CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

Having analyzed the disputes over the waters of the Syr Darya River basin from their inception in the early 1990s to the present day, three tasks remain in this study. First, is to answer the research question posed in Chapter I, on the base of the historical approach. Second, is to reconsider the four main factors mentioned in Chapter I in terms of their role in promoting or impeding cooperation among the basin states. Finally, the study will propose a set of recommendations that might be useful in the sense that they could help to resolve the disputes between the upstream and downstream states of the Syr Darya River basin.

 

6.1 The Impact of Water Disputes on Interstate Relations

In the specific case of the Syr Darya River basin, how have the water disputes affected interstate relations?

With the disappearance of a single authority in the field of resource management, the Soviet Union, each basin state proclaimed the excusive right to its natural resources, including water (see page 62). These actions by the co-riparians could be explained by the fact that the Central Asian countries became autonomous actors and started to interact with each other in traditions of the realist concept of sovereignty, as discussed in Chapter II. In other words, the countries have striven to maximize their individual utilities, to protect national interests and preserve their position in the absence of central authority. In terms of natural resources, the co-riparians were inclined to treat their coal, gas, oil or water as strategic resources and were generally interested in unilateral exploitation for their national developments.

Insistence on sovereignty and independence in the field of resource management negatively affected state interaction within the basin. The countries have repeatedly clashed with each other over the issue of how to use and develop natural resources. Especially heated controversy flared up about those resources that transcend state boundaries, the international shared watercourse system, the Syr Darya River.

A review of the history of riparian discord in the Syr Darya River basin provides certain facts, which demonstrate that since the early 1990s the water issue has adversely affected and continues to aggravate interstate relations within the basin. Developing in a negative direction, these interactions passed through several stages: from the relative lull of the early 1990s to mutual disappointment of the middle 1990s, and finally to open rivalry in the late 1990s/ beginning of 2000s.

After gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian countries hurried to assure each other that their relations in the field of management of transboundary watercourse systems of the region would be unchanged. The states decided to keep the water allocation schemes, which had been developed in the conditions of the united planned economy of the Soviet Union. This initial stage of state relationships was characterized by a relative lull and the illusion that the previous allocation schemes could be feasible in new political and economic realities of the post-Soviet period.

The next stage of state interaction on the water issue could be dated back to the period of 1993-1996, when these relations started to show obvious signs of strain. During these years upstream Kyrgyzstan re-directed several times its hydraulic potential from irrigation to hydropower generation in the winter seasons. In reply to such actions, the Uzbek side threatened to halt gas deliveries to Kyrgyzstan, and thus forced Kyrgyzstan to meet its commitments under the 1992 Water Treaty. This period is noteworthy due to the fact that for the first time in the history of riparian relations, one basin state used its natural resources as a tool to compel another one to follow certain obligations.

The relative lull and the illusion of the middle 1990s changed into a period of mutual disappointment and accusations of the late 1990s/ beginning of 2000s. Over 1997-2000 the relationships between the basin states continued to exhibit a tendency towards deterioration and reached utterly their critical point in the summer of 2001. In fact, in 1997, due to a shortage of gas deliveries from Uzbekistan and irregular coal/oil supplies from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan made a decision to revise its relationship with downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In particular, the upstream state adopted a resolution, which stipulated that money should be paid for water releases downstream. Furthermore, upstream Kyrgyzstan adopted Uzbekistan’s methods and began to use its abundant water resources as a tool to force its two downstream neighbours to supply energy resources in time and at the relatively acceptable prices. During this period the co-riparians began to clash more obviously and furiously, exchanging mutual accusations, criticizing each other and ignoring the water-related discussions.

Before discussing possible ways of the settlement of the water disputes, this study also reconsiders the four principal factors in order to demonstrate once again the role of these factors in promoting or impeding cooperation among the basin states. The factors are: (i) the degree to which national economies of the basin states are dependent on water supplies; (ii) the economic weight and political might of the upstream and downstream states; (iii) the nature of interstate relations in terms of their potential to intensify water disputes; and (iv) efforts and steps, which have been taken by the co-riparians in an attempt to solve the riparian clashes.

The analysis of the physical and non-physical features of the Syr Darya River basin, which was conducted in Chapter III, shows that the national economies of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are heavily dependent on stable and regular water supplies from upstream Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz economy in turn urgently needs the energy resources of its lower riparian neighbours. Such strong and complex interdependence, however, did not result in mutual understanding and cooperation between the co-riparians. Quite the contrary, individual needs and national interests have continued to alienate the countries, prompting them to look for new trade partners. This furthered the disintegrative process in Central Asia at large and in the Syr Darya River in particular.

Such disintegrative trends became possible because in the early 1990s the newly independent states made a serious mistake that eventually affected interstate relations within the basin. This mistake lies in the fact that the co-riparians agreed to adhere to the water allocation schemes of the Soviet era but the countries neglected to take the same actions regarding other resources such as coal, gas and oil. As a result the water-rich states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, were bound by the unfavourable provisions of the 1992 Water Treaty. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the main suppliers of coal, gas and oil to the upstream states, however, did not have any obstacles to develop their energy sectors and increase export prices to the market level.

Having more favourable initial conditions like rich natural resources, considerable industrial potential and better-developed infrastructure, both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan managed to reach higher rates of economic growth than water-rich but economically poor Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan. Such differences in the development of the national economies led to so-called political stratification, when the more developed countries began to demonstrate tougher attitudes in negotiations towards the weaker states of the basin.¹⁷¹

Over a period of ten years the co-riparians of the Syr Darya River basin tried to come to a compromise on water sharing and energy transfer issues. These talks resulted in the signing of interstate treaties and the creation of different interstate institutions. Nevertheless, these treaties as well as the institutions have failed by and large to resolve discord between upstream Kyrgyzstan and downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The flat reluctance to forgo individual interests in the name of regional cooperation, the desire for unilateral profit, and the weakness of the enforcement mechanisms of the agreements concerned were the main factors that impeded the settlement of the riparian discord within the basin.

 

6.2 Recommendations

As the previous chapters have demonstrated, over the last ten years the water disputes in the Syr Darya River basin assumed a complicated and protracted character. This complexity and lengthiness stems from “the very nature of water disputes,” which usually implies involvement of two or more parties with their conflicting interests and needs, different approaches of the participants to water-related negotiations, and inefficiency of institutional arrangements.¹⁷²

Acknowledging the challenges, this study makes an attempt to propose some recommendations that might be useful in the settlement of the water disputes between the upstream and downstream riparian states of the Syr Darya River basin. These recommendations are basically pertinent to the nature of the state interaction on the water issue, state behaviour in water-related negotiations and state approaches towards institutional solution of the water disputes.

The first short but important recommendation suggests the co-riparians to revise the character of their interactions on the water issue. Recent regional developments have shown that these interactions are generally permeated with political tension rather than with the spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding. This tension is contributing to the lack of agreement on many salient issues of Central Asia, including the water-related problems. Therefore, it is advisable that the political tension between the co-riparians should be settled, or at least minimized first.

One of the possible ways to lessen the tension is to put an end to the resort to political reprimands that has become a norm of behavior of the powerful downstream states with respect to their upstream neighbors. These reproofs, often exceeding the limits of political tact and certain diplomatic ethics like in case of a public speech of the Kazakh President or hasty statements of the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan in the summer of 2001 (see page 60), do not favor a constructive dialogue. Quite the contrary, they usually create an uncompromising climate within the riparian community of the basin and provoke a splash of nationalistic sentiments and natural resistance in the neighboring upper riparian states.

The second recommendation has to do with the behaviour of the co-riparians in water-related negotiations. In water politics, negotiations are usually considered as the best recognized mechanism for resolving water disputes.¹⁷³ However, in case of the Syr Darya River basin negotiations are less helpful and often reach a deadlock due to incompatibility of positions of the co-riparians. The upstream and downstream states, therefore, are suggested to revise their behaviour in water-related negotiations and stick to certain negotiation strategies.

One of these strategies advises the contracting parties not to come to negotiations with fixed positions since they often make dialogue difficult and the establishment of cooperation impossible. Instead, the parties should be flexible and ready for constructive exchange of ideas on how to make conflicting interests and positions compatible. Although, this strategy could probably be considered as potentially time consuming and difficult, it could become one of those effective mechanisms that help to overcome the riparian discord in the Syr Darya River basin.

In addition, it might be useful if each basin state comes to the negotiation table with its concrete set of solutions on any water-related issue. Moreover, it is desirable for the co-riparians to exchange the solutions before the negotiation process. Such an exchange would probably help to avoid a situation when a delegation of a particular country refuses to discuss the proposed solutions under the pretence that it should consult with its higher authorities before making a decision.

The last recommendation relates to state approaches towards the institutional resolution of water disputes in the Syr Darya River basin. The essence of the approaches, which have been in practice since the 1990s, lies in the fact that the co-riparians have tried to manage the disputes without the direct international involvement in water-related organizations of the basin. Of course, it would be mistaken to maintain that international organizations are negligibly engaged in the water issues; different agencies of the United Nations as well as international financial institutions are quite welcomed by the co-riparians. Yet, their role is limited mainly to technical assistance in the form of consultations, recommendations and report drafting. In this regard, it inevitably comes to mind that the riparian states prefer to see international involvement at the project and/or negotiation stage but not at the institutional level.

In fact, over the last decade the riparian states of the Syr Darya River basin together with the basin states of the Amu Darya River established a number of interstate institutions to deal with the problem of water management in the region. These institutions are the Interstate Water Coordinating Commission and its executive bodies, the Secretariat, the Scientific Centre, the Syr Darya River and the Amu Darya River Basin Management Associations. In terms of structure, composition and functions, these institutions are merely regional arrangements that cover the co-riparians and do not foresee any direct international participation. As a result, the basin institutions often suffer from grave shortcomings that stem from certain difficulties, be they political such as the lack of political impartiality or economic such as financial dependency.

Perhaps, if the co-riparians become more open to international institutional involvement, they would be able to establish a truly vital and efficient model of the upstream-downstream relations in the basin. To create the model, it is suggested to the co-riparians that they establish a so-called Syr Darya River Committee in imitation of the Mekong Committee but with due regard for the political, economic and other trends of the region.

As the first step, it is advisable to formulate the status, the organization, and the composition of the Committee, which should reflect “the duality of an organization that, while answering to the member states, and must be accountable to the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and through it, to the UN.”¹⁷⁴. Probably, the UN Bureau of Legal Affairs and the UNECE, involved in many projects in the post-Soviet countries, could help the riparian countries with these organizational matters.

In order to make this body the true expression of the four riparians’ will it is advisable that the Syr Darya River Committee would be autonomous, free from any regional power’s guidance or influence. The Committee should be efficient and effective, capable of making and enforcing decisions and not be just another discussion group. In terms of structure, the Syr Darya River Committee could consist of the General Assembly and two subordinate organizations: the Executive Agent Bureau and the Advisory Board.

Focusing on the structure of the General Assembly, all basin states should be represented in the Assembly. It is suggested the states send their respective delegations under the guidance of authorized leaders. In terms of functions, the delegations are supposed to be engaged in supervision, coordination and control of water supplies and energy exchanges between the co-riparians. In case financial relations replace the barter settlements, the missions could focus on financial matters. These matters could include but not be limited to compensatory payments for independent purchases of natural resources, co-financing of the operation and maintenance of the interstate hydraulic infrastructure and other issues.

One of the subordinate organizations of the Syr Darya River Committee, the Executive Agent Bureau should be guided by a executive agent, who should be appointed by the UN Secretary General. The agent should serve as assistant executive secretary of UNECE and be connected to the UN, and UNECE. This connection could facilitate the resolution of any possible difficulties in the relations between the newly established organization, UNECE, and the UN. Functionally, the agent is supposed to receive general policy guidelines from the UNECE and advise the Syr Darya River Committee about administrative and technical coordination concerning water sharing and energy trade in the basin.

Another subordinate organization of the Syr Darya River Committee, the Advisory Board should include international experts from different UN organizations. Their main responsibilities could be to advise the Committee and the Executive Agent on joint projects, if any, and their repercussions for each riparian state in the short/middle/long terms. The international experts are also supposed to provide support in reports’ drafting and feasibility studies’ preparation.

The final important point about the Syr Darya River Committee is financial maintenance. The Committee, “in order to be able to function and to have at its disposal adequate financial and technical means,… need[s] the support of organizations such as the UN.”¹⁷⁵ It is advisable that the Committee would have its own budget, but “its personnel should be financed by the different organizations under the UN’s umbrella to ensure its economic and political objectivity.”¹⁷⁶

In case the co-riparians adopt the recommendations proposed by this study, they could probably achieve a certain success in solving one of the main stumbling blocks in interstate relationships, the water issue. This is because of the following reasons. The first recommendation to change the nature of state interactions on the water issue could lessen the degree of political tension between the co-riparians and could create auspicious conditions for constructive dialogue and exchange of ideas. The next suggestion is to alter state behaviour in water-related negotiations, which would facilitate the negotiation process by making conflicting interests and positions of the basin states compatible. The final proposal would probably flavor direct international involvement in the water disputes and help the co-riparians to establish a truly vital and efficient model of upstream-downstream relations in the basin.

To sum up, the recommendations are believed to be feasible because they basically stem from the relatively successful experience of the Mekong and Nile Committees. Besides, the suggestions are worthy of attention and should be put into practice because in general terms they could contribute to agreement within the riparian community of the Syr Darya River basin. This accord would promote regional stability and ease tense political relations between the upper and lower riparian states. The regional stability and balanced interstate relations in turn would be the main elements of the successful development of Central Asian countries.

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¹⁷¹ Ryspek Apasov. “Integratsiya ili Ekonomicheskii Natsionalizm.” [Integration or Economic Nationalism.] Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway, 2001, 17 pages. <http://rus.gateway.kg/vodn> (January 13, 2002).
¹⁷² Gail Bingham, Aaron Wolf and Tom Wohlgenant. “Resolving Water Disputes: Conflict and Cooperation in the United States, the Near East and Asia.” US Agency for International Development, Bureau for Asia and the Near East. 4 pages. <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/bing7515.htm> (April 07, 2002).
¹⁷³ Joel McGregor. “The Internationalization of Disputes over Water: The Case of Bangladesh and India.” University of Western Australia, Department of Political Science, Conference Paper. 12 pages. <http://apsa2000.anu.edu.au/confpapers/mcgregor.rtf> (April 12 2002).
¹⁷⁴ Nguyen Thi Dieu. The Mekong River and the Struggle for Indochina: Water, War ands Peace. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999, p. 55.
¹⁷⁵ Nguyen Thi Dieu. The Mekong River and the Struggle for Indochina: Water, War ands Peace. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999, p. 55.
¹⁷⁶ Nguyen Thi Dieu, p. 55.