IV. THE CONFLICT AND THE SOCIAL-POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN THE TWO COUNTRIES

The following short survey of the positions of the political forces on each side of the conflict demonstrates the lack of readiness of the majority of them for compromise.

A) Armenia

The situation at the end of the first half of 2002 points to three standpoints among the dominating sentiments of the political forces of Armenia:

1. The supporters of the independence or the integration of Nagorni-Karabakh into Armenia. These are the overwhelming majority of right- and left-centrist forces of Armenia. It is possible to count among them the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), which is the ruling party at present, the ARF (Dashnaktsutyun), the People's Party of Armenia, the National Democratic Party, the “Constitutional Rights” Union, “Orinats Erkir” and others, the members of which make up the overwhelming majority of deputies in the Armenian Parliament;
2. The supporters of the resolution of the Karabakh conflict by Armenia and Nagorni Karabakh’s joining the Byelorus-Russian Union. These include CPA, APIRBA, the majority of parties and organisations forming the broad coalition of socialist powers in Armenia and so on;
3. The supporters of concessions to Azerbaijan: AOD, a few pro-AOD small parties and organizations, such as the “New Way” Party, which even in 1993 emphasised the necessity of giving Nagorni Karabakh up to Azerbaijan.

The approximate estimation of the influence of these groups is thus: the first group enjoys the support of between 75 and 80 percent of Armenian citizens; the second – between 14 and 19 percent; the third – about 1 percent. This correlation is prompted, in particular, by the fact that in April 2001 all fractions of the Armenian Parliament came out against the schemes of settlement stipulating some form of subordination of Nagorni Karabakh to Azerbaijan, as well as solutions which would include the loss of some territory that was part of Armenia.

After the tragic events in the Armenian Parliament on 27^th October 1999, some changes in positions took place within the so-called “party of power”, because the Republican Party of Armenia and the People's Party of Armenia-2 alliance, the back-bone of the “Unity” ruling block, collapsed. Even now in Armenia, an active process of formation and strengthening of the structural organisation of many new parties and political blocks is taking place. For instance, a “Republic” Party (with the ex-prime minister of Armenia Aram Sargsian at its head) has been formed, which, with the People's Party of Armenia-2, has introduced a coalition consisting of 13 parties and organisations. It should be noted that these forces are in opposition to the present-day power of Armenia. Their official position concerning Karabakh has not been made clear. However, there is no doubt that despite their opposition to President Kocharyan, they would hardly take the risk of propagating any plan of settlement which hints that Nagorni Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan.

Taking into account that 2002 - 2003 in Armenia and Nagorni Karabakh are the years of preparation for the next presidential (and in Armenia also for parliamentary) elections, there is no doubt that very many political forces in Armenia and Nagorni Karabakh will take radical stands in the matter of settlement of the conflict. An obvious expression of this tendency is the emergence of a conspicuous movement which has come out against the return of the Azeri occupied territories around Nagorni Karabakh even after the achievement of a political settlement. Their motto is that these territories can't be called “occupied”, that as well as the proper territory of Nagorni Karabakh they are the ancient lands of Armenia and they should be called “liberated territories”. One of the most influential organisations in this movement is simply called the “Organisation for the Defence of the Liberated Territories”. “Our concession to Azerbaijan is the fact that at its request in 1994 we stopped our advance, otherwise this state would have collapsed. No concession must be made to Azerbaijan,” one of the leaders of this movement, Zhirair Sefilyan, stated recently.

At the same time, the degree of tension in Armenian society in connection with the expected new proposals of the co-chairmen of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, is unlikely to abate. What is more we want to note that because of the radicalisation of sentiments in Azerbaijan in favour of the resumption of the war as a way of resolving the conflict in Armenia and Nagorni Karabakh, a tendency towards militarisation is growing. Like before, this impulse was stated by the leader of Nagorni Karabakh, Arkady Gukasyan, who said in an interview in the American newspaper “The Los Angeles Times”: “If Azerbaijan wants war, it will get it.”²¹

B) Nagorni Karabakh

All political forces in this non-recognised state (including the pro-power coalition, the CP and ARF(D), and also numerous public organisations of patriotic character) are in favour of the independence of Nagorni Karabakh or its reunification with Armenia.

Thus, it is possible to conclude that the political atmosphere in Armenia and Nagorni Karabakh on the whole can't be called tolerable in relation to the conflict and to the position of Azerbaijan in the matter of resolving the Karabakh problem. The dominating sentiments in the society of Armenia and Nagorni Karabakh can't help being influenced by the fact that the major part of citizens in Azerbaijan don't reject the possibility of resumption of the war. According to sociological researches in the countries of the South Caucasus, held within the frameworks of the “South Caucasus System for Civil Consent” project in 2002 with the support of the European Commission, 32% of respondents in Azerbaijan believe that a resumption of military actions in the Karabakh conflict is probable. For comparison, in Armenia only 16.6% of interviewed respondents take the same position²².

C) Azerbaijan

The position of the majority of political parties in Azerbaijan corresponds to what was said in the “Charter of the Four”, published in the summer of 2001. This document stands as an answer to the aforementioned statements of the fractions and groups in the National Assembly of Armenia. In the summer of 2001, an initiative group held meetings and consultations on the coordination of the Charter. As a result it was signed by about 600 people: the leaders of the biggest political parties, non-governmental organisations and media, religious leaders, representatives of the intelligentsia and so on. In September and October 2001, the Charter was sent to the President of Azerbaijan and presented to public, before being delivered to the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group and sent to international organisations.

The Charter assumes that the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia can be settled only stage-by-stage and with consistent observance of the following four principles:

• all occupied lands must be cleared and the territorial integrity of the state restored;
• refugees and those forced to resettle elsewhere must return to their homes, including Shusha and other settlements in Nagorni Karabakh and the security of their life must be guaranteed;
• Nagorni Karabakh can be granted the right of self-government, but the powers implementing the sovereignty of the state must be left to the supreme organs of power of Azerbaijan;
• if the settlement of the conflict by peaceful methods turns out to be impossible, Azerbaijan, in accordance with the UN Charter and certain resolutions of the Security Council, must banish the aggressor, using force.

A somewhat different approach is suggested by the Social Democratic Party:

1. Azerbaijan must declare its position on the opening of communications and roads between Azerbaijan and Armenia;

2. Proposing a status to NK in the structure of Azerbaijan, it is necessary first to declare the following:

a) Nagorni Karabakh is an autonomy that lives on the basis of the principle of self-government, uniting both the Azeri and Armenian citizens of this region;

b) The term “Lachin Corridor” implies only the highway under control of international forces and Azerbaijan Customs;

c) Nagorni Karabakh is declared to be a free economic zone and means are allotted for its development;

d) On the initiative of the Armenian minority, a non-governmental organisation is formed – the Armenian Fund for Culture. The Azerbaijan budget transfers a part of its taxes to Armenians living in Azerbaijan; the state should not interfere in matters of culture.

The Fund must have an international status and independently select the place of its location;

3. Azerbaijan must clarify the status of Nagorni Karabakh;

4. Before the completion of the resolution of the conflict, Azerbaijan must make clear its decision to restore economic relations and trade with Armenia;

5. The Azerbaijan administration declares that it will not obstruct the relations of state or private organisations of their Armenian partners;

6. Azerbaijan applies to the states of the South Caucasus and international organisations to assist international non-governmental peace-keeping organisations acting in the region

7. The Azerbaijan state starts its straight negotiations with the leaders of Nagorni Karabakh; on behalf of the state these negotiations can be carried out by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Chairman of the Commission on National Relations or by one of the representatives of the President of Azeraijan²³.

D) Grassroots Diplomacy

At the beginning of the 1990s, grassroots diplomacy was quite active. It generated some hopes of melting the ice of distrust between the Azeri and Armenian peoples and establishing dialogue between them. Substantial work in this respect was carried out by the American “Global Community” organisation, which arranged several meetings between the representatives of creative and scientific groups, as well as non-governmental and peace-making organisations in the two countries. Thanks to this mission, for the first time after the commencement of the conflict, joint projects and meetings aimed at reducing tension and advancing cooperation between non-governmental organisations in the two republics began to be implemented. In 1993, the chairwomen of the National Committees of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assemblies of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Arzu Abdullayeva and Anahit Bayandur, won the Olaf Palme Peace Prize for their outstanding activities towards the establishment of peace in the region by the power of grassroots diplomacy.

Lately, however, a sharp decline in these activities has been observed, despite efforts by western countries and international organisations to support them. This is partially accounted for by a general apathy, caused by the failure of efforts by official executives and structures to achieve at least some progress in the settlement of the conflict. However, the greatest factor which obstructs the development of grassroots diplomacy is, undoubtedly, the growing negative attitude to it on the part of both official organs and some parties and organisations in both countries. In Azerbaijan, they adhere to the view that any contact with the “Armenian aggressor” should not be tolerated, presuming that these contacts only strengthen Armenia’s position. There have even been assaults on Armenian representatives coming to Baku to participate in these discussions (for instance, in September 2001) and cases when Armenian representatives have not been allowed into Azerbaijan. By contrast, Armenia is ready to receive any delegation from Azerbaijan, whereas attempts to visit Nagorni Karabakh or some of its regions often run into refusals, the motive of which are not clear.

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²¹ “The Los Angeles Times”, 28.03.2001
²² “Golos Armenii” newspaper, 23 May,2002
²³ We are grateful to Zardusht Alizadhe, the co-chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, for providing us the document dated back to 1995