CHAPTER TWO

INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES

 

2.1 Water as a Unique Resource

Like other natural resources, water is commonly treated as an essential source, which is required to maintain life on the Earth. This is so because in general terms water is really important for both the environment and human beings. Its availability conditions the health state of the surroundings and determines considerably the economic activity of human society.⁶ In terms of international relations, water resources are of great importance due to a hidden potential they possess. This potential generally comes to an ability of the water issue to transcend a merely domestic agenda and become a source of political rivalry between riparian states.⁷

What are the main features that make this transition possible? Researchers of water politics identify a number of physical characteristics that predetermine the unique potential of water: first, it does not have a substitute; second, it transcends political boundaries; thirdly, its availability is fixed; and finally, global reserves of water are distributed unevenly.

The first unique feature of water is proved by the fact that during the last century humankind never found a productive way to create water in artificial conditions or to substitute this life-giving source by any other surrogate. Another fundamental characteristic is also worthy of attention: water moves regardless of any geopolitical boundaries established by man.⁸ Furthermore, even though water is considered to be relevant to the category of renewable resources, to some extent its availability depends on different hydrological factors, such as seasonal precipitations and climate changes.⁹ Finally, water reserves are disproportionately distributed around the world. While sparsely populated northern areas of the Earth, contain more than 80% of the total reserves,¹⁰ the water-poor zones, making up about 40% of the global area, possess only 2%.¹¹

All these physical characteristics of water resources determine their crucial importance not only for domestic affairs but also for international politics.

 

2.2 Current Global Situation

Recent findings demonstrate that nowadays 40% of the global population faces the problem of water stress, which means that the index of annual per capita freshwater availability varies from 1,000 to 1,700 cubic metres.¹² It occurs against the general background of steady growing exploitation of water resources: for nine decades of the last century mankind has increased water withdrawments in river basins by six times.¹³ Under the circumstances of water stress and increasing demand for water supplies, states are predisposed to regard access to and control over water systems as “a matter of national security,”¹⁴ which in turn contributes to discord and clashes between co-riparians.¹⁵

In fact, history is inundated with examples of disputes over limited water resources in different parts of the world. Currently, almost every continent or region of the globe has its volatile water issue on the political agenda: the Rhine and the Danube in Europe; “the Jordan and Euphrates in the Middle East; the Ganges in the South Asia; the Nile in Africa; the Colorado and Rio Grande in North America”¹⁶ and the Syr Darya and Amu Darya in Central Asia.¹⁷

Despite such a wide geography of water disputes, the scholars of water politics believe that sharp rivalry over internationally shared waters is typical for developing states rather than for industrialized nations.¹⁸ This fact is usually explained by the weakness or absence of institutional arrangements and regimes, which are able to solve conflicting interests of basin states.¹⁹

In fact, the aspiration to achieve economic development and social prosperity in a water-stressed region leads to a situation when states tend to be dissatisfied “with the present or future prospects on water availability.”²⁰ Under such circumstances, co-riparians are inclined to revise their positions on use of the river systems and to take certain steps aimed at protecting their national interests, including secession from existing institutions or the rejection of established norms and regulations.²¹

Even though the relationship between limited water resources and confrontation is often indirect and difficult to trace, in some regions of the world water scarcity has already contributed to political tension and rivalry between sovereign states. Therefore, for many decades the competition for limited water resources remains to attract attention from the scholars of the politics of scarcity and resource conflicts.²²

 

2.3 The Concept of an International River Basin

Originating high in the mountains, water streams flow together in one riverbed and form a river that brings its waters through valleys to the sea. Along its way to the terminus, a river and its tributaries, including surface and ground waters create so-called a unitary river basin – a geographical area, which is shaped by the borders of a given water system.²³ In view of the fact that moving waters disregard geopolitical divisions and in response to the increased cases of clashes over the fluvial waters, in 1966 the International Law Association introduced the concept of an international drainage basin. According to the concept, as soon as a river crosses frontiers of one country to continue its flow through the territory of two or more states, the notion of an international river basin is applied.²⁴

 

2.3.1 Upstream – Downstream Relations

Flowing from one basin state to the next, the water system of a given basin places co-riparian countries with their needs for water in upstream and/or downstream positions. As a rule, states, which are regarded as upstream, possess abundant water resources since the majority of water flows are born in their mountainous ranges. Downstream riparians in turn have too little water for their social and economic development, and are heavily dependent upon waters flowing from the territories of their water-rich neighbours.²⁵ Such inequitable distribution of water supplies multiplied by economic or political competition in a basin brings to conflict of interests between the co-riparians.²⁶

Scholars of water politics believe that water-rich nations and downstream states are inclined to approach the question of use and development of international watercourses in an entirely opposite ways. Thus, for example, recent studies maintain that possessing rich water potential, the upstream nations very often do not see any necessity to “forego their unilateral advantage” and to develop the river system in cooperation with downstream riparians.²⁷ Striving for power and authority, upstream countries tend to control unilaterally the amount of water flowing downstream. In case of conflict or any other dispute, the beneficiaries of abundant water resources never miss an opportunity to demonstrate the power and capacities they possess in order to force the opposite side of conflict to obey or compromise.²⁸ Such demonstration by water-rich nations usually provoke disagreement downstream a river and lead to riparian clashes over the way in which this international river system should be used and developed.²⁹

For instance, according to reports, disputes over waters of the Euphrates River remained one of the main reasons of tense and complicated relations between Turkey and Syria. In 1990 Turkey finished the implementation of a number of irrigation projects, which strengthened its upstream power and made it possible for Turkey to become the main distributor of the downstream flow of the Euphrates River.³⁰ In 1995, in reply to accusation that it had an aggressive water policy and caused pollution of the Euphrates river basin, Turkey made a statement, which did not leave any doubts in the minds of leaders in downstream countries: “Neither Syria nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey's rivers any more than Ankara could claim their oil.... We have a right to do anything we like. The water resources are Turkey's, the oil resources are theirs. We don't say we share the oil resources and they cannot share our water resources.”³¹ Starting from that year the water potential of Turkey became a weapon and an instrument of political pressure “to force [Syria] to withdraw support for Kurdish rebels operating in southern Turkey.”³²

In their turn, lower riparians as a rule are very anxious about the manner in which upstream beneficiaries exploit waters of a common river basin. Such concern is conditioned by the fact that the consequences of any intrusions into a river system, be they irrigation projects or building dams, are different for upstream and downstream users. Thus, for example, for upper riparian states, implementation of water projects generally implies improvement of the water supplies and economic prosperity. For the downstream nations with their high reliance on outside water flows, intensive consumption of water, taken place upstream, could result in weakening of energy security, population migration and damage of ecosystems.³³ In other words, unilateral development of an international watercourse system upstream, “irrespective of the preferences of…[all]…beneficiaries,” affects political, social and ecological situation downstream.³⁴

Due to unfavourable consequences stemming from water-related projects, downstream states tend to see a way out of such situation in new political coalitions even with their historical adversaries. Therefore, there is an opinion among scientists that waters of international rivers can bring together long-standing rivals or become one of the reasons of confrontation between nations “with similar political systems and a tradition of friendly cooperation.”³⁵ For example, despite discords on many political issues, differences in cultural backgrounds and competition for water, Israel and Jordan managed, at least for some period, to hold to agreements on the Jordan River.³⁶ At the same time, Saudi Arabia and Jordan having more similarities than differences failed to come to consensus on shared water resources.

It should be mentioned, however, that the upstream-downstream relations described above are not constant and stable scheme typical for all international river basins. A powerfulness of a water-rich state is not a constant factor as it is considered by some experts of modern water politics.³⁷ Plentiful water resources available in some upstream states do not always guarantee advantageous or at least equal position of the countries in regional politics. Quite the reverse, water could become one of the reasons for the shaky position of upper riparians, loss of authority among more dominant but water-poor neighbours and unprecedented manifestation of power by downstream riparians.

 

2.3.2 Riparian Dilemma: Theory and Practice

Why do the fluvial waters of a transboundary watercourse system often serve as a source of discord between basin states? The main causes for water disputes between co-riparians are rooted in so-called the international river basin dilemma, when water resources of a given river basin are treated differently by all legal beneficiaries. Such different attitude towards water resources is conditioned by the following reasons: (i) physical peculiarities of a basin; (ii) economic efficacy; and (iii) historical perceptions of water in a region.

The geographical features of a river basin, which includes an international river and its tributaries, imply that all co-riparians should treat water resources as an undividable unit. In fact, the river basin could be considered as a common-property resource by virtue of the fact that the fluvial waters easily transcend geopolitical boundaries of basin states and bind drained areas together. However, the current developments, which are taking place in different parts of the world, display that upstream riparian users are less inclined to sacrifice their sovereignty over their natural resources in the name of water management at the basin scale.

Another component of the dilemma is economic efficiency. Like geography, economics considers the river basin as an indivisible unit subject to a universal approach. Utilizing joint actions in the field of land irrigation and drainage, and other areas, the basin states could elaborate so-called a basin-wide model and derive mutual benefit from sharing water resources of a river basin.³⁸ In reality, since water resources are of crucial importance for national economies, be they upstream or downstream, water-rich riparians seem to be reluctant to give away their assumed economic benefits, stemming from beneficial locations.

Despite the geographic and economic advisability regarding the holistic development of an international river basin, historical experience shows that “only reluctantly will states relinquish control over…resources that lie, even partially within their borders.”³⁹ Given an advantageous position and striving to maximize their utility, the upper riparian states are inclined “to exploit resources unilaterally” and “have no direct interest in unitary river basin development.”⁴⁰ Furthermore, when it comes to water scarcity, competition “for access to, and control over limited water supplies” becomes more acute provoking tension and conflict between riparian communities and nations, inhabiting a river basin.⁴¹

 

2.4 Concepts of International Relations on the Problem of Cooperation

Why do states cooperate with each other or refuse to collaborate when it comes to the issue of natural resources? The proponents of different concepts of international relations have fundamentally different views of the problem of cooperation. However, the enduring debate between two controversial schools of thought, realism and institutionalism, presents more than academic interest for researchers of international relations. The two schools have diametrically opposite approaches to the issue in question.⁴² This is so, by virtue of the fact that each perspective (i) perceives differently the basic units of international relations and their interaction, and the nature of world system; and (ii) interprets state behaviour on the global arena in a dissimilar way.

Elucidating the different aspects of international politics, the realists use a state-centric approach, which implies specific focus on a state as a unit of analysis⁴³ and as the key, unitary and purposive actor in inter-state interactions.⁴⁴ The realists argue that in order to maximize its utility, protect national interests and preserve its position in the absence of central authority, a rational actor is typically preoccupied with military and political issues.⁴⁵ For the realists, in a self-help system, a state strives for strengthening its “power positions relative to other states,” in an attempt to protect its sovereignty and secure its survival as a nation-state.⁴⁶

Tackling the problem of cooperation, the realist concept claims that interacting in the specific environment of mutual distrust, when states tend “to maintain or increase their power positions relative to other states,” it would be ruinous for one actor “to place [its] security…in the hands of another.”⁴⁷ The realists argue, therefore, that cooperation among states is quite a problematic issue.⁴⁸ The adherents of the perspective assume that under certain circumstances collaboration dictated by certain self-interests is possible.⁴⁹ However, the realists are quite pessimistic about duration of such collaboration since it presupposes dominant-dependence relations rather than equality between parties involved.⁵⁰

Doubts of the realists about the long-term and equal nature of cooperation between nation-states could be closely linked to the concept of the national sovereignty. The concept hypothesizes that due to the absence of supreme authority within the international system, states act as autonomous and independent actors on the global arena, protecting zealously their survival and existence.⁵¹ In general, the doctrine contains two visions of a state autonomy: internal and external sovereignty.⁵² The idea of internal sovereignty assumes that a state has a supreme authority within a particular territory. In other words, even though there is power hierarchy in international politics, a state has a right to be independent in its domestic affairs and be “entitled equally to full respect by other states.”⁵³ External sovereignty implies “the extent to which a state is recognized by other states as the legitimate authority within its borders.”⁵⁴

As long as natural resources play an essential role in regional politics and are of crucial importance for economic development, states are inclined to regard them as strategic and are interested in their unilateral exploitation.⁵⁵ Some principles of international law, if do not actually advocate such behaviour, at least recognize, to a certain degree, the right of states to manage their natural resources in any way they find appropriate.

Thus, for example, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources of the General Assembly of the UN reads that (i) “the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned”; (ii) “the free and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural resources must be furthered by the mutual respect of States based on their sovereign equality.” ⁵⁶

Institutionalism shares the assumption of the realist perspective that the state is the key actor of international relations.⁵⁷ However, institutionalism does not regard the state as the sole actor in world. Equally with states, non-state actors, like human-constructed institutions play their own role of no small importance in world politics.⁵⁸ For the institutionalists, international arrangements fall into three categories: (i) formal intergovernmental or cross-national nongovernmental organizations; (ii) international regimes; and (iii) conventions.⁵⁹

The adherents of institutionalism believe that when it comes to issues of cooperation or conflict among states, institutional arrangements are able to exert their influence on state behaviour.⁶⁰ Institutionalism asserts that despite the anarchy in the international system, it has evident elements of institutionalisation, which imply the existence of “persistent and connected sets of rules…that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”⁶¹. These norms and standards facilitate negotiations between the key actors and help to predict and interpret state behaviour taking place within the system.⁶²

Although, institutionalism accepts the idea of the decentralized nature of world politics and the lack of trust and confidence among states, as proposed by the realist school, when it comes to the issue of cooperation, the highlight of the theory is that under certain circumstances “cooperation is possible”.⁶³ Defining the conditions under which states would be more disposed to collaboration rather than to confrontation, institutionalism asserts that institutional arrangements and regimes can guide states in the process of negotiation, development of international treaties, and monitoring compliance and implementation of commitments.⁶⁴ Given the absence of central power, international arrangements and regimes can serve as key mechanisms to secure “some degree of order in international relations.”⁶⁵

In order to address the problem of disputes over transboundary water resources, institutionalism employs a regime framework. This is so, because the scholars of this persuasion believe that “transnational problems cannot be managed by one country acting alone”;⁶⁶ therefore, institutional arrangements are needed to solve the environmental challenges.⁶⁷ The primary concerns of regime theory are how to “encourage actors to overcome their reluctance to cooperate” and to stimulate them to “produce outcomes beneficial to the international community.”⁶⁸ Designing institutional mechanisms, which can promote cooperation in question, the theory assumes that mutual profits could be a more powerful impetus for states rather than power. At the same time regime theory claims that the success of a regime depends on (i) mutual recognition of preferences, and (ii) proper comprehension of states’ behaviour in the negotiation process.⁶⁹

There are two main models of regimes within the theoretical framework: the least common denominator (LCD) and bargaining regimes. The first type of regimes could be constructed on the basis of the law of the least common denominator, when principles and regulations of an agreement correspond to the needs of the least enthusiastic party of a regime.⁷⁰ According to a regime theory, very often regimes are doomed to failure due to unwillingness of one of the parties to join “decisions [that] reflect the views of the least enthusiastic party [only].”⁷¹

The second pattern of regimes is so-called bargaining or negotiated regimes. The logic behind such regimes is that both state and non-state actors can participate in a bargaining process. Moreover, any participant can execute leadership functions provided that the resolutions will be compromises and acceptable for all sides. The interesting point about these kind of regimes is the variety of methods that are aimed at satisfying the parties concerned: “stressing uncertainty, monitoring, iterated games, promoting equity and integrative bargaining over debate on distributive and efficiency issues, the introduction of…selective incentives [like] side payments, political pressure and education.”⁷²

To conclude, the problem of cooperation in an international river basin can be described and analysed on the basis of different concepts and approaches. However, the concept of the national sovereignty of the realist perspective and regime theory of institutionalism provide “a theoretical framework for understanding states’ behaviour and addressing the problem of the clashes over natural resources.”⁷³

 

2.5 Basic Principles of International River Use: Review and Evaluation

What are the instruments that might induce both parties of the disputes in question to treat water resources not only as a common good but also as a commodity? What does the politics of water have to say about the principles of use and development of internationally shared water resources?

According to the scholars of the water politics, the main stumbling block in development of an international river basin is the reluctance of upstream states to sacrifice their sovereignty for the common good of all basin nations. This is so because any kind of collaboration over the internationally shared waters calls in question “the state’s proclaimed sovereignty over its resources.” Therefore, it is considered that meeting the wishes and needs for water supplies, upstream states tend to expect political appreciation and economic compensations from lower co-riparians.⁷⁴

There are five basic principles concerning the sovereignty of basin states over the water resources: absolute sovereignty, river flow integrity, community of co-riparian states, and equitable utilization.

The concept of absolute territorial sovereignty or so-called the Harmon Doctrine is generally based on the unilateral right of a state to use “the fluvial waters’, which lie within its territory without any limitations whatsoever, regardless of the effect of this utilization of other states.” The doctrine is based on the idea of sovereignty of the realist concept, and has enjoyed great support from the majority upstream states “since it conferred [them] marked power advantages.”⁷⁵ Nowadays, even though some literature argues that the theory was rejected by water-rich states because it contradicted the rules of international water law, history exemplifies that some countries tend to use their upstream positions to have influence on their water-poor neighbours.

The next three principles mentioned below follow the institutionalist approaches. The principle of river flow integrity presents an extreme opposite vision on the problem of the management of international river systems and is mainly supported by water-poor states. The logic of the principle is that a river basin should be considered as an undividable unit, where downstream users have a right to enjoy “the full flow and quality of water”.⁷⁶ The concept implies that upper states “must conduct themselves within the limits of their territories in such a way as not to alter the natural regime of the river when it runs through the territory of another state.”⁷⁷ Moreover, the doctrine introduces so-called prior appropriation of water, which suggests that “the existing water rights of lower riparians must first be respected and satisfied before any other claims can be met.”⁷⁸

The theory of community of co-riparian states or condominium is regarded by analysts of the water politics as a more realistic view in comparison with the principles mentioned before. The concept serves as buffer line between upper and lower stream countries since it supposes that “all riparians over the whole international river or river system should be limited in their freedom of action over the utilization of international rivers.” According to the concept, before the implementation of any water-related projects within its territory, “a state would need to obtain prior consent from co-riparians…concerned with the utilization of waters”. This idea encourages basin nations to develop jointly the fluvial waters and treat the shared water resources as a common property.⁷⁹

The final key principle of the concept, equitable utilization, is influenced by both realists and institutionalists schools. This idea states that both upstream and downstream states should manage waters of river systems “in an equitable and reasonable manner and are duty-bound to do so cooperatively.”⁸⁰ The concept “has become the most widely advocated by the international legal community, as evidenced by treaties, juridical decisions, academic research and international bodies.”⁸¹

To sum, even though “the best strategy for addressing…[environmental issues]…[is] cooperation, not competition,”⁸² it is very important for conflicting sides to appreciate and accept that each side of a dispute has its own interests. To wit, the three principles mentioned above should not be treated as the main tools for powerful downstream riparians to force economically weak upstream states to follow the rules. Rather than insisting on their uncompromising position that water is a common good for all, downstream countries could consider needs and interests of water rich but economically weak neighbors.

 

2.6 Resolution of Water Disputes: Theory and Practice

What are the factors that prevent co-riparians from collaboration in international river basins? What could be constructive circumstances, under which both upstream and downstream states would prefer a peaceful resolution of clashes over water resources to acute confrontation? First of all, the researchers assert that the main obstacle for “the effective resolution of water disputes” is rooted in the existence of political conflicts between states. Indeed, events developing between the states of the Jordan River basin or the Indus River basin have illustrated that clashes over security and strategic issues do not dispose states towards cooperation on matters related to so-called low politics realm.⁸³

Another factor that undermines any efforts aimed at resolving clashes over internationally shared water resources is the absence of a balance of power between the legitimate beneficiaries of a given region.⁸⁴ This is so, because as a rule a state, possessing more power and authority in international river basin, is inclined to ignore the interests of the weaker side of negotiation process. Insisting on its position, a regional power gains benefits and secures its power in a basin in the short-term. However, in the long run the dispute resolution process is undermined since a weaker party persists to demand “more favorable conditions.”⁸⁵

Addressing the problem of clashes over the internationally shared water resources, the scholars of water politics advance the following suggestions, which could be relatively subdivided into political, institutional and technical recommendations. In terms of political responses to the problem in question, the researchers recommend that “political conflicts [should] be resolved first.”⁸⁶ Besides, it is crucial to involve a third party, which should be “impartial and firmly committed to a successful resolution of the dispute.” Moreover, all conflicting parties should be sure of the impartiality of the third party, otherwise, as experience demonstrates, the negotiation process is doomed to fail.

Institutional response to water disputes suggests that together with an adjustment of political confrontations existing between co-riparians, work on the elaboration of projects and arrangements should be conducted. Besides, the third party involved in such negotiation process should “show a commitment to working closely, and in advisory capacity,” with a variety of institutional representatives of parties concerned. At this stage the mission of governments is very essential for the problem-solving procedure: they should provide domestic technical expertise and in every possible way to facilitate talks on water resources use and development.⁸⁷

Finally, there is the technological solution to reducing the conflicting interests of co-riparians. It implies a number of measures directed to improve water quality and increasing water supplies of a given river basin. These steps could vary from so-called cloud-seeding, desalination and waste-water reuse to “importing water from relatively wet zones.”⁸⁸ Nowadays, when modern scientists more and more frequently urge the international community not to take water availability for granted,⁸⁹ these technical responses could be decisive for upstream and downstream states of the arid and semi-arid zones.⁹⁰ For downstream users such actions could be more useful for solving problems of the quantity and quality of water supplies than the accusations directed to upstream co-riparians regarding poor irrigation development and high profit hunting as was done by some researchers (in this respect see a short essay by Mr. Sultangazin).⁹¹

 

2.7 Conclusion

Taking into consideration the current situation with global water supplies and the unique nature of water resources, Swain appeals to the international community to “change the prevailing attitude towards [water]”: the fluvial waters of transnational river systems could not be treated as a free commodity anymore.⁹² The historical experience demonstrates that because of the weakness of the international legal basis as well as reluctance of some states to accept the call, use and development of international water resources remain one of the most salient issues in world politics.

Nevertheless, scholars believe that there is a potential for partnership within a co-riparian community. Despite the deep preoccupation with “protecting national security and maintaining economic growth,” there are certain ways in international practice, in which states could collaborate on pressing environmental issues.⁹³ However, one of the main prerequisites should be strictly adhered: cooperation in question should be equal and beneficial for every party concerned.

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⁶ Ashok Swain. “Water Scarcity as a Source of Crises.” In War, Hunger, and Displacement, edited by Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart, Raimo Väyrynen. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 179.
⁷ Robin Clarke. Water: The International Crisis. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1993, p. 90.
⁸ Robin Clarke. Water: The International Crisis. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1993, p. 90.
⁹ Robin Clarke, p. x.
¹⁰ Ashok Swain. “Water Scarcity as a Source of Crises.” In War, Hunger, and Displacement, edited by. Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart and Raimo Väyrynen. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 179.
¹¹ World Resources Institute in collaboration with the United Nations Environmental Programme, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank. World Resources 2000 – 2001. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 107.
¹² Ashok Swain. “Water Scarcity as a Source of Crises.” In War, Hunger, and Displacement, edited by Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart and Raimo Väyrynen. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 179.
¹³ World Resources Institute in collaboration with the United Nations Environmental Programme, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank. World Resources 2000 – 2001. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 104.
¹⁴ Peter Gleick. “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security.” International Security 18, no. 1, summer 1993, p. 79.
¹⁵ Miriam Lowi. “Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of Peace.” Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 1, summer 1995, p. 123.
¹⁶ Robin Clarke. Water: The International Crisis. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1993, p. 91.
¹⁷ Peter Gleick. “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security.” International Security 18, no. 1, summer 1993, p. 80.
¹⁸ John Bulloch and Adel Darwish. Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East. London: St Edmundsbury Press Ltd., 1993, p. 18.
¹⁹ Ashok Swain. “Water Wars: Fact of Friction?” Futures 33, 2001, p. 771.
²⁰ Ashok Swain. “Water Scarcity as a Source of Crises.” In War, Hunger, and Displacement, edited by Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart, Raimo Väyrynen. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 184.
²¹ Ashok Swain, p. 185.
²² Robin Clarke. Water: The International Crisis. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1993, p. 90.
²³ Miriam Lowi. Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 1.
²⁴ Nurit Kliot. Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. London: Routledge, 1994, p. 277.
²⁵ Robin Clarke. Water: The International Crisis. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1993, p. 94.
²⁶ Miriam Lowi. Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 1.
²⁷ Miriam Lowi. “Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of Peace.” Journal of International Affairs 49, no 1, summer 1995, p. 127.
²⁸ Miriam Lowi, p. 127.
²⁹ Robin Clarke. Water: The International Crisis. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1993, p. 90.
³⁰ Frederick Kenneth. “Water as a Source of International Conflict.” Resources For The Future, Resources Library, spring 1996, 6 pages. <http://www.rff.org/resources_articles/files/waterwar.htm> (November 01, 2001).
³¹ Paul Mitchell. “Conflicts Arise Over Water Supply.” World Socialist Web Site, spring 1998, 3 pages. <http://www.wsws.org/news/1998/may1998/wat-m21.shtml> (November 01, 2001).
³² Peter Gleick. “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security.” International Security 18, No. 1, summer 1993, p. 89.
³³ Peter Gleick. “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security.” International Security 18, No. 1, summer 1993, p. 93.
³⁴ Miriam Lowi. “Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of Peace.” Journal of International Affairs 49, No. 1, summer 1995, p. 126.
³⁵ John Bulloch and Adel Darwish. Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East. London: St Edmundsbury Press Ltd., 1993, p. 15.
³⁶ Ashok Swain. “Water Wars: Fact of Friction?” Futures 33, 2001, p. 772.
³⁷ Paul Williams. “Water Usually Flows Downhill: the Role of Power, Norms, and Domestic Politics in Resolving Transboundary Water-Sharing Conflicts.” Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Working Paper, 1998. <https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/ria01/igcc29ae.html> (June 09, 2001).
³⁸ Miriam Lowi. “Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of Peace.” Journal of International Affairs 49, No. 1, summer 1995, p. 126.
³⁹ Miriam Lowi. Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 1.
⁴⁰ Miriam Lowi. “Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of Peace.” Journal of International Affairs, 49, No. 1, summer 1995, p. 127.
⁴¹ Miriam Lowi, p. 123.
⁴² Miriam Lowi. Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 3.
⁴³ Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987, p. 6.
⁴⁴ Miriam Lowi. Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 3.
⁴⁵ Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987, p. 7.
⁴⁶ Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, p. 48.
⁴⁷ Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, p. 48.
⁴⁸ Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, p. 49.
⁴⁹ Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, p. 35.
⁵⁰ Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987, p. 56.
⁵¹ Stephen Krasner. “Sovereignty.” Foreign Policy 122, January/February 2001, p. 20.
⁵² Samuel Barkin. “Resilience of the State: the Evolution and Sustainability of Sovereignty.” Harvard International Review 22, No. 4, winter 2001, p. 42.
⁵³ Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf. World Politics: Trend and Transformation. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983, p. 490.
⁵⁴ Samuel Barkin. “Resilience of the State: the Evolution and Sustainability of Sovereignty.” Harvard International Review 22, No. 4, winter 2001, p. 42.
⁵⁵ Miriam Lowi. Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 1.
⁵⁶ United Nations. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII). Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 3 pages. <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/c_natres.htm> (November 29, 2001).
⁵⁷ Robert Keohane. International Institutions and State Power. Colorado: Westview Press, 1989, p. 1.
⁵⁸ Robert Keohane, p. 2.
⁵⁹ Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power. Colorado: Westview Press, 1989, p. 4.
⁶⁰ Robert Keohane, p. 3.
⁶¹ Robert Keohane, p. 3.
⁶² Robert Keohane, p. 4.
⁶³ Robert Keohane, p. 3.
⁶⁴ Robert Keohane, p. 2.
⁶⁵ Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987, p. 210.
⁶⁶ Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer. Regime Theory and International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, p. ix.
⁶⁷ Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levi. Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993, p. 3.
⁶⁸ Peter Haas. “Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Environmental Cooperation.” In Regime Theory and International Relations, edited by Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 183.
⁶⁹ Peter Haas, p. 183.
⁷⁰ Peter Haas. “Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Environmental Cooperation.” In Regime Theory and International Relations, edited by Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 183.
⁷¹ Peter Haas, p. 184.
⁷² Peter Haas, p. 184.
⁷³ Peter Haas, p. 186.
⁷⁴ Nurit Kliot. Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. London: Routledge, 1994, p. 4.
⁷⁵ Nurit Kliot. Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. London: Routledge, 1994, p. 5.
⁷⁶ Thomas Naff. “Conflict and Water Use in the Middle East.” In Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses, edited by Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon. Cambridge: Division of Applied Science, Harvard University, 1994, p. 263.
⁷⁷ Nurit Kliot. Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. London: Routledge, 1994, p. 5.
⁷⁸ Nurit Kliot, p. 5.
⁷⁹ Nurit Kliot. Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. London: Routledge, 1994, p. 6.
⁸⁰ Thomas Naff. “Conflict and Water Use in the Middle East.” in Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses, eds. Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Division of Applied Science, Harvard University (1994): 264.
⁸¹ Nurit Kliot. Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. London: Routledge, 1994, p. 6.
⁸² Heather Beach et al. Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Resolution: Theory, Practice, and Annotated References. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000, p. 63.
⁸³ Miriam Lowi. “Political and Institutional Responses to Transboundary Water Disputes in the Middle East.” The Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars. Division of International Studies. 7 pages. <http://wwics.si.edu/PROGRAMS/DIS/ECS/report2/lowi.htm> (November 21, 2001): 3.
⁸⁴ Gail Bingham and Aaron Wolf. “Resolving Water Disputes: Conflict and Cooperation in the United States, the Near East and Asia.” University of Colorado. Conflict Research Consortium. 4 pages. <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/bing7515.htm> (November 21, 2001).
⁸⁵ Gail Bingham and Aaron Wolf. “Resolving Water Disputes: Conflict and Cooperation in the United States, the Near East and Asia.” University of Colorado. Conflict Research Consortium. 4 pages. <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/bing7515.htm> (November 21, 2001).
⁸⁶ Miriam Lowi. “Political and Institutional Responses to Transboundary Water Disputes in the Middle East.” The Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars. Division of International Studies. 7 pages. <http://wwics.si.edu/PROGRAMS/DIS/ECS/report2/lowi.htm> (November 21, 2001).
⁸⁷ Miriam Lowi. “Political and Institutional Responses to Transboundary Water Disputes in the Middle East.” The Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars. Division of International Studies. 7 pages. <http://wwics.si.edu/PROGRAMS/DIS/ECS/report2/lowi.htm> (November 21, 2001).
⁸⁸ Miriam Lowi.
⁸⁹ Ashok Swain. “Water Scarcity as a Source of Crises.” In War, Hunger, and Displacement, edited by Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart, Raimo Väyrynen. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 179.
⁹⁰ Miriam Lowi. “Political and Institutional Responses to Transboundary Water Disputes in the Middle East.” The Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars. Division of International Studies. 7 pages. <http://wwics.si.edu/PROGRAMS/DIS/ECS/report2/lowi.htm> (November 21, 2001).
⁹¹ Umurzak Sultangazin. “The Role of Academic Research in Solving the Ecological Problems of the Aral Region.” In Central Eurasian Water Crisis: Caspian, Aral, and Dead Seas, edited by Iwao Kobori and Michael Glantz. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998, p. 81.
⁹² Ashok Swain. “Water Scarcity as a Source of Crises.” In War, Hunger, and Displacement, edited by Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart, Raimo Väyrynen. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 202.
⁹³ Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levi. Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993, p. 3.