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THE ACTORS

Independence was bestowed on Tajikistan quite suddently, destroying the habitual patterns of its life. In the words of the Republic's former President R.Nabiev, independence descended upon Tajikistan like a meteorite falling from the skies; no one and nothing had been prepared for it. There was no new format of inter-relations, and the actors of the sanguinary drama who were striving for changes had the vaguest notion of the system they wanted to set up. And, of course, different ultimate goals. The Islamists were out to establish an Islamic state (even if this would take longer than they desired), but the Democrats and nationalists never intended to give up the secular model of the state in the name of national revival.
In a setting of inter-regional strife it was the traditionalism of Tajik society that gave the Islamic slogans their mobilizing power and strong appeal - first and foremost among the rural population. At the same time Tajik society was not Islamized to the extent of producing hard-boiled fundamentalists. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, an American expert on Tajikistan who stayed in the country during the civil war, had this to say about the local Islamic movement: "Almost all of its leadership was drawn from poorly educated villagers who did not have higher education, its members mostly the unemployed youth and rural old men. Only a handful of the leadership had any formal religious education, the rest were primarily self-styled Imams of local mosques." (4)
The spectacular turnabout of Akbar Turajonzoda, the Great Qozi of Tajikistan, played no small part in enlisting supporters for the Islamists' cause. He became a leader of the opposition, but he used his official post to enroll the parallel mollahs into a clergical organization shaped along the administrative division of Tajikistan: as the Great Qozi he appointed a "mollah khateb" to head each district and town.
In the early stage the Islamists won the sympathy of many representatives of the urban intelligentsia, who regarded their movement as a distinctive manifestation of national originality. Shirin Akiner, a British researcher, has pointed out that "since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Islam has come to play an increasingly prominent role in Central Asia. At the most basic level, it has come to signify, as it did in Tsarist times, a yardstick for differentiating between 'them' and 'us'." (5) True enough, this revival of Islam could not but be underpinned by a search for fresh self-identification, by an urge to restore the severed cultural traditions and historical ties.
Yet political Islam was also charged with another task. Its purpose was to shake the foundations of the Central Asian regimes during the current complex period of transition, marked by uncertainty and the loss of Moscow's pivotal support. In Tajikistan the authorities lost their grip on the situation as soon as they came up against an organized opposition force which, comprising as it did the Democrats and the Islamists, was an ideological entity - and, moreover, represented the mass-scale rebellion of the southern areas.
The rise of political Islam with a fundamentalist colouring was boosted by the massive assistance of international Islamic foundations and several Islamic states, primarily the Arab countries and Pakistan. Iran was obviously well disposed towards the Islamists, but geopolitical considerations made it wary in providing direct support.
Tajik society could boast of a section of well-educated intelligentsia coming from regions other than Leninabad - from the Pamirs, Garm and other places and parts of the country. It was they who provided the ideologists for the democratic and nationalist factions of the opposition (the Democratic Party, Rastokhez, La'li Badakhshon). The bizarre alliance, officially set up by the Islamists, the Democrats, the Tajik nationalists and the Ismaili Pamiris in the run-up to the presidential election of December 1991 may be attributed to the following causes:

The opposition parties represented the southern regions of Tajikistan (with the exception of Kulyab, the long-standing ally of the Leninabadis). In this regional context ideological differences between them could be regarded as being of secondary importance;

Concerted efforts were the only way to seriously challenge the Leninabadi communist leaders;

By uniting different anti-government forces the opposition could hope to substantially enlarge its electorate.

The Democratic Party was trying to take advantage of the support the Islamists enjoyed in the villages, while the IRP leaders could enlist the support of the Democrats' urban electorate. Both parties relied heavily on the cooperation of members of the La'li Badakhshon, many of whom belonged to the Ministry of the Interior and the police force.

Tactical matters took precedence over strategic issues. The strategies were formulated in very general terms. A substantial number of Islamist leaders were openly and aggressively striving for an Islamic state, but the moderates in their ranks opted for a more balanced approach. They either doubted the possibility of establishing such a state in post-Soviet Tajikistan in the foreseeable future or preferred to keep to themselves their true ideas so as not to frighten away the country's urban population and to make themselves more acceptable to the anti-communist forces in Russia.
The opposite side was represented by an alliance of Leninabad and Kulyab, supported by the local Uzbeks. They did not recognize the national reconciliation government set up under the pressure of the Demo-Islamist bloc. Kulyab's extremely negative attitude to the Islamists stemmed from well-founded apprehensions concerning its own vulnerability, rather than from ideological intransigence. Kulyab had long been one of Tajikistan's poorest and less developed regions. It actually had no industrial enterprises and its agriculture was far from flourishing. Plots alloted for private farming could at best provide for the family which worked such a plot, and Kulyab always had to depend on food supplies from Kurgan-Tyube, Garm and other southern areas, which at that time were dominated by the Islamists. Attempts to economically strangle the unwelcome Kulyab did take place under the coalition government. The blockade came at a time when mudflows had fully obliterated the crops, and the region was brought to the brink of famine. The Dushanbe authorities assumed that the harder the Kulyabis were hit, the more tractable their attitude to the Demo-Islamist bloc would become.
The result, however, was the reverse of what had been expected. The people of Kulyab rose up to fight the new regime under the slogans of internationalism, socialism, etc., which won them the sympathy of both the non-Tajik population (which had already been exposed to the militant nationalism of the Demo-Islamist bloc) and that section of the Tajiks which felt a nostalgic yearning for the "good old times" and was incapable of adapting itself to the radically changed pattern of life.
The question of whether and how far the Popular Front, led by Sangak Safarov, a man with a criminal past, was capable of representing the alternative ideology of the Left, is open to doubt. In any case, the Popular Front needed a certain ideological groundwork for its activities and chose to draw on the slogans borrowed from the old communist stock. These, however, were of secondary importance: the main thing was that the Kulyabis were the only ones capable of urgently setting up efficient fighting units (despite their economic plight), drawing on support from the outside; these units eventually defeated the Islamists. The Kulyabis realized that they were fighting for survival and were prepared to stake everything on it. Suffice it to remember that the ordinary people willingly gave their life savings to support the Popular Front.
It was the Kulyab's armed contingent that gave it an advantage over its civil war ally - Leninabad Region. While giving the Kulyab a measure of support and actively playing the Uzbekistan card, the Leninabadis expected the former to win the battle for them and to agree to remain a junior partner in the inter-regional power sharing scheme. These proved to be simplistic expectations. The Kulyabis were bidding for a monopoly on power so as to put an end to all attempts ever to throttle their region.
The armed resistance of Kulyab during the civil war proved to have been of crucial historical importance. It bore out the inadequacy of the then current conceptions and expectations that the newly independent Muslim states would be toppled by the Islamists, that the specific nature of their development warranted their rapid Islamization and return to that fold of civilisation from which they had been forcibly severed by Soviet power. One is tempted to subscribe to the opinion of Alexei Malashenko, a Soviet specialist in Islamic studies, which he voiced in the autumn of 1992: "The clashes that broke out in Tajikistan show that the fundamentalists (in the context of Tajikistan this term has only relative value. - I.Z.) were not prepared to assume the reins of government and were incapable of cementing the nation torn by inter-ethnic, inter-regional and inter-clam contradictions.... Incidentally, does not the situation in Tajikistan suggest the experience of its Afghan neighbours, where the communists' replacement with the fundamentalists had caused a similar bloodbath?" (6)
By thwarting the Islamists in 1992, the forces that had come out against them in Tajikistan precluded the possibility of the Islamists taking over one by one the Central Asian states - a prospect that was threatening Uzbekistan in particular. That could have worked a crucial change in the balance of power both of the macro-regional and the international scale - all the more so since Tajikistan's Islamists were not acting in a vacuum.
The fighting went on. Suppported by the local Uzbeks, Uzbekistan and the Russian army in Tadjikistan, the Popular Front was slowly taking over the country.
This kind of alliance did not spring up overnight. The reaction of Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov to the civil war in Tajikistan had been prompt and sharp enough. Events in the neighbouring state were capable of provoking an Islamist outbreak in his own country, and primarily in the Ferghana Valley bordering on it. In contrast to their Tajik brethren the Ferghana Islamists fully deserved the name of fundamentalists. They succeded in establishing a hard-fisted regime in the Namangan district, based on the Sharia law; it existed in parallel with the official Tashkent regime until it was finally crushed by Karimov.
Karimov's preference for the Lelinabad-Kubyab bloc also stemmed from the firm, long-standing links with the north of Tajikistan. Leninabad Region, bordering on Uzbekistan, had traditionally been subjected to strong Uzbek influence, with ethnic Uzbeks accounting for a high percentage of its population. Tashkent expected the Leninabadi communist 1nomenkla1tura 0, once it had triumphed over the opposition, to reassume the reins of government and reassure stability, forming a regime that would be congenial in body and spirit to that in Uzbekistan.
A similar line of reasoning motivated the stand of the local Uzbeks, who had come out against the opposition. They, moreover, had grievances of their own. Some members of the Demo-Islamist bloc had tried to steer inter-Tajik discord into the channel of Tajik-Uzbek contradictions, thus enhancing the conflict's inter-ethnic dimension. This development was reminiscent of the notorious "search for the enemy". Thus, a Rastokhez representative, Mirbobo Mirrakhimov, whom the coalition government appointed director of the television network, showed on TV a group of young men whom he accused of crimes against the ruling regime, with special emphasis on their Uzbek origin.
Russia did not clearly define its stand for quite some time. This is attributable to a number of reasons, both objective and subjective in their essence. First of all, the Russian Democrats were out to weaken the communist 1nomenkla1tura 0. At the outset of the conflict the Russian Democrats were absorbed in their own struggle against the Central Union authority. Accordingly, any manifestation of anti-government trends in the Union republics was regarded as an important factor in undermining the communist regime and Moscow's control over the outlying territories. Second, in keeping with their strong pro-Western orientation, the Russian politicians of that period operated with a bare modicum of information on Central Asia and its peoples. Their ideas about Tajikistan' political forces and their capacity to organize themselves were even more sketchy. They probably did not realize the destructive potential of an organized opposition in a traditional society. Regarding the Central Asian republics as a bastion of inertia and conservatism, they must have been little worried over the military-political implications of the clash between the opposition and the Tajik authorities, even though the latter were obviously unable to cope with the situation. At that juncture the Russian leadership, which had no premonition of the impending numerous conflicts in the post-Soviet territories, did not regard stability as a category of intrinsic value. Third, during the early stages of the conflict in Tajikistan Russia was too preoccupied with other matters. The former republics were heading for sovereignty; the prospect of getting rid in the first place of the Central Asia states, which required a regular supply of resources and financial backing was extremely welcome. Tajikistan, it should be remembered, was the poorest and less developed of the former Soviet Republics.
The absence of a strategic policy line vis-a-vis the Central Asian states made Russia's policy, especially in the early stages of the inter-Tajik conflict, fully dependent on the turn taken by events, on the military and political developments; that is why no alternative options were considered and no necessary preparations made. Moreover, at the very outset of the civil war the total lack of coordination between various Russian agencies came to light, as well as the consolidation of group interests and the desire of individual groupings to further their own self-seeking goals. Thus, the military establishment had its own objectives, which it realized with a greater or lesser degree of success; subsequently the frontier protection forces developed their own objectives, as did the Russian business groups and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
At the onset of the civil war the most noticeable divergences were those between the command of Motorized Rifle Division N 5o 0 201, posted in Tajikistan, and Russia's higher military and political leadership. The Russian leaders presumed that the Division was to observe neutrality and take no part in the inter-Tajik strife. Orders to that effect were sent from Moscow.
In actual fact, however, the Division found itself in an increasingly difficult situation. It felt the increasing pressure of the new administration. Verbal attacks on the Russian military during public rallies were followed by open threats. The influx of refugees who sought the protection of the Russian army depleted the already meagre food stocks. There was a drastic change in the status of the army officers, who had belonged to the Republic's elite. Now they had to think about the safety of their families and to face the prospect of becoming hostages in the inter-Tajik confrontation. Under such circumstances the officers could not but be inclined to the Leninabad-Kulyab alliance, which at that time was identified with the former regime, which they had supported. The Division observed formal neutrality, but its practical activities left no doubt about its support of the Popular Front. However violently Division Commander Ashurov cursed Sangak Safarov in the course of their telephone conversations, this had no bearing on the real state of affairs.
When the Russian politicians finally realized that the opposition was a destabilizing force and took notice of the alarmist appeals of the Uzbekistan president, they adopted the line of supporting the Leninabad-Kulyab bloc. The Russian armed forces were engaged on a limited scale in the military pressure exerted on the opposition. Its crushing defeat, however, failed to bring peace to Tajikistan. Moscow began to urge a political settlement and undertook to act as both intermediary and guarantor of the extremely fragile and precarious stabilization in the country. Division 201 became the backbone of the multinational peace-keeping forces, with the Russian frontier forces protecting the Tajik-Afghan border.
Countries of "the far abroad", which have been important personae in the Tajik drama, also had to reajust their performance as the conflict continued to develop. Understandably, Iran was particularly well disposed towards the Islamists. Even before the collapse of the USSR, when the grip of the Centre on the periphery was somewhat relaked, Iran began to pay special attention to Tajikistan. Teheran saw this Persian-speaking Republic as a natural sphere or Iranian influence, and the Islamic Revival Party as a promising potential ally. The upsurge of Tajik nationalism in the wake of the search for self-identification provided a favourable climate for Iranian policy. The streets began to sport inscriptions in Farsi, with Iranian banks and other establishments making their appearance in the country. The blood-splashed turn taken by events caused Iran to act in a more cautious manner. By overtly supporting the opposition it would have run the risk of spoiling its relations with Russia and the Central Asian states - something that Iran preferred to avoid, seeing its continued isolation on the international scene. It was not fortuitous that Teheran opted for a different way of affecting the further course of events: it began to play an active part in the inter-Tajik negotiating process, and it has been able to add a positive dimension to it. Yet there are no indications that Teheran's sympathetic attitude to the Islamists has changed. As a matter of fact, it continues to support them, trying to avoid any open manifestations of its involvement - which, in the opinion of certain observers, is on the increase.
Pakistan has acted in a more overt manner, pursuing a longer-term strategy. In addition to financial aid, which was mostly delivered via the Islamic foundations (just as the aid that came from Saudi Arabia), the Pakistani authorities undertook to provide religious education for the Tajik refugees' children. They are trained to make up the future cadre of true fundamentalists, and they will be likely to take a far tougher line than the earlier post-Soviet generation.