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THE CONFLICT DYNAMICS

In February 1990 Dushanbe was swept by a wave of rallies and spontaneous manifestations, in which the nationalists played an active part. Triggered off by the settlement in Dushanbe of several Armenian refugee families which had fled from Baku, they soon grew over into pogroms (whose victims were Russians), abuse of Tajik women wearing European-style clothes, and so on. This was a shocking experience for Dushanbe with its multinational population and long-standing tradition of tolerance; it gave a premonition of the coming drama. There were also manifestations directed against K.Makhamov, First Secretary of the Tajikistan Communist Party. Today opinions still differ as to the forces that propelled the February outbreaks. Some observers believe that they were staged by the mafia-like structures seeking to unnerve the communist elite, which controlled every aspect of life, intimidating it with the scope of nationalistic outbreaks. According to some privately expressed opinions, the real cause was an inter-clan struggle within the communist 1 nomenklatura 0. Observers who tend to agree with the opinions of the opposition maintain that it was a matter of "discrediting the emerging opposition by playing on society's fear of nationalism." (7) The official Dushanbe version is that the Islamists "made a trial move.... At that juncture the opposition was driven into a corner and the turmoil appeared to have subsided."(8) In any case, it is safe to say that the February events signified the emergence of a new political force in Tajikistan, which was ready to challenge the Soviet elite.
In the wake of the February events, the Tajikistan Party of Islamic Revival (PIR) was officially registered with the active support of the country's Qoziat and of democratic organization, as well as under diplomatic pressure from the representative of the Islamic world.
In the autumn of 1991 the opposition launched an active presidential election campaign, nominating a single candidate: Dawlat Khudonazarov. The choice was far from ideal. In the eyes of the Democrats Khudonazarov, a well-known film director and a former member of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party, was still a chip of the old block - of the hated Soviet 1 nomenklatura 0. For the Islamists he was not the best choice either. A native of the Pamirs, he was an Ismaili, an alien for the Sunni Islamists.
All these doubts, however, were overshadowed by the fact that Dawlat Khudonazarov, who enjoyed country-wide popularity, could bring together different political and social groups. Khudonazarov's friends were trying to talk him out of his alliance with the Islamists. Belonging to the modernized stratum of society, they were scared by the prospect of an Islamic state. Khudonazarov, who was swayed by personal ambitions, could see no other way of gaining power short of becoming the candidate of the opposition movement, which comprised all anti-government parties and factions regardless of their ideological background. The opposition had no chance of winning the presidential elections. First, it was less experienced than the communist 1 nomenklatura 0 in conducting election campaigns. Second, its nationalist slogans kept off a great number of non-Tajiks. Third, the population had enjoyed relative social security under the communist rule, and its inertia and conservatism did not allow the opposition to swell its ranks. The opposition's failure gave a new impetus to the power struggle in Tajikistan.
In November 1991 Rakhmon Nabiev, a prominent communist functionary, was elected president of Tajikistan.
The election of Nabiev set at ease preeminently the minds of the non-Tajiks, some of whom had started to leave the country. They believed that the situation could be controlled and the old times brought back. In point of fact, however, the confrontation entered a new phase. The Islamists and the Democrats began to work actively in order to enlist new supporters, using anti-government slogans. They were able to gain in strength as a result of the mission of Anatoly Sobchak. He represented the stand of the Russian Democrats who, in the wake of the August 1991 putsch, were preoccupied with the problem of weakening the communist 1 nomenklatura 0 both in Russia and in the other Republics. At the moment Sobchak personified (and with good reason) the triumph of Russian democracy which had been able to withstand the armed pressure of the conservatives.
The spring of 1992 was marked by the opening of a grandiose rally on Shokhidon Square, in front of the building which housed the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The two month - long rally was organized by the opposition, which put forward Islamist, nationalist and moderately democratic slogans. As a counter-measure, the government launched a rally on Ozodi Square in defense of the president and the existing authorities.
On May 5, 1992, the opposition took over the national television service and the presidential palace. The president retorted by forming guard units of supporters from Kulyab, who were armed with 1.800 automatic rifles.
The outcome of the talks between the two sides was a national reconciliation government (a coalition government), in which the Islamists received several key posts for the first time in the history of political Islam in the former USSR. The government, however, proved unable to stop mounting instability. Absence of law and order, criminalization, gradual disorganization of all municipal services and the economy in general, intensified armed clashed between the opposing camps (with Leninabad, Kulyab and the local Uzbeks all refusing to recognize the coalition government) - these were patent signs of the failure of the new administration. In fact the coalition government became a civil war government. After the forced resignation of President Nabiev in September 1992, it was Akbarsho Iskandarov, head of the Tajik Supreme Soviet (parliament), who became the acting president.
Meanwhile the Popular Front forces mounted an offensive in the south of the country, taking over Kurgan-Tyube. A second front was soon opened with the support of Uzbekistan on the approaches to Dushanbe, in the Regar and Gissar areas (which had compact Uzbek populations). The opposition was loosing its hold on strategic initiative.
Efforts to stop the bloodshed were undertaken in November 1992. The Supreme Soviet, the country's only legitimate body, assembled in Khojent (former Leninabad). Both Nabiev and the government officially resigned. Emomali Rakhmonov, formerly head of a collective farm in Kulyab region, was nominated Chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Executive Committee. Almost half of the newly appointed ministers came from Kulyab. There was no place left for the opposition. By December 1992 the Popular Front, supported by 201 Division and the Uzbek forces, effected a military reconquest of the areas still held by the opposition, and forced hundreds of thousands of people out of the country. The Democratic faction leaders took refuge in Moscow, while the Islamic leaders (Dowlat Usmon, Turajonzoda, Said Abdullo Nuri) had to seek refuge in Iran, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.
The consolidation of the positions of the new authorities resulted in an unprecedented rise of the Kulyab clan, which assumed control over some 80 per cent of all government posts. People from Garm and the Pamirs are pushed out of Dushanbe, and the Leninabad clan has had to agree to play second fiddle. The division of spheres of economic influence proceeds apace, with the former military commanders claiming share of control of the country's resources, of the output of major industrial enterprises and the sphere of cotton growing. The economy has been criminalized to such an extent that it hinders the implementation even of very moderate economic reforms.
The peace-keeping force posted in the country includes contingents from Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, but the three Central Asian republics have a purely token presence. Measures have been taken to protect the Tajik-Afghan border.
In must be said, however, that the relative stabilization of the situation was by no means reliable. The change in the inter-regional balance when the new government agencies were formed (this time, in favour of Kulyab); the opposition's attempts to play a certain part in Tajik affairs; continued military tensions, in particular along the border; Russia's increasing involvement in events in Tajikistan - all these factors, coupled with very bleak prospects of normalizing the situation have pointed to the need to seek political solutions, for the government to enter into a political dialogue with the opposition.