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DEBATES ON MILITARY PROBLEMS

The discussions concerning the prospects of the post-Soviet states' rapprochement or even reintegration in the military-political sphere have experienced after the creation of CIS quite an important evolution. There has been a radical change in the appraisals of the possibilities of contraction of the defense area and real steps have been outlined in this direction, there have been formulated conceptions of regional approaches, of the building of a multi-level defense system and the peculiarities of co-operation of the separate fighting arms.
After the break-up of the USSR, the process of division of the Soviet legacy had a very negative effect on the defense of the independent states. They received not what they needed for the accomplishment of the given task but fragments of the military machine which, as fate had willed, happened to be on their territory. They did not have even the semblance of a complete system in the form of a grouping of troops, mobilization deployment schemes, command and control agencies, and munitions. Moreover, most of the post-Soviet republics were inexperienced in building up the army and organizing the defence, they did not have trained military specialists and officers, especially such as represented titular nationalities. /45/.
At the same time nationalization of military policy could not initially but become an end in itself, serving as a symbol of national independence. The attempts to create or, to be more precise, to preserve unified armed forces were under such circumstances doomed to failure.
The Collective Security Treaty concluded on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent was a compromise between the real defense requirements and the desire of separate states to maintain independence in this matter. The declarations of the member-states (the Treaty was joined by all Central Asian republics with the exception of Turkmenistan) of their readiness to realize the right to collective defense, immediately to put in action the mechanism of joint consultations to coordinate their positions and take measures in case of a threat to the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of one or several signatories of the Treaty were important from the point of view of the recognition of collective efforts. Practically, however, the very composition of the signatories was not conducive to military cooperation based on equality, it presupposed that the main burden would as previously be borne by Russia, it did not remove the contradictions between the partners and, in the final count, did not promote real integration in the field of security.
Nevertheless, as compared with the neo-isolationist approach then prevalent in Russia, the position of the military with their attention focussed on the "near abroad" was more realistic. The military from the very beginning pressed for intergation with the former Soviet republics pointing out to the necessity of keeping reliable defense system, including defensible borders which could be only the borders of CIS. The military department actually outpaced the Russian politicians, who much later began talking about Russia's vital interests in the post-Soviet space.
Actually, the military in Russia is not a homogeneous interest group. There are divisions between various departments within the army and security establishment, personal frictions and rivalry, etc. The existing differences had certain impact upon shaping of general security policy but they were less important than the political debate on the issue.
"While the military has played a significant role in developing a new security policy, it has not dominated this policy despite the military's substantial influence caused by presence of Russian troops in the near abroad. Instead, the debate over foreign policy amongst the civilian elite in Russia has produced a shift towards the position previously held by the military, which has thus created a new accord between the civilian and military leaderships", wrote the Western researcher John W.R.Lepingwell /46/.
The need to formulate a clear-cut conception of the Russian army's tasks, the required dimensions of its presence in the "near abroad" and its commitments was also dictated by the uncertain status of the Russian troops deployed in the former Soviet republics. The ambiguity of their position clearly began to be felt in the conflict zones. It was especially obvious in Tajikistan, where the 201st motorized rifle division remained after the disintegration of the USSR. On the one hand, the military command in Moscow did not want the interference of the Russian force in the intra-Tajik affairs and demanded of the 201st division maintaining neutrality. On the other, the servicemen who had for many years stayed in Tajikistan and had certain privileges could not but establish contacts with the local elite and develop their own political likes and dislikes. Therefore the neutrality of the 201st division throughout 1992 remained formal. Its command obviously sympathized with the Leninabad-Kulyab bloc and quite disapproved of the demo-Islamic opposition. At any rate, when the former speaker of the Supreme Soviet, Safarali Kendzhayev, tried to wipe out the government including opposition members (September-October 1992), his armed grouping was permitted to enter Dushanbe unimpeded by the Russian troops. Later on, when the Russian politicians made their choice in favour of the "old guard" of Party executives and practically sanctioned the support of the Popular Front hammering the opposition forces, the discrepancy between Moscow's approach and the real actions of the 201st division was removed.
Practical experience in the "near abroad" conflicts accelerated the development of the Russian national security strategy and, apparently, helped to conceptualize the principal tasks of the Russian army in the post-Soviet space in a military doctrine. Firstly, in accordance with the military doctrine, the main danger lies in the local wars and armed conflicts. Secondly, the new idea is that the security interests of the Russian Federation and the other CIS members may necessitate the deployment of Russia's troops and military hardware outside the Russian territory. Russian troops can form part of joint or Russian groupings and individual bases and installations. Thirdly, the Russian army, along with its traditional tasks, is to perform peacekeeping operations /47/. Since the new doctrine does not define even approximately the probable enemy, its orientation to the "near abroad", actively producing conflicts and local wars, is the more obvious.
At the same time domino theory is not very popular with the military. They do not rule out a danger of spill over of certain conflicts in the "near abroad" but, in Central Asia, they see more imminent threats as coming rather from foreign countries than from within the region, though for political reasons the idea did not find place in official document.
Publication of separate sections of the doctrine caused a wave of criticism both from the left and from the right. Whereas the champions of continuing Russian domination objected against the withdrawal of the troops deployed outside Russia to its territory before 1996 (the "unwarranted haste" therein once cost dear to Mikhail Gorbachev), the democrats feared that the new doctrine gives to the military-political leadership too much freedom in choosing the enemy, both external and internal. With all the diversity of views, however, there can be no doubt that the military doctrine marked an obvious rapprochement between the military and political leaders, being a sort of a compromise document.
The absence of an enemy was a concession to the politicians who "hope to be good in the international arena to all in general" /48/, and the theses of the methods of deterring the threats coming from the conflicts in the "near abroad" were a concession to the military.
Yet the mutual adaptation proceeded mostly through the adjustments made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in foreign policy. The observer of the newspaper Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star), which is a military semi-official organ, quite naturally quoted with pleasure the report of the Russian foreign minister at a Foreign Ministry conference on Russian foreign policy early in 1994. "No doubt, much effort will still have to be made to make the process of Russia's adaptation in the post-Soviet space civilized, safe and worthy of a great power. But the is seem to have been dotted, the priorities of the Russian foreign policy have been named. Speaking of them, the Russian Foreign Minister pointed out that 'Russia must continue its military presence in the regions where the sphere of its military interests existed for ages'" /49/.
In the general discussion of the army's role in defending Russian interests in the "near abroad" a special place belongs to the peacekeeping functions. Conceptually it was formalized only after 1993, although Moscow's actions in the conflict zones even after that were not infrequently of a reactive nature and lacked a strategic perspective. As the logic of armed conflicts was increasingly involving the Russian troops, there came the understanding that none but Russia wanted to assume the role of a peacekeeper. It applied, above all, to Central Asia, which was for the Western world the periphery and where conflicts in no way endangered the Western interests (in contrast, for example, to the situation around Nagorny Karabakh).
Peacekeeping forces in the conflicts in the "near abroad" cannot be accomplishing universal tasks. As we know, the basic idea of peacekeeping operations consists in "compelling to peace", in ensuring conditions for a political dialogue and settlement. At the same time, Tajikistan had its own peculiarities, since it did not require separation of the warring sides. The peacekeeping contingent was primarily repulsing the pressure of the armed opposition making efforts to cross the frontier. This imparted to the peacekeepers the untypical functions of auxiliary units guarding the state frontier. Later on this incongruity was done away with - the peacekeeping forces ceased to take part in frontier clashes and served mostly to stabilize the situation inside the country.
The peacekeeping forces are formed in the main from Russian troops. Despite the repeated agreements, the Central Asian states' participation in the peacekeeping operations in Tajikistan is but symbolic. The CIS states which do not belong to this region refused to take part in the establishment of peace altogether.
Useful cooperation is beginning with international organizations - the UN and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) - which helps, in Tajikistan at least, to refute the too often repeated allegation of the Russian imperial intentions.
Russia has no alternative as a conflict manager in Central Asia. At the same time the absence of prospects of political settlement in Tajikistan, where the conflict to a decisive degree depends on the course of events in the neighbouring Afghanistan, will always be used by the politicians demanding the withdrawal from Central Asia.
The major trend of the Russian military policy, which is now in the process of formalization, is the creation of a CIS system of collective security. Although the idea to construct such a system has been propagandized by the military since the moment of disintegration of the USSR, different opinions exist to this day as to how it can be realized and what place will be taken in it by the Central Asian states. In 1992 the Central Asian respublics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan) were the first to sign the Collective Security Treaty. The awareness of their vulnerability, the post-Soviet syndrome and the desire to retain support from Russia in the military sphere - all these factors once made the Central Asian states active adherents of collective efforts. As to the Russian politicians, they did not show much interest in preserving the defense space through the development of contacts with Central Asia but merely did not resist the process taking place. The treaty at that time had not so much military-strategical as tactical importance - it was to influence the Ukraine rejecting the very conception of collective security.
In 1993-95 the situation appeared to be different. Both the politicians and the military in Russia came to the conclusion that it was necessary to define models of military-political integration in order to ensure the solution of common defense problems in compliance with Russia's interests, the problems including military legislation, technical equipment, training the national armies and, lastly, the legal and social protection of the servicemen. The more suitable form of military integration is a military-political alliance requiring a system of permanently functioning military and political organs, joint military structures and groupings of forces and weapons, and the coordination of strategic plans and plans of training troops and headquarters. In short term the idea which would have probably been the best response to defense needs does not seem realistic. The opinion of military experts, de- fence ministers of the signatory states of the Treaty, and the Foreign Intelligence Service regarding this question still meets with the resistance of politicians in a number of states fearing a revival of the bloc confrontation and Russian dominance in this most sensitive sphere.
The stumbling-block in the creation of a military-political alliance along with political considerations and present scarcity of resourses, is the different character and direction of threats to the states of different regions. As one option several regional subsystems are proposed to be formed. Thus, the Central Asian region is to be divided into two security zones: western (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and partly Kyrghyzstan) and eastern (Kazakhstan and partly Russia and Kyrghyzstan). The main danger to the states of the western zone comes from Afghanistan. As to the eastern zone, account should be taken of the Chinese factor. According to the estimates of Leonid Ivashov, Secretary of the Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS member-states, the Xinjiang grouping of forces today surpasses Kazakhstan's armed forces for its combat potential and mobilization capabilities. The Chinese factor is also present in the East-Asian region (the territories of the eastern area of the Russian Federation and of the eastern region of the Republic of Kazakhstan), where Russia and Kazakhstan should join their efforts. A politico-economic organ (Defense Council) and a coalition command of the grouping of forces are to be created in each of the above-mentioned regions /50/.
The need for a regional system of collective security was also apprehended by the participants in the discussion held at the Headquarters Coordinating Military Cooperation /51/.
A factor that makes not only the military but Russian politicians as well to search for an adequate military response is eventual NATO enlargement. From political and psychological points of view this process is detrimental to the interests of Russia. "The greatest danger lies in the emerging perception of military-political isolation of Russia, in revival of anti-Western and militarist sentiments in public thinking", - runs the document "Russia and NATO" worked out by the group of prominent Russian reserchers and practitioners of the Council on foreign and military policy. (52) The main idea of the paper is to avoid linkage between NATO enlargement and development of Russia's partnership with the West and with NATO.
The debates on NATO in Russia revealed the fact that many politicians and military had tended to see NATO enlargement as a greater threat than any other coming from South or East. In this context Russia's efforts to set up collective defense and security system within CIS might be intensified by a perceived vulnerability of the country.
Practical realization of collective security efforts is far from being ideal. Much more time is spent on discussions than on the implementation of the already reached agreements. The summit meeting in Almaty (February 1995) showed that only three countries unreservedly supported the Russian conception of guarding frontiers - Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrghyzstan, i.e., the states encountering the greatest external danger. The others are inclined to regard the Russian approach to the joint guarding of external frontiers as a possible pressure.
Contradictions within CIS outweigh the integration tendencies, in the military sphere as well. And in this respect Central Asia, as compared with the other post-Soviet regions, is nevertheless a more undemanding partner for Russia. But precisely these states the politicians (but not the military) still approach with the greatest reservations.