CHAPTER FOUR

CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISPUTES OVER THE SYR DARYA RIVER

The lack of agreement on the water resources of the Syr Darya River has negatively affected the political and economic life of the riparian states as well as on the environment of the region at large and on the basin in particular. First and foremost, discord amongst the upstream and downstream users on the issue of equitable water use has triggered political tension and an enduring polemic on ownership rights to the transnational water resources. Secondly, irrespective of their geographical positions, the basin states are suffering economic losses caused by uncoordinated development and use of the transboundary watercourse system. Finally, for the last decade, there has been growing concern over the degradation of ecosystems of the Aral Sea and the Syr Darya River basins as a result of unprecedented pressure on water resources and insufficiently considered practice of water management.

 

4.1 Basin Polemics on the Ownership Right to Water

Disagreement on the issue of equitable use of the water resources of the Syr Darya River basin has led to a debate related over ownership rights to the transboundary waters. In the disputes there are two conflicting camps, the upstream and downstream riparians, each have their own fixed positions. Upholding its rights, the upper riparian, Kyrgyzstan, is predisposed to claim permanent sovereignty over its water resources. The position of this basin state basically implies that the fluvial waters that originate within and run through its territory are the property of the state, and hence could be utilized according to the “interests of national development and well-being of the state concerned.”¹¹⁸

Since its independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has taken a number of measures aimed at changing previously accepted and often uneconomic attitude towards water, existing at the domestic level. The first step goes back to 1994, when the country abrogated the 1972 Water Code of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic and put the new Water Law in force.¹¹⁹ One of the remarkable features of this law was the fact that article 39 of the law released agricultural and forestry sectors of the national economy from payment for water use.¹²⁰ Subsequently, this provision was excluded from the 1995 version of the law and never appeared in any following editions. The process of revision of attitude towards water resources has basically demonstrated the desire of official Bishkek to build contract-based relations with local water consumers and later with external users.

Similar developments could be observed in the legislations of downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In fact, article 30 of the Law on Water and Water Use of Uzbekistan claims that domestic enterprises, organizations and agricultural sector should pay for the use of surface and underground water resources of the country. These payments, further, go into the state budget and are distributed in accordance with needs of the water industry of the country. In the case of Uzbekistan, the Water Code of Kazakhstan obliges domestic water users, be they industrial enterprises, or agricultural consumers, to pay for water to be supplied for irrigation, industrial and other needs.¹²¹

The cases illustrate that domestically not only upstream Kyrgyzstan, but also the downstream riparians have recognized their water resources as a commodity, which has its definite economic value. Additionally, the co-riparians consider the water pricing as an effective mechanism to impel water users to rational use of these precious resources and as a great help to national budgets to maintain the national hydraulic infrastructure. Similar steps as well as innovations to the water laws, however, have brought to dissimilar reaction within the riparian community of the Syr Darya River basin.

The new policy associated with regulation of water consumption by domestic and external users, adopted by Kyrgyzstan in the middle of the 1990s and later in 2001, was not adequately supported and understood by its neighbours. The two lower basin countries, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have declared that water resources cannot be a subject of bargaining since the resources are an integral part of a global natural cycle, and thus they do not belong to anyone, but to humankind. In other words, this claim implies that all the riparians have equal rights to use the water resources of Kyrgyzstan.¹²² While the statement undoubtedly contradicts provisions of the Kyrgyz legislation, both the Water Law and the Constitution, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan continue to make attempts to convince the Kyrgyz side to renounce its point of view with respect to the water resources.

In these attempts, the downstream countries have used different tactics towards water-rich Kyrgyzstan, from political pressure and bitter criticism to trade measures. Undoubtedly, trade measures adopted by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan adversely affect the economy of Kyrgyzstan; however, the political admonitions by the two powerful states are of no small danger in the sense that they set the basin states at loggerheads. Indeed, the approaches and tactics, chosen by the downstream neighbours, trigger natural resistance from official Bishkek and stir up heightened political rhetoric and nationalistic sentiments within Kyrgyzstan.

The behaviour of the downstream neighbours of Kyrgyzstan could be rooted in political and economic might of the lower riparians. Having more favourable initial conditions like rich natural resources, considerable industrial potential and better developed infrastructure, both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan managed to reach higher rates of economic growth than water-rich but economically poor Kyrgyzstan. Such differences in the development of the national economies led to so-called political stratification, when the more developed countries began to demonstrate tougher attitudes in negotiations towards the weaker states of the basin.¹²³

This hard-line approach becomes especially evident when the basin states discussed the water issue. During his first official visit to Kyrgyzstan in July 2001, the Kazakh leader, Nursultan Nazarbaev, severely criticized the Law of Kyrgyzstan “On Interstate Use of Water Units, Water Resources and Water Facilities of the Kyrgyz Republic.” In particular he claimed that the law “does not have any legal foundation…it is impossible to set a price for irrigation water…it contradicts international standards…it is unacceptable for Kazakhstan.”¹²⁴ Echoing the statement of the Kazakh leader, the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan, Utkir Sultanov, declared that adoption of the law “is none other than a result of deputies’ ambitions of the Kyrgyz parliament.”¹²⁵

There is an interesting and contradictory nuance in these reprimands that makes cooperation in the basin questionable or even impossible. When it comes to the issue of domestic natural resources, the legislative bodies of the co-riparians have something in common with each other: they claim state ownership of their natural resources, including water.

The land, its minerals, fauna and flora, as well as other natural resources shall constitute the national wealth, and shall be rationally used and protected by the state.

(Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Part III, Chapter 12, Article 55.)¹²⁶

In the Kyrgyz Republic the land, its underground resources, water, forests, flora and fauna, and other natural wealth are used as a basis of life and activity of the people of Kyrgyzstan, and are under special protection of the state.

(Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, Chapter 1, Section 1, Article 4.)¹²⁷

The land and underground resources, waters, flora and fauna, other natural resources shall be owned by the state.

(Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Section I, Article 6, Paragraph 3.)¹²⁸

The above-mentioned provisions affirm the excusive right of the states to natural resources, including water, and exclude any claims from other states. In spite of similar attitudes towards resources, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are reluctant to recognize the ownership rights of Kyrgyzstan to the water resources. The noteworthy fact here is that these resources originate exclusively within the sovereign territory of Kyrgyzstan and they do not receive any replenishment from rivers of the contiguous states. Unwillingness together with a hidden aspiration of the lower riparians to “undivided, gratis, and thus irrational consumption”¹²⁹ of the water resources of the sovereign Kyrgyzstan undermines any attempts to solve the water disputes in the Syr Darya River basin. As a result, every party of the disputes comes off worst.

 

4.2 Economic Damage

In the absence of agreement on how to develop and use the water resources of the Syr Darya River, both upstream and downstream states are incurring considerable economic losses. While Kyrgyzstan has to bear costs related to the maintenance and operation of hydrotechnical units and other facilities, downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan suffer mainly from economic damage caused either by floods or droughts.

In fact, the broad hydrological system of Kyrgyzstan with its dams, reservoirs and irrigation cannels requires more than US$ 25 million of annual investments. For the poorest country of Central Asia, which is “not in transition…[but] a developing country …sinking into poverty,”¹³⁰ such an amount is a backbreaking burden. In 2001 the Kyrgyz government could allocate only US$ 8 million for the maintenance and operation of the system.¹³¹ Even though these allocations are just one third of the investments required, for Kyrgyzstan, which has been experiencing a protracted economic crisis since its independence, such costs mean aggravation of the situation within the country. Therefore, the uppermost state is hardly able to provide alone a proper and regular maintenance of the infrastructure, which is important for all riparians. As a result of the inability of Kyrgyzstan to manage the situation alone as well as refusal of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to share the costs, the hydraulic system is continuing to dilapidate, causing high water losses by evaporation, infiltration and other reasons.

Asserting its national interests, upstream Kyrgyzstan has gradually changed the operating regime of the hydraulic system, initially designed for the irrigation needs of the lower riparians of the basin. Nowadays the infrastructure serves mainly the needs of Kyrgyzstan: it produces more than 80% of the energy required for domestic and export purposes in winter, and irrigates the Southern agricultural fields in summertime. Since the infrastructure was not designed for energy generation, it slowly deteriorates, threatening the stability of electricity supply to Kyrgyzstan in cold seasons. For the downstream states the consequences of the transformation of the operating regime are also unfavourable: floods in winter months and severe water deficits in summer.

In fact, the recent reports clearly illustrate the scope of the economic loss, sustained by the lower riparian states of the Syr Darya River basin. In Uzbekistan, the agricultural sector of the national economy is especially vulnerable to fluctuations of water supplies, which reduce an area of agricultural fields and result in decreases in crop yields. Downstream Kazakhstan is also concerned with the water issue because of the way in which the upper riparians develop the basin water resources directly affects both the health condition of its population and the environment.

Since the water level of the Syr Darya River heavily depends on the water of its main tributary, the Naryn River, the consequences of any interference upstream the river are immediately observed in downstream parts of the basin. Whenever Kyrgyzstan discharges water from the Toktogul reservoir, the enriched flow from the Syr Darya River dashes to the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan, fills the Kayrakkum reservoir of Tajikistan, crosses again the territory of Uzbekistan and then flows into the Chardara reservoir of Kazakhstan. At that point a problem of floods on the Uzbek side occurs because the coming water often exceeds the storage capacity of the Kazakh reservoir and results in outflow to the lower reaches in central Uzbekistan.

According to Uzbek officials, because of unscheduled water releases by Kyrgyzstan in winter months, for the last 5 years the water level of one of the lower reaches of the Syr Darya River, the Arnasay River, rose to 7.5 meters.¹³² In 2000, during one such outflow, 750 m³ of water a second was flowing down into the reach, flooding 350,000 hectares of arable land.¹³³ These floods also damaged road infrastructure, power transmission network and social facilities of the central and Eastern parts of Uzbekistan. In 2001, the government of the country claimed that “because of Kyrgyzstan’s extensive water discharge…the total loss for Uzbekistan reached almost US$ 1 billion.”¹³⁴

Until recently the situation with floods has remained disastrous: “a number of residential areas and agricultural farms of the eastern Uzbekistan [were] under threat of being flooded because 650-700 m³ of water [were] being released from the Toktogul reservoir.”¹³⁵ As recent reports say, despite high overall demand for hydroelectricity and sharp energy crisis when some regions are cut off the power, Kyrgyzstan agreed to decrease the water flow from the reservoir to 500 m³ per second.¹³⁶

In addition to the issue of floods in winter seasons, there is a problem of water deficits in Uzbekistan. For a period of the last two years this country has experienced considerable drop in harvest due to severe dry summers multiplied by a shortage of water.¹³⁷ In 2001 the country sustained a considerable loss because water flows in one of the two main sources of its irrigation, the Syr Darya River, were reduced by 40 %.

Kazakhstan, the last water recipient, is also extremely anxious about any water mismanagement, which may take place in the upstream parts of the Syr Darya River basin. This is so because the agricultural and fishing sectors of the national economy are heavily dependent on fluvial water. However, for Kazakhstan the water issue is associated not only with the problem of quantity but also with the concern for water quality.

In fact, when Uzbekistan irrigates vast area of pesticide-treated cotton/rice fields, the water of the Syr Darya River deteriorates seriously in quality.¹³⁸ Poor quality together with shortages is causing economic damage as well as irreplaceable harm to the ecology and population of Kazakhstan. As a result, the damage to the national economy is burdened by the cost of measures required to mitigate ecological consequences of the inadequate water management upstream the river.

By virtue of its geographical and climatic conditions, only the southern part of Kazakhstan and areas along the riverbed and in delta of the Syr Darya River are fit for the cultivation of crops.¹³⁹ As in case of neighbouring Uzbekistan, a majority of these agricultural fields, especially in central Kazakhstan, are vulnerable to seasonal droughts and natural water fluctuations that now occur more frequently.

Studies conducted by different institutions have noted the great water deficit experienced by this downstream state: the average level of water supply has dropped to 60% and to 5-10% in its central parts.¹⁴⁰ In addition to the natural causes of water shortage, the situation with water supplies in Kazakhstan has been aggravated by unilateral measures taken by its neighbour, Uzbekistan. Thus, for example, in 2000 about 15,000 hectares of cotton fields of Kazakhstan did not receive enough irrigation water. As a result, about 30% of the harvest was lost.¹⁴¹

After several decades had elapsed, it would be right to maintain that the fishing industry of Kazakhstan has also turned out to be the most affected sector of the national economy. This sector have fell into decay due to insufficient quantity and poor quality of the water of Syr Darya River. For example, in the 1960s, there were 2 fishing centres, the Aral fish enterprise, 8 fish plants, and 19 collective fish farms in the delta of the river; 61,000 workers were involved in the production and processing of fish.

However, due to the water deficit as well as pesticide poisoning of the river water, since the 1970s the fish catch gradually declined to almost zero level in the 1980s, sparking a “collapse of the industry and employment in this sector.”¹⁴² From the end of the 1990s Kazakhstan has taken a number of measures to revive its fishing industry; however, unilateral actions by neighbouring Uzbekistan have often threatened these undertakings. In spring 2001, the water level in one of the biggest Kazakh reservoirs, the Chardara reservoir dropped because the water flow was stopped by upstream Uzbekistan. This action caused danger to spawning fish in the reservoirs and rivers, and threatened the remaining fishing industry of Kazakhstan.

Recent research claims that despite the efforts of Kazakhstan to rescue its fishing sector in the Aral Sea and the Syr Darya River basins, the fishery in these parts of the country is continuing to decline and disappear. As a result, “only 1,800 people still work in the industry on imported and domestic fish.”¹⁴³ Nowadays, the water shortage is considered as one of the most significant problems making difficult the sustainable development of Kazakhstan.

In spite of the existence of numerous water agreements signed by the basin states since the end of the 1990s the problem of unilateral measures in the basin has became more serious. This has prompted competition between different sectors of the national economies and affecting relationships between the co-riparians.

 

4.3 Environmental Impact

The unresolved issues relating to sharing of the watercourse system as well as unrestricted unilateral use of the water resources has led to the alarming degradation of the ecosystems of the terminus of the Syr Darya River, the Aral Sea, and the river itself. Current events in that area serve as a warning to the basin states: environmental deprivation does favour neither upstream nor downstream states.

The more cotton/rice fields have been developed downstream the Syr Darya River basin, the more fluvial water was diverted for cultivation of water-intensive crops. In order to increase productivity, crop expansion was accompanied by unlimited use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and defoliants, which have been poured onto the fields. The chemicals in turn were “not only discharged into the river through drainage canals, but have also filtered through to the groundwater when land [was] flushed by huge amounts of irrigation water.” Then the groundwater carried minerals and chemicals to the surface, where they were left to accumulate after the evaporation of the water. As a result, the water of the Syr Darya River, the groundwater as well as soil of the basin became highly polluted, affecting directly the population of the riparian states.

Unprecedented pressure on and unrestricted use of the water resources for irrigation needs result in sharp declines in stream flows into the Aral Sea and the degradation of the highly productive deltaic lands of the Syr Darya River. The delta region became desiccated or salinized, provoking a shortening of the vegetation period and a loss of wildlife.

The Aral Sea was once the fourth biggest inland sea in the world, feeding for centuries riparian societies and maintaining fragile natural balance in the region. Today the Sea together with its main water arteries has become “the most serious consequence of water mismanagement in Central Asia.” In the 1960, before the cotton/rice campaign, the Aral Sea surface was 66,100 km² with a maximum depth of 68 meters and the salt content of 1% only. Starting from the 1960s when the river systems were diverted for irrigation the flow of water into the sea began to drop. 27,000 km² of the former sea bottom became dry surface, about 60% of water volume was lost, the sea level declined 14 meters, and the concentration of salt doubled.¹⁴⁴

Today, an estimated 200,000 tones of salt and sand are being carried away by wind and discharged within a radius of 300 km every day. Recent research asserts that this salt and sand are gradually changing natural landscape around the Aral Sea. In fact, “a new desert has appeared to the south and east of the sea.” This so-called white desert has a tendency to expand very quickly across the territories of some basin states. Every year it spreads a further 150,000 hectares.¹⁴⁵

Another negative consequence of water mismanagement is the change of climatic conditions of the Aral Sea basin at large and the Syr Darya River basin in particular. According to some reports, over the several decades droughts and sand storms more frequently have affected the riparian areas and have become a normal natural phenomenon in the basins. Such changes have negatively affected the basin populations, prompting high rates of cancer-related diseases and infant mortality.¹⁴⁶

High reliance on water-intensive crops such as cotton or rice downstream the Syr Darya River was fraught with serious consequences for the environment of the basin. First of all, for the period of 1970-1980s the river did not reach its terminus, the Aral Sea. As a result fourth largest lake in the world have began to shrink and became “one of the world's most staggering disasters of the 20th century.”¹⁴⁷ Secondly, the natural landscape of the basin has started to change drastically, which in turn resulted in significant changes of weather conditions. Finally, societies leaving along the river have suffered from the diseases caused by unlimited use of pesticides/defoliants and climate changes.

 

4.4 Conclusion

The disputes over the water of the Syr Darya River adversely affect the political, and economic situation in the basin at large and in each riparian state in particular. In addition, inadequate water development and use causes degradation of the environment of the basin states independently of their geographical locations. The aspiration for economic development attended by a desire to gain unilateral and momentary advantages affects the relationships within the riparian community.

Trying to pursue national interests in a unilateral manner and at the expense of each other, the co-riparians more and more drift towards political confrontation and fierce economic competition. Furthermore, discord over the water of the Syr Darya River basin exhibits a tendency to become a political game rather than an opportunity to combine efforts to resist the dangerous consequences of water mismanagement. The basin states have adopted a market economy and are not ready to give away or sacrifice its water resources and needs for the good of others. Under such circumstances crucial practical issues concerning the revision of water management and the rehabilitation of hydraulic infrastructure of the basin are left out of focus of the game.

Besides, the water issue in the Syr Darya River deserves special attention and concern since it has the potential for conflict not only at the state level but also between peoples. Some of the basin states are already burdened by the bitter experience of bloody confrontation with each other in the recent past. Therefore, political games and speculations on the water issue at both the interstate and domestic levels are fraught with serious consequences in the ethnically diverse environment of the region.

To sum up, the lack of accord on the development and use of the water resources of the Syr Darya River basin results in economic damage for the parties and speeds up the environmental degradation of both the Aral Sea and the Syr Darya River basins. Furthermore, the disputes over the waters of the river aggravate political tensions between the co-riparians and undermine regional security in Central Asia.

---

¹¹⁸ Kamal Hossain. “Introduction.” In Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources in International Law, edited by Kamal Hossain and Subrata Roy Chowdhury. London: Frances Pinter Publishers (1988): x.
Kamal Hossain. “Introduction.” In Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources in International Law.
¹¹⁹ Informational Centre Toktom. Postanovleniya Jogorku Kenesha К R. [Resolutions of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic]. Postanovlenie o Poryadke Vvedeniya v Deistvie Zakona Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki o Vode. [The Resolution on Carrying the Water Law into Effect]. <http://www.toktom.kg/toktom_cgi-bin/ex/document.cgi?33279> (February 16, 2002).
¹²⁰ Informational Centre Toktom. Postanovleniya Jogorku Kenesha К R. [Resolutions of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic]. Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki o Vode. [The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Water]. <http://www.toktom.kg/toktom_cgi-bin/ex/document.cgi?31999#SCROLL0> (February 16, 2002).
¹²¹ US Agency for International Development. Environmental Policy and Technology Project. Analysis of Legislations of the Republics of Central Asia Related to Protection and Rational Use of Water Resources (A Subject-Matter Study). July 1997, 44 pages.
¹²² Ryspek Apasov. “Intergratsiya ili Ekonomicheskii Natsionalizm.” [Integration or Economic Nationalism.] Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway, 2001, 17 pages. <http://rus.gateway.kg/vodn> (January 13, 2002).
¹²³ Ryspek Apasov. “ Intergratsiya ili Ekonomicheskii Natsionalizm.” [Integration or Economic Nationalism.] Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway, 2001, 17 pages. <http://rus.gateway.kg/vodn> (January 13, 2002).
¹²⁴ Turdukun Usubaliev. Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliku o Mezhgosudarstvennom Ispolzovanii Vodnyh Obektov, Vodnyh Resursov i Vodohozyaistvennyh Sooruzhenii Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki. [The Law of the Kyrgyz Repyublic on Interstate Use of Hydraulic Unites, Water Resources and Water Facilities of the Kyrgyz Republic]. Bishkek: Sham Publication House, 2002, p. 11.
¹²⁵ “Vvedenie Platy za Vodopolzovanie Protivorechit Mezhdunarodnomu Pravu – U. Sultanov.” [Water Pricing Introduced by Kyrgyzstan Contradicts to the International Law – U. Sultanov]. Uzbekistan National News Agency, October 15, 2001, 5 pages. <http://www.uza.uz/specials/2001/10/1.shtml> (February 17, 2002).
¹²⁶ International Foundation for Election System. Central Asian Offices. IFES-Uzbekistan. Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan. <http://www.ifescentralasia.kg/Uzbekistan/ENG/const_uze.html> (January 27, 2002).
¹²⁷ Portal Gosudarstvennyh Sluzhb Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki. [Public Service of the Kyrgyz Republic]. Konstitutsiya Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki [Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic]. <http://www.gov.kg/cgi-bin/page.pl?html_name=Gov/const.htm#gl1> (January 27, 2002).
¹²⁸ International Foundation for Election System. Central Asian Offices. IFES-Kazakhstan. Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
<http://www.ifescentralasia.kg/Kazakhstan/ENG/conste_kaz.html#1> (January 27, 2002).
¹²⁹ Ryspek Apasov. “Integratsiya ili Ekonomicheskii Natsionalizm.” [Integration or Economic Nationalism.] Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway, 2001, 17 pages. <http://rus.gateway.kg/vodn> (January 13, 2002).
¹³⁰ Larry Elliott and Mark Milner. “Call for Debt Relief in Former Soviet States.” Guardian Unlimited, July 16, 2001, 3 pages. <www.guardian.co.uk/debt/Story/0,2763,522379,00.html> (January 29, 2002).
¹³¹ Naryn Idinov. “Kyrgyzstan Continues Efforts to Sell its Water.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc., August 08, 2001.
¹³² Arslan Koichiev. “Water Games Could Leave Central Asia High and Dry This Summer.” Eurasianet.org. March 19, 2001, 3 pages. <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/environment/articles/eav031901.shtml> (January 29, 2002).
¹³³ “Uzbek Environment Chief Calls for Action over Aral Sea Feeder Rivers.” Eurasianet.org. February 22, 2000, 2 pages. <http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbekistan/hypermail/200002/0024.html> (January 30, 2002).
¹³⁴ Arslan Koichiev. “Water Games Could Leave Central Asia High and Dry This Summer.” Eurasianet.org. March 19, 2001, 3 pages. <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/environment/articles/eav031901.shtml> (January 29, 2002).
¹³⁵ “Kyrgyzstan Fails to Stick to Water-Energy Deal.” UzReport.com. January 24, 2002, 2 pages. <http://uzreport.com/eng/disp_news.cfm?ch=238&dep=34&vrec=2659> (January 29, 2002).
¹³⁶ Naryn Idinov. “Kyrgyzstan Reduces Water Flow Form its Reservoir.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc., February 17, 2002.
¹³⁷ “Water Shortage Causes Drop in 2001 Harvest.” Eurasianet.org. June 13, 2001, 2 pages. <http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbekistan/hypermail/200106/0019.html> (January 30, 2002).
¹³⁸ Bea Hogan. “Central Asian States Wrangle over Water.” Eurasianet.org. April 05, 2001, 3 pages. <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/environment/articles/eav040500.shtml> (January 29, 2002).
¹³⁹ Ali OKda. Aral Sea. Aral Sea Region: Kyzylorda Oblast, Kazakhstan. Online Database. Available. <http://nailaokda.8m.com/aral.html> (February 01, 2002).
¹⁴⁰ United Nations. United Nations Environment Program. ENRIN facilitated SoE Reports. State of Environment of the Republic of Kazakhstan. <www.grida.no/enrin/htmls/kazahst/soe2/soee/nav/water/water.htm> (February 02, 2002).
¹⁴¹ Lyudmila Guseva. Problema Ispolzovaniya Vodnyh Resursov v Tsentralnoi Azii. [The Problem of the Use of the Water Resources of Central Asia]. Kazakh Institute of Strategic Studies. 9 pages. <http://www.kisi.kz/Alalitic_magazine/1_2000/an0112.html> (October 06, 2001).
¹⁴² Michael Glantz. “Creeping Environmental Problems in the Aral Sea Basin.” In Central Eurasian Water Crisis: Caspian, Aral, and Dead Seas, edited by Iwao Kobori and Michael Glantz. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998, p. 47.
¹⁴³ Nikita Glazovski. “The Aral Sea Basin.” United Nations University Publications, 1995. Online. Available. <www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu14re/uu14re0c.htm> (February 01, 2002).
¹⁴⁴ Tsuneo Tsukatani. “The Aral Sea and Socio-Economic Development.” In Central Eurasian Water Crisis: Caspian, Aral, and Dead Seas, edited by Iwao Kobori and Michael Glantz. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998, p. 65.
¹⁴⁵ Tsuneo Tsukatani, p. 65.
¹⁴⁶ Tsuneo Tsukatani, p. 66.
¹⁴⁷ Bea Hogan. “Central Asian States Wrangle over Water.” Eurasianet.org. April 05, 2001, 3 pages. <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/environment/articles/eav040500.shtml> (January 29, 2002).