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INTRODUCTION
Lena Jonson
Lena JONSON, Senior scientific employee, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Stockholm, Sweden).
A basic assumption of the Stockholm conference was that the events in Chechnya are of concern not only to the Russian Federation but also to the international community. Three issues were discussed: (a) possible Russian strategies for stabilizing Chechnya; (b) stabilizing the immediate neighbourhood; and (c) possible ways and forms in which the international community can contribute to a peace process. What is happening in Chechnya has consequences for the security of wider Europe, and the international community therefore has an obligation and a responsibility to act. The term ‘international community’ is used here to refer first to international organizations, such as the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU), and, second, to non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations.
The Russian authorities justified the military campaign against Chechnya in 1994 by the threat posed by Chechnya as a bastion of ‘crime and lawlessness’. The campaign of 1999 was initially justified by the threat posed by terrorism emanating from Chechnya. These labels are simplifications which do not properly describe the character of the conflict. At the same time they reflect the drastic changes which took place in Chechen society during the 1990s. Part of the tragedy of the conflict is the fact that the Russian war machine destroyed Chechen society during the first war of 1994–96 by breaking down the economic, political and social structures. The weak and fragmented Chechen leadership was not capable of restoring society. As a result Chechnya turned into a ‘failed state’ within the Russian Federation, where no state authority could guarantee the law or the security of its citizens, and a strong terrorist component entered the Chechen conflict.
Moscow’s behaviour toward Chechnya during the 1990s reflects a lack of strategy. As has been pointed out by many Russian and Western commentators, Russian policy toward Chechnya early became a hostage to the struggles for political advantage, and Russian policy making was ad hoc, personalized and improvizational. A first abortive Russian effort at a military invasion of Chechnya took place after Chechnya declared its state sovereignty in November 1991. At that time President Boris Yeltsin’s declaration of a state of emergency was quickly reversed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and a stand-off at Grozny airport was averted when Moscow’s troops were withdrawn. After three years of passivity, Russian policy changed in 1994. Contrary to recommendations by specialists that political and economic instruments should be used in order to isolate Chechnya, Moscow opted for a policy of assassinating or overthrowing Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudaev. In spite of warnings from high-ranking Russian military officers that the use of military force would be counterproductive, Yeltsin decided to invade with military forces on 11 December 1994.
The task of taking back control of Chechnya immediately turned out to be a more complicated task than the federal authorities had expected.1 After five months of heavy fighting, Russian troops controlled only two-thirds of the overall territory of Chechnya and small, mobile Chechen armed groups were engaged in a guerrilla war in the south and south-east of the republic. The first war ended with the Khasaviurt ceasefire agreement, signed on 31 August 1996. As a result Russian federal troops were withdrawn and the political status of Chechnya was to be decided in negotiations within a period of five years.
Russian policy between 1996 and 1999 was again characterized mainly by passivity. No serious negotiations on the status of Chechnya, as prescribed in the Khasaviurt Agreement, took place, since both sides were stuck in their positions and not open for compromises. Russia chose not to support the relatively moderate elected Chechen President, Aslan Maskhadov, against his more radical challengers. When Chechen terrorist and criminal activities expanded outside Chechen territory after 1996, the Russian federal authorities left it to the local authorities of Russian regions and republics to respond to the new threats to their security emanating from Chechnya. At the beginning of 1999 the federal authorities started to strengthen the administrative border of Chechnya. However, the intrusion by Chechen rebels into Dagestan in August 1999, supported by local Dagestani Islamists, created a completely new political situation.
Vladimir Putin came on the scene as part of the struggle for power in Moscow. As pointed out by Emil Pain, his determined military campaign against Chechnya, initiated in September 1999, lacked a clear strategy. This lack of strategy was reflected in the shifting objectives of the military campaign that followed: in August 1999 the declared objective was to deter Chechen aggression in Dagestan; in October it was to create a cordon sanitaire between Russia and Chechnya along the River Terek; in November to ‘eliminate the terrorists’, and finally in January 2000 to restore the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. Putin’s determination to restore federal control over Chechnya gained the support of the political elite as well as of the broader public.
In March 2000 the Russian authorities declared that most of the Chechen territory was under the control of Russian forces except for the mountains in the southern part of the republic. Continuing reports of terrorist attacks on groups of Russian elite soldiers in what was supposed to be Russian-controlled territory speak a different language, however. The territory is still far from ‘pacified’.
Russian strategies for ending the Chechen conflict are discussed in the first part of this report. In a first chapter Aleksandr Khalmukhamedov raises the question of a post-war strategy for rebuilding political structures and civilian life, and develops a proposal much along the lines of the proposal that was being prepared in April 2000 within the Russian Ministry for the Federation and Nationalities Affairs. His recommendations include the introduction of direct presidential rule and a presidential representative who, for a period of 18 months or two years, would rule with full authority. That means that he would have the authority to decide on financial and constitutional issues and to coordinate all power structures (silovye struktury). He would also be responsible for the building up of political structures on the local level. Khalmukhamedov, however, also points to the large regional differences with regard to support for the federal forces, which have consequences for the possibilities of building up pro-Russian civil structures.
Since Khalmukhamedov wrote his chapter, developments have taken a somewhat different path. Vladimir Putin, now Russian President, decided by decree that a temporary system of local administration was to be set up in Chechnya, and on 12 June 2000 Mufti Akhmed Kadyrov was appointed head of the temporary administration. Kadyrov, like all other Chechen leaders, is not accepted by all groups of Chechens. In taking on this difficult task Kadyrov’s field of responsibility is very limited as he is subordinated to the Commander of the Northern Caucasus Military District, Gennady Troshev, and Viktor Kazantsev, the Presidential Representative of the same area. Responsibility for economic reconstruction and the distribution of financial means will fall under Troshev instead of Kadyrov.
Whether Kadyrov will last long in his function depends on the success of the Russian military forces in pacifying Chechen territory. In his chapter Emil Pain points to the difficulties for the federal troops to gain control over Chechen territory. He argues that the present military campaign is no more successful than the previous campaign of 1994–96. Federal troops are again stuck in a situation in which there are no safe areas for them as the Chechens continue to develop partisan warfare. There is no military solution to this conflict, says Pain. In the end, therefore, the Russian authorities will have to come to some kind of political compromise. Yet Pain predicts a scenario of a prolonged war, since both sides are determined to continue fighting. A desire to seek a political compromise is unlikely to appear before the next presidential election in 2004, Pain claims. Putin was elected because of his tough policy on Chechnya and the public remains in favour of his policy. At this stage Putin is therefore hardly willing or able to change his policy and seek a compromise on Chechnya. In the meantime Pain recommends the creation of a cordon sanitaire in order to isolate the most disastrous effects in the neighbourhood of the Chechen conflict.
The idea of building a cordon sanitaire is met with criticism by Vitaliy Naumkin in his chapter. Naumkin argues that such a zone can never be made effective. Chechnya cannot survive economically cut off from economic relations with its neighbourhood. If it is cut off, people will continue to find a way to carry on illegal activities outside Chechnya. What is more, a Russian policy of isolating Chechnya will not help make membership in the Russian Federation more attractive to the Chechens. To isolate Chechnya would also pave the way for a future secession, claims Naumkin.
The search for a long-term solution to the Chechnya conflict has an economic and a political dimension. Economic development is a necessary condition if Chechnya is ever to become stabilized. Negotiations on the future political status of Chechnya are no less important if a long-term political solution is to be found. The comment by Kjell-Åke Nordquist is interesting in this context. From a comparative perspective and rich experience of separatist conflicts around the world, he points to possible and alternative forms of autonomy within an existing state. This overview may provide input for a future discussion on the political status of Chechnya.
The last chapter in the first part of this report is a critique of the basic assumptions behind Russia’s policy since the end of the first Chechen war. Gail Lapidus argues that Russia, by abandoning its undertakings in the Khasaviurt Agreement, by not acknowledging the complex political situation in which Chechen President Maskhadov was compelled to operate, and by its present savage warfare under the banner of anti-terrorism, has actually destroyed the prospects of normalization of Chechen society for a long time. Through her criticism Lapidus indicates what could have been an alternative Russian strategy—supporting the legally elected President Maskhadov. Lapidus is joined in her criticism of Russian policy by Märta-Lisa Magnusson in her comment.
In the second part of this volume Vitaliy Naumkin, Larissa Khoperskaya and Enver Kisriev analyse the conflict potential of the immediate neighbourhood of Chechnya and discuss the consequences of the Chechen war. The situation around Chechnya does not always attract the attention of the international community. Enver Kisriev concentrates on the situation in Dagestan and Larissa Khoperskaya on that in the wider region. Both warn of the risk of violence with even more far-reaching consequences than the Chechen conflict. Among the conflicts mentioned by Khoperskaya are those between the Russian federal authorities and the federal subjects, between federal subjects, and finally within federal subjects. Some of these conflicts are a direct consequence of the Chechen conflict, others are aggravated in the context of the general instability and turmoil in the region emanating from Chechnya. The large Chechen diaspora of refugees and migrants on neighbouring territories is also a serious problem. They exacerbate the already severe socioeconomic conditions in the Northern Caucasus and add to the high unemployment in the area, which has already led to severe tensions in relation to the Russian inhabitants in the neighbouring Russian regions.
The multitude of ethnic groups in the Northern Caucasus and the growing political role of Islam provide a potential for future conflict. Kisriev’s discussion of the Dagestani constitutional system is of great interest in this context as this system tries to balance different ethnic groups in the executive and legislative bodies of the republic. Concerning the ongoing radicalization of Islam in the region, Vitaliy Naumkin argues that the religious factor is not the predominant factor behind the conflict, either in Chechnya or in the Northern Caucasus. On the other hand radical Islam does have an attraction, for unemployed young people in particular. Naumkin therefore suggests that the Russian Government should support religious education in Islam and encourage a dialogue between different schools in Islam in an effort to oppose extremism. He also suggests that the international community should assist in providing educational material in order to help the young generation back to normal life. Svante Cornell in his comment further develops the discussion on the Islamic factor in Chechen politics.
In the comments that follow, Anna Zelkina argues that the current Russian policy in Chechnya has introduced additional strains on the relationship between the Russian federal centre and the regional leadership in the Northern Caucasus. She points out the risk that the war may spill over into neighbouring regions and thereby encourage separatist tendencies. Gennady Chufrin, on the other hand, argues that the West should support Russia in its fight against terrorism and separatism as Russia is the key to stability in the wider Caucasian region.
In the third part of this report Neil MacFarlane, Friedemann Müller and Odd Gunnar Skagestad deal with the question of how the international community can assist in a process of stabilizing Chechnya and its neighbourhood. Only regional actors can initiate such a process. Nevertheless the international community may contribute not only to the process in mediation, but also to stimulate and support economic development in the region.
The war in Chechnya creates a dilemma for Western policy toward Russia. The West wants to see Russia integrated into the world economy and into European cooperation and also to promote a democratization process in Russia. The Russian military campaign in Chechnya raises the issue of brutal warfare and violation of human rights, and the West is forced to react, says Neil MacFarlane. Yet he comes to the conclusion that measures against Russia in criticism of its warfare in Chechnya have to be balanced against the overall interest of improving relations with Russia and of keeping a dialogue open between Russia and the West.
MacFarlane’s arguments reflect and explain why the West remained relatively silent and passive when the Chechen conflict deteriorated during the autumn of 1994 and the first Russian campaign in Chechnya was initiated.2 At no point during the winter of 1994 did Western governments utilize the existing international instruments for seeking information about the situation and for conflict prevention and mediation which had developed during the preceding years.3 This was repeated when the second campaign was initiated. During the autumn of 1999, Western governments remained quiet in order to avoid raising criticism against Russia in international fora. In April 2000 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe suspended the Russian delegates from voting at a session on Chechnya. No sanctions followed, however, as the EU in general, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair in particular, made clear that good relations with Russia are an issue of highest priority.
During the first war in Chechnya the OSCE came to play an important role. In late April 1995 an OSCE mission, called the OSCE Assistance Group, was established in Grozny. Odd Gunnar Skagestad gives a presentation of the broad mandate given to the OSCE Group and its mediation work during 1995–97, provided first of all by the Swiss diplomat Tim Guldimann. The most prominent part of the OSCE’s activities up until 1997 were its mediation efforts and Guldimann was instrumental in facilitating the negotiation process that led to the Khasaviurt Agreement. It also assisted in bringing about the Treaty on Peace and Principles of Mutual Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, signed by President Yeltsin and Chechen President Maskhadov in May 1997. The OSCE also monitored the presidential and parliamentary elections which took place in January 1997, when Maskhadov was elected president. After spring 1997 the prevailing view in Moscow was that no third-party mediation was necessary.
This OSCE practice has not been repeated in the second Chechen war. In spite of Russian declarations that the government is open to cooperation with international organizations with regard to Chechnya, the government has so far been predominantly negative toward allowing activities by international organizations on Chechen territory. Odd Gunnar Skagestad argues, however, that lack of trust and resources on the Russian side makes an impartial third-party mediator necessary if the conflict in Chechnya is to be solved. Skagestad concludes that Russia may again find it in its own best interest to avail itself of the good offices of the OSCE in order to seek a way out of the seemingly never-ending imbroglio.
If Chechnya is ever to be stabilized, economic development is necessary. Friedemann Müller argues that the development of Chechnya’s economy will depend on Chechnya becoming part of a larger Caucasian regional economic complex. Such integration would also benefit the Russian economy at large.
Müller bases his argumentation on the trends of globalization of the world economy and the opportunities provided for states and regions which are able to adapt. Chechnya needs foreign investment, but if foreign investors ever find their way to Chechnya, it and Russia will have to adapt by upholding the rule of law, a minimum of ad hoc state intervention and common international standards with regard to capital investments. Chechnya has a comparative advantage in the oil business. The extraction of oil on Chechnya’s territory has declined, however, since the early 1980s and its refinery capacity used to be much larger. The pipeline linking the Caspian Sea with the Black Sea across Chechnya, which resumed operation in November 1997 and was closed in August 1999, remains an asset for the future. At present Russia is building a bypass pipeline across Dagestan, the consequences of which will be disastrous for Chechnya if such an isolation policy becomes permanent. Chechnya is part of Russia and Russia must take the initiative to make the Northern and Southern Caucasus parts of a common economic cooperation complex. Russia is slowly coming to understand the benefit of international cooperation, transnational economic transactions of capital and investments and requests for common international legal frameworks. It is important for Russia to understand that this could also mean a way out of the deadlock in Chechnya.
Müller dwells on the idea of a Russian–EU initiative for stability in the Caucasus (a Stability Pact for the Caucasus) in order to integrate efforts to develop the infrastructure, the energy system and the economy, and last but not least to strengthen a system based on the rule of law. Müller stresses that Russia must take the initiative and by common international efforts create stability and sustainable economic development in the region. However, he says, Russia has to accept the new international conditions for economic development in the context of energy production and transport in the Caspian and Caucasian region. On the other hand, Russian–EU cooperation on the Caucasus could open a completely new page in their mutual relations.
For the moment there seems to be no way out of the Chechen conflict. The violence continues from both sides. The Russian President and Government are stuck in their determination to bring Chechnya back under federal control with military force and show no interest in inviting international organizations to assist in finding a non-military solution to the conflict. The result may be a stalemate in which the Russian side formally controls the territory but in reality lacks both the control and the instruments necessary to normalize the situation. In the end, therefore, the prospects of a prolonged large military presence with its disastrous consequences for the Russian economy and the continued killing of Russian soldiers in ‘safe’ areas may force the Russian leadership into revising its policy. The international community should prepare for contributing to a peace process the day the Russian leadership is ready for common efforts in the search for a lasting solution to a conflict which is now very old.
1
Allison, R., ‘The Chechnya conflict: military and security policy implications’, ed. R. Allison and C. Bluth, Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia (Royal Institute of International Affairs: London, 1998).2
For more detail, see Lapidus, G., ‘Contesting sovereignty: the tragedy of Chechnya?’ International Security, vol. 23, no. 1 (summer 1998).3
See Ib Faurby, ‘International reactions to the war’, ed. T. Trier and L. F. Hansen, Conflict and Forced Displacement in the Caucasus. Perspectives, Challenges and Response, International Conference on the Caucasus (Danish Refugee Council: Copenhagen, 1999).
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