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COMMENTS ON PART II
Gennady Chufrin
Gennady CHUFRIN, professor, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm, Sweden).
A) Analysis of the influence of events in Chechnya on the neighbourhood brings us back to the beginning of August 1999. It was then and not in September that the current conflict started after Chechen separatists invaded neighbouring Dagestan. Their goal was to create a unified Islamic state in the Northern Caucasus that would comprise, besides Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. The inclusion of Dagestan was particularly important in these plans as it would give land-locked Chechnya an outlet to the Caspian Sea. With this aim in mind a Congress of Chechen and Dagestani Peoples was set up in April 1998 with Shamil Basaev as its chairman. Clearly no responsible government in the world would accept such a threat to national security and territorial integrity, and each had an obligation to its own people as well as before the international community to take decisive steps to resolve this situation.
The attitudes in Russian society toward such steps are well known—the resolute steps taken by Putin in Dagestan and Chechnya propelled him to power (incidentally when the Islamic invasion began in Dagestan in August last year Putin’s predecessor as Russian Prime Minister—Sergei Stepashin—clearly panicked and was prepared to accept the loss of Dagestan) and his government continues to enjoy an overwhelming public support despite quite heavy Russian losses. One reason for this public support is a widespread understanding that these steps were unavoidable, were forced on the Russian Government and were accepted as the need to take firm action in the face of major challenge to Russian national security and territorial integrity.
B) The influence of the conflict in Chechnya on the neighbourhood is manifold and one of its most prominent manifestations is, of course, its humanitarian dimension.
Much has been said and written recently about the humanitarian aspects of the conflict. They are being actively discussed at various official and unofficial international fora. The mounting Western criticism of Russia on humanitarian grounds has become one of the major irritants in relations between Russia and the West to such an extent that at one time it even threatened to negatively influence their interaction on other issues as well.
There is no doubt that the humanitarian situation in and around Chechnya in connection with the conflict is very serious indeed. The so-called collateral damage in the form of civilian casualties and the refugee problem are considerable. There can also be no doubt that the humanitarian situation needs to be improved drastically and the refugee problem to be resolved as soon as possible. A clear understanding of the size of the problem and its causes are essential in addressing the situation.
According to different sources, the number of refugees that left Chechnya for the neighbouring regions of the Northern Caucasus—mostly for Ingushetia—is in the range of 200 000–230 000 people. These staggering figures are rather misleading: they not only reduce the extent of the problem of refugees from Chechnya in the current stage of the conflict but they also fail to reflect the fundamental political and social causes of the problem.
Khoperskaya shows that in the two years preceding the current stage of the conflict around 500 000 people, mostly Russians, left Chechnya. Moreover, following the 1994–96 Chechen war Chechens also started to emigrate en masse from Chechnya, fleeing the criminal situation in the republic. This means that the problem of refugees from Chechnya did not start last September, it started long before as a form of social protest when the ordinary people of the republic began to realize that the government of Maskhadov was unable and/or unwilling to address their needs and requirements and that the rule of law had been replaced by the rule of criminal gangs. As a result tens and even hundreds of thousands left the so-called independent Chechnya—not for Turkey or any other Islamic country but for Russia where, despite their unenviable status as refugees, they could at least stop fearing for their freedom and indeed for their lives.
Clearly, even if the hostilities in Chechnya are stopped today the refugee problem will not be resolved either tomorrow or any time soon. This would require restoration of the rule of law and order in the republic, restoration of the normal functioning of education, medical and other social systems, restoration of electricity, heating and water supply, and the provision of jobs for ordinary people who did not have normal employment opportunities in the so-called Republic of Ichkeria. Only then may the civilian population be expected to return to their homes and resume normal life.
C) The next problem is connected to speculation, mostly in the Western countries, about a possible ‘spill over’ of events in Chechnya on the situation in the Southern Caucasus, or to be more exact—on the situation in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Of course, one cannot and should not completely rule out such a worst-case scenario, but at least one should understand that it is certainly not in the Russian interests to expand the conflict. Not only does Russia not have the means to do this but, more important, it has no serious motivations either. On the contrary, the Russian Government is very interested in resolving the conflict as soon as possible and would like to avoid being bogged down in it for any considerable time. The reasons are both political and economic, internal as well as external.
One should not overlook or disregard Moscow’s numerous reassuring signals to its neighbours in the Southern Caucasus regarding its intentions, such as its preparedness to reduce the amount of military equipment on its bases in Georgia by the end of this year as well as to close down two of them—in Vaziani, near Tbilisi, and in Gudauta, in Abkhazia, by the middle of 2001. The Russian Government has also indicated its genuine interest in the new security initiatives launched in different forms by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and now also by Turkey, and aimed at creating a stability and security pact for the Southern Caucasus.
Despite the obvious drift of Georgia and Azerbaijan away from Russia and the CIS, the government of Putin intends to maintain good neighbourly political relations with Baku and Tbilisi. It underscores its common interests with both Georgia and Azerbaijan, which are also challenged by the threat of separatism.
In this connection I see the Russian actions in Chechnya as corresponding to—not contradicting—the interests of both Georgia and Azerbaijan as they prevent the overall security situation in the Caucasus from destabilizing any further—especially if one considers the alternatives that existed there only six months ago.
D) Finally, I think that it is in the basic interests of the international community to help Russia as the largest regional power with vital national interests in the region and to render it firm assistance in fighting separatism and international terrorism in Chechnya. After all, whom do leaders of the international community want to deal with in the future in the region? With the legitimate and responsible Russian Government or with the Chechen separatists and extremists? Is the continuing weakening and strategic withdrawal of Russia from this strategically important region, traversed by the oil and gas routes from the Caspian Sea to the world market, in the interests of the international political and business community?
Indeed, let us imagine the implications for regional security following possible success by Chechen separatists and extremists in the Caucasus. Who then would or could ensure law and order in the region? Would Azerbaijan or Georgia, themselves tied up rather unsuccessfully in fighting similar security challenges on their own soil in Abkhazia or Nagorny Karabakh, be capable of fulfilling that mission? Or would it be done by NATO? Would NATO countries be prepared to send troops to the Caucasus or take part in enforcing peace there in the Kosovo-like fashion? And what reaction could one expect from Russia in this case?
Answering these questions correctly is in our common interests and it seems that leaders in some Western countries have already made their choice.
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