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THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

Negotiations aimed at a settlement of the inter-Tajik crisis got off to a start in a far from propitious climate. On the one hand, the government maintained its negative stand on holding any talks with the opposition, which they presumed to have been crushed; political contacts with it were therefore regarded as an unwarranted concession. On the other hand, the military outcome of the civil war, far from resolving a single issue, had merely served to create new ones. The uninterrupted military tension along the border and the activities of the opposition groupings within the country hindered any dependable stabilization. The tipping of the scales in favour of the Kulyab clan provoked discontent all over the country - eventually even among Kulyab's former allies: Leninabad Region and the Uzbek community, which came to realize that they had been deprived of their share of decision-making and economic control. The continued tensions in Tajikistan could not but cause concern outside the country, above all in Russia and Uzbekistan, which came to doubt whether Emomali Rakhmonov and his command were really able to restore order. Negotiations started under outside pressure, they did not stem from the conflicting sides' will to look for compromise solutions.
The first round of the official inter-Tajik talks was held in Moscow in April 1994 under the aegis of the United Nations. It was attended by the representatives of Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Thus from the very beginning the negotiations were set in a wide international context which, one could hope, would impel both sides to agree to compromise.
The talks were held around three sets of issues: the refugee problem; cessation of hostilities and disarmament; the political future of Tajikistan. Despite acute controversies around the two former issues, certain minor steps were undertaken. (Thousands of refugees were able to return to their abandoned homes; cease-fire agreements, even though continously violated, were signed).
The key issue which is of paramount concern for both sides is that of power sharing. In fact, the negotiations revolve around this very issue, while the rest remains of subordinate nature. As soon as the armed conflict was over it transpired that a more fair division of power among the country's regions was a major prerequsite for restoring stability. In November 1992, when the country was ravaged by the civil war, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev came up with the initiative of creating a State Council in Tajikis- tan, which would include representative from all regions on a parity basis.(9)
The proposal reflected the search for a mechanism to represent all regions in the administrative structures, but the climate for the promotion of such far-reaching political initiatives was far from propitious. The Russian Foreign Ministry may have supposed that while the question of power was not yet definitively settled, it would be easier to reach a compromise solution. In fact the Leninabad-Kulyab bloc was not interested in resolving the conflict: it was out to put an end to the opposition once and for all.
Yet the task of setting up an organ capable of providing a more smooth transition to the even-handed representation of regions and political forces has remained a crucial issue at every stage of the negotiations - and one that inevitably causes the hardest debates.
At the first round of the talks, held in Moscow, the issue was put forward by the opposition, which proposed the creation of a Council of National Accord (CNA). It was to be set up by the conflicting sides on a parity basis for the duration of no more than two years and given the right to make legislative proposals. This Council of National Accord was expected to form a provisional government of competent neutral people. The opposition's idea was that the Council should adopt a new Constitution and organize democratic multi-party elections.
The idea of a transition period had a certain logic. Theoretically, it could provide for a relatively smooth transition to power sharing, leaving enough time for drawing up and ratifying a new Constitution, the necessity of which was recognized by both sides. However, in practical terms it had some extremely sensitive aspects: it required the dismissal of the existing government from the political arena and its replacement with a very amotphous structure.
As the negotiations proceeded, the platforms of the sides were bound to be modified. This applies both to the conflict participants and the outside forces. Contacts between the government and the opposition began to cover a wider range of issues despite the persisting political restraints. The talks reached a new high when Rakhmonov and Nuri (leader of the United Tajik Opposition) held face-to-face negotiations (previously the two sides were represented by lower-ranking figures). Since May 1995 Rakhmonov and Nuri have signed several documents concerning the format of the negotiations and the substance of the settlement.
There was an internal factor which to some extent facilitated Rakhmonov's contact with Nuri: the efforts made by the former to legitimize his regime. The 19th session of the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet (July 20-21, 1994) approved the holding of a referendum on a new Constitution and presidential elections in September 1994. For the opposition, these measures could amount to its final dismissal from all participation in the country's political life. It therefore heightened its military activities along the border and staged more acts of terrorism and sabotage inside the country.
In view of the sharp deterioration of the situation the UN General Secretary, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, submitted a report to the Security Council, which said in particular: "Be- cause this situation has emerged, I have had to review the expediency of continuing the preparations for the third round of negotiations in Islamabad at this stage." (10)
International pressure proved to be of some effect. The elections and the referendum were postponed until November 1994, and the Islamabad round of talks did take place in October 1994. A protocol on a joint commission for the implementation of the temporary cease-fire agreement was signed and a joint communique was issued, but disagreements concerning the political issues merely increased.
According to the opposition, the conditions imperative for its participation in the referendum and the elections had not been provided. Its members believed that elections could be held only after the achievement of national reconciliation. True enough, activities by the political parties in opposition were banned in the Republic; the opposition had no access to the media and thousands of refugees still remained outside the country.
The government, however, was not able to put off the elections and the referendum much longer. The deadline for the powers of the old Soviet parliament was out at the end of March 1995. (11) In the event of a further postponement of elections the country might be left 1 0de jure and 1 0de facto without a legislative body.
And so the presidential elections in Tajikistan were held as scheduled - in November 1994. Emamoli Rakhmonov was challenged by Abdumalik Abdullajanov, Tajikistan's ambassador to Russia and former prime minister, a native of Leninabad Region. He was officially registered as a presidential candidate after much procrastination; on the day following the elections Abdullajanov's team issued a protest against "numerous cases of falsification". Rakhmonov emerged victorious. Moscow considered him a safer bet since he could ensure the continuity of leadership; if Abdullajanov, who did not control the power structures, had been elected, a new military confrontation would have been on the cards.
In his turn, Rakhmonov gave assurances that after the elections he would be able to get rid of the most sinister figures at various levels of the country's administration. In his electioneering leaflet he promised that as president he "would purge the local and central government agencies, the courts, the public prosecutors' offices, the police, the customs and tax services and other agencies, dismissing those who compromise the authorities in the eyes of the people." (12)
Rakhmonov's scope for action in this respect should not be overestimated: it would be a hard task for him to encroach on the positions of his Popular Front allies, who had helped him to win power and subsequently had taken up many administrative posts. Yet many politicians in Tajikistan and other CIS countries voiced their hopes that Rakhmonov would at least be able to exercise control over the Ministry of the Interior.
Parliamentary elections were held in Tajikistan in February 1995. Zafar Saidov, head of a Foreign Ministry department, had previously declared that the authorities would be prepared to postpone the elections for a few months should the opposition express an interest in them, (13) but the mechanism enabling the non-grata opposition leaders to participate in them remained unclear. Moreover, the opposition leaders gave no signs of their willingness to play some part in the election process. They believed that this would be possible only after the resumption of free activities by all the banned parties (first of all, the Democratic Party and the Party of Islamic Revival of Tajikistan) and the reappearance of the free press. The proposal that the Democratic Party should be registered did not draw any response from its leaders at the time.
The ruling circles made some attempts to give the elections and the referendum on the Constitution a more democratic tenor by enabling some refugees to vote. Polling stations were set up in Moscow, Minsk, Alma-Ata, Tashkent, Bishkek, Ashkhabad and a number of towns in Iran and Afghanistan. According to official figures, a total of 2,179 people living outside Tajikistan took part in the referendum.
At the same time the Tajik leadership decided to make regional representation in the Majlisi Oli (the Supreme Soviet) more balanced. Safarali Rajabov, a native of the Garm group of regions, was elected the Majlisi chairman. (14)
Refusing to recognize both the presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as the new constitution passed by the referendum, the opposition continued to demand the setting up of a Council of National Accord to act during a transition period. The Council would be in charge of the power, structures the Radio and Television Committee and the Public Prosecutor's Office; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations would be under the twin control of the Council and the government.
It can be seen that the Council as visualized by the opposition was to assume all the key functions of the state, leaving almost nothing to the government. This option was obviously out of the question for the Dushanbe authorities, which had already won diplomatic recognition by many states.
A compromise solution based on the creation of an organ which would actually replace the existing government was a hopeless proposition.
Nevertheless, the legitimization of Rakhmonov's regime formally put its participation in the power-sharing negotiations on a more secure political footing.
In addition to internal factors, the negotiations were sustained by strong international pressure. Continuing instability in Tajikistan exposed Russia's inability to secure a peaceful settlement despite its military involvement. This was detrimental to Russia's prestige both in Central Asia and other post-Soviet territories, putting question mark over its claim to leadership in the CIS and its competence as an intermediary in situations of conflict.
Unable to find a common language with the Tajik leaders, Tashkent displayed a growing interest in their replacement with members of the Leninabad clan, who had closer ties with Uzbekistan. To exert pressure on Dushanbe, the Uzbek regime went to the length of playing host to the leaders of the United Tajik Opposition. This was not a case of Tashkent changing its negative stance vis-a-vis the opposition, but an attempt to draw on its support in promoting a "third force" - the National Revival Bloc, headed by Abdumalik Abdullajanov. After that the United Tajik Opposition began to propose that the Abdullajanov bloc should participate in the official inter-Tajik negotiations.
Iran, too, wanted to be a more active intermediary in the negotiations. The general impression is that Iran was disappointed by the unproductiveness of its self-restrained position with regard to Tajikistan. Iran was pushed aside by other, more energetic countries, practising a less fastidious approach, in particular by Turkey, which was undaunted by the absence of either ethnic or cultural affinity with the Tajiks. At the same time, Teheran manifestly took the line of increasing its support to the opposition, for it had became fully aware of the weakness of the Dushanbe regime.
All in all, these factors brought about the drafting of a document on the creation of a National Reconciliation Commission, which was signed by President Rakhmonov and UTO leader Nuri in Moscow on December 23, 1996; the functions and powers of the commission, as well as its composition, were to be defined in the course of future negotiations. (15)
Predictably, the discussion of this question in Teheran in January 1997 did not bring a breakthrough in the settlement process, though it did yield certain results. To quote Maxim Peshkov, head of the Russian mission on the Tajikistan settlement, the sides were able "to reach agreement as regards a major part of the political problems. Thus, the mechanism of reshaping the new coalition government has been defined, as well as the number of members of the National Reconciliation Commission and the quota assigned to the opposition in the Central Election Committee during the elections of the Republic's new authorities, which are to take place approximately after 18 months. The question of quotas in the newly formed National Reconciliation Commission and the entire set of military matters are to be discussed at the next round of the talks." (16)
The optimism of the Russian representative is quite comprehensible, but equally comprehensible is the fact that the Tajiks have not been able to reach a compromise solution on the crucial question of quotas assigned to the representatives of the government and the opposition in the projected National Reconciliation Commission. The question of granting representation to Abdullajanov's supporters has not been solved either. Uninclined to help Uzbekistan in its political games, Moscow does not regard Abdullajanov as the only internal political figure in opposition to the present Tajik regime. In formal terms Russia's stand is justified, even though Leninabad is the most imposing force inside the country; massive rallies in support of Abdullajanov were held there (he had carried off 85 per cent of the vote in that region at the 1994 presidential election).
During this round of talks the opposition, whose leaders were far from being satisfied on all counts by Moscow's stance, tried to exert pressure by demanding that a UN peace-keeping force be sent to Tajikistan.
While the politicians were signing these hard-won agreements, the situation on the ground underwent a drastic change. The field commanders, who have made effective progress in dividing the spheres of influence, began to loose interest in the interminable and hopeless internecine strife. Of late their primary concern has been to "legalize" and consolidate the gains of the civil war. Politicians have actually been outrun by the pace of developments. The meeting held on September 15-16, 1996, between the Tajikistan State Commission and the field commanders of the Karategin area can be seen as an attempt to catch up to some extent with the brisk process of the semi-feudal partition of some of the country's areas. The composition of the UTO delegation at the meeting testifies to a clearcut division of functions and control among the field commanders, who are not interested in the appearance of new forces which might call for a re-division. The UTO was represented by Mirzokhoja Nizomov, commander of the Karategin area (the delegation's chairman); Makhmadruzi, commander in charge of Tajikobad; Eshoni Aziz, deputy commander in charge of Komsomolobad; Mirzokhoja Akhmadov, commander in charge of Garm; and Kosimjon, commander in charge of Komsomolobad. The talks were held with UN mediation. "Agreement was reached to effect the following measures prior to the settlement of political questions at the coming inter-Tajik negotiations: to remove the checkpoints in the Jirgatal and Tajikobad areas; to reconstitute agencies in charge of internal affairs and security in these two areas; to permit members of the UTO armed forces to stay in these areas without their weapons; the sides guarantee the free movement of transport on the Dushanbe-Jisgal route; the sides undertake to jointly discuss and resolve all outstanding questions." (17)
The large-scale offensive mounted by the Taliban forces in Afghanistan, who seized Kabul, radically changed the course of events, and this was bound to affect the situation along the border. Moreover, shortly before the next round of inter-Tajik negotiations the UTO resorted to its well-tried tactic of hard pressure on the Dushanbe leaders so as to obtain more concessions at the negotiating table. In contravention of the September agreement the opposition's armed forces seized the territory of the Garm group of regions.
Another manifestation of the division of spheres of control has been the struggle over the aluminium plant in Tursun-zade. As the official talks went on in Teheran, the local people (mostly ethnic Uzbeks) barred the way of the government army brigade, which had been charged with the protection of the plant, and prevented it from entering the town.
The confrontation in the republic has not stopped even after a breakthrough in the negotiations. On June 27, 1997 a General Agreement on Peace and National Accord was signed in Moscow by Tajik president Imomali Rahmonov, United Opposition leader Saidabdullo Nuri, and the UN envoy for Tajikistan, Gerd-Dietrich Merrem. Attending the ceremony were Russian president Boris Yeltsin, officials of Iran and several countries involved as observers at the inter-Tajik talks, and UN undersecretary general for peacekeeping operations Bernard Mayet. There was no immediate word on the agreement's specifics.
An accompanying Protocol of Mutual Understanding was also signed at the Russian Foreign Ministry by Rahmonov and Nuri in the presence of foreign ministers Yevgeny Primakov of Russia and Ali Akbar Velayati of Iran. The Tajik sides agreed to convene in Moscow before July 7 the first meeting of the National Reconciliation Commission in order to work out a draft general amnesty law for submission to the existing Tajik parliament. (18)
The National Reconciliation Commission chaired by Saidabdullo Nuri will consist of 26 people, split equally between opposition and government representatives. New parliamentary elections will be held after a transition period of 12 to 18 months but, until the transition period is over, at least 30 percent of the portfolios in the Tajik government will be occupied by opposition representatives. Opposition forces are to be integrated into government force structures, and 460 armed opposition fighters will go to Dushanbe to protect opposition leaders.
As it could have been expected, Abdullojanov and his supporters were not allowed to take part in the negotiation process; and the "National Revivalists" have not been given a quota of seats in the newly-created coalition government. "Right after the signing of the present agreement, the authorities began to hold meetings in support of the agreement all over the republic, but it didn't work in Leninabad oblast. There the people boycotted the meetings as a sign of protest," Abdullojanov told "Prism".(19)
Meanwhile the spilit within the pro-goverment camp has grown even wider. A mutiny was launched in western and southern Tajikistan on July 20 by the Army's 1st (rapid deployment) and 11th brigades, commanded by Colonels Mahmud Hudoiberdiev and Umar Murchayev, and backed by their supporters in these two areas. In Shahrinau, west of Dushanbe, the mutineers have created an "autonomous defense council" chaired by Hudoiberdiev protege, Sherali Mirzoyev, whose political base is in Kurgan-Tube south of Dushanbe. Their demands include administrative control over that southern region, and reconsideration of the government's consent to allow some 450 opposition fighters to enter Dushanbe as security for the opposition's delegates to the planned National Reconciliation Commission. At the same time, the message to Rahmonov from Shahrinau expressed rhetorical support for the president's policy and the June 27 peace agreement with the opposition. Rahmonov yesterday refused to recognize the "autonomous defense council" and warned that its leaders are liable to prosecution if they "take actions that would damage peace and conciliation".
In fact the signing of the peace agreement has intensified struggle among different armed groupings which have been trying to secure their control over major economic assets and sources of illicit income, which they might lose in the process of power sharing between the government and the opposition.
Though the situation in the Republic remains tense, the importance of the arrival of the United Tajik Opposition chairman Saidabdullo Nuri on September 12 in Dushanbe together with opposition members of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), other opposition leaders, and the beginning of the Commission's work should not be underestimated. The country is entering a post-crisis stage of the conflict. The sides will be faced by new problems and challenges but a process of transformation of the conflict has started and it seems to be irreversable.