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THE SECOND CHECHEN WAR:
POSSIBLE SCENARIOSEmil Pain
Emil PAIN, director, Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies, Moscow, RF.
IntroductionIn December 1994 the Russian authorities made the first attempt to put an end to Chechen separatism by force. They had to retreat after two years of bloody fighting. This attempt cost Russia at least 35 000 Chechen and Russian lives1 and, according to different estimates, $5.5 billion.2 The war contributed to a great extent to the national economic crisis of August 1998, resulting in the state’s debt default.
It seemed that the experience of 1994–96 had taught society and the federal authorities that colonial methods cannot be applied to ethno-political problems, and that force cannot be used to impose one’s will on a small ethnic community, if a significant part of it is prepared to take up arms to defend its interests.
Nevertheless, in October 1999 hostilities started again in Chechnya, under the official name of ‘an anti-terrorist operation’. It was baptized by the journalist community.
There was an amazingly rapid change in public opinion in Russia in favour of the war. While in 1994, at the beginning of the first war, two-thirds had been firmly against a military solution, in September 1999 nearly as many wished to see a complete victory. The turnabout occurred within a few months: in the spring of 1999 a majority regarded another war as impossible; 82 per cent of those polled agreed that Chechnya should be allowed to separate from Russia, in one form or another.
There are several reasons behind the change: first, people were tired of economic, political and military failures and craved for victories. The news from Dagestan of the victory of Russian troops over the Chechen invaders caused a mental revolution: people started to believe that force was the key to the Chechen problem, and that the country needed a firm hand (unexpectedly personalized by Putin) to introduce law and order. Second, Russian society had lost its illusions about the ‘Chechen revolution’ and the image of a ‘fighter for national self-determination’. Suddenly, Russians saw the ugly face of a Chechen terrorist, who takes hostages and blows up apartment blocks. Third, the events in Kosovo had played their role. The Russian military argued: ‘If NATO can shell civilian objects in a sovereign country for the sake of political aims we can do the same in our own country’.
The public was very much affected by the official propaganda, which skilfully and imperceptibly replaced the stated aims of the campaign: in August it was repulsion of the Chechen aggression in Dagestan, and this was naturally supported by everyone. In October, it was the creation of a cordon sanitaire between Russia and Chechnya along the River Terek, which also was supported by a majority. In November it was the ‘complete destruction of the terrorists’, which caused doubts among some of the politicians, among them Yabloko. On 1 January 2000, Acting President Vladimir Putin visiting the troops in Chechnya, announced Russia’s integrity to be the aim of the war, that is, to keep Chechnya within Russia. This aim had been pursued in the first campaign but was rejected by a majority in July 1999.
Russian society was prepared to be duped: it was told that the ‘new war’ was allegedly better prepared, would cost fewer lives and had more chances of success.
The victories of late 1999 and early 2000 confirmed the hopes of those who supported Putin’s emphasis on military methods and believed in the final victory. However, to my mind Russia’s military victories today (April 2000) are not very different from those of the first war. Today, as in the past, the present war may not bring Russia the final victory, crush the resistance, or keep Chechnya within Russia. I believe that no matter how events unfold, the war may instead create new threats to the Chechen Republic, Russia and some of its neighbours.
The possible scenarios are mainly determined by the possibility of a military victory by either side, the size of the territories they control, the number and directions of migrants, and the scope of subversive activities.
Scenario I: Protracted warBy March 2000 the front line had disappeared because the Chechen opposition had scattered across the country. There was not a single district in the republic that could be described as controlled by separatists; the federal forces formally controlled the republic’s larger part or, at least, the district centres. Having destroyed the main forces the Russian authorities began withdrawing some of the detachments, thus rekindling the most optimistic expectations.
To my mind there is no reason to talk about a decisive victory over the Chechen resistance. The experience of the last war and the course of the present war have shown that the main Chechen forces will break the federal encirclement and penetrate cordons. Basaev escaped from a Dagestan described by the military as sealed off, he repeated the trick in Grozny and the Argun Gorge. The leaders of Chechnya—Maskhadov, Arsanov, Basaev, Zakaev, Gelaev, Udugov and others—are still alive and kicking.
In the first war the federal troops had to fight for the same settlements several times, liberating Argun and Gudermes twice. Information about fighting at already liberated settlements located deep in the federal rear escapes military censorship. The federal troops fought for two weeks for the village of Komsomolskoe (Urus-Martan district), earlier described by official propaganda as an example of loyalty.
According to the Russian military the rebels keep their bases outside the front area (in Georgia, Ingushetia and other adjacent places), which allows them to withdraw for a rest and return with fresh forces. This explained periods of relative lull in the last war. This time it also seems that the temporary lull in the spring will end with guerrilla activity in the summer.
The Russian Army’s greater efficiency in the second campaign proved to be largely a myth. The main goal is to neutralize the terrorists, yet those who fit the international definition of terrorists are escaping today as they escaped during the last war.
There is no confirmation that the Russian losses are smaller in this war: during two years of the last war 4300 Russian servicemen were killed (official figures for 1997); and in six months of the present war, 2200 were killed (more than 1000 were killed on Chechen territory).3 Simple calculations show that the relative number killed in action in this war is higher than in the previous campaign. In the previous war losses were especially great after Grozny had been captured and the troops were scattered over the territory to control it. Indeed, it is much easier to attack a block-post guarded by a small number of soldiers than to fight a large detachment supported by aviation. The story repeats itself: in March 2000 more than 150 perished in two ambushes (in the Argun Gorge and at Grozny). This means that the novelties of this campaign (a greater role for aviation and artillery with a diminished role for armour) did not produce the desired effect when confronted with mobile guerrilla groups. Instead, they did much more damage to civilian objects and probably increased the number of civilian victims.
In the last war the local people showed no loyalty toward the federal forces; we can hardly expect them to be different this time. Nine years of actual independence for Chechnya produced a generation which finds the very idea of subordination to Russia distasteful.
The Russian authorities define as terrorists not only those who made inroads into Russian regions, took hostages and blew up apartment blocks (there are about 2000 of them in Russia according to the number of criminal cases) but also those who oppose Chechnya’s continued existence within the Russian Federation. With such an approach, the majority of the Chechen population belongs to the opposition.
The number of people who once believed that the Russians would drive the bandits away from the republic is diminishing each day. They find the price for being liberated from the bandits to be too high. On the eve of the first war, there were people who were displeased with Dudaev; yet, in the course of the hostilities, domestic conflicts were pushed aside in the face of the ‘common enemy’.
Bombing and cleansing of villages, multiplied by rumours, are responsible for the swelling guerrilla ranks. Fighters are being recruited in the filtration camps, which were built by the Russian forces to intern those suspected of armed resistance.
Old people are scared of the war—the young find it exciting. This is confirmed by numerous cases of fanaticism among the fighters who crossed the minefields outside Grozny to pave the way for the rebel forces to get out.
There are many signs that the Chechen opposition is prepared for a prolonged guerrilla war. The presidential elections in Russia confirmed that a majority of the Russian population is behind the official policy of war until victory is complete. Thus, both sides are determined not to retreat.
Under this scenario nearly the entire central part from Vedeno in the south to Grozny in the north, from the Sunzha district in the west to Gudermes and Nozhai-Iurt in the east (and probably villages in the Khasaviurt district in Dagestan) may become a scene of guerrilla warfare. Today, it is home for 65–70 per cent of the republic’s total population, or 260 000–280 000 people.
Three northern districts (Nadterechnoe, Naurskaia and Shelkovskaia) and Shatoi district in the south may find themselves outside the guerrilla area. The former have always looked to Russia for historical reasons; the latter has done so because of its sparse population—though small guerrilla enclaves may be found there (in the Argun Gorge). However, there is no guarantee that peace will be preserved in these districts: area clearings and clashes between the federal forces and guerrillas are inevitable.
Under this scenario subversion and terrorist acts will take place in Chechnya and the neighbouring territories, as was the case during the first war. Mozdok, Budennovsk and the frontier zone of Dagestan with their military objects are especially vulnerable.
The main migration flows have already taken shape and will hardly change in the future: today, as in the previous war, there is ‘circuit’ migration, in which people from a bombed village move to another village or district, or in extreme cases, to Ingushetia. They stay as close as possible to their homes to be able to return promptly. This is especially evident during the agricultural season. There is constant rotation in the refugee camps in Ingushetia (up to 50 000 every month) which makes it difficult to count how many people live there.
How probable is a victory for the federal forces?
By way of an answer Russian experts refer to the nationalist movement in western Ukraine and the Baltic republics, crushed at the turn of the 1950s. This experience would bear no relevance today, even if Russia were a totalitarian country in the style of Stalin’s Soviet Union, separated by an ‘iron curtain’ from the rest of the world. The so-called success of the Soviet interior forces in Ukraine and the Baltics was attained through resettlement, when thousands of families were moved to Siberia and replaced by workers from eastern Ukraine and Russia.4 Today, Russian authorities would never risk an official deportation of the Chechens, and it is hard to implement other forms of exile. It is next to impossible to move Russians or any other ethnic group to Chechnya. In fact, two wars have made the Russian population leave Chechnya and the republic is becoming ethnically homogeneous. According to sociological polls the Russians have no intention of returning in the near future.
The population in Chechnya is half the size of the population on the eve of the first war; that is, 400 000 people. There are more than 100 000 men who can fight; there are also women among the guerrillas. At least 300 000 Chechens live in the Northern Caucasus, some of whom may join the guerrillas.
When western Ukraine and the Baltics were pacified in the 1930s and 1940s, the soldiers were paid only enough to buy cigarettes; today, Russia spends over $100 000 a month to pay the army in Chechnya. To this must be added the costs for the wages of tens of thousands of civilians working for the army in-the-field; the costs for fuel and munitions, and for maintaining and repairing matériel. According to Nikolai Petrakov, one of the most prominent Russian economists, the war costs Russia $160 million a month.5 Even with restructured or postponed foreign debts Russia cannot afford this.
In the past, the fringes of the empire had little to do with the mother country. Today, the war weighs heavily on all spheres of life in Russia, which is still in a deep crisis. I am absolutely convinced that Russia has no temporal reserves: in the 19th century it had 50 years, today five years would be an overstatement.
There will be no victory in Chechnya in the coming 18–24 months if the present trend continues; the chances may increase if the character of the warfare changes.
Scenario II: Complete annihilationAny guerrilla war will continue as long as it is supported by the local population; here I have in mind both the psychological readiness not to fear repression from the authorities and the demographic resources (the number of civilians). During the first war, these factors decided the Russian defeat. Today, the level of guerrilla activity is as high as in the previous war.
The Russian authorities are obviously not prepared to use the Soviet method of deportation. This means that extermination is possible. This is a purely theoretical supposition: so far there have been no signs of such intentions. What the Russian troops have done can be described as ‘excess violence’ but not as ‘genocide’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’.
The second scenario could occur if the federal powers transcend this line. The zone of clashes with the guerrillas would be extended to include the areas to the south of Grozny and the Chechen villages in Ingushetia and Dagestan, where rebels hide. There might be ‘bombing by mistake’ of Chechen villages in Georgia.6
According to this scenario the flow of forced migrants will increase somewhat (as compared with February 2000) and its direction will change. Yet, the scale of December 1999 will hardly be reached, when over 200 000 (more than half of them from Grozny), left their homes after massive bombings of the main cities. The cities’ migration potential has exhausted itself. Instead the rural dwellers, which are less mobile, will be set in motion.
This means that forced migration will be limited because of the specifics of the migrants themselves. The rural population has less chances of professional adaptation, migration would therefore be only of a temporary nature. They will try to live as close to their abandoned homes as possible so as to be able to return in time for the agricultural season; strong religious feelings and traditional consciousness demand burials in the native land; and limited language skills will call for remaining in the familiar linguistic environment.
Chechens prefer to live where there is a Chechen diaspora: the migration pattern will therefore correspond to the Chechen settlement pattern outside the republic.
Over 60 per cent of all Chechens outside Chechnya are living in the neighbouring southern regions of Russia, up to the Volgograd region. At worst, this area will receive a similar share of Chechen migrants. 30 per cent of the Chechen diaspora are found in other regions, which means that at least one-third of the migrants will settle there. Ukraine and Kazakhstan come next with regard to the size of the Chechen diasporas. They also attract new migrants because more than 50 000 Chechens already live there; the frontier is open (through the Astrakhan region to Kazakhstan and through the Rostov region to Ukraine); Russian is spoken, and the Soviet way of life to which Chechens are accustomed predominates there. Their proximity to Chechnya is also important. Georgia and Azerbaijan may attract up to 10 000 each (including those already living there), some of them former fighters. In case of a massive exodus, 2000–3000 may find a home among the Chechens living in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian republics. The number of Chechens migrating outside these areas will be small.
Turkey, for example, may attract not more than 5000–6000 fighters, in addition to those several hundreds needing medical aid or looking for sponsors to continue armed struggle; the rest will stay as close to Chechnya as possible to continue with the guerrilla warfare.7
In any case, a war waged to kill off more Chechens will decrease the demographic potential of guerrilla warfare. Consequently this would make a federal victory more probable. However, new generations will take revenge for the insults inflicted on their fathers and grandfathers. This explains why ethno-political conflicts extend for several generations.
A favourable development for Moscow will be secured only by a post-war economic upsurge in Chechnya and higher living standards for its population. Unfortunately, while a military victory of the federal forces is probable, post-war restoration at the expense of the Russian taxpayers is improbable.
One cannot fail to see that while each of the three problems is hard to resolve; taken together they defy any solution. Indeed, how can Chechnya be restored if the budget allocates less than 10 per cent of the sum Vice-Premier Nikolai Koshman asked for? Even if the money is found, who can guarantee it will not be stolen? Where will new jobs be created? Most people used to work at the oil refinery in Grozny. It is now completely ruined and the federal powers are doing nothing to restore it. Will it be possible to find employment for people in Chechnya when there are no jobs in other North Caucasian republics, which have experienced neither bombing nor guerrilla warfare?
A war of annihilation would create no positive results, and Moscow is aware of this. The world community would become even more negative in its attitude to Russia. Under these conditions Western governments will be forced to introduce economic sanctions against Russia.
In addition, more cruel methods of warfare will invite a wider scope of terrorism, which may involve not only trained saboteurs from Chechnya but also Chechens living outside the republic. This happened in the Astrakhan region in the autumn of 1999.
Expanding terrorism may affect public opinion at home: there will be more hatred and readiness to exterminate the Chechens among some groups. Yet, a majority of the population may become more willing to separate the obstinate republic from Russia.
Scenario III: CompromiseAs it seems now this war will end in more or less the same way as the previous war did. In 1996, when the figures of dead and wounded were increasing at a fast rate with no final victory in sight, the costs of the war were rising, the pressure from the outside world was mounting (e.g., at the G8 summits), and the Russian public showed its growing displeasure on the eve of the presidential elections. The federal authorities were forced to look for a non-military solution. The same may happen in 2004 or a year before, on the eve of the next presidential elections. Those Russian political and public figures and academics who are contemplating a political compromise agree that a cordon sanitaire is the most acceptable scenario. My understanding of this is given below.
Its main aim will be to provide security (military, economic and social) for all regions of Russia outside those zones in Chechnya where there will be no federal forces. Russia should be protected against the most radical terrorist groups preaching a so-called Great Islamic Imamate from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea.
I think that the cordon should consist of several lines of control where different methods will be used. The first will strengthen defences and control on the frontier between Chechnya and Ingushetia, along the Terski mountain range, the River Terek and the frontier between Chechnya and Dagestan. The second will provide economic security along the frontier between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, between Chechnya and Stavropol Territory, and to the east of districts in Dagestan populated with Chechens. The third will provide additional control along the border between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, Chechnya and Stavropol Territory, and Dagestan and Kalmykia.
The logic of the cordon sanitaire presupposes that the federal troops will be moved to the first line; the assault detachments will be replaced with those trained to guard frontiers; and that the necessary infrastructure will be created (permanent fundamental structures, trace strips, minefields, etc.).
The cordon will protect the Russian regions against inroads of terrorists from Chechnya much better than the army now fighting there over a large territory while control belongs to the few and dispersed garrisons, which cannot stop even large armed units. Basaev and Raduev raided Russian territory while the Russian Army was seemingly in control in Chechnya.
The cordon will diminish losses in the army. The experience of the last war has demonstrated that the losses increased together with the territory the Russian Army tried to control. Comparatively small units, block-posts and columns attracted guerrillas and were their easy prey. Naturally enough, when the army moved deeper into the territory this created new waves of migrants and civilian losses.
Before the first war the federal authorities had the opportunity to move the frontier between Dagestan and Chechnya down the mountain slope to the more favourable natural conditions along the River Terek in order to put pressure on Grozny. I put forward a similar idea in September 1994 at a sitting of the Expert Council to the President of Russia, calling it ‘One Chechnya—Two Systems’. I suggested the creation of three northern districts, ‘a zone of prosperity’, which would give the population a choice—to live in these pro-Russian areas or in the ruined Chechnya under General Dudaev. It would have been much easier to do this then, when the northern districts were more willing to cooperate with Russia, but the chance was allowed to slip through our fingers in 1994.
It seems that on the eve of the next presidential elections this scenario will again attract the attention of the authorities. This scenario leaves the larger part of the republic outside direct federal control, yet, in reality this is already the case. The federal forces have no real control over occupied territories. For example, in the last war in February 1995 Grozny was captured and controlled by the army, yet the federal and local powers felt absolutely secure only in Severniy Airport and in the heavily guarded Government House. Any movement between these islands of Russian law and order required armoured carriers. In the summer of 1995 General Romanov was nearly murdered on this official route.
What is important in this scenario is that the zone outside federal control is no longer an area of guerrilla warfare. Only in this scenario will the number of people returning to Chechnya exceed the number leaving the republic.
Naturally enough, the cordon sanitaire is no remedy for the ruined economy and Russia will not be able to restore it single-handedly. It will need the help of the international community.
ConclusionsEveryone knows that the large-scale fighting has destabilized the situation in the Northern Caucasus; this will continue for about 12 months no matter which turn the events in Chechnya take.
The third scenario offers the least damages for all involved in the conflict and for the political environment. This can be worded as a compromise between the federal power and the Chechen armed resistance according to the formula ‘Peace in Exchange for Land’.
The second scenario will produce the worst results: there will be more victims among the civilians, and Russia’s isolation from the rest of the world will increase.
The first scenario will prolong the war and confront the federal forces with guerrillas. Moscow’s chances of success are slim.
In the short-term perspective political instability in the Caucasus and the danger of terrorist acts will remain. Whatever happens in Chechnya in the distant future, it seems most probable that 90 per cent of the forced Chechen migrants in Russia will never return to Chechnya.
1
See Mukomel, V., ‘Vooruzhennye mezhnatsionalnye i regionalnye konflikty: liudskie poteri, ekonomicheskii ushcherb. Sotsial’nye posledstvia. Identichnost’, konflikty v postsovetskikh gosudarstvakh, ed. M. Olkott et al. (The Carnegie Center: Moscow, 1997), pp. 301, 305–306.2
Ibid., p. 311.3
Valeri Manilov, Deputy Head of the General Staff, supplied figures for April 2000: the North Caucasian operation cost the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior 2181 killed and 6388 wounded. See Mir za nedeliu, no. 15 (22–29 Apr. 2000).4
Somewhat earlier, in 1944 the Chechens were deported to the steppe and semi-desert areas of northern Kazakhstan. They only returned home in 1956.5
See Petrakov, N., ‘Posle peredyshki ne prishla by kryshka’, Trud, 11 Jan. 2000.6
An ethnic group of Kistin Chechens (less than 2000) has always lived in Akhmeta district of Georgia. During the war the population swelled to about 5000.7
On 23 February 2000 General Aushev, President of Ingushetia, said in an interview to the NTV channel in the ‘Hero of the Day’ programme that when the federal troops seized the main rebel bases in the mountains most of those who survived would return to their home villages to continue guerrilla fighting.
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