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Comments on Part II
Anna Zelkina
Dr. Anna Zelkina, research fellow, School of Oriental and African Studies (London, the UK).
The Caucasus region has emerged as a clearly defined common security complex. In this complex Chechnia occupies special place. As it emerged from all three papers presented at the panel, the stability in the whole region to a considerable degree hinges on the future of the Chechen conflict. Taking into consideration the prospects for peace and stability in Chechnia discussed in the first session, the following paradigm seems to emerge. The precondition-albeit not a guarantee-of long lasting stability in the region rests upon the settlement of the Chechen issue. The precondition, although again not a guarantee, of the success of the Russian policy in Chechnia, is the meaningful policy of economic and social development.
In order to understand the future of the Chechen conflict we have to address the implicit and explicit aims pursued by the Russian government in this republic. In less than a year since the beginning of the Russian operation in Chechnia, its officially declared aims have undergone considerable modification. The operation started as a response to the incursion of the joint Chechen and Daghestani armed groups into Botlikh and Tsumada regions of Daghestan and the dubious terrorist explosions of apartments blocks in Moscow and other Russian cities. The then Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, accused Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov in the failure to ensure law and order in the republic that had turned Chechnia into the uncontrolled zone where terrorists and criminals could receive training and retreat to escape justice. On this basis he denounced Maskhadov's legitimacy and in September 1999 transferred the "anti-terrorist operation" to the territory of Chechnia. The officially declared aim at that stage was " to destroy terrorism and ensure law and order in the republic." It was not until October 1999 that Russian military officials declared that the ultimate aim of their anti-terrorist campaign was to "reintegrate the whole territory of the Chechen republic into the federal structures and re-establish Russian military presence on its territory." On 1 January, 2000 Vladimir Putin, now the acting President finally publicly endorsed this aim1. This character of the Chechen operation was recognized by Vitaliy Naumkin, who suggested that it should be qualified "not as an anti-terrorist campaign (although it certainly has an element of it as well), but as an action aimed to suppress an armed separatist movement." Therefore, it appears useful if we discuss the development of the conflict within the framework of an anti-separatist movement rather than a campaign aimed at combating terrorism.
One of the main reasons repeatedly given by Russian politicians and analysts against any change of the status of the Chechen Republic is that it can set a dangerous precedent and ultimately lead to the disintegration of the Russian Federation in a fashion similar to that of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Russian policy toward Chechnia from 1991 and particularly from 1994 has been governed by the assumption that all national republics of the Russian Federation and, particularly, those in the Northern Caucasus are prone to separatist tendencies. I have always found this assumption to be too far fetched, considering the overall balance between Russian and titular nationalities in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia and unique ethnic mix of Daghestan. Even Ingushetia, which shares many common traits with Chechnia has chosen to stay within the Russian Federation and has not displayed any trends for independence. On the other hand as it becomes clear from the paper by Dr. Khoperskaia, the current Russian policy in Chechnia has introduced additional strains into the relationship between the Russian Federal Center and the regional leadership. I would argue that the strongest incentive for independence in Chechnia was the common assumption that as long as Chechnia remains a subject of Russian and not international law its population is not immune against Russian punitive policies (just as the ones that we are witnessing now).
In this respect, I believe that the military operation that has led to huge scale destruction and victimized the whole population of the republic is unlikely to strengthen the long term trust between the leadership of the national republics and Federal Center. At the same time, the Chechen campaign is being fought in the atmosphere of general rise of ultranationalist feelings among ethnic Russians. As such it contributes further to the tension between Russian and non-Russian citizens of the Russian Federation and prevents the emergence of a civil society based on the common citizenship rather than ethnic identity.
The latter appears to be an issue of crucial importance to the future of the Russian state itself. At the conference much has been said in favor as well as against treating Russia as an imperial state. In this respect, I would like to offer Rob Hagger's definition of the difference between legal organization in a state and an empire. While the legal system in a state is based on the equality of all citizens inhabiting a particular territory, the empires do not present universal laws to all its subjects. The principle of equality is replaced by the principle of control and subordination. Often such subordination and exercise of control can be achieved only through co-optation of the local institutions and either state or clan based power structures. The latter type of rule clearly corresponds to the system of administration in......
1
On the gradual modification of the Russian plans in Chechnia see: E. Pain's paper in the current issue, and A. Zelkina, " The Old War in New Disguise," Helsinki Monitor, No. 3, 2000.Full texts of the articles in hard copies or electronic versions are available through the placing orders in the subscription order form
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