ON STABILIZATION IN AREAS
NEIGHBOURING ON CHECHNYA

Vitaliy Naumkin

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Vitaliy NAUMKIN, D.Sc. (Hist.), professor; president, Center for Strategic and Political Studies (Moscow, Russian Federation).

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Though failing to draw neighbouring regions and states in its orbit, the bloody Chechen conflict has succeeded in destabilizing the entire Caucasian region. At the present time, it is necessary to normalize the situation in the adjacent territories, primarily in the North Caucasian republics, and to establish a rapport between Russia, on the one hand, and Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the other.

Prospects for settlement in the Chechen Republic

Naturally, stability in the territories surrounding Chechnya will primarily depend on the situation in the republic itself. So far, we do not know Vladimir Putin’s programme on Chechnya, but we can judge some of its fundamental elements on the basis of pronouncements made by the President and certain officials and a number of concrete steps undertaken by the government. Aleksandr Khalmukhamedov, representative of the Russian Ministry for the Federation and Nationalities Affairs, has presented a programme of settlement to this conference.

Summing up the available provisions, it may be inferred that the programme rests on the idea of direct presidential rule in Chechnya during the transition period, which was urged by the majority of Russian experts. At the same time it is necessary to develop local administration from the grass-roots level up, and to reform the administrative system of the Chechen Republic in such a manner as to prevent the disloyal portion of the population from penetrating into the bodies of power (to expand the borders of federal-controlled areas that are least infected with the virus of separatism, and accordingly to reduce the territory of problem and rebellious areas). A concept has been proposed of a multi-echelon organization of Chechnya that leaves the areas enjoying the greatest degree of self-administration in the north while turning the south into a kind of protectorate (it is easy to discern therein some elements of the old plan for the division of Chechnya).

Without going into the details of this programme, I will say that it does not even touch upon the matter, which, in my view, constitutes the essence of the problem, namely, relations between the federal authorities and the insurgent movement, or that portion of Chechnya’s population which continues to aspire for independence. I have always called for the military operation in Chechnya to be qualified not as an anti-terrorist campaign (although it certainly has an element of this), but as an action aimed at suppressing an armed separatist movement. This type of aggressive separatism had and continues to have numerous supporters in Chechnya—closing our eyes to this fact would mean deceiving ourselves. Incidentally, the Russian authorities have actually recognized the difference between participants in an insurgent movement, or a mutiny, and terrorists proper (although, admittedly, the difference is often quite theoretical) by announcing an amnesty precisely for insurgents.

Separatism used to find and continues to find support outside of Russia. There are forces, which, if not supporting it directly, think it is useful to play with it, to use separatism for bringing pressure to bear on Moscow and compelling Russia to make concessions on a number of important political, economic and military problems.

The main scenarios

Several options may be determined for the future relationship between the federal centre and those Chechens who intend to withdraw the republic from the Russian Federation—it is precisely this problem that has the main bearing on the prospects for settlement in the Chechen Republic.

The first of these is to win separatists, primarily the active ones, over to the side of the federal authorities and the loyal part of the population. Understandably, to assure this option, it is necessary to change resolutely the psychological climate and the Chechen society’s attitude to the federal authority. This can be achieved only by solving the economic problems: by providing jobs and housing for the local population, and by placing education, health care, and so on, within reach. In other words, being part of the Russian Federation should, as Emil Pain justly insists, be attractive. But one hardly needs to substantiate scepticism about the possibility of implementing these goals in the near future.

The second scenario envisages nothing but deterrence and suppression of separatism with the help of both violent and political, economic, administrative, informational and propaganda methods. This approach implies in advance that the eradication of separatism is impossible and consequently the restriction of rights and freedoms enjoyed by the citizens of the republic will drag on indefinitely lest candidates disloyal to the federal authorities should use democratic opportunities for promotion to senior posts. Extending the direct rule involves considerable costs and makes sense only if the situation in the republic sees a positive, if slow, change.

The third scenario means a diversified evolution leading to further normalization of relations and rapprochement with that part of the population which is ready to cooperate with the federal authorities, accept them, block the irreconcilable elements, and severely put down any armed resistance to the authorities; and to gradually win all hesitant, neutral and indifferent elements over to the loyal sector. Given this scenario, it is possible to create some of the conditions enabling respect for rights and freedoms in the near future.

I will not consider the chances of each of the above scenarios, for this requires a special study, and will only say that relations with neighbouring regions and states will in any event change, as will the demographic pressure on the Transcaucasian states as well as other republics of Northern Caucasus, primarily Dagestan and Ingushetia.

Is a ‘cordon sanitaire’ necessary?

The problem of a so-called cordon sanitaire, one championed by many politicians and experts, requires separate consideration. As I see it, the model for ‘locking’ Chechnya or its uncontrolled, mutinous part inside some pocket is hard to realize on account of the high cost this mechanism involves and the technical difficulties. The gradual erosion of this cordon is similar to the erosion of sanction regimes around the world. The ‘cordon option’ will reduce to naught the efficiency of any measures designed to make life in the Russian Federation attractive for the Chechens and will overly complicate the already difficult task of economic rehabilitation. The Chechens cannot be given an opportunity to work, study and obtain medical treatment if their territory is isolated from the outside world or their ties with other regions of the Russian Federation are prevented from developing as widely as possible. The establishment of a system of interconnections would represent an efficient means of drawing Chechnya into the federal orbit. By isolating Chechnya (or part of it), a cordon sanitaire will in fact be grist to the mill of those supporting its secession from Russia.

A Chechen autarky is impossible because of both objective factors (shortage of land and resources, differences in the development level of districts, long-term presence of a large number of Chechens outside of the republic, their ties with the neighbouring regions, etc.) and subjective factors (peculiarities of the Chechen culture and mentality, etc.). In the opinion of the prominent Russian lawyer Iu. Antonian, ‘a change in the psychology of the people is in order, which in the late 20th century allowed slave ownership and hostage-taking as an industry and a “profession”. The people itself must become convinced that working is better than fighting and that Russia and the Russians are not enemies of the Chechens.’¹ It would be good to know how this might be achieved! It is obvious that many types of small and medium business, which hopefully may help in overcoming ‘the negative energy of terrorism’, are linked with an opportunity for the inhabitants of Chechnya to travel outside of its borders. These, specifically, are freight carriage, small-scale transit trade, repair work, cattle grazing, growing of vegetables, etc.

The idea concerning the development of local self-government, which has been introduced by the representative of the Ministry for the Federation and Nationalities Affairs, is a very topical one. However, it would be a mistake to transplant the experience of the Central Asian states, primarily Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, to Chechen soil and North Caucasian soil in general because of too great typological differences between these societies. As a result of the war, the traditional institutions have lost much of their former influence in the Chechen society. The embattled younger generation took little interest in the opinion of the elders; there were supporters of different and even opposite political views within one and the same clan group, and local religious authorities were treated with less than the former reverence. If the powers decide to rely on these elements to make social organizations function, the organizations will become the target for active attacks by the Islamists and separatists. As is evident from the experience of Middle Eastern countries, Islamic extremists seek to bring schools and professional and civic associations under their influence. It is primarily these social institutions that provide a channel for ideological indoctrination and recruitment of the youth. The education system is the key element of federal actions aimed at changing the mood of the inhabitants of the republic. An invaluable help in this sphere might come from foreign countries and international organizations.

We emphasize that the Russian state authorities tend to underestimate the immense harm being done to ethnic relations by the poisonous seeds of hostility scattered in abundance across the works of certain historians from Muslim (and not only Muslim) regions of Russia (let alone CIS countries). A case in point are rabidly anti-Russian writings by authors from Tatarstan (who, incidentally, not so long ago showed themselves equally zealous writers of works on the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), which grossly distort the historical truth and regrettably become the basis of the instruction process at schools. It is these works that are the mental pabulum for young people in those regions, who will be the flammable stuff of ethnic conflicts, which may yet lie in store for us, and who swell the growing ranks of the extremists-Wahhabis, in Tatarstan. Events in Chechnya will seem like child’s play by comparison with threats implicit in a Russian–Tatar conflict. West European states would do well to share their experience of textbook revision in Germany, France and Poland with the Russian authorities, which are not yet aware of the seriousness of the problem.

Stabilization measures in Ingushetia

Far from all the republics of the North Caucasian region, however, need to be cleansed of pent-up hate. Ingushetia has preserved its historical loyalty to Russia. It is not infected with the virus of separatism, although it continues to suffer from the same social ailments as Chechnya, has similar cultural traditions and values and, like Chechnya, has gone through the tragedy of Stalinist deportations. Nor, unlike the Chechens and the Avars, did the Ingush rise in arms against the Czar Government in the last century. The Ingush have not become the bearers of Salafite Islam in the Northern Caucasus. Though giving certain odds to the federal authorities, these circumstances should still not delude anyone: the reserve of strength here is being exhausted not only by the refugee flow from Chechnya but also by the unsettled conflict with North Ossetia. Attempts to obtain special privileges for the republic (say, in the personnel or financial sphere), which the Ingush authorities undertake from time to time, can only pour oil on the fire. The fact that Ingushetia is a subsidized republic takes the edge off the problem of its relations with the central authorities, predetermining its interest in Moscow. Apart from that, Ingushetia has not yet completed its territorial delimitation with Chechnya, is apprehensive of its warlike brothers, and continues to bear a grudge against the Ichkeria authorities for their decision to separate.

To ensure stability in the republic, it is necessary to settle the Ossetian–Ingush conflict, which it has been possible only to dampen somewhat, and to improve the social and economic standard of living in the republic. The problem of relations with Chechnya will obviously require a solution as well: the regime of crossing the administrative border between the two republics ought to be defined, the border itself specified, the Chechen refugee problem settled, and much else.

But it was Georgia, not Ingushetia, that served as the main transit bridge linking Chechen insurgents with the region and providing them with supplies.

The Georgian knot

One of Moscow’s objectives in this sector is to interdict separatist fighters from using Georgia’s territory for their bases and from conveying mercenaries and weapons to Chechnya, as well as to prevent other actions threatening Russia’s security. There were cases involving this kind of use of the Georgian territory in the past, which called forth a sharp Russian reaction.

Moscow and Tbilisi restored mutual understanding of late, after Georgia started strengthening stretches of its border with Chechnya and Dagestan. According to a statement by the director of Georgia’s State Border Department, Valeriy Chkheidze, with the coming of spring the Georgian border guards will establish 12 new strongpoints on the border.

In keeping with the Georgian official statistics, 270 foreign nationals were deported from Georgia between September 1999 and March 2000, who had attempted to penetrate illegally into the territory of Russia in the zone of combat operations in Chechnya.² This suggests that mercenaries from Near and Middle Eastern countries hope as before to use Georgian territory for penetration in Chechnya. Georgian diplomats also reported that local border guards had recently detained 30 persons, who had attempted to enter illegally the republic’s territory across the Chechen stretch of the Russian–Georgian border. This, in turn, indicates that the border cannot be reliably sealed on the Russian side, either. The Georgian side ‘allows for a possibility of individual border violations, since the rather dissected topography of the Chechen stretch of the Georgian–Russian border rules out a possibility of establishing a complete control over it’.³ The stretch boasts four mountain passes, each of which has from four to twelve offshoots. Twenty OSCE observers from eight European states, Russia included, who monitor the stretch, can hardly track all the human flows crossing the border. But this kind of monitoring is able to mollify tensions between Georgia and Russia, the latter fearing that separatist fighters will penetrate into its territory along with refugees from Chechnya and in certain cases addressing such charges to Georgia.⁴ A pretext for charging Georgia with supporting separatists is also given by self-styled representatives of Ichkeria living in its territory.

It is evident that Tbilisi is concerned over the situation in the area of the Georgian–Abkhazian conflict and draws parallels between Chechen separatism in Russia and separatist movements threatening the integrity of Georgia. Tbilisi realizes quite well how baneful it is to make any overtures to Islamic extremists from Ichkeria and their foreign partners. Taking account of the situation in Chechnya, Tbilisi even urges Moscow to back the Georgian position with regard to conflicts in the territory of the republic, stressing that stability in the Northern Caucasus cannot be reached without conflict settlement in the Southern Caucasus. (Let us leave aside the fact that it is an illusion to think that Russia is able to settle, say, the Georgian–Abkhazian conflict once and for all as if by magic.)

However, at the same time Georgia is unwilling to quarrel with Chechen combatants and become a target for them once it gives them some reason to believe that it is an ally of Russia. What complicates the situation for Georgia is its own ethnic Chechen (Kistin) population living compactly near the border with Chechnya in the Akhmeta district, which over recent months has been swelled by 6000 refugees. The Georgian leadership also fears that Russia, under the pretext of an anti-terrorist struggle, will bring pressure to bear on Georgia and attempt to increase its influence linked to aims exceeding the framework of the anti-terrorist campaign. President Eduard Shevardnadze made repeated statements to the effect that Georgia would give no one a pretext for spreading combat operations to its territory. Ungrounded accusations about Moscow attempting to bring pressure to bear on both Georgia and Azerbaijan can be heard from some European capitals. It must not be forgotten that Russia, already facing an aggravation of the conflict in Chechnya, did accept agreements on the evacuation of its military bases from Georgia.

But it is really of vital importance for Russia to ensure the impenetrability of the Chechen stretch of its border with Georgia. Joint Russian–Georgian activities, both bilateral and within the framework of collective efforts with the participation of other countries of the region, might prove useful to neutralize threats coming from terrorists, aggressive separatists and Islamic extremists.

In keeping with Russian information, there were after all cases when Chechen combatants crossed to Georgia. For this reason, Moscow has raised the question of the visa regime. Once in Georgia, Chechens are likely to create numerous problems for Tbilisi, both regional (not only regarding relations with Russia) and internal. As estimated by certain analysts, Chechen immigrants are capable of making an impact on the internal political situation in the republic, including on the Georgian–Abkhazian knot: one part of them is pro-Georgian, another is radically pro-Abkhazian, while still another is neutral (so-called economic immigration). As is assumed, biased attitudes characterize entire clans (Maskhadov’s clan, Alleroi, for example, is loyal to Shevardnadze), thus Chechens may turn up on both sides of the Georgian–Abkhazian conflict. The separatists will be using its preservation and especially escalation to destabilize the situation in the Caucasus.

To quote Colonel-General Valeriy Manilov, First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Defence Ministry of Russia, Russian border guards sealed off one-half of the mountain passes on the Chechen stretch of the Russian–Georgian border by late April 2000.⁵ After part of the combatants were forced to cross to Georgia, a network of border posts and mobile groups prevented them from filtering back to Chechnya.

The problem of relations with Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is even less interested than Georgia in encouraging aggressive separatism in the Northern Caucasus. There is some logic in the assumption, however, that the preservation of a moderate conflict situation in the Northern Caucasus might benefit Baku by making Moscow more pliant in connection with the Karabakh conflict. Nevertheless, the disadvantages are much greater. First, one of the key aspects of its economic policy is workforce export to Russia. Currency cheques sent home by about two million Azeris working in Russia is one of the most important sources of revenue for the republic. Conflicts in the Northern Caucasus tend to erode the potential of this source. Second, preservation of simmering conflicts will certainly aggravate the Lezghian problem and destabilize the ethnic situation still further. Third, the authorities of Azerbaijan view Islamic extremism as one of the main threats, and its growth in neighbouring states can hardly be in Baku’s interests. Fourth, tensions existing in the Northern Caucasus (and the threat that they might spread to other areas) may impact unfavourably on prospects for oil and gas production on the Caspian shelf and their transportation to world markets. Fifth, faced with secessionist moods in some ethnic regions, Azerbaijan is not interested in seeing even minimum separatist victories in neighbouring states.

Nevertheless, Azerbaijan, like Georgia, cannot assume ‘an excessively pro-Russian’ attitude to the Chechen events, being under pressure from both inside the country and some of its neighbours. But the main check in Azerbaijan’s relations with any religious extremists will be the temporal, pro-Western orientation of its leaders.

Sufism and Wahhabism

The Russian federal authorities should know better than to hope for a conflict between North Caucasian endemic Sufism and imported alien Wahhabism. Sufism, or Tariqatism (Muridism) is thought to be a patently moderate trend. In reality, it was and continues to be professed by the majority of supporters of Chechnya’s separation from Russia, terrorists included. (The still unexplained fact of the withdrawal of extremist Sufism from the political arena of countries belonging to the Muslim world merits a separate study.) Moreover, conversion to Wahhabism of a number of combatants is often a time-serving step motivated by the desire to get aid from abroad. Enver Kisriev justly notes in his report the difference between Tariqatism and traditionalism (although a more precise name could have been found for the latter), or household Islam. As far as Wahhabism is concerned, a more precise name for this trend, which both the foreign emissaries and its local adherents, who draw inspiration from foreign experience, seek to see adopted in the Northern Caucasus, is Salafism, a more general term meaning a return to the original teaching of Islam (derived from the Arabic word salaf, the ancestors). The relative success enjoyed by the Salafite daawa (sermons, appeals) is explained not only by the size of the monetary contributions its preachers make to the empty coffers of North Caucasian and other Muslim communities, but also by its attractiveness.

First, Salafism opposes ethno-political disunity and the worrisome vulnerability of ‘a mixed identity’ with a unified and consolidated Islamic identity based on the supremacy of loyalty to the Islamic umma (community) over all other ethnic loyalties and shored up in addition by a social mechanism, the Islamic jamaat, which has genetic links with the customs of North Caucasian ethnic groups.

Second, as a doctrine based on purity, equality and almost ascetic simplicity, Salafism contrasts favourably with the state of corruption characterizing the traditional ethno-political elites. The Salafites seek to direct the protest of indigent sectors of the population against the omnipotence of the local nouveau riches, and call for abstinence, renunciation of reckless waste of money, luxury, and wasteful, pompous celebrations.

Third, Salafism fills the vacuum formed in consequence of the demise of previous ideological precepts (socialism) and plays the role of a new, ‘true Islam’, which people have never known before. Active non-Muslim attacks on Salafism, or Wahhabism, are also conducive to the preservation of its potential, helping it acquire the halo of ‘true Islam’. Efforts to represent Wahhabis fighting against the federal forces as venal mercenaries, as drugged bandits tend to run athwart the prestige gained by those of them who unhesitatingly, boldly and recklessly risk their life for the sake of victory over the infidels and show superior skills in combat, mystically avoiding many a trap set for them by the army. At the same time, the Salafites, or Wahhabis, will not abide by the sacred traditions, causing discontent among the local population by their non-acceptance of the worship of saints’ graves, which is a custom in Sufism. An even more sinister concept is that of taqfir, or the right to brand as infidels (kafirs) those Muslims, who, in the Wahhabis’ view, do not follow the precepts of true Islam and are therefore liable to destruction if they fail to reform. It is this part of the doctrine that repels many Muslims, let alone adherents of different faiths, and makes it possible to qualify it as a teaching based on intolerance not characteristic of the whole of North Caucasian communities. It must be said for the sake of justice that the religious culture of some Muslim peoples of Russia did comprise in the past certain trends which called for the destruction of those Muslims (particularly the clergy) who, as they saw it, behaved in a way other than that prescribed by Islam. A case in point are the Vayisovites in Tatarstan. Similar tendencies were observed among certain Turkestan Kadimites, who fought against the Jadides.

On the whole, the acute social and economic crisis gripping the region will always be a fertile ground for religious extremism. It is hard to assume that its roots might be destroyed by strong-arm or administrative methods in societies with a high level of unemployment. To stabilize the situation in territories surrounding Chechnya, in my view, it is necessary to get rid of the anti-Wahhabi syndrome, overcoming the temptation to charge all the troubles of aggressive separatism and terrorism to the account of this complicated trend in the Islamic religion. Let us not forget that slave trade, banditry and hostage taking, let alone opposition to the Russian central authorities, had appeared here long before local inhabitants got to know Salafism. By relying on it several decades ago, King Abdel Aziz bin Saud managed to pool scattered Arabian lands into a centralized state, something that earned him, in the 1920s and 1930s, the sympathies of the Soviet diplomacy, which established close contacts with him.

The role of Islam and Afghanistan

Supporters of Islamization or rather re-Islamization may consider Islam not only as a unifying national force but also as a consolidating supranational principle. Politicians employing Islamic phraseology in their bid for power, Islamists pursuing the goal to create a belt of Islamic regimes in the post-Soviet space, separatists, terrorists and simply adventurers are interested in precisely this type of consolidation. But it cannot be denied that statehood based on the concept of Islamic umma contradicts the idea of a national or ethnic state. Seemingly, there is an opportunity to use this contradiction for opposition to aggressive separatism. But it is quite difficult to break the existing alliance of radical nationalists: the fragmented state of the Islamic world sickens the extremist-minded Wahhabis, but they will be enthusiastic for evicting the Christians from Muslim-populated territories and accordingly expanding the Dar el-Islam. For the Chechen separatists, radical Islam is a means of spreading separatism to other republics of the Northern Caucasus, which remain loyal to the federal authorities. In the new conditions possible after the second Chechen war in Russia, the decisive role in the implementation of plans pursued by the separatists and religious extremists will be played by the factor of external support.

As of today, Afghanistan gives the most support to international terrorism and Islamic extremism, including in the Caucasus and Central Asia. It trains combatants, engages in illegal drug and arms trafficking, and pours forth propaganda of religious intolerance and hostility. These activities are financed by international Islamic non-governmental centres based in Near and Middle Eastern countries. The international extremist Islamic circles set the objective of creating belts of Islamic states in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and conduct subversive work against the governments of a number of Central Asian states, primarily Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as against Russia, which has a Muslim population of not less than 13 million people, all of them members of its indigenous ethnic groups.

Afghanistan is the only country which has recognized the self-proclaimed regime of Ichkeria. In all probability, this state will remain one of the major international centres of support for the separatists’ continued guerrilla and terrorist activities. Despite some uncertainty it could be suggested that Afghanistan will become the prospective asylum for a Chechen government in exile. The Ichkeria separatists would prefer to be based on the territory of a state enjoying a better reputation in the world community, but it will be quite hard to find a government willing to allow such activities. The Chechen presence in Afghanistan profits extremists from Central Asian countries, who would like to use the combatants’ potential in their struggle against the governments of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This could lead to a sharp rise in tensions in the Central Asian region, which the Chechen separatists, after having definitively merged with Islamic extremists, will wish to use for the creation of a transit corridor to the Northern Caucasus. Forecasts of the emergence of a unified extended front of Islamic extremists, separatists and radical nationalists in a huge space comprising the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus from the Chinese borders to the Black Sea, and of an even greater territory from Kashmir and Xinjiang to the Balkans, may then come true.

Consolidation of these forces, if it occurs, may give impetus to close cooperation between Eastern and Western states, so far unprepared for it and divided by serious contradictions.

Problems of stabilization in Dagestan

Dagestan remains the most important target for religious extremists. Enver Kisriev’s report provides an exhaustive analysis of both factors leading to conflict and conflict relations, and factors and relations of stability. Sharp clashes of different group interests have not yet burst into an open conflict. A majority of Russian experts single out the confrontation between the economic and social interests as the chief conflict-prone element. A pronounced property and social differentiation, which splits society into very rich and very poor strata—against the background of there being almost no middle class, which might become the main bulwark of stabilization—unemployment and corruption are superimposed over the motley ethnic make-up of the population. This, in a paradoxical manner, performs two opposite functions: on the one hand, it enhances the existing contradictions, but on the other hand it deflates them, and fear of an upsurge of ethnic hostility tends to deter violence. Two problems—Chechen and Lezghian—project Dagestan’s internal proneness to conflict to the outside, creating a field where it may be affected by external factors. There are two strategic components aggravating the situation: one is linked with oil and its transportation routes, the other with Dagestan’s military–strategic position as a border area, both North Caucasian and Caspian.

Some Dagestanis have turned to Wahhabism for both internal reasons and under the impact of external influences. At the level of village jamaats, Wahhabism has played a definite positive role, helping to keep law and order and fight crime, elements of moral degradation, alcoholism and corruption. After becoming unacceptable on account of its intolerance, switchover to methods of social violence, and its employment for political purposes by the Chechen separatists and foreign extremists, Wahhabism was suppressed after Chechen combatants had invaded Dagestan; but there is still a fertile soil for its comeback. Russian media report that several thousand combatants have been massed in areas of Chechnya bordering on Dagestan with a view to making yet another invasion in the territory of that republic. According to different sources, from 600 to 1000 combatants are mercenaries from Near and Middle Eastern countries, which is confirmed by representatives of Western countries.

Since Dagestan, like Ingushetia, is an economically depressed area, the federal authorities ought to apply primarily financial and economic measures in order to improve the situation. The problem is that infusions in the regional economy line the pockets of corrupt representatives of local ethno-political elites. For this reason, everything must be done to preclude misappropriation of financial flows on top of allocating enough money for investments and budget support of these republics (particularly in the area of education, for the needs of the law enforcement agencies, and job placement for young people). Evidently, the Ingush and Dagestanis ought to be given greater opportunities for getting an education in other areas of Russia, including in the centre, as well as more access to religious education at home rather that at the educational establishments in foreign countries of the Islamic world, which bring up future imams and mullahs in the spirit of intolerance, hatred for things Russian, and extremism. Russia must support moderate trends in this religion, oppose extremists and aid dialogue with representatives of all trends of Islam.

Considering the urgent task of normalizing the situation in Chechnya, the federal centre is unlikely to find additional funds for investment into the development of other North Caucasian republics. Therefore, to cope with this task, it is necessary to attract aid from foreign countries and international non-governmental organizations.

Meriting a separate study is the problem of possible, if extremely cautious, modernization of Dagestan’s political system in the direction of democracy, which would make it possible to assure a broader participation of the population in the administration of the republic. At the same time, an ill-considered and formal democratic reform consisting in a mechanistic transplantation of traditions and institutions characterizing the parliamentary democracy of the West European type is capable of destabilizing the situation. A case in point are presidential elections in Karachaevo-Cherkessia. In the opinion of Russian expert Dmitriy Makarov, the elective principle in this case must be backed by an agreement between the local ethnic elites.

The regional stability is threatened by a mounting ethnic Russian emigration from practically all North Caucasian republics. The federal authorities ought to adopt urgent measures in order to stop this ‘voting with feet’, and to create a system of incentives to discourage the wish of ethnic Russians to leave their familiar surroundings. Once the process of dispersal to ‘national quarters’ is completed, it will be too late to reverse it. Equally, the federal authorities should give aid to inhabitants of North Caucasian republics so that they might find jobs in other parts of Russia.

Let us hope that Chechnya is the exception rather than the rule and that the Chechen conflict will not be repeated in some other area of the Northern Caucasus. But a strong, efficient and democratic federal authority is required if the region’s conflict-prone potential is to be reduced. Thought should be given to how to redistribute powers between the centre, on the one hand, and regions, territories and republics in the Northern Caucasus, on the other, so that they enjoy greater freedom in the economic, political and humanitarian spheres.

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1 Iu Antonian, ‘Energeticheskiy potentsial ekstremizma’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 Apr. 2000.

2 Kazhdaia, G., ‘Gruzia povoda ne davala’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 Apr. 2000.

3 Ibid.

4 See, e.g., Nikolaev, D., ‘Politika dvoinykh standartov’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 Mar. 2000.

5 ORT broadcast, 20 Apr. 2000.