use the freed resources to resolve the country’s economic problems. Other experts agreed with this opinion, but on the grounds that Kyrgyzstan was not in a position to counteract any hypothetical external aggression from its powerful neighbors. In so doing, they all ignored the fact that significant regional, inter-state and internal problems exist in the world, which, if aggravated, could escalate into ethnic, religious, inter-clan, and regional clashes and armed conflicts.

At present, the threat to security is acquiring global dimensions; mass population migration, the illegal shipment of drugs and weapons, the dissemination of nuclear technology, international terrorism, and ecological disasters are devaluating customary ideas about the state and its security, national interests, national values, and priorities.

Most of those analyzing the problems of security and stability in the region agree that a threat is being created in Central Asia by radical Islamicizers, who have their own understanding of the new world order based on a distorted interpretation of the theory of jihad... Islamic extremists reject the principle of resolving disputes and conflicts by negotiation, consensus, or peaceful settlement. They claim that peaceful interrelations are only possible after all pro-western regimes have been overturned and an Islamic state created along the lines of the caliphate during the era of the first four righteous caliphs, which was based on the Shari‘a.

Some political scientists believe that should Central Asia become a hotbed of Islamic extremism, it will find itself in the zone occupied by Muslim-Christian and Confucian civilizations. Some countries and international centers of Islamic radicalism not only want to see the countries of Central Asia under green banners, but are making specific, goal-oriented efforts to re-Islamize the countries of the region according to the conception of an “ Islamic state.” But Central Asia is oriented toward a secular course of development. The clash between these two trends has raised the conflict potential in the region. This is confirmed by the civil war in Tajikistan,¹ the events of 16 February, 1999 in Tashkent, and the intrusion of Islamic extremists in August 1999 into the Batken and Chon-Alai districts of Kyrgyzstan.

In the Face of New Trials

A rare and amazing plant called bat grows on the hills in the north-east of the district center of Batken. It is unique, since when it flowers it gives off a poisonous vapor. Local residents cover the bat plants with wide bowls at this time to collect the poison as it condenses. It is used for medicinal purposes. And this area, now the most recent, seventh district of Kyrgyzstan, Batken (which literally means the site of bat), owes its name to this plant.

On 30 July, 1999, Kyrgyzstan’s President Akaev held a press conference to discuss the results of the first six months of the year. When, during a live interview, a Russian television correspondent asked him to evaluate the threat posed by Islamic extremists, he replied: “ First, I would like to note that religious extremism is a serious problem for the Central Asian region. We are right on the doorstep of unsettled and essentially uncontrollable Afghanistan. We must nip any manifestations of religious extremism and terrorism in the bud, and not allow extremists to destabilize the situation in the region. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan will work together in this direction...”

By a quirk of fate, on this particular day, Friday, 30 July, 1999, a group of armed men crossed the border from Tajikistan and showed up near the Zhyluu-Suu Water Cure Center in the Batken District of Osh Region in Kyrgyzstan.

The population settlements of Zardaly and Korgon are located on the upper reaches of the River Sokh, which originates in Kyrgyzstan, passes through the Uzbek enclave of the same name on Kyrgyz territory and runs into Uzbekistan, where it joins the Syr Darya. This route through the Batken District of Kyrgyzstan is indeed the shortest passage between the main fighters’ base in the Khait settlement in the Garm District of Tajikistan and the Fergana Region of Uzbekistan. What is more, the River Sokh is a great landmark even for someone who does not know the local terrain: the numerous rivers which run into it originate in the glaciers of the Alai mountain range, beyond which is territory controlled by the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), the historical region of Karategin with its mountainous Dzhergetal, Tavildarinsk, Tajikabad, Garm and Komsomolobad districts, inhabited mainly by a Karategin sub-group of Tajiks and partially by Dzhergetal Kyrgyz.

Just Who Are the Wahhabis?

When the Batken events began, the public community of Kyrgyzstan was interested in finding out who the fighters encroaching on Kyrgyz territory were, and what they wanted. However, long before this, information began appearing in the press which could shed some light on this question.

In 1998, President of the Boordoshtor Public Charity Foundation for the Support of Tajik Refugees K. Darmankulov told the press that “ the Wahhabis were forming a special sub-division in Garm for the purpose of attacking Uzbekistan.” He also spoke of the need to take urgent measures to intercept the efforts of these people and stated: “ We cannot hide the fact that their criminal intentions are aimed at undermining Central Asia.” ²

In October 1998, a scandal flared up in Kyrgyzstan around the detention in the town of Osh of a freight train with 16 wagons carrying ammunition from Iran. As it later became clear, the freight was meant for one of the leaders of the anti-Taliban coalition, Akhmad Shakh Masud. In May 1999, the “ Panjsher Lion” said the following on this subject: “ We deeply appreciate the efforts of the leaders of the sovereign states of Central Asia to settle the Afghan conflict. Unfortunately, the matter goes no further than purely declarative statements. The detention of a train on the territory of friendly Kyrgyzstan travelling from Iran with freight intended for Afghanistan, which was subsequently sent back from where it had come, is an eloquent example of this. We were deprived of some vital deliveries. This only gave the contingents of the Taliban movement additional motivation to escalate hostilities and come right up to the southern borders of the CIS. Do the leaders of the Central Asian countries and Russia not understand that in addition to purely declarative statements, real action is needed to stamp out the Afghan conflict? We do not need words, but specific aid, humanitarian, industrial, technological, and other. After all, the Taliban will not stop at seizing the whole of Afghanistan! They have plans to move on to Samarkand, Bukhara, and beyond. Their plans include creating a supranational radical and extremist Islamic state—the Islamic Emirate of Fergana. The leaders of the Uzbek Opposition, Tohir Yoldosh and Juma Namangani, are working actively on this at present in Mazari-Sharif, on Taliban-controlled territory. This is where the threat to Central Asian security is coming from!” ³

Akhmad Shakh Masud also stated that the extremists of the Taliban movement are undergoing training in the madrasahs and camps of Pakistan, from where they are sent to the territory of the Islamic State of Afghanistan controlled by the anti-Taliban coalition and to Central Asia, Russia, and China to conduct subversive activity.

There were also reports in the press stating that in the middle of June 1999, the home of one of the leaders of the Uzbek Opposition, Juma Namangani, came under machine-gun fire in the Garm District of Tajikistan. Namangani escaped unharmed, but two of his bodyguards were killed. Not long before this, on Namangani’s personal orders, seventeen fighters from a contingent of the Uzbek Opposition, who were supposedly intending to give themselves up to the Uzbekistan authorities and lead a peaceful lifestyle, were seized and shot.

Many people in Kyrgyzstan are also worried about whether the fighters who attacked Batken are Wahhabis. The problem is that for various reasons, including the insufficient competency of some experts, the term “ Wahhabi” has come to be synonymous with the terms “ Islamic extremist,” “ Islamic terrorist,” “ Islamist,” and “ Islamic fundamentalist.”

In Kyrgyzstan, public debates on the influence of Wahhabism on society have been going on for a long time. There are various opinions on this count. During recent years, the State Commission on Religious Affairs under the Kyrgyzstan government and the Spiritual Muslim Administration of Kyrgyzstan (SMAK) officially announced that there are no Wahhabis in Kyrgyzstan. Admittedly, in rare cases, by way of compromise, they admit their possible presence in the south of the republic, in the Osh and Dzhalal-Abad regions. The Ministry of National Security has recognized a threat to the country’s security from Wahhabis and expressed astonishment at the State Commission’s viewpoint.⁴ Press secretary to Kyrgyzstan’s President K. Imanaliev made a statement on 13 May, 1998⁵ in which he expressed concern about the appearance of “ Wahhabi missionaries” in the country. He also noted that the law-enforcement agencies should intercept any manifestations of religious extremism and terrorism.

The militants who invaded Kyrgyzstan are usually called “ Wahhabis” or “ Islamic fundamentalists” in the press. In an interview with the government newspaper Kyrgyz Tuusu of 15 October, 1999, General A. Chotbaev said: “ ...they are terrorists, bandits with Wahhabi ideas and way of thinking.” The imam of the Ton District of Issyk-Kul Region Zh. Koichumanov believes the action of the militants to be incompatible with the Shari‘a and calls them misguided.

The opinions of those analyzing the problems of Central Asia also diverge. Department Head of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies Rashid Karimov notes that in Namangan and Andizhan “ since the beginning of the 1990s, Saudi Arabian Wahhabis have been setting up Islamic schools along the lines of totalitarian sects and investing Saudi Arabian money in them in order to create organized Islamic opposition in the Wahhabi-Taliban style. .....Therefore, the Uzbekistan leadership is not only interested in stopping the encouragement of Islam, but also introducing certain repressive measures with respect to Islamic organizations and the Muslim clergy.” ⁶

Another point of view is expressed by a Russian journalist and employee of the Human Rights Information Center in Central Asia, V. Ponomarev. He claims that representatives of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, particularly members of the Adolat movement from Namangan, are in strained relations with the local Wahhabis.

The followers of the Islamic Taliban movement are often also called Wahhabis, although they are Sunnis of the Hanafi school. This is confirmed by Afghan refugees in Kyrgyzstan, who occupied important posts in their homeland. In our opinion, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan Burkhanuddin Rabbani expressed himself sufficiently clearly on this account, when he said: “ There are definitely Wahhabis in Afghanistan. But compared with the Taliban, they do not have any particular power or influence.” ⁷

As of today, Islamic radicals have made substantial progress in Afghanistan. After gaining control of Kabul and approximately 90 percent of the country’s territory, they are currently engaged in an ongoing struggle with the northern alliance. Islamic radicals are united in their belief that anything alien to Islamic traditions, and anything that could destroy this religion and undermine the foundations of the life of its people must be fought against. According to the radical conception of “ The Muslim Era,” true Muslims should join together in a jamaat (community), which exists beyond the jurisdiction of the state, and should expand its influence and supporters in order to conduct a struggle to overthrow any power which does not please them with every available means. In so doing, this conception permits, along with parliamentary methods, mass terror, pressure on clan leaders and officials, as well as armed intervention as ways of seizing power.

The aim of Islamic extremists is always the same—to overthrow any power they find disagreeable and establish the norms of the Shari‘a. The era of Islam, which they profess, is attracting an increasingly large number of disillusioned young people. The difficulties encountered during the transition period in the region, particularly the economic crisis, the stratification of society according to material wealth, and the increase in corruption are causing people to doubt the correctness of the democratic course, which the Islamic fundamentalists are skillfully using to their own advantage.

The religious fanatics who invaded Kyrgyzstan are supporters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) formed by Uzbek emigres in 1995-1996. They are headed by Tohir Yoldosh (“ Farukh” ), the movement’s emir, who was born in 1968.

He frequently visits Pakistan, Afghanistan and other Islamic states to settle the movement’s financial and political questions. The military affairs of the IMU are supervised by Jumabai Khajiev, the same Juma Namangani, also born in 1968, and until recently one of the field commanders of the armed formations (“ Namangani contingent” ) of the UTO in Tajikistan. The backbone of his contingent is comprised of Uzbek Namanganis, including former members of the religious-political party Islam lashkarlari, which was crushed by the Uzbek authorities in March-April 1992. This party is the military wing of the Adolat movement.

The Appearance of Uzbek Islamic Fundamentalists in Tajikistan

The first Uzbek militants among the ranks of the Tajik Opposition appeared in 1992, when the Uzbekistan authorities began employing repressive measures against opposition parties and movements, such as Adolat, Islam lashkarlari in the Namangan Region, Adamiilik va insonparvarlik in Kokand, and also Birlik, and Erk. At that time, anyone suspected of being associated with these parties and movements was arrested. According to Uzbek human rights activists, the number of those arrested during this period reached the thousands. Admittedly, some of them were released. However, this led to the appearance of Uzbek refugees.

As an Islamic expert from Uzbekistan, B. Babadzhanov, correctly notes, “ with no experience in dealing with fundamentalists, the republic’s power and other structures traditionally tried to employ repressive measures against the imams. These measures did nothing to subdue the religious spirit of the population, and even caused the rather liberal-minded imams and ulama to turn clearly radical in protest against their unmerited treatment by the local power representatives. These and similar measures undertaken by some government agencies incited the radical wing of the Fergana fundamentalists to conspire in their activity, band together in clandestine unauthorized communities, and step up their underground and semi-legal contra-ideological efforts.” ⁸

After the religious-political group Islam lashkarlari was crushed, it was the turn of mufti Muhammad Sadik, who currently lives in Libya, and his supporters, followed by arrests of the Wahhabis. As journalist V. Ponomarev maintains:“ ...in 1998-1999, the repression of believers assumed dimensions comparable to those of Stalin’s purges during the 1930s. ...After the explosions on 16 February, the police conducted a kind of mini-census of the population, including on the list of potential Islamist terrorists all men between the ages of 18 and 35 absent from their place of permanent residence. In April, Karimov stated that the fathers of the ‘extremists’ on the wanted list would also be brought to criminal account. Through no fault of their own, tens of thousands of residents found themselves classified as ‘enemies of the state.’ A huge concentration camp is being built under the veil of extreme secrecy in remote and isolated Karakalpakstan for ‘religious extremists,’' who are sent there without visiting privileges, and from which only the dead find a ticket out.” ⁹

Reasons for the Intrusion of Militants into Kyrgyzstan

According to legend, Islam came to Kyrgyzstan through the ancient land of Batken, where the Muslim missionary, Arab Abdulla, and his brother, brought the first Muslims of the Fergana Valley to namaz. The local residents also know the place where the first preacher is buried. But today, an entirely different kind of people have come to this land...

Before the militants of the IMU invaded Kyrgyzstan, important political events took place in the country of their temporary residence, which incited them to begin committing especially dangerous state crimes on the territory of this sovereign republic. According to a plan of national reconciliation in Tajikistan, on 17 June, 1999, a protocol was signed between Rakhmonov’s government and the UTO on the disbandment and disarmament of the armed Opposition formations and removal of the ban on the activity of opposition parties and their mass media. On 3 August, 1999, the Tajik Opposition leadership announced the disbandment of their armed formations. “ The Commission on National Reconciliation calls on all those in the illegal possession of weapons to voluntarily hand them in to the authorized structures,” the Opposition statement said.

On 16 August, on the eve of the Bishkek summit of the Shanghai Five, at which it was planned to discuss problems of security in the region, President Rakhmonov held a conference attended by chairman of the Commission on National Reconciliation, UTO leader Said Abdullo Nuri, government members, and heads of the power structures. After reviewing the questions on the agenda: the illegal presence in eastern Tajikistan of more than a thousand Uzbek refugees; the voluntary surrender of weapons in the areas of former military-political confrontation before 24 August; as well as the return of Uzbek citizens temporarily residing in the Karategin zone to their permanent residence in the Republic of Uzbekistan, the conference participants made a decision regarding “ the voluntary return” of Uzbekistan citizens to their homeland, which Tashkent had recently insisted on.

By making this truly “ Solomonic” compromise, President Rakhmonov placed the special commission for resolving this problem in a difficult position and created what would seem a remediless situation for the Uzbek Islamic fundamentalists. And it was no coincidence that the commission members included representatives of the Opposition and influential field commanders, in addition to power structure employees. The point was that Uzbek Islamist militants have been living in eastern Tajikistan since 1992, i.e. on territory controlled by their comrades-in-arms, the militants of the Tajik Opposition. They fought together against the government troops, then left together for Afghanistan... And now the Namangani contingent was supposed to surrender their arms to them and “ voluntarily” return home. The war was over, the Tajik Opposition occupied new positions in the government, were forming portfolios, and setting ultimatums.

From the very beginning, many doubted the possibility of implementing this decision. First, according to the data of the UN High Commission for Refugees, there were 1,600-1,700 Uzbek citizens in Tajikistan who had fled to their neighbors to avoid arrest in their homeland, and the matter could only mean their forced expatriation. Opposition representatives maintained that the Uzbek refugees flatly refused to return to Uzbekistan, because most of their relatives had been imprisoned for no reason, and they did not doubt for a minute that their return would mean certain death. The mission of the UN High Commission for Refugees in Tajikistan was also against deporting the Uzbek oppositionists and refugees to Uzbekistan. According to its leaders, the Uzbek migrants had asked to be given the official status of refugees.

Several Opposition members suggested separating the refugees from the armed Uzbek groups, which were subject to disarmament and deportation.

However, far from all the field commanders of the Tajik Opposition agreed with this approach.

There are various opinions on why the Islamic fundamentalists invaded Kyrgyzstan. Most analysts believe that Namangani and his people are in a hopeless situation and decided to make a dash for home with their weapons in their hands.¹⁰ The main emphasis is placed on the threat to destroy the Namangani contingent. This scenario, in our opinion, seems oversimplified. (The Islamic extremists were not stamped out either on 24 August, or later. Moreover, at present in Tajikistan, conditions are begin created for the temporary transfer of Islamic extremists to Afghanistan.)

In our opinion, the Batken events cannot be viewed as an incidental phenomenon caused by implementation of the Tajik agreements. The invasion by the Islamic extremists is part of a pre-planned strategy to Islamize Central Asia. Powerful forces stand behind all this, who are not trying to hide their true aims and intentions. In May 1997, on CNN, the leader of the World Islamic Union, well-known billionaire Osama bin Laden, said that “ we are going to purge Tajikistan, and then the whole of Central Asia...”

Islamic extremists have been engaged in long and meticulous preparations to create a spring-board in the Batken District of southern Kyrgyzstan for conducting terrorist acts and diversions in Uzbekistan. They have studied the environs in advance, marked out routes, and acquired the necessary documents. In May 1999, the Islamic representatives addressed the local residents of the villages of Korgon and Zardaly, told them they were the protectors of the Muslim religion, that they were acting against the Uzbekistan authorities, and would never touch Kyrgyzstan. The militants instigated the local population to join them and found understanding among some people. And most of the residents of these remote villages earned themselves some money by selling them food. The Islamic fundamentalists paid generously for their purchases in dollars.

As Kyrgyz parliamentary deputy O. Tekebaev, public prosecutor of the Batken District R. Musaev and other officials noted, representatives of the Uzbek Islamic fundamentalists have been trying to recruit the local residents of Zardaly village since as early as May 1999, and told them that in August an armed contingent would come to this region.¹¹

The decision of the Commission on National Reconciliation in Tajikistan regarding disbandment of the Opposition armed formations did not come as a surprise to the militants of Namangani. As long-term allies of the Tajik oppositionists, the Uzbek Islamic fundamentalists naturally were aware of all the problems and decisions, since coordination of action, and exchange of information and experience is not only practiced among them, but also within the framework of the Moscow-Kazan-Grozny-Makhachkala-the Fergana Valley-Tajikistan-Afghanistan polygon.¹²

Moreover, Tajik and Uzbek Islamic fundamentalists, along with foreign radical Islam centers, have begun implementing the next step in Islamizing Central Asia.

The fighting strategy of the Islamic extremists justified itself in Tajikistan: the UTO was recognized by Rakhmonov’s government, members of the Opposition already occupy posts in the government, and a decision was made regarding holding a referendum on 26 September, 1999 to make changes in the key provisions of the Tajikistan Constitution, including on permission to form political parties on a religious basis. The Islamic fundamentalists had their sights set on achieving as much political leverage as possible at the referendum, as well as during the presidential and parliamentary elections.

They believe that the time has come to shift the active center of extremism and begin implementing the “ Tajik scenario” in Uzbekistan, in order, according to the conception of the “ Islamic state” advocated by the international Islamic radicals, to force official Tashkent to recognize the IMU as legal opposition to the authorities and begin negotiations with its leaders. For this and other purposes, some of the UTO militants were sent to inaccessible regions of eastern Tajikistan as early as June.

Fighters’ training centers and storage terminals were organized in the regions of the Karategin zone controlled by the Tajik Opposition, which were continuously supplied with weapons, ammunition, and other military hardware. In addition, these sites were supplied with the necessary financial resources for conducting their activity.

The armed invasion of the Islamic fundamentalists was not intended to start a full-scale war with Uzbekistan, as many are trying to claim, but in order to carry out the “ strategy of seizure of power” in accordance with the ideology of Islamic extremism, by conducting destabilizing terrorism, diversion, and partisan sorties. It is not difficult to imagine what these compulsory acts would have led to. The extremists would have drawn the government into a spiral of coercion, which would have undermined the formation of a legal democratic system. As a result, the process of political and economic liberalization would have been thwarted, i.e. the democratization policy would have been blocked. Naturally, the conflict would not have been restricted to the confines of one state, and the “ Afghanization” of the whole of Central Asia could have been inevitable...

The breakthrough into Uzbekistan gave the Islamic extremists the opportunity to kill several birds with one stone and clarify several questions that interested them.

Paradoxically, the invasion of Kyrgyzstan suited all the political forces in Tajikistan: the government (cooperating with official Tashkent, it made a decision, and created a special commission, i.e. did everything expected of it), and the Commission on National Reconciliation (it announced an ultimatum, but the Namanganis refused to lay down their arms, and left for their homeland).

Some people incorrectly interpret the drawn-out negotiations regarding the demands of the militants to grant them a corridor to Uzbekistan. Since they could have done this without permission from the local authorities, it can be assumed that the Islamic fundamentalists were not trying to get home.

In fact, the militants could have crossed into Uzbekistan via several routes. But the matter raised in the negotiations, as we believe, could only have concerned a permanent corridor between the Islamic fundamentalist base in the Karategin Valley of Tajikistan and the Fergana Valley for conducting regular raids into Uzbekistan with intermediate terminals on Kyrgyz territory, for which they selected the population settlements of Zardaly and Korgon. It would be impossible to invade Uzbekistan if this question were not resolved.

To be fair, it should be mentioned that there are other opinions on the reasons for the militant invasion into Kyrgyzstan. For example, some people believe that the Altyn-Zhylga area (the Golden Hollow), which is being explored by Japanese geologists, is rich in gold, and therefore the extremists wanted to claim it for themselves; moreover, one of the foreigners is an extremely wealthy man, and it might have been possible to receive a large ransom for him.

Kyrgyz government experts and several political scientists believe that the main purpose of the invasion was to establish control over the drug route which passes through Kyrgyz-Tajik territory.¹³ In fact, the region which the militants invaded is actively used by drug dealers for shipping Afghan opium and heroin. But, in contrast to railways and roads, drug traffic is not tied to the location, and drug couriers, depending on the changes in the situation, constantly change their routes. Second, in contrast to international terrorism, the drug business operates clandestinely, without attracting attention. Third, no one has been threatening this drug route, and there would be no sense in recruiting armed contingents of Islamic extremists, not to mention attracting unnecessary attention. During the many negotiations on the release of hostages, the Islamic extremists never once mentioned any indulgences on the part of the government with respect to drug transit.

Is the Dragon Coming Down into the Valley...?

The world obtained its information about the Batken events thanks to contemporary information technology; today it is possible to shed light on events in crisis and conflict zones under real time conditions.

In the village of Zardaly and its environs, time has essentially not advanced since the days when the basmach (anti-Soviet) detachments under the leadership of Kalkhoji hid in the local ravines, and the local residents were released once and for all from the threats of the Red Army soldiers of Madaminbek, by luring them into a trap...

During the years of collectivization, the local population was herded into collective farms. And they began farming. Since 1996, with the introduction into Kyrgyzstan of private land ownership, the natives of these regions began returning to the abandoned homes of their fathers, working their own land plots, and breeding cattle. Only bridle-paths lead to these parts, and all the comforts of civilization lie far beyond the mountain tops. In recent years, supporters of the “ pure faith,” “ the bearded ones,” as they call themselves, have begun coming through the high mountain passes from unsettled Tajikistan to visit them, paying hard currency for the food and products they purchase. So the local residents even found this kind of neighborliness to their advantage, and did not want to broadcast this local foreign trade channel for fear of attracting competitors.

It was not until the Islamic extremists drove the local residents from their homes, leaving some as hostages, but shooting others, that they realized just who they were dealing with.

But they were not the only hostages. The whole of Kyrgyzstan unwittingly became an indirect victim of the domestic policy problems of its neighbors.

The all-army conference of troops participating in the military action against Islamic extremists in the south of the republic held on 22 November, 1999 summarized the results of their joint activity. The Kyrgyzstan government analyzed the reasons for the mistakes that had been made and adopted important decisions, specific measures were outlined, and attention was directed to the state of the power structures as a whole, and the armed forces in particular. But it is a commonly known fact that a poor country cannot have a strong army.

The results were summarized, and the heroes awarded. May the memory of those who fell always remain in our hearts.

But there are still unanswered questions. First of all, the public has not received a definite answer to whether the Kyrgyzstan government knew about the threat to the country’s security from the Islamic extremists, and whether it would have been possible to undertake timely measures to prevent the armed invasion. If yes, then why were the appropriate measures not taken and whose fault was it; few people in Kyrgyzstan believe that Colonel General M. Subanov bears the entire brunt of the blame.

An analysis of the available facts shows that the Kyrgyzstan government did know about it, and what is more, some leading executives even accused the employees of the power structures of undermining the stability and ethnic harmony in the country. Nevertheless, in our opinion, those people making important state decisions did not have advance warning or reliable information about the specific plans and dates of a possible intrusion by Islamic extremists into Kyrgyzstan. This is indicated by the fact that when the government troops left Zardaly, the contingents of Islamic extremists were already descending the Abramov glacier.

We must agree with the military’s criticism of the executive power, which dismissed the threat of international terrorism and did not listen to the opinion of the armed forces leadership. But for some reason the military analysts are not questioning why there is not a single member of the military in the Kyrgyzstan parliament, in contrast to other CIS countries, even be he a former member, who could support the interests of the military and the Defense Department from the point of view of legislative power, particularly regarding questions of planning the military budget. They are also avoiding the subject of the coordinating role of the Kyrgyzstan Security Council in carrying out strategic planning of internal and external security, by concentrating the main attention on anti-crisis measures.

The government’s main mistake, it seems to us, lies in the fact that, first, no specific measures have been taken in the fight against international terrorism and religious extremism. Second, after 13 August, when the first hostages were released and it became clear who sovereign Kyrgyzstan was dealing with, it made sense for army sub-divisions to take up positions in Zardaly, finish the operation to destroy the Islamic extremists of the Namangani contingent, and transfer this section of the border to the supervision of the Kyrgyz border guards.

Linking the militant invasion of Batken to the withdrawal of Russian border guards from Kyrgyzstan, some authors made comments in the press, criticizing the “ short-sighted Kyrgyz bureaucrats and certain deputies” of ousting Russia from the republic. These people possibly do not know that the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, particularly in the Batken District, has never been guarded by Russian, or any other troops. They are forgetting at least two things: Islamic extremists are most active in Russia itself, where there are more than just border guards, and, second, the decision to withdraw the federal border troops into Russian territory was made unilaterally by Moscow. President Akaev was informed of this on 21 August, 1998 by Director of the Russian Federation Federal Border Service Colonel General N. Bordyuzha. The Kyrgyzstan authorities discussed this question with the Russian leadership, however, former deputy of the USSR Supreme Council from Kyrgyzstan, then Russian Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov, did not change the government decision. As for “ ousting” Russia from the region, this is happening even against Biskhek’s will, and it is the topic of a separate conversation. At present, strained relations have developed between Bishkek and Tashkent. The thing is that even before the Batken events, certain circles in Uzbekistan tried to convince the public that the main bases of the Islamic extremists, who were attempting to destabilize the situation in the Uzbek region of the Fergana Valley, were located in the border area with Kyrgyzstan.

Official Tashkent is displeased that Kyrgyzstan did not destroy the bandit group and gave it the opportunity to retreat to Tajikistan. As a result of this, the visit of Uzbekistan president to Kyrgyzstan planned for the autumn of 1999 was postponed. After the erroneous bombing by Uzbek aviation, Kyrgyzstan, in addition to the human toll, also sustained material damage of 10.5 million soms. But official Tashkent did not react to the note of protest from the Kyrgyz side. On 16 November, 1999, the Kyrgyzstan Foreign Ministry received a verbal message from the Uzbekistan Foreign Ministry, in which the Uzbek side claimed that the bandit group which committed the armed attack on the Kyrgyz villages supposedly found its way in from the Dzhalal-Abad Region of Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyzstan Foreign Ministry expressed its astonishment at this. Once again, the gas tap has been turned off, which means Kyrgyzstan will sustain even more losses.

“ Use a friend to remove an enemy, but don’t employ force yourself,” says an old Chinese stratagem. Tashkent’s desire to destroy the Islamic extremists with the help of Kyrgyzstan is quite understandable. But independent military analysts (not only from Kyrgyzstan) believe that the military-political leadership of Kyrgyzstan made the right decision.

Batken subjected the strength of the unions and international organizations to which Kyrgyzstan belongs, as well as its relations with its neighbors, to a severe test. The member-states of the Agreement on Collective Security, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Russia, rendered significant military and technical aid. A joint headquarters of member-states of the Agreement on Collective Security went into operation in Bishkek, and permanent contact was sustained with Uzbekistan. Particular concern and willingness to help was expressed by essentially all the public and political forces of neighboring Kazakhstan, primarily, Orleu and Otan, which called for action, rather than playing the waiting game.

The countries of the Shanghai Five, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, also condemned international terrorism and rendered moral and material aid. Beijing acted in the most efficient way by immediately delivering the necessary military hardware in three special shipments.

Batken showed yet again that the principle of border transparency between the CIS member-states and Central Asian Union has seen its day, it is being successfully taken advantage of by international terrorists, smugglers, and drug dealers...

^{1 Mezhtadzhikskii konflikt: put' k miru, Collection, RAN and Shark IATs (Dushanbe), Moscow, 1998, p. 30.
^{2 Ordo, No. 1(16), 1998.
^{3 V kontse nedeli, 14 May, 1999.
^{4 Asaba, 12 Dec., 1997; 9 Jan., 1998; Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 19 and 20 Dec., 1997; 16-17 Jan., 1998.
^{5 Vechernii Bishkek, 14 May, 1998.
^{6 Centralnaja Azija i Kavkaz, No. 3(4), 1999, pp. 46-47.
^{7 Utro Bishkeka, 16 June, 1999.

^{8 Centralnaja Azija i Kavkaz, No. 4(5), 1999, p. 128.
^{9 V. Ponomarev, Ugroza islamskogo ekstremizma v Uzbekistane. Bulletin, POLITON Independent Information Agency (Kazakhstan), 5 October, 1999, pp. 29-30.
^{10 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
^{11 Asaba, 3 Sept., 1999.
^{12 D. Trofimov, Tsentralnaia Aziia: problemy etno-konfessionalnogo razvitiia, MGIMO, Moscow, 1994.
^{13 Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 23 Nov., 1999.}}}}}}}}}}}}}