I. INTRODUCTION: THE LEVELS OF THE KARABAKH CONFLICT: FROM LOCAL TO GLOBAL SCALE

Since the time of its entrance the USSR the multinational Azerbaijan had already had its own ethnic problems, but only one of them developed into a full-scale war with the Armenian population of Nagorni Karabakh and Armenia for NK. Armenians made up (according to the statistics) 70-75 % of NK population - 150-160 thousand. As a result of this confrontation the “freedom” of Karabakh Armenians cost about 50000 lives of people perished from both sides, forced resettlement of 250 thousand Azeris from Armenia and 400 thousand Armenians from Azerbaijan, seizure of six more regions of Azerbaijan besides the enclave NK, 800 thousand refugees in its own country. The Azerbaijan Republic claims that 20% of its territory is occupied by the Republic of Armenia. The Republic of Armenia assures that it was the result of the struggle of the Defense Army of the unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) against 7-million Azerbaijan and, consequently, it is Azerbaijan’s internal affair. Whereas enclave NK turned into a territory united with the Republic of Armenia almost all along the state border between the two countries.

The further presentation of the material requires certain clarification of what can conventionally be called “the levels” of the conflict. Their importance arises from the fact that transitions from one level to another quite substantially modified the character of the confrontation and the ways of solution of the problem. Taken in chronological sequence the dynamics of the Karabakh conflict can be displayed by the following scheme of levels.

1. Ethnic-confessional: Azeris – Armenians
2. Regional: Azerbaijan – Karabakh – Armenia
3. Soviet – post-Soviet: Azerbaijan – USSR (Russia – RF) – Armenia
4. International: Azerbaijan – Armenia and others “players” (the most important of them – the USA, Russia, the countries of the European Council, Turkey, Iran)

We think it necessary to analyze these levels separately before passing to the analysis of possible variants of stabilization, and only then to the ways and methods of solution of the conflict.

1. THE ETHNIC LEVEL OF THE CONFLICT

The radical distinction of ethnic-confessional self-identification of Azeris and Armenians is quite obvious although sometimes it, whatever paradoxical it may be, turns into likeness. Azeris refer themselves to a large-scale community of Muslims and to the minor, but still great, community of Turks. Azeris think themselves to be a numerous people and practically are never disturbed by the problem of ethnic survival, of its possible extinction. Azeris are mostly Shi’ites, that distinguishes their position in the Muslim world, in general, and offers them an almost exceptional one in the Turkic world. Armenians belong to the large-scale community of Christians. However, due to their confessional specificity they hold (and they conceive the fact) a particular place among them, regard themselves as a unique ethnic group. Owing to the long period of their life in the surroundings of non-Christian culture and historical collisions Armenians have developed a persistent sense of constant threat of extinction of "a small ethnic group in conditions of hostile surrounding". It seems obvious that this element of Armenian mentality played an important part in the development of this conflict, and more to it, it is playing a significant part at the present stage as well. It is, for instance, one of the reasons of their distrust to the assurances of the Azeri side about ensuring security of Armenians of NK.

During the years of the Soviet system both peoples lost their spirit of religion. As a result, Islam and correspondingly Christianity turned into a form of ordinary religious affairs. Nevertheless, Armenians retained their perception of religion as a factor of consolidation of the people, of the church - as an institution of self-government and social organization (and this part was really carried out by the Armenian Apostolic church during the centuries Armenia was deprived of its own statehood).

For all this, the closeness of these two people seems to have much deeper roots than the seventy years of life in approximately similar conditions of the Soviet regime (let alone the earlier historical periods). For instance, historical situation have repeatedly encouraged in both cases the de-ethnisization of some layers of these peoples. The "ethnic-genetic material" of native Albanians was chiefly shared by these two peoples. And the last is that the long joint habitation brought to a great number of mixed marriages leading to marginalization of both ethnos.

It is really astonishing that closeness of Georgians and Armenians at all accounts should have been greater than that of Armenians and Azeris, but a great many of historical-cultural facts and regularities prove the opposite. This fact found its strikingly vivid reflection in the places, usually in provinces, where representatives of these peoples lived together and formed a peculiar symbiosis.

Azeris always distinguished "our" and "foreign" Armenians, and the "our" Armenians ("from Karabakh") (in the eyes of Azeris) always opposed themselves to "Yerevanians". This is why it is possible to speak about several "Azeri" ("belonging to Bakuvites", "Armenian", "Georgian," etc.) and "Armenian" ("belonging to Karabakh", "Yerevanian", "diaspora") mental attitude in relation to "neighbors" and "history". The inverted comas in one and the other cases mean that all these spheres are mythologized to a sufficient extent, saturated with unconscious and subconscious motives and stuffed with "facts". The historical myths and the shift of responsibility from one ethnic group of the people to the other never lost their grounds.

However, approximately since the middle of the XIX century the proper experience of conflict inter-relations of Armenians and Azeris in the area has begun. It continued with bloody confrontations of 1905, 1918 and the years to follow up till the contemporary events, when the conflicting sides manifested a tendency to mutual annihilation, crossed the thresholds of humanity, like Serbs and Croatians at their time. The attempts to identify the opposing side as "barbarians" were realized in multiple phobias, fright before each other, in the formation of the image of the enemy, in the conversion of subconscious phantoms into reality. Two components of the forming elite - intelligentsia and religious figures, devoid of the experience of democracy, played the negative part, intensified by the decisive role of "revolutionary anarchy" rendered by the "newly arrived" bellicose elements. Just in such surroundings emerges the idea of genocide of Azeris, claims for the so-called Western Azerbaijan in response to the Armenian claims for Karabakh and Nakhchivan.

One of the ways out of the dead-ends of consciousness is seen in modeling in the region those principles of joint Diaspora life of Armenians and Azeris that got formed in Russia, the cooperation of which is seldom burdened by "the idols of the past and the present". The possibilities of destruction of the myths also proceed from the processes of democratization, that make the social, political and economic spheres of public life quite transparent .

2. REGINAL LEVEL OF THE CONFLICT

The Karabakh conflict became the main factor in the (early or late) formation of the national elites of Azerbaijan, Armenia and even of NK, claiming political power. Coming to power was possible only through an upsurge of nationalism. It is a mistake to think that the Baltic countries witnessed a democratic, liberal break-through. They also experienced an upsurge of nationalism but this was common to the Baltic republics and projected externally against the USSR. This didn't take place in the South Caucasus. The different attitudes of the three republics to the search for an external orientation, their constant shifts in position and later Georgia's and the Azerbaijan Republic 's joining the CIS dissipated their expectations and results.

The leaders of the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia have for ever become hostages of national slogans and sentiments, and not only did they have to, but they also did so consciously in the knowledge that prolongation of the conflict is an indispensable condition of retaining personal power. (The case with the first President of the Republic of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosian, is the exception which confirms the rule). The fact that politically active masses and leaders being mainly from the peasantry led to the modification of the psychology and logic of the political situation and its analysis. Today's leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan - Robert Kocharian and Heydar Aliyev - rely on certain forces (of a “Diaspora” character) and have to curry their favour. Meanwhile, the hard and cruel period of primary accumulation of capital has already ended and brought the capital under the control of small groups ("clans") of people tied with each other.

In such a situation there appears a strong need for a certain "new way of thinking" in the political elites of the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia, but the time was pressing and the formation of such a new approach may demand a change of the present political elites and their leaders. The problem of the system of stability assumes an extraordinary significance in case if a shift of elites takes place in the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic ( as much in Georgia too).

Georgia, which could assume the task of consolidation of the region ( and of formation of that very "new way of thinking"), itself has been buried in a mountain of problems, including ethnic conflicts. The impossibility of a Tri-partite Alliance is uncannily similar to the situation at the beginning of the 20^th century when all these three republics obtained short-lived independence. And the sentiments of the NK population shouldn't be underestimated. Over ten years the Armenians of NK, like the Abkhazians, live de facto without any subordination to another country, and this fact reflects on their mentality and turns them into a peculiar factor in the political situation of the region which is often made use of by foreign forces.

It is obvious that the development of civil societies and institutions, and, in general, the consolidation of democracy, is an important (although insufficient) condition for a final solution of the conflict and reconciliation of the two peoples. The formation of civil unions and structures directed in their activities to the consolidation of democratic processes in the three republics and the formation of an intellectual forum of the South-Caucasian countries are important factors of these processes. The search for a common model to resolve the multiple conflicts in the republics of the region, the analysis of the problem of ethnic similarity (homogeneity) and its different representation in the republics of the South Caucasus, setting up Russian, American and European forums of the peoples of the South Caucasus and coordination of their actions are important aspects of the activities for reducing the level of tension in the conflicts of the region.

3. SOVIET-POST SOVIET LEVEL OF THE CONFLICT

The Karabakh conflict is the longest and bitterest, although not the first one in the dying agonies of the USSR. One way or another, one tendency was clearly observed at those times - the growing tension in the area, later called, the "southern under-belly" of the USSR (Russia). In this area were concentrated conservative regimes which regarded communism as a favorable form of long-gone feudal rule. And namely here, in this region "perestroyka" couldn't rely on the structures of power. There is a view that inter-ethnic confrontations, uncharacteristic for the Soviet regime were provoked by the "Center" with the singular aim of undermining the image of the local conservative ruling elite and replacing the leaders of the old type with new ones, though still from the communist nomenclature. If it is really so, then these processes were not thoroughly thought over, nor were steps taken to ensure that any undesirable consequences of the conflicts were kept in check or to keep out third party actors inevitably attracted to these events because of the opportunity they offered these third parties to realise their political ambitions. The change of the elite burdened the Center with quite new problems. It couldn't control them with absolute power like it had done before. The hypocritical slogans of the "perestroyka" were snatched up at first by the national elites, but then, however, they were co-opted by the completely regenerated nomenclature, having tasted the pure initial capitalism, deprived of any, except verbal support for liberalism, freedom, democracy, the market and human rights.

National conflicts were gradually, stage by stage turning into methods for:

a) political mobilization;

b) putting pressure on the government;

c) seizure of power;

d) retention of power;

e)contrivance of "black holes" on the territory of what was then still a single state, for smuggling abroad great amounts of money, raw material, narcotics, live commodities, weapons, etc.

This suited everybody "running from the drowning ship: the USSR", except the inhabitants of these "black holes" who were forced to ensure these channels were kept open at the price of an escalation of military confrontation and of a sudden deterioration of living standards, weakening of state security and chaos in the legal systems and mechanisms for defending rights on the territories in conflict. The scraping up of significant capital helped the new elites "lobby" their interests in the Center which was in its turn also passing into the hands of the new nomenclature.

The sudden collapse of the USSR, acted by the scenario of “Belovezhie agreements” adopted in Byelorus was a favorable moment to end the conflicts in the South Caucasus, but, unfortunately, it was missed because the stability of the powers in the region depended on successes and failures in those very conflicts. And moreover, the course of events in the conflicts themselves depended to a certain extent on the deliveries of Russian weapons and the participation of Russian military instructors. The post-Soviet victories and defeats of the countries within the region, and in the first place those of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic, to a significant degree depended on "donations" from the Russian Federation. As the Azerbaijan Republic and Georgia had not entered the CIS they gradually became the objects of Russia's political, economic and military pressure. Eventually they changed both their ruling elite and, temporarily, their political orientation. Nevertheless Russia completely failed to propose any sensible means for a solution of the conflicts, and to render any economic help or a way for integration (although Russia rendered a decisive part in the achievement of cease-fire in the Karabakh and other conflicts of the region). There is no foreseeing the milestones of the development of the Russian Federation. In addition, the fatal frustrations and failures of reforms arouse stable skepticism even in relation to such an active figure as President Putin. Russia’s priorities are stubbornly guided by its political interests and in the framework of the latter the conflicts of the South Caucasus have to stay in a suspended state for an indefinite time. On the other hand, it is quite predictable what attitude Russia will manifest in case of achievement of a hypothetical agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic and their transition to a Western orientation, excluding Moscow from partnership in the region.

History again presents such a chance to the countries of the region, however strange it might seem. But what will be the actions of the ruling elites and the public? The Republic of Armenia holds the key role in this matter. But again, there isn't a common center to take decisions, and historical ones by nature at that. It can't be ruled out, though, that these countries may take a decision in favor of RF, that is, to again return to the political orbit of Moscow. In this case it is necessary to consider perspectives for political and especially economic development and the speed of Russian Federation's integration with the European community. The point is that these tempos determine the degree of the USA's “withdrawal” from European affairs. But for the time being we can observe a polarization of the political orientation of the countries in the region which is on the whole, negative: Azerbaijan looks towards the USA, Georgia to Western Europe and Armenia to Russia.

However that may be, there may again be presented a historical chance for the countries of the region to come to a consensus on the contradictions which have been tormenting them. It seems, however, that their political elites haven't yet matured enough to take unpopular, but eventually necessary decisions helping to put an end to conflicts and restore mutual trust in the region. For all this, it is already favorable that an understanding is growing in the region -slowly but nonetheless growing - that there is no real alternatives to peaceful negotiations and only this route can bring the sides in the conflict to a system of mutual guarantees of security, stability and cooperation in the region.

Taking the above into account the intellectual and political elites must assume the task of thinking up variants of uniting and elaborating a common political orientation for the countries of the region. It doesn't mean at all that this, as many people think, will be a new one-sided and strict orientation on one country. It means a tri-partite vision of the political future of the South Caucasus.

4. THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT.

Owing to the conflicts the processes of globalization came to the South Caucasus region sooner than in other parts of the post-Soviet area. The presence of oil intensified those processes by giving the conflicts an international aspect. The consequences of this process have barely been studied and here we make an attempt to outline in brief the scope of problems which emerged as a result of it.

Since May 1994 a fragile cease-fire has reigned here in the course of which the sides couldn't come to any acceptable variants of solution of the inter-ethnic conflict. If the region had been situated in other geopolitical conditions and Azerbaijan hadn't had the strategic resources of perspective oil extraction the conflict would have been settled long ago. However several great countries and the world superpower, the USA, have come all at once to have in the region their "vitally important, strategic" interests, not always publicly stated and entangled in a complex ball of contradictions. In its statements made over several years about the political priorities of the South Caucasus Russia does its best to recover the influence the USSR had in the region. Iran, greatly worried by a possible penetration of the USA and the NATO to the region, resists in all possible ways the inflow of western investments and the formation of a new world center of economic development in the region, which implies uniting Western Europe with Far East by means of communications and oil-gas pipelines. Despite quite real contradictions RF and Iran at present have to become tactical allies, striving to oppose the unbound ambitions of the West to include the vast regions of the South Caucasus and Central Asia (CA) into its sphere of political and economic influence. The three recognized republics of the South Caucasus are assigned different roles by these opposing countries, but it is clear that a full-scale realization of anybody’s ambitions in the region is possible only if all three countries are included in a common geopolitical space.

It may seem paradoxical that Armenia which has the most significant diaspora in the West became an ally of namely Russia and, as a matter of fact, a conductor of its political interests in the region. Despite the fact that it was precisely on the insistence of the Armenian diaspora that the USA introduced in 1992 sanctions against Azerbaijan formulated in Amendment 907 to the "Freedom Support Act" ( making Azerbaijan the only country in the CIS deprived of the USA's humanitarian assistance until the events of September 11 2001), the Republic of Armenia continues to believe that it can realize its goals only in alliance with Russia. The grounds for this choice is the coincidence of the interests of RF and the Republic of Armenia: the former strives to turn the Republic of Armenia into a military-political outpost of its influence, the latter sees in RF its protector from its traditional foe - Turkey, which completely defends the position of the Azerbaijan Republic in the Karabakh conflict. The Azeri side states that in 1996-1998 RF gifted the Republic of Armenia heavy arms costing 1 billion US dollars (including missiles capable of reaching Baku). There is a fear in Azerbaijan that all this military power is meant to inflict Azerbaijan a blow aimed at the seizure of new territories, which have strategic significance for the functioning of the Baku-Supsa (Georgia) pipeline and the laying of the new Baku-Ceyhan (Turkey) oil pipeline. Armenians find this scenario hard to agree with because next door in Turkey is a military no less powerful with a strong interest in the conflict.

Generally, the relations of Turkey with the countries of the region is an important aspect in the international "dimension" of the situation in the South Caucasus. Turkey itself, as a big and powerful regional state, quite naturally, strives to strengthen its influence in the newly independent countries of the region. Besides, as a member of the NATO and the main regional ally of the USA, Turkey objectively takes part in the competition (albeit somewhat weakened and indistinct lately) between Russia and the West for influence in the South Caucasus. However the positions of Turkey in the region have been consolidated slower than it might be expected on the face of it. The reason is the Karabakh conflict. Having common ethnic characteristics with Azerbaijan, Turkey took a strong position in the conflict in favor of this country.

The matter is not in the material or military help, but more importantly the psychological aspect of the support, consolidated by internal political realities both in Turkey and Azerbaijan. Rather often in the media (Armenian and foreign) it is said that if it weren't for the factor of Turkey the political elite of the Azerbaijan Republic would have been more inclined to compromises. One way or another, Turkey de facto imposed economic sanctions on the Republic of Armenia: closed the common border and refused direct trade with the republic. Considering that this was done in the interests of a third country - Azerbaijan, this is a rare case in the history of the last decade. Perhaps the only comparison it bears is with Iraq’s unilateral embargo on oil exports in April 2002 as a token of its support for the Palestinian struggle against Israel in April 2002. And there is one more factor to add: the traditional mutual wariness of Armenians and Turkey aggravated by the problem of qualifying the events of 1915 (Armenians presume that, in essence, the problem is whether these events should be called "genocide", that nobody in Turkey denies either that hundreds of thousands of Armenians perished at that time; Turks in their turn don't agree with this statement and stress that the same number of Turks and Kurds perished at those times, too). As a result, the border between the Republic of Armenia and Turkey became the second line of tension after the border dividing the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic (however, let's make it clear and say that in the latter case it would be more appropriate to speak not about the borders, but about the lines of opposition, at least for the reason that as a result of military actions these lines have become different from the official borders). As it was already mentioned, this situation is being exploited by another external player: Russia.

Meanwhile the Republic of Armenia is going through the next stage of its attempts to escape the influence of RF or at least to equalize it with the influence of the West (the USA). It is helped in this by the foreign political conception it adopted, the so-called "complementarism", presupposing a possible removal of discrepancies between the interests of Russia and the West in the region. It is characteristic that these efforts are undertaken by the forces, who came to power on the wave of criticism of moves made by former president Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who was impeached in 1998 after his attempts to solve the NK problem in accordance with the statement of the Chairman of the Lisbon Summit. Even such cautious steps by the Republic of Armenia are painfully received by the RF which instantly reacts in such cases with actions that destabilize the political situation in the South Caucasus.

Even official sources in the Republic of Armenia acknowledge that about 1 mln. people left the country as emigrants and in search of work, although independent experts think that this number is understated. The number of Armenians who left NK is also significant, the vast territories including the occupied ones are practically deserted, devoid of population. But in the neighboring countries - the Azerbaijan Republic (about 2 mln. people left the country) and Georgia (about 1,5 mln. left) - the situation is just as sorrowful, so bad in fact, that it would be appropriate to speak about a demographic catastrophe in the region, especially because the majority of those who leave their countries are young men of reproductive age. The economic stagnation of the Republic of Armenia, devoid of tangible raw materials and energy reserves points its political leadership towards solving the problem and joining the strategic projects of reformation of the region. This, possibly, runs counter to the interests of RF (if, generally, it is possible to speak about a matured conception of the policy of RF in the South Caucasus).

In the meantime during recent years the Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (MG) has been putting forward a thesis in favor of developing economic cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan before a political solution of the problem is achieved. Obviously, by this means the West envisages not only the possibility of removing tension in the region and the expansion of its investment programs, but also a certain decrease in the military-political influence of RF in the region.

It is natural that this kind of proposal should be always rejected by Azerbaijan which thinks that any cooperation with the country occupying its territory is impossible before the settlement of the conflict. The details of this will be dwelt on later.

Under these circumstances Georgia, which could assume an intermediary mission between the two countries of the South Caucasus, is itself, with Russia’s connivance, being pulled into the depths of inter-ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and of South Ossetia and of latent confrontations in Ajaria and Javakheti. It should be noted that, unlike the Azerbaijan Republic which is consistently advised to seek a solution to its problem only by peaceful negotiations, in the case with Georgia the West admits the possibility of military actions for the solution of the problem of its territorial integrity. In any event Georgia and the Azerbaijan Republic today are strategic allies and strive to jointly reduce the presence and influence of Russia in the region. The formation of the GUUAM Union (comprising Georgia, the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, though recently Uzbekistan announced its secession from this organization) has become, thus, one of the steps directed against Moscow's military- economic domination. And the USA's recent decision to inject $45 million into this organization may give it a new impulse for development.

The direct military-technical collaboration of Moscow with Iran and the formation of Russia-Iran-Armenia alliance are intended as a response to the West's challenge. Islamic Iran renders support to the Republic of Armenia and has cool relations with the Azerbaijan Republic. Iran consistently comes out against the policy of the USA of penetrating into the regions of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and together with this, unlike RF, it is indifferent to the democratic values of the West. The dragging out of the solution of the status of the Caspian sea also promotes to the efforts of Moscow and Tehran to oust the USA from the region and is confirmed by Iran's repeated declarations about its non-recognition of the oil contracts of the Azerbaijan Republic with the West. The latest example was in summer 2001 when Iran forced Azeri geophysical survey ships and the representatives of British oil firms to cease work in an Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea which Iran claims belongs to it. The rigidity of Iran’s policy in relation to the Azerbaijan Republic is accounted for by one more factor - by the habitation of a considerable number of ethnic Turks-Azeris in Iran (according to different assessments they number about 20 million, or about 30% of the population of Iran), who can be fomented by external forces to secede. Iran, to some extent taking advantage of a peculiar position of Western-European countries, is skillfully balancing on the verge of having global sanctions applied against it. Against the background of a sharp rise in petroleum prices the intrigue surrounding around the existing and planned pipelines has reached a climax. Iran, deprived by the efforts of the USA from participation in the extraction of Azeri oil does its best to regulate its cooperation with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan striving, thus, to direct their oil and gas pipe-lines to Western Europe and Far East via its territory.

Traditionally Azerbaijani oil, except for the low-capacity Baku – Batumi pipeline, has gone to the European market via the Baku - Novorossiysk pipeline. The planned Baku –Ceyhan pipeline, whose cost is estimated from $2,4 up to $3,5 billion, will transport Caspian oil bypassing the Russian Federation. It is clear, that the pipe-line war which has flared up will substantially determine the course of political events in the region. That has become especially true after the events of September 11, 2001 that placed the regions of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in the very center of modern geopolitical processes.

It's worth mentioning that according to media reports, the widely advertised meeting of the presidents of the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia in Key West (Florida) in April 2001 was, as a matter of fact, purely an attempt at "specification of relations " between Russia and the USA concerning their respective influence in the region, and not between the parties of the conflict over NК.

The situation in the South Caucasus, as we have already noted, paradoxically bears comparison with the beginning of the 20^th century, when Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia for a short period gained independence. Just as then, the republics are involved in an inter-ethnic confrontation accompanied by frequent military actions between them and inside their borders. Will the ending of the modern confrontation be any different from the sad experience of the beginning of the past century which deprived the countries of the South Caucasus of independence and promoted, with the silent consent of the West, the establishment of the Soviet regime in the region? The answer to this question depends on the degree of understanding by the political elites of the South Caucasus of the lessons of the sad past. Will the elites be able to restrain their political ambitions and irrepressible lust for personal enrichment to find an opportunity of integration of the region in the global political and economic system which is currently going through the processes of formation of a new world order? Certainly, we are not now living at the start of the 20^th century but to deprive independence of its real essence, to turn the republics of the South Caucasus into vassals and hostages of alien political ambitions and interests is quite possible.

So far what is unifying the region is the common state of hopeless penury and despair of the population, unemployment, mass emigration, monstrous corruption, mutual clan support and authoritarian methods of management revived by former Soviet party functionaries who took crammer courses in the western slogans of democracy and free market. These are the real results of the ethnic confrontation, and they are not final at that, because the desert sands are already spreading across the whole South Caucasus region as from three to five million people abandon the region in search of work and a peaceful life.

The seemingly transient conflict could, by becoming latent, last for decades, swallowing more and more new victims. The genuine democratic education of the population and protection of democratic values in the region is the only possible means for reviving it in the third millenium. Who is going to do that, how it will be done and what arguments can prod them into doing it is another matter?!

Just before the 21-st century began, little by little and prompted by hardship, mankind began to profess philosophy and culture of peace. The first shoots of this culture are too weak even to find their way to the sunlight through a thick centuries-old forest formed from a culture of war and violence. It is difficult to say when and how this symbiotic existence will reach its outcome, but the fact that the only path to survival is in the rationalism of culture of peace as opposed to the irrational culture of war is out of the question. Those who has not realized it, those who profess the surgery of war very soon themselves become victims of its sharp and ruthless scalpel.