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POLITICAL DEBATES

Russia's Interests

Russia's long-term interests in Central Asia (CA), directly connected with its national security and guarantees of normal socio-political and economic progress, can be summed up in the following general list:

political and economic stability (the absence of intrastate and inner national conflicts and acute economic crises);

preservation of the various contacts between Russia and the CA countries, prevention of a vacuum that can be filled with forces hostile to it;

ensuring Central Asia's ecological security;

prevention of the spread of chauvinism and Islamic extremism;

prevention of the spread of terrorism, drug trafficking and the smuggling of arms;

preservation of communications crossing Russia and access to new transport arteries and to oil and gas pipe-lines oriented to the "far abroad";

ensuring security of the Russian population.

A general approach of such kind does not, naturally, give an idea of the debates in Russia about the policy in Central Asia, it does not take into account, either, the differentiation within the region itself. At the same time the main trends indicated here form the pivot around which, in fact, different points of view and different groups of interests clash.

Mention could be made, on the whole, of three main problems - conflicts, political Islam and the fate of the Russian-speaking population, that have become the source of the most acute contradictions and that are most extensively used in the internal political struggle.
1. The thesis that Central Asia is a zone of conflicts, in a "hot" or latent state, is doubted by no one. Such a conclusion is based on the existence of disputed territorial issues (according to the Institute of Geography, the Russian Academy of Sciences, the region has at least 19 disputed zones whose present borders can be called in question) /5/, the unsettled statehood, when the state is unable fully to perform the functions of administration and control; the aggravation of ethno-national problems as the consequence not only of the activated quests for national self-identification but the intra-ethnic economic rivalry and the struggle for water resources, land, a greater share of privatized property, etc. The conflict in Tajikistan, overburdened, moreover, by the Islamic dimension, has demonstrated the steadiness of conflict situations in the regions, the tendency towards their quick inter-nationalization and the complicacy of political settlement.
An analysis of conflictual factors, as well as Russia's practical actions in Tajikistan, give ground for the experts' searches of models of policy towards conflicts which correspond most to Russia's interests.
We do not intend examining here possible scenarios of the progress of conflicts. Some authors think that the repetition of the Tajik version is not excluded first in Kyrghyzstan and then in Uzbekistan /6/; others see the possibility of the spreading conflict gripping Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, partly Afghanistan and, with a less degree of probability, also the territory of Kyrghyzstan /7/.
However the conflict, or conflicts, may develop, Russia is confronted with the choice: to try to stabilize the situation or immediately to quit the conflict-ridden area. This choice is complicated by the circumstance that it does not have its own fortified borders, where it could withdraw its armed forces and which would reliably protect it from the export of violence, narcotics and arms coming from the instability zone. Moreover, the question where this defense line separating it from Central Asia should pass has by far not a geographical dimension. Will the situation in Russia itself be improved by the official severance from it, with a frontier, cutting off the millions of Russians living in northern Kazakhstan? And, finally, will Russia gain by pursuing in the "near abroad" a policy through which this country, that has proclaimed itself the legitimate successor of the USSR, will leave to the mercy of fate the peoples still preserving a certain Soviet archetype and bound up with it by the common historical past?
It must be admitted that the danger of Russia's aid to stabilize the situation turning into an instrument for the support of one regime or another exists indeed. In any case, the greatest threat of politization of military commitments lies in unilateral guarantees and measures, should the Russian leadership find it possible to resort to them.
Nor can Russia turn its back on the conflict situations in Central Asia, which have a tendency to internationalization. As the Kazakh researcher Assan Nugmanov put it, "But there is one circumstance that may to a great extent shelter Central Asia from instability, although not eliminate it completely. This cirmustance is Russia's role in Asia and the Near East. Central Asia is certainly within the sphere of Russia's geopolitical ambition. This is an inescapable fact" /8/.
The attempts to rid Russia of the burden of conflicts in Central Asia and simultaneously the recognition of the existing realities preventing the immediate withdrawal have given rise to the conception of a by-stage termination of Russian presence based on defense in depth. Initially Tajikistan as the first line, then Uzbekistan, then the southern borders of Kazakhstan and the establishment of the line of retreat across the northern regions of Kazakhstan, to be more precise, the Aral-Balkhash line /9/.
Such a combination of isolationist conceptions with moderate neo-imperialism reflects the searches of a strategy in the conditions when Russia's practical politics towards Tajikistan evoke criticism from all political forces. On the one hand, they obviously lack consistency in the policy of retaining Tajikistan within the sphere of Russian influence. Military presence alone is not sufficient for that; it requires a more decisive economic support coupled with a more rigid pressure on the Tajik leadership to demand the observance of human rights, retirement of the more odious leaders, and a fairer distribution of official posts between the individual regions. On the other hand, the military measures that are being adopted do not testify to the intention of leaving Tajikistan and can be interpreted as a gradual escalation of presence and, consequently, as Russia's increasing involvement in the conflict. With the periodical aggravation of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border, accompanied by the killing of Russian servicemen, the demands to withdraw from Tajikistan resound in Russia especially loudly. The mediatory efforts of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the attempts to settle the conflict politically are capable, to a certain extent, to neutralize the criticism but real and tangible achievements therein are so far nonexistent.
2. The problem of political Islam in Central Asia likewise arouses serious debates directly related to the formulation of Russian politics in the region and reflecting the political alignment of forces in the country. It has become especially acute in connection with the civil war in Tajikistan, where the Islamists played one of the leading roles. In accordance with the existing approaches it is possible to name three main schools: the "alarmists", the "rejectionists" and the "realists". The first - and they, as a rule, comprise politicians and observers having but an approximate idea of Islam - assert that the whole of Central Asia is a zone producing the more extremist forms of militant Islam. No distinction is thereby made between Islam as a religion and political Islam. All Islamic movements are, moreover, included in the category of fundamentalist. The result is a sort of "demonization" of Islam, its picturing as a direct threat to Russia. Accordingly, possible versions of fundamentalism's offensive are being predicted. One of the apocalyptic scenarios is the following: the fall of Tajikistan, then Uzbekistan, then the southern areas of Kazakhstan, which will be the intermediate base for the advance on Russia. The pressure from the Northern Caucasus will play an auxiliary part. These two lines are intended to meet in the Volga basin and then to cut Russia in two. As the result the western part will find itself incapable of independent existence and the eastern will be doomed to disappear as a state from the political map.
Quite obviously, whatever alarm the role of Islamic extremism might cause, the assumptions that it is capable of wiping Russia off the face of the earth is sheer nonsense. The authors of such clumsy publications pursue a clear political purpose: to scare the West with Islamism to such an extent as to make it support all of Russia's efforts in the post-Soviet space. "...the awareness is needed, above all, of the expansion of the aggressive fundamentalism as a common problem of the European countries 'from the Urals to the Atlantic ocean'" /10/. Presented in such form, the Islamic factor is called upon to bring grist to the mill of the pro-Westerners or "Atlanticists" in the Russian establishment. Having nothing in common with a serious analysis of the problem, these publications are dictated by the continuing internal political confrontation in the Russian political circles.
The supporters of the second trend produce diametrically opposite arguments. Central Asia was so much secularized under the Soviet government that its re-Islamization will take an indefinitely long time, consequently there is nothing to fear. Such assertions blend with the political plans of those politicians who want to put an end to Russian presence in the region and to create some Slavic entity, possibly with the participation of Kazakhstan.
Representatives of the third school, experts in these matters - the Orientalists, historians and jurists - are inclined much more thoughtfully and calmly to appraise the situation. They do not see anything tragic in the apparent movement of the Central Asian republics towards the Moslem world, do not consider Islamic fundamentalism to be the only and inevitable alternative in the development of the local societies, are far from ascribing to Islam anti-Russian or anti-Orthodox moods alien to it and do not see Russia as "an outpost of the Christian world advanced into the enormous world of Islam" /11/, rightly pointing to its Christian-and-Islamic character. Moslems in CIS total some 60 million, in Russia the figure reaches 13 million. In the opinion of a Russian Orientalist Yuri Gankovsky, "Moslem fundamentalism as such has never and nowhere presented any danger. It is quite a different thing how it is used in politics" /12/.
As to Central Asia, the role of political Islam in the region, if soberly assessed, might be described as follows. Political Islam, although it does not enjoy a widespread support and does not have charismatic leaders, has in principle come into being. At the same time in CIS this movement, with rare exceptions, is not radical or extremist. The blood shed in Tajikistan is on the conscience of both sides.
There is no ground to believe that new attempts at Islamizing Central Asia are excluded once and for all. Political Islam is essentially a social movement. It arises in societies where an accelerated process of marginalization is taking place, where the gap between the rich and the poor is growing while the formation of the middle class is too slow, where the destruction of traditional values is in progress, etc. In this sense Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and to a lesser degree Kyrghyzstan (Islam did not play the decisive role among the nomads) are threatened with an oncoming Islamic tide. Such fears are not the least factor responsible for the present regimes' gravitation to Moscow, the retention of power for them being possible only within the scope of secular development of society. Meanwhile the Russian leaders are compelled to keep somewhat aloof from Central Asia by the probability of political unscrupulousness of these regimes. In the opinion of a number of observers, should power in Russia be taken by the Communists, Liberal Democrats or other supporters of the national idea, the authoritarian regimes could quite possibly find a common language with them. As Orientalist politologist Alexei Malashenko said,"And the talk sometimes going on there (in Central Asia - I.Z.) about the revival of imperial thinking can quite well be replaced by toasts to the restored friendship of the peoples" /13/.
One can come to the conclusion that Islamism in Central Asia can at present be a much more serious threat to the power structures in the region itself than to Russia and that precisely Russia is seen in the region as the guarantor against any upheavals. No wonder that in October 1992 Islam Karimov, under the influence of the war in Tajikistan, called upon Russia to return to the performance of its age-old function of the superpower in this region of the world /14/.
It should be admitted that the "realists'" argumentation is more in line with the "supreme power" trend in Russian politics, but the conclusion of the absence of antagonisms in the coexistence of Russia and the Islamic republics does not at all presuppose the possibility of using forcible methods for a new "territorial formalization" of this coexistence.
3. The "Russian question" in the "near abroad" states as a whole and in Central Asia in particular has become the main element in the political debates in Russia, the attitude to which determines the degree of popularity of political leaders, parties and movements. Moreover, precisely the evolution of views concerning the condition of the Russians outside Russia marked the Democrats' shift towards the national idea. The turning point herein is considered to be the article "The Power in Quest of Itself" by State Adviser of the Russian Federation Sergei Stankevich published in March 1992 /15/. Prior to that time, the legitimate concern about the condition of the Russian minorities was actually used to obtain political dividends by the opponents of Yeltsin's team, the Communists and National Patriots. They indeed subtly felt the public mood in Russia, and his success in the parliamentary election V.Zhirinovsky largely owed to this feeling.
The crux of the matter was not that one of the recognized Democrats of the "first enrolment" took notice of the condition of the Russians but what priority he found it necessary to give to it. In the opinion of Stankevich, this problem should be central in determining the entire complex of relations with the "near abroad" countries, subordinating to itself all the other state interests. "The attitude to the Russian population and the Russian heritage is Russia's most important criterion for including one state or another in the category of friendly. This, in turn, cannot but determine the entire complex of our bilateral relations - from the question of the future of the troops to the economics and finances" /16/.
Practically at the very same time B.Yeltsin expressed his opinion on the subject much more constructively, taking into consideration the former Soviet republics' possible reaction as well: "It should be frankly admitted that so far we have been poorly defending our compatriots. At the same time, to try to solve such problems with the help of force and ultimatums or, worse still, through armed confrontation with the republics, as some propose, is nothing but political adventurism. To resort to it means deliberately to put our citizens in a position of enemies, to provoke against them an avalanche of violence" /17/.
The migration of Russians from the republics of Central Asia was to a considerable extent a natural event. The growing local nationalisms, used both by the ruling elite and its opponents to mobilize the population, combined with the quite justifiable desire for the revival of the language and national culture, the overcoming of the national inferiority complex - all these factors could not but lead to deprivation of the population outside the titular nation. Moreover, Russians in Central Asia remained, on the whole, an alien element: having been integrated in the system existing under the Communists, they found themselves fully cut off from the local society. Their not knowing the language and traditions, not understanding the behavioral models began to be felt not at the time when Russians were mixed with the local Russian-speaking elite but when they found themselves face to face with the very same people of whom, as it turned out, they had but a very vague idea although lived with them side by side for decades.
It can be debated whether the Russians enjoyed a special status after the pattern of the French colonists in Algeria or the British in India, or whether they had no social privileges. The revelation of the truth will now change nothing - after the declaration of independence of the republics the Russians felt, if not a direct threat, at least obvious uneasiness as regards their future. Accustomed to be under the patronage of the state, they showed a very low degree of political self-organization and social solidarity and therefore felt defenseless in the unexpectedly strange countries: ethnic discomfort is clear to see. It is evidenced by the fact that Russians are leaving not only the war-ridden Tajikistan but also the stable Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, where Russians constitute up to 40 per cent of the population. This undoubtedly undermines the economies of the Central Asian republics themselves (Russians were employed mostly in industry, and their own specialists and trained workers are so far in short supply) and at the same time is a heavy burden to Russia incapable of economically digesting the mass influx of migrants. The more so because the migrants are urban inhabitants with high professional skills, and there is no work for them in Russia's rural areas. Lastly, Russians who have long lived in Asia have become a sort of a subethnos. Without being integrated into the local society, they nevertheless borrowed a number of features (diligence, non-acceptance of hard drinking, respectful attitude to elders), which make them aliens in the Russian countryside.
Russia's long-term interest consists in having Russians stay in the states where they have been living many years, for which it is necessary to obtain a situation in which their civil rights are not infringed upon. Meanwhile political debates around this problem are far from practical recommendations. More often they represent attempts at playing the "Russian card". And ever more frequently this card is being snatched from the nationalists by the democrats. Quite radical views are professed by Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for Contacts with the Compatriots Konstantin Zatulin; sufficiently sharp statements are made apropos of this by A.Migranyan, Member of the Presidential Council. Such a sharp turn was not left unnoticed. Vladimir Zhirinovsky said in April 1994: "Two years-and-a half ago I joined the presidential elections with the slogan 'I shall defend the Russians and the small peoples'. I was then called a chauvinist. Today even Kozyrev defends (so far in words) Russians in the Baltic areas. Where are the Democratic Russia members with their general human values now? Where is now the Democratic Russia's appeal to the regions 'To take as much sovereignty as they can carry'? It is indecent even to recall it" /18/.
Generally speaking, no one doubts that any Russian government wants to see that the interests of the Russians in the former Soviet republics are not infringed upon. At the same time the growing importance of this problem in the system of Russian politics reflects not so much the Russian population's deteriorating position as certain shifts in the approaches of the ruling circles of Russia itself. The Democrats began exploiting with enthusiasm the national idea, while the government seeks a rapprochement with the populist Duma (such a rapprochement was demonstrated, although not with regard to Central Asia but with regard to the Crimea, when the signing of the Russo-Ukrainian agreements was made dependent on the observance by Kiev of the Russians' rights in the peninsula). Similarly it can be expected that with the aggravation of the problem of Russian population in any of the Central Asian republics, Russia's reaction will be severe enough.
Accent on the given problem is also due to the election campaign considerations (the defense of Russians is a sure slogan), but unlike other issues, which are of a temporary nature, the use of the Russian factor will long be one of the instruments of political action with the Russian leaders.
Models of Coexistence

For all the diversity of models offered by different political forces, their characteristic feature is the recognition of a special role of Kazakhstan, the approach to the other Central Asian states being practically undifferentiated. Turkmenistan was recently called a "strategic ally". The title does not pertain to a special role assiged to it by the Russian politicians; it reflects a search for counterbalance to the positions of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea issue.
Some researchers believe that such a state of things is to be explained, above all, by the geopolitical specificity, which itself dictates different levels of relations. Significantly, such point of view is maintained by a Kazakh scholar, whom, to tell the truth, his Kazakh colleagues do not forgive such free thought. It is the opinion of N.Masanov that "Central Asia, geopolitically, is the province of precisely the Moscow-St.Petersburg nuclear space, and by mere force of circumstances, owing to its geographical situation, it was and will be compelled to revolve around the Moscow-st.Petersburg nuclear space. In relation to the Moscow-St.Petersburg nuclear space, Kazakhstan represents a periphery of the third-and-fourth level, while the other Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan etc. represent a periphery of the fifth-and-sixth level. And, naturally, they find themselves in a dependent position" /19/.
Of the entire complex of causes determining Russia's heightened interest in Kazakhstan - the geopolitical interests, the vast territory, the presence of resources, and nuclear we- apons on its territory - the main one is, no doubt, the issue of the Russian-speaking population. In all the schemes of Russian politicians concerning the future configuration of CIS, its center and periphery, Kazakhstan is included in the nucleus of the main states (Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan). A.Migranyan, for instance, pointed out: "... in order not to allow the emergence of a serious counterbalance to itself within the framework of CIS, Russia is trying gradually to increase the nucleus of the Commonwealth. No wonder therefore that the first to be discussed was the problem of an economic union between Russia and Byelorussia. The Ukraine was compelled to join it, and only then did the inclusion of Kazakhstan and other CIS members take place" /20/.
Special attention Migranyan pays precisely to the specificity of the ethno-cultural situation in Kazakhstan. In his opinion, the attempts to prevent an explosion in Kazakhstan primarily determine Nazarbayev's desire for integration within the framework of CIS and promotion of close contacts with Russia. The vulnerability of Kazakhstan makes possible its being pressurized by Russia.
Today the Russian government, which formerly did prefer exerting pressure on Kazakhstan (for example, the still unremoved demand of introducing dual citizenship, quite unacceptable for the republic ethnically almost split in two), has made concessions to Nazarbayev in a number of issues having to do with the creation of an economic union and the development of closer contacts. This is due to the awareness that the remaining in power of Nazarbayev, who resists Radical-Nationalists of every stripe, is a kind of a guarantee for maintaining stability in the republic. Moreover, in the conditions when Russia got stuck in Chechnya, the searches of reliable partners inside CIS have acquired for it special importance, the more so that the Kazakhs are Muslims. The agreements signed with Kazakhstan in January 1995 /21/ and then the summit held in Almaty were important factors that have made it possible for the Kazakhstan president to take steps to strengthen his power and to extend the field for manoeuvre.
In March 1995, the Constitutional Court of the republic announced the parliamentary election invalid, violating the existing law and, consequently, the parliament itself illegitimate. President Nazarbayev dissolved the parliament and ordered a Kazakhstan referendum.
The fact that the president has assumed the whole of the state power and intends obtaining the national mandate to extend the term of his presidency reflects complicated processes taking place in the republic not only at the level of relations between the executive and legislative branches of power but also in a wider national context.
After the parliamentary election, Nazarbayev, as we know, was subjected to quite a strong pressure by different political groups, whose representatives had obtained seats in the Supreme Soviet. On the one hand, greater activity began to be shown by the conservatives, who are against reforms, on the other, by the nationalistic opposition. The latter was represented by heterogeneous groupings. They included representatives of the national minorities - Russians, Koreans, etc., who felt ever less confident with the progress of erection of the new Kazakh state. The implementation of the law concerning the language, which is spoken only by a part of the Kazakhs themselves; the policy of gradual settlement of the northern areas of Kazakhstan, with their compact Russian population, by Kazakhs; the changing of the old Russian appellations for Kazakh; discrimination against the Russians in everyday life, in providing employment, etc. - all these measures arouse dissatisfaction in the Russian and other non-Kazakh ethnoses. These really existing frictions and apprehensions were used by the part of the opposition that played the national minorities card to undermine Nazarbayev's positions.
On the other hand, he felt the even stronger and more effective pressure of the Kazakh nationalists, represented mostly by the southern clans, who accused the president of insufficiently taking into account the interests of the titular nationality, who capitalized on national revival slogans being utterly out of touch with realities and ignoring the peculiarities of ethnic structure of Kazakhstan, where half of the population are non-Kazakhs. Moreover, the southern clans, deprived, in their opinion, of a sufficient share in the political establishment, were ready to regard as enemies not only members of other ethnoses but also the Russianized educated part of the Kazakhs. They were called "mankurts", i.e., people who had lost the memory, national traditions, etc. It was the pressure of this quite representative group, whose demands Nazarbayev, for understandable political reasons, could not ignore, that served to weaken his positions among the Russian-speaking population, who pinned on Nazarbayev, known for his tolerance, great hopes at the initial stage of the independence. On a larger scale, the Kazakh nationalists' activities served to complicate relations with Russia as well, which was especially against the president's interests. They provoked the nationalists' actions in Russia itself, the latter demanding that unrelenting pressure should be brought to bear on the Kazakh leadership. No wonder that some deputies of the State Duma announced their intention to have the position of the Russians in Kazakhstan coordinated with the signing of any bilateral agreements.
Finally, part of the deputies accused Nazarbayev of authoritarianism.

The steps taken by the Kazakh president are, of course, far removed from democracy. At the same time the strengthening of executive power in the concrete conditions of Kazakhstan can provide more reliable guarantees for the continuation of the policy of reforms. The president was able to cut off the radicals, whose influence on the process of making political decisions was of a destabilizing character.
At the same time the Russian authorities were dissapointed by the reluctance of the Kazakh leadership to grant Russian a status of the second state language and to soften its position on the Caspian Sea.
Despite existing frictions between the two countries, the possibility of a military-political alliance with Kazakhstan is likewise recognized by the politicians who consider integration within the framework of CIS unrealistic and unnecessary /22/.
Kazakhstan's special role as a component part of a certain new type of state is also recognized by the followers of the nationalist orientation. But while the officials speak of such a form of association as will not mean its member countries' abandoning their own statehood, the nationalists express themselves much more plainly. In his interview to the magazine "Forbes" Alexander Solzhenitsyn said: "In 1990 already I wrote that Russia could desire the unification of but the three Slavic republics and Kazakhstan (with all the other republics to be left out). But the unification in a single state and not in a fragile far-fetched confederation with an enormous supranational bureaucratic machinery..." /23/.
Such an attitude is due not only to the author's actual non-recognition of the sovereignty of separate republics of the former USSR but, above all, to his conviction that the northern territories of Kazakhstan are, in fact, Russian. "The whole of the northern and north-eastern Kazakhstan is in actual fact Southern Siberia, it is populated primarily by Russians, who are repressed in Kazakhstan today in their national, cultural, business and everyday activities (just as the other non-Kazakhs, making up together with the Russians 60 per cent of the population of Kazakhstan)" /24/.
At the present time such an approach does not find a direct reflection in political practice but it is invariably present as a sort of a background. The government refers, as it has already been mentioned, preserving status quo as long as possible with a minimum of Russian expense. The more populistic Duma, where nationalists of the Zhirinovsky type have an impressive number of seats, is inclined to use the factor of the Russian population and to exert a heavier pressure on the Central Asian states. It is at this and lower levels that the approaches which can be called neo-imperialist are taking shape.
Thus, in any form of association with Russia Kazakhstan will always find a definite place for itself. But what about the other republics of Central Asia? A much greater diversity of views is to be found here, their significant aspect being, however, that the entire argumentation of the zealots of Russia's retaining its influence and presence in the region and of those who insist on an immediate withdrawal from there is based exclusively on the negative factors, on the threats coming from the region. In other words, both the continuing presence and withdrawal are regarded by their respective advocates (it applies, above all, to the political level of discussion) as but a lesser evil.
Precisely the same arguments are often used to corroborate essentially opposite and mutually exclusive schemes. These arguments and the ensuing conclusions, if an attempt is made to summarize them, will appear as follows:

conflictual situations in Central Asia are a threat to Russia's stability. /a/ Therefore Russia is the only country whose military presence, political influence and economic aid can help to stabilize the situation. /b/ Therefore Russia should withdraw from the region in order not to be involved in conflicts, which can only exhaust it.

there is a real danger of destabilizing influence of the extremist forces from the "far abroad". /a/ Therefore Rus- sia should defend the border, which is simultaneously the border of CIS. /b/ Therefore Russia should fix and fortify its own frontier in order not to suffer unnecessary losses.

the Russian-speaking population in Central Asia has the right to count on Russia's protection. /a/ Therefore Russia should continue its presence or close contacts with the states of the region as the guarantee of normal existence of the Russian-speaking population. /b/ The Russian-speaking population will all the same be ousted to Russia. It is enough to provide opportunities for their settlement in Russia.

the Central Asian states are actively developing relations with the Moslem states of the "far abroad". It is not excluded that the emerging vacuum can be filled by forces unfriendly or even hostile to Russia. /a/ Russia should stay on in order to prevent the appearance of such vacuum. /b/ The Central Asian states belong to a different culture and civilization. Their joining the Moslem world is inevitable, and it is useless to squander resources to keep them in the sphere of one's influence.

Since the adherents of different approaches use the very same arguments, their conceptions are not infrequently of a speculative nature and influence but indirectly the formulation of Russia's political line with regard to Central Asia. The endless debates about the "Atlantism" and Eurasia, about the special mission of Russia as the bridge or buffer between the West and the East, whose importance is growing with the aggravation of confrontation between the North and the South, can be classed rather as intellectual exercises than practical recommendations. Sergei Stankevich, speaking of the need to revive the Eastern aspect of Russia's foreign policy, complained of the absence of ideologists capable of formulating the Eastern question at its contemporary level and of practical officials capable of offering effective responses /25/.

Meanwhile attempts to define the place of the Central Asian states in the system of Russian strategy and within the bounds of the CIS were made repeatedly. The extreme solutions (complete withdrawal or preservation of practically the former amount of presence) have already been mentioned. Much more productive, from the practical point of view, are intermediate solutions. For instance, Vladimir Lukin, former Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the USA, Chairman of the State Duma Committee for International Affairs, rejecting the possibility of Russia's withdrawal from Central Asia, suggested building up a multi-level system of relations with the states of the region depending on their importance for Russia. His idea consisted in creating "a clear-cut system of reciprocal commitments between the big state and its smaller neighbours which will receive security guarantees in exchange for the recognition of the special interests and influence of the 'big neighbour' proportionately to its geographical proximity and strategical and economic weight". The system will be realized within the bounds of close allied relations with some states and partnership with others. "The level of our relations with friends, as a rule, is to be qualitatively higher than our relations with partners, and the level of relations between our partners and our friends is to be qualitatively lower than between us and our friends" /26/.
Although the author did not precisely specify what place the Central Asian states will occupy in the scheme he proposes, obviously most of them can hardly expect to have the status of "friends". Quite modest tasks are assigned to Russia in this region by A.Migranyan: the development of economic relations, the training of national armies and arms delivery. The latter prefers not to mention why these countries will inevitably remain in the sphere of Russia's economic and military-political influence /27/. What is meant here is even less than partners but rather some sort of dominions.
Intermediate schemes thus leave to Central Asia (minus Kazakhstan) merely the status of a periphery connected more or less with Russia. While in the first case Russia is stillrecognized as having certain obligations and responsibility for what is taking place at the southern borders of the CIS, in the second case they are practically denied. However doubtful the term "neoimperialism" may be as applied to the present policy of Russia in Central Asia, it should be admitted that the trend towards reducing commitments while preserving the influence corresponds to it much more than the attempts to construct a differentiated scheme of relationships.
The evolution of approaches of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Central Asian region in particular, after 1992 was due to a variety of reasons. On the one hand, this was helped by the internal political developments in Russia itself. The crystallization of ideas of the national-state interest was taking place in the context of growing influence of the nationalistic trend and the strengthening authoritarian tendencies. On the other, the shock of the civil war in Tajikistan and the remaining tension sharply reduced the possibilities of continuing the neoisolationist policy and keeping aloof from the events in Central Asia.