Эл баши болгуча – суу баши бол.

Instead of being at the head of people, be at the head of water

(Kyrgyz proverb)

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

 

1.1 WATER POLITICS IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

In recent decades, there has been a notable proliferation of research concerned with the alarming tendency of interstate rivalry for access to and control of transboundary water-resource systems. The correlation between such rivalry and water availability is inversely related. To wit, the more the quantity or quality of water supplies declines, the more fiercely states seek to consolidate their rights to secured access or unilateral control over the life-giving sources.

Such state behaviour is conditioned by the role that shared watercourses play at domestic and international levels. As a rule, riparian states regard a shared riverine system not just as a hydrological unit, maintaining historical and traditional patterns of life, but also as one of the main tools to sustain their economic might and political weight. As a result of such heightened significance of transboundary water systems for national economies as well as for politics, co-riparians tend to keep up with actions of one another and clash over the question of how to develop and use these systems.

Similar attitudes and behaviour with respect to water resources of internationally shared watercourse systems can be observed in Central Asia.

Since gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian countries have repeatedly clashed over the main river systems of the region, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers. These clashes have to do with issues of quantity and quality, and have basically stemmed from a new geopolitical situation in the region. The novelty of the situation lay in the fact that with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and creation of new sovereign states, new international river sub-basins appeared in Central Asia, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya River basins.

The degree of dependence on water within these basins varies from country to country, and is conditioned by the geographical location of each state. Thus, for example, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess abundant water resources, and could be regarded as upstream states. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in their turn are mainly downstream states, the national economies of which depend on water resources flowing from their upstream neighbours.

Such uneven distribution of the water resources together with other challenges, be they economic or political, has repeatedly provoked discord among the basin states. The essence of the disagreement lies in the fact that being poor in oil, gas and coal upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sometimes use their plentiful water resources for hydropower generation during the winter months. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in turn believe that rich hydraulic potentials of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers should primarily serve needs of their cotton and rice industries as was the case during the Soviet period.

For a period of ten years, the basin states have tried without any marked success to solve the water disputes over the transboundary watercourse systems. The negotiation process on the water of the Syr Darya River between Kyrgyzstan and its downstream neighbours, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, ultimately reached a deadlock in the summer of 2001. At the same time, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have also certain difficulties on how to manage the water resources of the Amu Darya River basin.

Both cases of water disputes in the region are interesting because of the fact that they refute the arguments about upstream-downstream relationships, advanced by the majority of researchers of water politics. Analysing the problem of complex and tense relationship within a riparian community, these scholars hypothesize that “the state which is the furthest upstream…will have no obvious incentive to cooperate.”¹ Furthermore, when it comes to a position of a downstream user in water-related talks, the researchers believe that “irrespective of [its] relative power resources, [the state] will seek a cooperative solution because…[it is]…at the mercy of those upstream.”²

This assumption might be true if a state is not only in an advantageous geographic position but also enjoys considerable political and economic weight among co-riparians. Riparian relations within the Tigris-Euphrates basin could probably prove this assumption. However, upstream-downstream relations, which have been formed in the international river basins of Central Asia, especially in the Syr Darya River basin, contradict the assumption and develop in accordance with different and probably less studied principles.

In fact, being more powerful in terms of economic growth and political might, the lower riparians of the Syr Darya River basin have demonstrated an authoritative and inflexible attitude and less desire to cooperate with their less developed upstream neighbours. Upstream Kyrgyzstan in turn is more predisposed to collaborate on the water issue due to its high dependency on deliveries of energy resources from the powerful downstream states.

Over the last decade the upper riparian state has put forward a number of cooperative proposals on joint development and use of the shared watercourse system. None of these initiatives, however, has found a positive response from or at least understanding among the powerful neighbours. On the contrary, the proposals have resulted in sharp criticism and unprecedented pressure from the lower riparians. Such lack of understanding and respect for interests and needs of each other has furthered the riparian discord and has resulted in political rivalry between the co-riparians of the Syr Darya River basin.

In general terms, this disagreement has deep repercussions for the riparian states irrespective of their geographical position within the basin. In fact, while the downstream states have suffered economic losses caused by shortages of irrigational water in the summer seasons or floods in winter, the upper riparian has repeatedly found itself on the threshold of energy crisis.

In search of a solution for the problem of water shortages, the downstream countries have used different approaches towards water-rich Kyrgyzstan. These approaches vary from an attempt to negotiate in a business-like manner (exchange of water for energy resources) to sharp criticism and political reprimands. Thus, for instance, Kazakhstan has attempted to build its relations with upstream Kyrgyzstan on the basis of a pragmatic approach. Being well aware of an energy shortage in Kyrgyzstan, downstream Kazakhstan proposed to provide Kyrgyzstan with fuel and coal. These energy deliveries were supposed to facilitate negotiations on water supplies to Kazakhstan. Further events, however, showed that Kazakhstan failed to redeem its promises, repeatedly plunging Kyrgyzstan into an energy crisis in the middle as well as in the late 1990s.

Relations between two independent states, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, have developed in tenser manner. Uzbekistan, aspiring to the role of leader in the region, is resorting to hard-line tactics towards its weaker neighbour. In particular, in the early 1990s Uzbekistan declared that the river systems of Central Asia are a common wealth, which belongs to all societies inhabiting the region and cannot be under unitary control of a particular country. This statement has basically meant that upstream Kyrgyzstan should leave its claims about exclusive property right to its water resources as well as about market value of water and provide irrigational water for the vast cotton fields of Uzbekistan for free.

The water-related clashes between the upstream and downstream riparian states of the Syr Darya River have been taking place against the background of drastic changes in energy sectors of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. These changes derive from the fact that the lower riparians have continued to inflate the prices for their energy resources, which was ruinous for the energy-dependent economy of Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, the country has eventually been driven into a debt hole.

Such situation has urged Kyrgyzstan to take appropriate measures in order to bring to an end to its dependence on energy supplies from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and to defend its national interests. In the winter of 2001, Kyrgyzstan directed all water resources into hydropower generation to compensate for the shortage of gas and coal deliveries. These actions have resulted in a depletion of water reservoirs in Kyrgyzstan and crop failures in neighbouring states.

Over the last ten years the co-riparians had made several attempts to solve the water issue. Numerous interstate agreements and several interstate organizations, covering the Syr Darya River basin demonstrate these efforts. The question is whether the endeavours show the real willingness of the basin states to overcome and cooperate on the water issue? As the current state of affairs has shown in most cases none of the agreements has been observed in full, and interstate institutions have turned out to be helpless to resolve the disputes between the water-rich and water-poor countries of the basin. Examining the behaviour of the basin states, it becomes evident that the water resources of the transnational river system have become a cause of discord and tough political rivalry rather than an impetus for collaboration.

 

1.2 Statement of the Problem

What are the main obstacles to joint use of water resources of the transboundary watercourse system, the Syr Darya River? Have they been significant in terms of their capacity to challenge “any unifying role…[a] river might play?”³ How do water disputes affect the upstream-downstream relations within the riparian community of the basin? Are these disputes fraught with potential risk in the sense that they challenge the socio-economic welfare and political stability of each riparian state as well as of the basin as a whole? What are the counter-measures that could be taken to lessen and overcome the discord between the upstream and downstream users of the Syr Darya River?

By examining these obstacles, it would be possible to discover the reasons for the riparian disputes; to wit, the interests of the co-riparians as well as their purposes. These interests and purposes are important because they condition state behaviour in the Syr Darya River basin. The interests and purposes of the co-riparians will be also worth further research because they would be conducive to understanding why the states clash over the water of the Syr Darya River basin.

For example, being deprived of energy resources, the upstream state, Kyrgyzstan, is inclined to proclaim its plentiful water resources a commodity, which has a certain market value. Water-dependent Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in turn tend to strongly object to the Kyrgyz initiatives to treat water as a commodity and to disagree with excusive property right of Kyrgyzstan to the water resources of the Syr Darya River basin.

By knowing the major driving forces and goals of the riparian neighbours, it would be possible to come to the next point of the water issue in the Syr Darya River basin, namely, the consequences of the disputes for each riparian state as well as for the basin as a whole. The current state of affairs has demonstrated that due to the lack of an agreement on water management, none of the basin states benefits. Indeed, irrespective of their geographical positions, the co-riparians are suffering economic losses associated with ineffective development and use of the basin water resources. Furthermore, the water issue has negatively affected interstate relationships within the riparian community.

A study of the outcomes of water disputes in the Syr Darya River basin would be helpful to map out concrete steps to lessen the negative influence of the water issue on economies, and on the regional politics and the environment of the basin. Besides, showing the consequences of water clashes in “the ethnically heterogeneous…and water-stressed”⁴ environment of the Syr Darya River basin, could stimulate the regional leaderships to overcome the problem. The desire to cooperate in turn could bring back the attention of the international community to the economic problems in the riparian countries as well as ecological challenges in the basin.

This study deals with several important points to be identified and addressed. It analyses the main causes and consequences of the water disputes between the upstream and downstream states of the Syr Darya River basin. Based on the results, the study advances certain ways to settle the water issue in the basin.

Discussing the riparian discord in the Syr Darya River basin, the research focuses on upstream-downstream relations between three riparian states: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The fourth basin state, Tajikistan, remains out of the focus of this study. For several years the country did not participate in the negotiation process on the transboundary river system due to civil war and political turmoil. By the end of the 1990s Tajikistan had jointed the discussions but still little reliable and clear information about the position of this country can be found.

 

1.3 Objective and Hypothesis

This study is a result of two years of research conducted in Japan under the ADB Japanese Scholarship Programme. The objective of the study is to analyse the riparian discord between upstream and downstream states of the Syr Darya River basin, located in Central Asia. It aims to explore the main reasons and consequences of the water disputes for the situation in the basin at large and for interstate relationships in particular. It seeks to answer the research question of how the water disputes affect political relations between the riparian states of the Syr Darya River basin.

The study attempts to test the hypothesis that insistence on sovereignty and independence by states involved in water disputes has negative results and leads to a situation where all lose.

In the past the riparian states had a relatively successful experience how to cope with uneven distribution of water and energy resources within the region at large and within the Syr Darya River basin in particular. In general term,s this experience was based on a principle of mutual appreciation of the interdependence of the national economies and geographical challenges. Perhaps, the experience deserves to be examined again in the sense that it could help the basin states to find a way out of the current impasse.

 

1.4 Methodology

The study uses a conceptual framework based on upstream-downstream state relations in water disputes. This framework is aimed at categorizing those aspects that are of crucial importance for each riparian under any circumstances, be they discord and confrontation or negotiations on cooperation. These factors are: (i) the degree to which national economies of the basin states are dependent on water supplies; (ii) the economic weight and political might of the upstream and downstream states; (iii) the nature of interstate relations with respect to the water issue; and (iv) efforts and steps, which have been taken by the co-riparians in an attempt to solve the riparian clashes.

The study also utilizes the historical approach, which has been developed by one of the scholars of the politics of water, Miriam Lowi, in her investigation of disputes over the internationally shared water resources of the Middle East.⁵ To wit, at the beginning the study looks at the history of water disputes between the co-riparians of the Syr Darya River basin from the early 1990s until the present. For analytical purposes the research explores the main reasons and consequences of the disputes for the riparian community at large and each basin state in particular as a part of the conceptual framework mentioned above.

Finally, the research uses the specific case study approach to answer the research question of how the water disputes affect political relations between the riparian states of the Syr Darya River basin. This question contains a particular feature of water disputes in the basin: while the upstream state is inclined to revise generous water distribution because of challenging market realities, the downstream states are reluctant to accept new conditions of water management in the basin.

The study is based on secondary sources of data. The reviewed sources were in English and Russian, and are listed in the Bibliography at the end of the research.

 

1.5 Organization of the Study

The study is organized in six chapters. Chapter one consists of the background information, a statement of the problem, an objective and a hypothesis, and methodology. This chapter considers the recent trends in water politics in the post-Soviet Central Asia by highlighting general dynamics of interstate relationships as well as the latest claims of each riparian state.

Chapter two represents theoretical part of the study, which introduces some conceptual issues necessary for understanding a peculiarity of state interactions within a riparian community. This part of the study accentuates on a concept of an international river basin and on the problem of cooperation. Besides, the chapter outlines basic principles of international river use and possible ways of water disputes resolution.

Chapter three begins with a description of physical and non-physical features of the Syr Darya River basin in order to understand the logic behind a certain political behaviour of the basin states. The chapter, then, introduces the water issue itself with the focus on those factors that have caused the disputes over the water of the Syr Darya River basin among Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Chapter four continues the analysis of the water issue in the Syr Darya River basin by exploring consequences of the water discord for the basin at large as well for each riparian state in particular. The chapter maintains that none of the parties involved gets benefit from a situation existing in the Syr Darya River basin.

Chapter five outlines the various attempts the co-riparians have made in recent years in order to solve the water issue. In particular, it analyses water agreements, signed by Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in different period of time. The chapter concludes that the agreements have remained on paper and have never been put into practice in full measure. This is so because these agreements reflect a desire of the regional powers to pursue their unilateral interests rather than an aspiration for just cooperation.

Chapter six forwards a number of proposals, which might be useful in solving water disputes between upstream and downstream co-riparians of the Syr Darya River basin.

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¹ Miriam Lowi. Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 10.
² Miriam Lowi. Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 10.
³ Donald Weatherbee. “Cooperation and Conflict in the Mekong River Basin.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 20, 1997, p. 168.
⁴ Elisa Chait. International Water Resources Association. Water Politics of Syr Darya Basin, Central Asia: Question of State Interests. 7 pages. <http://www.iwra.siu.edu/pdf/Chait.pdf> (March 03, 2002).
⁵ Miriam Lowi. Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 11.