THE PROSPECTS

The civil war in Tajikistan has had a most adverse effect on the prospects of the Republic's independent development. It has hurled Tajikistan back economically, socially and culturally, and has further undermined the precarious relations between different parts of the country. There is no denying that Tajikistan has practically been pushed back to the stage of semi-feudal relations. Many of the larger and smaller areas are ruled by regional law, execised by various armed groups. This, incidentally, is the salient feature of many conflicts of the post-communist period. Whatever form they assume (inter-ethnic or quasi inter-ethnic), their true source is the struggle waged by the new elites, whom the totalitarian regimes prevent from rising to the top, for control over territories, property, natural resources, etc.

For a fragmented country like Tajikistan, the division of spheres of economic and political influence may spell an all-out national disaster, should the North opt for a  1de fac-1to 0 secession from the unruly and impoverished southern regions, leaving them to the mercy of fate.

The task of Tajikistan's regional consolidation involves not only the achievement of a settlement between the government and the opposition, but also fairer power sharing among various internal forces which are not part of the opposition outside the country. The present government has earned the disapproval of everyone - the North, the local Uzbeks, the highland Tajiks - but each of these forces has its own vision of its role in the country's future political structure and aspires to reach its own goals which do not at all coincide with those of the other opposition-minded groups. The peace-keeping and frontier forces, too, have become aware of their own interests, which adds to the complexity of the task of achieving stabilization.

The formation of a coalition government might to a certain extent mitigate the piled-up contradictions. The longer this process is drawn up, the greater the risk that the changing situation on the ground will impose its own rules of conduct on the goverment and the UTO. Some observers believe that even today the government ministers who hail from Leninabad Region are acting on Abdullajanov's command.

The Tajiks conflict, morover, is kept alive by outside forces. It is also linked to some extent to the Afghan conflict. The mujaheddin, who are dominated by Islamist ideas, fight on the opposition's side and live by warfare, are hardly likely to be deterred by political agreements between the government and the opposition. These are also certain groups whose permanent economic interests depend on maintaining the tensions, which facilitate the drugs traffic, keep the arms trade alive, etc.

Last but not least, the Agreement on Peace and National Accord signifies not the end of the road, but merely marks a new starting point. The economic rebirth of the country with the concomitant economic reforms will require outlays on a huge scale, which may not be available, and this would make for continuing social tensions. An aggravating factor is that the country will soon have a generation of illiterates or semi-literates. Children have no chance of attending secondary school, not to speak of receiving a higher education. There is no money to pay the teachers' salaries, no textbooks, no resources to keep the schools going. The impoverished condition of the people has given rise to a characteristing Third World phenomenon, when children become the main earners in marginalized families. The immense task of modernizing the country can not be solved without a large number or trained local personnel.

Realistically speaking, there can only be a settlement, guaranteed by outside forces, which would also be prepared to contribute to the economic revival of Tajikistan. It appears that nowdays no one can afford to assume a burden of such enormous weight.

References

  • Olivier Roy. Le conflict du Tadjikistan est-il un modele des conflicts d'Asie Centrale? Le Tadjikistan a l'epreuve de l'independance. Sous la direction de Mohammed-Reza Djalili et Frederic Grare. Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales. Geneve, 1995, pp.161-162.

  • Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 4, 1996

  • V.I.Bushkov, D.V.Mikulsky. Tajikistan: chto proiskhodit v respublike? / Tajikistan: What Is Happening in the Republic?/. 1992, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow, 1993, pp.25-26

  • Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. The Bloody Path of Change: The Case of Post-Soviet Tajikistan. The Harriman Institute Forum, July 1993, vol.6, No.11, p.6.

  • Shirin Akiner. The Struggle for Identity. In: After Empire: The Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia. Ed. by Jed C. Snyder. National Defence University Press< Ft. McNair, Washington D.C, 1995, p.21

  • Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 18, 1992

  • Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 2, 1995

  • G.Khaidarov, M.Imomov. Tajikistan. Tragediya i bol naroda / Tajikistan: the Tragedy and Pain of a Nation/. Dushanbe, 1993, p.72

  • Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 19, 1994

  • Document S/1994/893. Quoted from: Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 14, 1994

  • Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 2, 1995

  • Op. cit., November 9, 1994

  • Op. cit., February 22, 1995

  • Sadoi mardum, March 12, 1995

  • Itar-Tass, Interfax, January 5, 1997

  • Nezavisimaya gazeta, January 21, 1997

  • Sadoi mardum, September 21, 1996; Vecherniye vesti, September 26, 1996

  • Itar-Tass, June 27, 1997 Prism, July 11, 1997. The Jamestown Foundation, Vol.III, No.11, Part 2)
 
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