POLITICAL ISLAM AND CONFLICT IN TAJIKISTAN

Saodat Olimova

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Saodat OLIMOVA is Research Fellow at the ‘Sharq’ Centre for Analytical studies in Dushanbe and a representative of the journal Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz in Tajikistan.

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Tajikistan is the only country in Central Asia where an Islamic party is participating in governing the country. However, the role of Islam in politics is also connected with the tragic events in Tajikistan since independence.

The Historical Background

As we know, the Hanafite school of Sunni Islam, well-known for its liberalism, prevailed on the territory of pre-Soviet Tajikistan. The Sufi orders of Naqshbandiyyah and Qadiriyyah were also widespread. By tradition residents of Badakhshan professed Isma’ilism, which is a religious–philosophical teaching of Shi’ism. By and large the territory of contemporary Tajikistan has been a weakly urbanized mountainous periphery remote from the major Islamic centres of Central Asia such as Bukhara and Samarkand.

In its regional form Islam gave a world outlook and a way of life to the inhabitants of these territories. Ethnic identity was effaced, unpronounced and replaced by a regional ‘gorge’ identification. Religious identity was the main component of people’s self-identity. The patriarchal communities of the highlands have always tended to unite the secular and religious leadership. The Sufi orders were a distinctive example of such an association because over time they created a kind of social structure that permeated the rather socially homogenous traditional society while their leaders – pirs-ishans – automatically gained tremendous influence on the secular life of the communities.

From the early years of the Soviet Government, its attitude towards Islam was decided by the question of how the new regime would take root in Muslim regions, especially in such a traditionally Muslim region as East Bukhara. Hence the dual attitude to Islam in Soviet Tajikistan: a fierce struggle against it, on the one hand, and an attempt at cooperation on the other. The duality entailed the destruction of the institutional Islamic clergy and an attempt, albeit not quite successful, to eradicate the system of Muslim law. ‘Popular Islam’ was allowed to exist, led by a conformist clergy and under the control of the authorities.

The campaign against the institutional doctrine of Islam resulted in the strengthening of Sufism, the organizational basis of which remained the secret Sufi brotherhoods primarily of the Naqshbandiyyah and Qadiriyyah, which often remained outside the field of vision of state atheism. The struggle against the Ismai’li religious leaders was especially fierce and, as time went by, led to a very high level of secularization among the Badakhshan people.

However, on the whole, the greatest impact on the religious situation in Tajikistan during the Soviet era was made by modernization and urbanization.

The tough social control so characteristic of the deeply and firmly Islamized traditional Tajik society is impossible in the city. Social practice was supposed to work out new mechanisms to regulate social behaviour: external control was to be replaced by self-control.

Nevertheless, urbanization in Tajikistan was special. A. Vishevski remarked that the ‘Soviet model’ of accelerated modernization corresponded, first and foremost, with the historical conditions of the eastern Slavic peoples. For this reason the speed and scope of modernization in Central Asia differed from that in Russia.¹

The modernization and industrialization were perceived by the people in Tajikistan as something alien and unnecessary. New values clashed with traditional values and were therefore rejected. A large part of the population responded by preserving its traditional system of values. According to the development model applied in Tajikistan economic modernization relied mainly on people, capital and technology coming from outside Tajikistan. The result was rural overpopulation and hidden unemployment.²

Thus, the Soviet-type modernization and industrialization initiated from outside preserved the traditional way of life in Tajikistan. The population benefited much less from modernization than its neighbours in Central Asia. The countryside stagnated but the rural population did not leave for the towns. Thus, traditional social structures, way of life and values remained almost intact.

Furthermore, the Soviet-type urbanization referred to in Vishnevsky’s apt remark was paralleled by a ruralization of the cities which had no full-fledged market relations or urban self-government, and were burdened with medieval trappings such as the absence of freedom of movement.³ An important trait of the incomplete urbanization process is the absence of a middle class, that is to say, the carriers of urban relations.

Nevertheless, the impact of industrialization and urbanization on Tajikistan cannot be denied. Peasants migrating to the towns were pushed to the margins of society and social dislocation. The condition of urban life – to become an individual in the city – was an idea not readily accepted by generations raised on communal principles. The cultural revolution, despite all the achievements in the field of education, did not eradicate the old values. While the level of education was rising and the way of life was changing, Islam remained the traditional social and cultural foundation.

The destruction of the institutionalized clergy followed by tough state ideological control and atheist campaigns drove Islam into hiding. This served to archaize Islam and Tajik culture as a whole, which largely explains why Sufism retains its influence. Popular Islam grew to become disproportionately strong as a way of life and a method of adapting to the atheist regime, on the one hand, and as a counterbalance to modernization, on the other.

Islam and the Inter-Tajik Conflict

Nevertheless, society in Tajikistan, albeit later than in other countries, reached a crisis of traditionalism during the period preceding perestroika. This crisis gave rise to dynamic disparities and, as a consequence, to many unresolved problems. Among the most important was the demographic explosion which resulted in an increase in poverty and backwardness. The lack of investment resources during the past 20 years has been an additional brake on economic development.⁴

Despite the crisis, Tajikistan continued along the road of modernization. As a result new elite groups emerged. Elites of a new type were growing alongside the Soviet Westernized nomenklatura elite. In its battle with the old elite the new elite tried to rely on the powerful potential of traditionalism.

The fundamentalist idea emerged in Tajikistan just as it did in other countries which had been drawn into the process of modernization. It began to sweep broad sections of the population wherever the development had traumatized the traditional patriarchal consciousness. The emergence of opposition groups supporting Islamic ideology somewhat resembles the situation in Iran. In Iran such groups emerged in the 1980s, first and foremost from among the middle commercial segments of the population, which had gained in status and importance from modernization.

The new strong economic groups stemmed from private business in the black-market sector of fruit and vegetables. According to economists, the black market accounted for more than a quarter of the republic’s GDP and was especially developed in the Kurgan-Tyube region. These economic groups were not represented in higher state organs.

The structure of Tajik society, which can be understood as a pyramid of ethnic and subethnic groups, professional and social strata, had long been in a state of dynamic equilibrium and had protected society’s stability. The backbone of Tajikistan’s national nomenklatura was recruited from the northern region. The northerners, although they fought for greater autonomy from the imperial centre, had no plans to make a clean break either with Moscow or with modernization. Karategin and the other regions, which had opposed Soviet government ever since it was established in Tajikistan, were not permitted to have their representatives in government. The Communist Party continued to enjoy traditional backing – in the Gissar Valley, which had accumulated a fair share of influence and resources; in the Leninabad region, which was the ruling industrial region; and in Kulyab, the agricultural heartland and a traditional purveyor of people for the military and for the police. All these regions were closely bound up with the state and dominated by popular Islam.

By the time the Soviet Union disintegrated, Karategin and Badakhshan had developed economically powerful subregional elites, which considered themselves insufficiently represented in government. Thus they backed ideologies alternative to communism – Islamism.

It should be remembered that these regional groups had always evinced closer ties between the secular and religious leaderships than had other subethnic groups. This paved the way for political Islam. Thus, the Islamic Party of Tajikistan’s Renaissance (IPTR) became a serious political force only when it was joined by the Sufi ishans and the numerous murids of the Karategin region.

Despite being secular, on the basis of their adherence to Ismai’lism the people of Badakhshan formed a national association called La’li Badakhshon. This association fulfils the role of an ethnic and religious political party.

These counter-elite groups formed by the late 1980s provided the foundation for the alliance between democratic and Islamic forces which took shape in the spring of 1992. The advocates of democracy and Islam were drawn together by the sense of egalitarianism and the communal democracy typical of the communities in these regions. There were ideological differences between them and among them, but these differences were ironed out by subethnic solidarity during the 1992–93 war. The end of the war saw an internal consolidation of the subethnic groups.

However, the exclusion of the opposition from political life in Tajikistan reduced the interest in parties of all subethnic groups. This rekindled the differences between different ideological factions within the parties. The ethnic and regional solidarity that used to cement the democrats and Islamists weakened, and previously suppressed differences between them were revived. By 1995, ordinary members and middle-ranking functionaries of both parties had become hostile to each other. The opposite camp, backing the communist ideology and post-communist ideological movements, was fragmented into different political factions and as a result the ruling elite of the country was replaced.

The symbiosis of modernism and archaism was underpinned by the imperial centre in Moscow. Once the latter vanished from the scene, traditionalists and nationalists replaced those elites which had aspired to modernize within the framework of the Soviet empire. As a result modernization was suspended and new traditionalists came to power.

The Religious Situation in Contemporary Tajikistan

Many processes in Tajik society are connected with Islam since it remains the most important component in cultural and ethnic self-identification.

Writing about religious and religious–political forces in Tajikistan, the French scholar Olivier Roy singles out traditional Islam, the Islamic Renaissance Party, Wahhabites and Tabligites (advocates of the international Islamic movement, the Jama’at ut-Tablig).⁵

Generally subscribing to this classification, it is possible to single out the so-called ‘official’ Islam, that is registered mosques whose imam-khatibs reject political Islam and support the Shura ulama (Council of ‘ulama) – the supreme institutional Islamic body in Tajikistan; the Islamic Renaissance Movement of Tajikistan (IRMT) ,which includes the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT); the ‘Taqfir’ Islamic party; non-institutional doctrinal Islam; popular Islam; Ismai’lism; the Sufi brotherhoods; and the adepts of numerous missionaries of different movements operating in the republic.

The return of young people from studies at schools of different movements has become a problem recently and relations between madhhabs and tariqahs have grown rather acute. There is a growing worry among traditionalists over external impacts on the religious situation in Tajikistan.

It ought to be pointed out that the most important clash in the country is not between communism and Islam but rather between fundamentalism and the so-called ‘popular Islam’. Let us dwell on it in more detail.

Unlike in Pakistan, Algeria and Chechnya, popular Islam in Tajikistan has proven to be as strong as urban Islam, canonical Islam and fundamentalist Islam. It is precisely for this reason that the Islamic factor has manifested itself in Tajik politics in the form of fundamentalism and traditional popular Islam.

As noted above, the Soviet regime was relatively tolerant of popular Islam. Soviet government could only maintain control of the territory by setting down roots in the local soil, which was Islamic and therefore totally immune to Communist ideas. From this perspective popular Islam represented an opportunity to guarantee the loyalty of the masses.

Popular Islam is a faith, a world of ideas and a way of life for the ‘silent majority’. It incorporates a traditional system of beliefs and lifestyles which vary with age, gender, trade or profession. This is very clear from the 1996 IFES survey.⁶ According to the survey, 64 per cent do not pray at all. The older the respondent the more consistently he performs the observances and precepts of Islam. Whereas 78 per cent of those who do not pray at all are aged 18–24 years, only 32 per cent of those aged 55–64 years fall into this category. 67 per cent of Tajikistan’s inhabitants aged between 65 and 74 years pray five times a day. A free attitude to religious precepts is regarded the social norm by the young, but this by no means makes them atheists or secularly minded. It is assumed that they change their behaviour as they grow older.

Existing religious institutions and organizations have an educational function. Islamic groups of all orientations in Tajikistan put a strong emphasis on enlightenment. This can be explained by the weakness of the institutional clergy and the changing role and place of Islam in the life of Islamic communities subjected to modernization. Although all Islamic leaders recognize that the immediate task was and is enlightenment, they declare the subsequent objectives to be political. Malashenko drew attention to this, saying: ‘Politicization of Islam is a natural characteristic of its renaissance’.⁷ During the period of growing crisis in Tajikistan, Islam became a main mobilizing force to oppose the nomenklatura elite.

Political methods prevail in the current struggle between Islamic movements. This is indicated in the work of the Commission on National Reconciliation, where the government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) waged a debate over the past year about removing the word ‘secular’ (Article 100) from Tajikistan’s Constitution in an effort to put the issue to a referendum.

Religious community organizations of the fundamentalists and tariqahs play an important role in the politicization of Islam. Sufi ishans continue to play a special role in the life of the Muslim community in some regions. They opposed the secular administration in the inter-Tajik conflict. The OPTR, the principal political actor of the UTO, comprises the heads of the powerful Sufi brotherhoods – the Karategin ishans and institutional clergymen which received their education at Islamic universities in the East (for example, Turadzhon-zoda). The opposing forces also invoke Islam, albeit its popular form which in accordance with the traditions of Central Asia subordinates the cleric to the ruler.

The Islamic Party of Tajikistan’s Renaissance

The most organized Islamic political force is the Islamic Party of Tajikistan’s Renaissance. This party evolved from a secret youth organization founded in 1978 and its leader Said Abdullo Nuri. The organization studied and disseminated the views of Sheikh Hasan al-Banna, brothers Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Qutb, Sa’id Hawwa, and Abu-l-’Al’a Mawdudi. At a congress of Muslims of the Soviet Union in Astrakhan in June 1990 the Islamic Party of Renaissance was founded and the Council of ‘Ulamas – its supreme body – was elected. Back in Tajikistan, the congress delegates Davlat Usmon and S. Gadoev asked the republic’s Supreme Soviet for permission to hold a regional constituent conference of the Islamic Party of Renaissance. In response the Supreme Soviet banned the party’s activities on the republic’s territory as being contrary to the Constitution and the law on freedom of religion in the Tajik SSR, which prohibits religious organizations from political activities.⁸ This notwithstanding, the initiating group held a constituent conference in the Chortut Mosque in the Leninsky district on 6 October 1990.

The conference organizers were fined under the resolution of Tajikistan’s Supreme Soviet ‘On Ending the Activities of Parties and Public and Political Associations Banned under the Legislation of the Tajik SSR’ of 14 December 1990. In November 1990, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan issued a statement ‘On the Attempt to Create a Tajik Branch of The Islamic Party of Renaissance Despite the Decision of the Third Session of the Republic’s Supreme Soviet to Ban it’.⁹

In September 1991, Tajikistan became an independent state. Rallies lasting for days became harbingers of the impending conflict. Pressed by the protesters, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan passed a law on 22 October 1991 ‘On Repealing Some Legislation of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan on Questions of Parties of a Religious Character’. This same law recognized as no longer valid paragraph 3 of Tajikistan’s Supreme Soviet resolution of 5 October 1990, that banned the creation of a branch of the All-Union Party of Islamic Renaissance and of an Islamic party in the republic.¹⁰ Thus, the republic’s Supreme Soviet permitted registration of the Party of Islamic Renaissance.

The first congress of the Islamic Party of Renaissance of Tajikistan (IPTR) took place on 26 October 1991. 657 delegates participated. The keynote address was made by IPTR Chairman Muhamadsharif Khimmatzoda. He presented the immediate tasks of the party and his views on the political and economic situation in the country.¹¹ The delegates unanimously approved amendments to the programme and the rules of the party. A separate meeting of the ruling board elected M. Khimmatzoda chairman, and D. Usmon and S. Gadoev as his deputies. The congress also approved the emblem and banner of the party. The party newspaper was called Nadzhot.

The Islamic Party of Renaissance of Tajikistan was registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Tajikistan 4 December 1991. There were 20 000 members at the time of registration.

The Rules say that ‘. . . as a public and political organization of Muslims of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Islamic Party of Renaissance of Tajikistan, is founded on the principles of Islam: belief in one God and his messenger Prophet Muhammad . . . . As a parliamentary type of a party, the Islamic Party of Renaissance of Tajikistan is active in election campaigns and nominates its representatives as people’s candidates.’

The main objectives of the IPRT, according to its programme documents, are: (a) spiritual rebirth of the citizens of the republic; (b) economic and political independence of the republic; and (c) political and legal awakening with the purpose of implementing the fundamental provisions of Islam in the life of all Muslims of the republic.

The IPRT’s tasks are: (a) agitation and propaganda of Islam through accessible mass media among the peoples of the republic; (b) involving Muslims in the economic, political and spiritual life of the republic; (c) observance and implementation of the requirements of Islam in the everyday life of each IPRT member; and (d) creation of youth organizations.

Answering questions from journalists Khimmatzoda and Usmon reiterated that the party’s objective was to create a democratic state based on the rule of law with a government of popular confidence comprised of representatives of various political forces.¹²

The IPRT is the only legalized Islamic party in Central Asia that has participated in elections. It is the only example of political interaction between Islamists and the state elite. In the autumn of 1991 the opposition bloc, with the IPRT playing the leading role, bet on an alternative presidential candidate – Davlyat Khodonazarov – and according to the official count, won 31 per cent of the vote (or more than 40 per cent, according to the opposition). Such a result reflected the high electoral potential of the opposition. Nonetheless, the conflict was brewing on grounds other than parliamentary.

The IPRT was one of the organizers of the unauthorized rallies on Shakhidon Square between 26 March and 23 April and between 25–26 April and 5 May 1992. The Ministry of Justice issued warnings to the IPRT leaders on 1 April and 4 May 1992 to stop the unconstitutional activities. The many days of rallies climaxed in the creation of a government of national reconciliation. It included IPRT representatives. Davlat Usmon was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Tajikistan. The IPRT was also a cofounder of the armed Front for the Salvation of the Homeland. The creation of armed units sparked civil war. Following the victory for the anti-Islamic coalition in November 1992, the leaders of the IPRT left the country.

In June 1993, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tajikistan suspended the activities of the IPRT for violating the law ‘On Public Associations in the Tajik SSR’. The Collegium of the Press and Information Ministry ruled null and void registration certificate no. 162 of 14 January 1992, which had been issued to the IPRT newspaper Nadzhot.¹³

The scrapping of the party did not signify the end of its political struggle. In 1993 in Afghanistan the Movement of Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan was created, and Said Abdullo Nuri was elected its chairman; Khodzhi Akbar Turadzhonzoda, first deputy; and Muhammadsharif Khimmatzoda, deputy chairman.

Following a drawn-out war and protracted talks, a General Agreement on Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan was signed in Moscow on 27 June 1997. This put an end to this long and difficult stage in the inter-Tajik conflict. Based on the peace agreement, a Commission on National Reconciliation including IPRT representatives was formed. Among other things, the Commission was charged with developing proposals on amending the laws on political parties and the mass media, and with drafting the mechanisms for a transition period up to the general elections.

According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Sharq Center in Dushanbe in January 1999, 5 per cent supported the Islamic Party of Renaissance. The Communist Party, however, scored 28 per cent.¹⁴ Among the supporters of the Islamic Party of Renaissance are men in a very low income bracket, unemployed people, those who run their own businesses, and those who refer to themselves as Karategins.

In public opinion polls the IPRT and Islamism as a whole has a low standing. This is attributed to the fact that during its semi-legal existence since the peace agreement was signed in 1997, the party could not come up with any definite political doctrine or economic programme to bring the country out of its dire straits. According to the 30 per cent quota granted to the United Tajik Opposition in the peace agreement, IPRT representatives will become members of executive organs on all levels. Representatives of the opposition secured the positions of deputy prime minister, deputy foreign minister, and minister of the economy and foreign economic relations, land reclamation and water management, agriculture, and chairman of the Customs Committee.

Islam and the State

When Tajikistan became independent it encountered the paramount issue of Islam’s place in and interaction with the state. The issue became more complex when civil war disturbed the reform process in Tajikistan and plunged the country into chaos. The conflict affected the evolution of the statehood in Tajikistan.

As a result the state has attempted to form a powerful military elite capable of playing a political role and of opposing Islam. The peace process is being hindered by the deep-seated mistrust and antagonism between political Islam and advocates of the supremacy of state authorities.

The authorities are trying to get religious organizations under state control. By now the government has abolished the muftiyyah and the institution of sar-khatibs (heads of regional and district mosques subordinated to muftis). The muftiyyah was replaced with the Shura ulama (Council of ‘Ulamas) that has no decisive say. The Council of ‘Ulamas is subordinated to the government and the Committee for Religious Affairs. The abolition of the sar-khatibs made the imam-khatibs (prayer leaders) practically dependent on local authorities because the election of imam-khatibs is possible only on approval from local khukumates. Madrasahs have no right to either interfere in religious affairs in various mosques.

There were major problems in May 1998 when the ninth session of the Majlisi Oliy (parliament) passed a law banning political parties from functioning on a religious basis. Leaders of the United Tajik Opposition reacted negatively to the new law. In an attempt to break the impasse, President E. Rakhmonov vetoed the law and sent it back to parliament. This resulted in a compromise. On 13 November 1998, the 10th session of parliament adopted a new version of the law. By amendments to Articles 3 and 4 it was made possible to legalize the Islamic Party of Tajikistan’s Renaissance. At the same time, Article 4 bans mosques and madrasahs from setting up primary organizations of a political and military-political nature.¹⁵

Among the leaders of the Islamic movement there is no consensus concerning the future of the country and how to carry out the political struggle.

Views differ very widely within the Movement of Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan. The following groups can be found:

First, the ‘traditionalists’, whose leader is the chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission, Abdullo Nuri. Nuri, has declared that Islam is a matter of concern for every Muslim and not a religious ideology which seeks state monopoly. The traditionalists can be divided into qadimists and fundamentalists (of the latter the Deoband school is strong, which brings the Movement of Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan closer to the Taliban).

Second, the ‘radical Islamists’, which constitute the most active and organized force among the Islamists. They share the view of the traditionalists on the issues of Islam and its ideological and social functions. They differ from the traditionalists on how to attain their goals. Standing out amongst them is the Taqfir party, recently founded in Garm, which is fighting against the Movement of Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan and criticizing it for ‘its policy of compromise with the government and betrayal of Islamic values’. The leader of Taqfir is Mullo Amirkhon.

Islamic radicals frequently voice opinions rejected by the majority of the population. For example, in February 1999 IPTR leader Khimmatzoda told a republican conference that IPTR’s goal is to create an Islamic state. In this Islamic state only male Muslims could be representatives in elected bodies. As a consequence all ethnic minorities, atheists and women would be excluded from the political process.

Today it is possible to get an idea of the results of the ongoing Islamization process. According to the Tajik Ministry of Economy, before the 1992–93 war there were 2000 women with higher education and 3000 women with secondary special education in Karategin. Today there remain only 178 women with higher education and 759 with secondary special education.¹⁶

Consequences of the Conflict

One consequence of the conflict is the tendency towards political and economic disintegration of the country. Regional elites have come to power in every region. There is a danger that subethnic territories will be formed with their own systems of power, external centres of gravity, different economic models, and contradictory interests. It can already be seen that the system of power varies within the country. Islam has a different role in different parts of the country. In the foothills of Pamir there is theocratic rule and in northern Tajikistan there is secular authoritarianism with a subordinated position for the clerics. There is a totally different situation in the Khatlon and Gorno-Badakhshan regions. In Khatlon it is possible to see practically all types of Islam’s coexistence with the regime. Furthermore, the Sufi pirs are extremely influential with their differing views of political Islam and Islam’s future in general. In Gorno-Badakhshan, the secularized populations regard Ismai’lism more as an ethno-political movement than a faith. Ismai’lism is making a comeback together with an explosion of the Badakhshan people’s national self-awareness.

Prospects for the Future

A settlement of the inter-Tajik conflict and an integration of the opposition in the political structures are the main requirements for stabilization in Tajikistan.

Islamism with its different orientations is already a factor in the political life of Tajikistan. It is therefore important to involve the parties and the movements of the opposition in the political process. A multiparty system must develop and the creation of different kinds of civic associations must be encouraged. Constitutional reforms including a reform of the electoral system are necessary.

If there is to be national reconciliation, a consensus must be reached between different regions, and ethnic and social groups.

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¹ Vishnevsky, A., Serp i rubl. Konservativnaya modernizatsiya v SSSR, Moscow, 1998, p. 281.

² The share of agriculture began to grow as of 1972. Its share increased from 67.8 per cent in 1990 to 72.6 per cent in 1997. See Tajikistan, Otchet po chelovecheskomu razvitiyu, ibid.

³ Vishnevsky (note 1), p. 10.

⁴ 72.6 per cent of the population live in rural areas. In 1996 the average per capita income was $5–$6. Tajikistan, Otchet po chelovecheskomu razvitiyu, 1997, Dushanbe, predsatavitel’stvo PROON in RT, 1997, p. 10

⁵ Roy, O., Evolutions dans un environnment complex, Ex-URSS: Etates du divorse. 1993, p. 145.

⁶ Wagner, S., Public Opinion in Tajikistan, 1996., Washington, 1997.

⁷ Malashenko, A., ‘Rossiya i islamskiy faktor’, Rossiya, Moscow, Feb. 1997, p. 22.

⁸ Khasanov, R., ‘Podpol'nyy obkom . . . pod znamenem islama’, Pravda, 16 May 1991.

⁹ See: Tajikistan v ogne (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1993), pp. 147–49.

¹⁰ Lukin‚ A., ‘Allah Akbar: Zametki s pervogo s'ezda Islamskoy partii vozrozhdeniya Tadzhikistana’, Soglasiye, 1 Nov. 1991.

¹¹ Soglasiye, 1 Nov. 1991.

¹² Abazov, R. F., ‘Islamskoye vozrozhdeniye v Tsentralno-aziatskikh novykh nezavisimykh gosudarstvakh’, Politicheskoye issledovaniye, no. 3, 1995, p. 65.

¹³ Narodnaya Gazeta, 4 Dec. 1993.

¹⁴ Dannye oprosa po politicheskoy sisteme, provedennogo Informatsionno-analiticheskim tsentrom ‘Shark’ v yanvare, 1999. Olimov, M. and Olimova, S., ‘Stolitsa i stolichnye zhiteli.’, Vestnik blagotvoritel'nosti (Dushanbe), no. 7, 1999, p 24.

¹⁵ Khasanov, K., ‘Kak eto bylo: Istina o registratsii ustava Islamskoi partii vozrozhdeniya’, Narodnaya gazeta, 27 Apr. 1993.

¹⁶ Statistics by courtesy of the Republic of Tajikistan Ministry of the Economy and Foreign Relations.