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International Conference
«Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, the Present and Prospects for Resolution»
Baku (Azerbaijan) 22-23 October, 2012 and Tbilisi (Georgia) 25-26 October, 2012
POLITICS
Bakhodyr ERGASHEV
Bakhodyr Ergashev, D.Sc. (Philos.), professor, head of the Social Sciences and Humanities Department, University of World Economy and Diplomacy (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)
By early 2005, the parliamentary election in Uzbekistan—a very important event of the beginning of the year—was over. By 17-20 January, the election, which was carried out in two stages, added 84 members of the Senate (the upper chamber of the Oliy Majlis) to the already elected 120 deputies of the lower, legislative chamber of the parliament, which became professional. Under the Constitution, 16 senators were appointed by a presidential decree of 24 January (among them were two poets, one scholar, two teachers, two directors of industrial enterprises, three heads of public associations, two members of the judiciary, and only four bureaucrats).
By appointing these people, the government let society know its attitude toward individual groups of the ruling elite and the latter’s composition in general. Local observers noticed how many teachers of secondary educational establishments (academic lyceums and professional colleges) and farm heads there were among the senators. The government obviously intended to tap the reformist potential of the intelligentsia and the middle class. As distinct from the upper chamber of the first and second convocations, the khokims (governors, mayors, prefects) of this convocation were given more opportunity to become involved in the functioning of the representative power structures (region, district, and city Kengashes of People’s Deputies), which they headed according to the specific laws of Uzbekistan.
The election campaign of 2004-2005 demonstrated a highly interesting transformation of the administrative resource: for the first time, the khokims and their structures were almost indifferent to the future parliamentary candidates (including those nominated by the two main rivals—the Liberal-Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (LDPU) and the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU), because under the new laws the heads of regions, districts, and cities could no longer be elected to the lower chamber. Significantly, only one khokim, who had to leave his post as prefect of the Shakhrisab District, was elected to the lower chamber. This illustrated positive differentiation between the executive and legislative powers not applied at the regional, district, and city levels. I have already said above that in the regions the elected khokims automatically became members of the executive power branch.
On the whole, the election campaign was conducted smoothly under the scrutiny of numerous international observers, while its results reflected a complex picture of the dominant social interests ranging from the budding class of employers to the socially vulnerable class of hired workers. The number of qualified lawyers in the parliament, in the lower chamber in particular, increased 4.5-fold, which was a special feature of this election. Under the constitutional reform then in progress, the legislative chamber was expected to provide professional juridical skills. The Liberal-Democratic Party of Uzbekistan won a relative majority in the lower chamber.
The LDPU, which for some time claimed the role of the party in power, was founded in November 2003 according to the best Western political technological patterns. It united charismatic local businessmen and farmers. In 2005, the new party ran against the country’s oldest party—the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan. Their programs reflected the on-going stratification between the middle class and the hired hands. The LDPU won 41 seats in the lower chamber, or 13 seats more than the PDPU, its closest rival; and it acquired 33 seats in the Senate, and 39 percent of the seats in the regional, district, and city Kengashes of People’ Deputies.
The Social-Democratic Adolat Party (SDP), already ten years on the political scene, turned out to be an outsider, which inevitably caused reshuffling among its leaders. It offered a program of radical reforms, up to and including public control over the special services, which, nevertheless, did not help it to avoid failure. It seems that its rather loose organizational structure and personnel policies contributed to the defeat. On 24 January, the Second Plenary Session of the SDP Political Council elected Dilorom Tashmukhammedova, a new PC, as first secretary. The SDP became the only party in Uzbekistan headed by a woman and a young person.
On 14 January, as the election campaign drew to an end, Nezavisimaia gazeta published an interview with the president of Uzbekistan entitled “Pri imperii nas schitali liud’mi vtorogo sorta” (Under the Empire We were Dismissed as Inferior People). The head of state offered his opinion on the recent events in Georgia and Ukraine and his new theoretical ideas about the sociopolitical changes in Uzbekistan. He took the trouble to develop his earlier thesis about the correlation between democratic developments and the nation’s mentality; the important role the new two-chamber parliament was to play in reforming the country, etc. A widely shared opinion had it that the government was warning the world community about its strength and its attitude toward the Color Revolutions unfolding elsewhere in the CIS.
Speaking at the first joint session of both chambers on 28 January, the president outlined the country’s priorities to the nation and the deputies of Oliy Majlis of third convocation. In his Address to the Nation of sorts, the Uzbekistan leader identified five major immediate goals of the country’s domestic policy: development of the legislature, continued judicial reforms, democratization of the media, flexible foreign policy, and economic liberalization. Economic liberalization was at the end of the list for the obvious reason that it is very hard to push through social and political changes. The professional parliament was trusted with the task of drafting and passing effective laws within the shortest time possible and monitoring their execution.
Evolution of the representative structures was another problem: in 2005, the newly created Senate was expected to acquire influence over regional policy to thus revive the entire system of regional, district, and city Kengashes of People’s Deputies, which had failed to become driving power of change. While the former task seemed doable for the simple reason that the senators elected from among the regional, district and city deputies do not get together as often and so remain closely connected to the system of local administration, the second task demanded much more time. To cope with the problem, the ruling establishment strengthened the party verticals to turn the weak parties of Uzbekistan into mass parties with strong leaders and to add vigor to the local factions (party groups) in the regions.
Under the new Law on Funding Political Parties, beginning on 1 January, 2005, the five parties with seats in the parliament could expect money from the state to pay for their everyday activities (not only election campaigns): the funds were distributed according to the number of seats the parties had won. Under this scheme the LDPU, the winner, received the largest amount of money, while the losers—the Milliy Tiklanish Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Adolat Party—received the smallest sums. This meant that for the first time in their history, three parties—Milliy Tiklanish, Adolat, and the National Democratic Fidokorlar Party—were given the chance to set up small networks of regional, city, and district structures (before that the LDPU and PDPU used their membership dues for this purpose). This invigorated the party groups in the Kengashes.
In his 7 February address to the new cabinet, which appeared in the press, the president stressed that “bureaucratic barriers, procrastination, and irresponsibility of the bureaucratic machine” should be liquidated. In fact, the electorate heard what it wanted to hear from the head of state: “The country should use all the advantages gained so far—stable currency and low inflation—to raise wages, pensions, and social allowances.” He also criticized the “regulated economy” and “guided democracy” models. This was obviously done because much had been said about them across the post-Soviet expanse. He also wanted to say once more that Uzbekistan rejected all types of foreign interference in its domestic affairs.
At the same meeting, the president offered his opinion on certain transformations of the presidential form of government started on his own initiative. He was convinced, for example, that the transfer of a large number of his responsibilities to the parliament and government did not mean that he himself was shirking responsibility. On the other hand, he admitted that the presidential vertical had been created to tide the country over the political and economic difficulties of the early 1990s. (Experts agreed among themselves that by saying this Uzbekistan president was forestalling accusations of appointing his own people and encouraging younger people to fill responsible posts in all branches of power.)
The year 2005 saw only two important personnel shifts at the regional level—the khokims of the country’s capital and the Tashkent Region were replaced. Analysts explained these moves by the desire of the head of state to strengthen both the vertical of executive power and the positions of the smaller, yet much more dynamic cabinet. (It was absolutely necessary to stimulate housing construction and reform of municipal services in the capital and encourage industry and the farmers in the Tashkent Region.) Many members of the expert community were convinced that behind the relative personnel stability in the regions was national consolidation in the face of the Color Revolutions and successful fulfillment of the state order on raw cotton in many regions.
The local elites, in turn, demonstrated sufficient cohesion and initiative. The khokim of the Jizak Region, for example, beat off the Internet attacks and accusations of anti-Americanism spearheaded at him. (Nearly all political technologists agreed that the mass rally organized in Jizak in the wake of the Andijan events and attended by the khokim was one of the best examples of effective propaganda.) The same can be said of the meetings between the khokim of the Ferghana Region and the local youth. On the whole, throughout the year the local administrations effectively supported the people and their social well-being.
Inter-party cooperation and rivalry cut short the expected period of post-election lull or even political stagnation. As early as 14 February, the LDPU, Fidokorlar, and Adolat created a Democratic Bloc of Three Factions in the legislative chamber. The initiators argued: “By taking advantage of the resulting majority, we will be able to draft and pass laws.” Indeed, the bloc acquired a relative majority in the lower chamber. It should be said that the “young twins”—the LDPU and Fidokorlar—shared the same ideas about protecting business, while the presence of the Social Democratic Party was probably aimed against the still strong PDPU. This forced the latter to move into the opposition.
The very fact of creating a democratic bloc was absolutely in line with the repeated statements about the desirability of political pluralism within the parliament, which, as was said more than once, needed plurality of opinions, constructive opposition, and majority/minority rivalry. The new bloc made it possible to lobby progressive laws; it created a checks-and-balances system to weed out anti-reformist drafts. (The parties which signed the agreement declared that they remained loyal to their election programs and stated aims.) Together, the three parties acquired the very much needed 68 votes, that is, a parliamentary majority.
Two days later, at the 16 February press conference, the PDPU, the main opponent of the Democratic Bloc, responded by announcing itself the “opposition party of the minority,” the “left wing of the reformist forces,” “participant in a healthy faction struggle,” and “supporter of political pluralism and parliamentary competitiveness.” The still strong party with 560,000 members, a working vertical arrangement, and strict party discipline inherited from the CPSU was out to prove that it could stand against any other political force. In the past, the PDPU defeated Fidokorlar, a party using the latest political technologies and which claimed the role of the ruling party at the 1999 election.
The young LDPU sent the passions of political activity higher still. On 19 March, at the Fifth Plenary Session of its Political Council, the LDPU registered the main shortcomings of its organizations: inadequate personnel policy, as well as inadequate performance of territorial branches; inadequate work with female and young voters; a narrow subject-range, and too superficial treatment of many topics in the party’s XXI asr newspaper, which attracted few subscribers. The plenary session elected Mukhammadiusuf Teshabaev, who spent much time working in the foreign economic sphere, the new leader. (Some foreign experts explained this by the party’s closer international ties, the increase in the country’s export and import, and much closer attention to the foreign investments issue.)
The course toward further liberalization of social and political life required greater theoretical efforts, so in March, the president set up several republican expert groups to give the parliament analytical support in drafting the necessary normative and legal acts. By inviting local unorthodox, as well as foreign experts, the head of state demonstrated that his political intentions were serious and that he was resolved to profit from the progressive experience of developed countries. The Group for Democratization of the Media, for example, drafted about twenty laws (On State Secrets, etc.) to give the media more independence.
The country’s leaders took into account not only positive, but also negative foreign experience. The March events in Kyrgyzstan, as well as the earlier Ukrainian developments confronted Uzbekistan with the problem of relations between the government and civil society institutions, especially NGOs. The country’s leaders’ earlier admission that international and foreign structures had filled a certain vacuum called for resolute, yet cautious steps. The Uzbek president’s famous interview to Nezavisimaia gazeta on 14 January and his later statements on the events in Kyrgyzstan suggested the main conclusion related to the country’s domestic policy issues: Uzbekistan’s 5,200 public associations should become non-commercial and non-political.
The Civil Forum of Uzbekistan attended by over 200 delegates, which took place on 20 May in the Kumushkan resort, helped to change the attitude toward nongovernmental organizations. The practice of civil forums monopolized in the past by foreign structures was appropriated by the Uzbek authorities. The National Association of Nongovernmental Non-Commercial Organizations of Uzbekistan (NANNOUz) was set up in the wake of the Kumushkan forum. Later an NNO Support Fund was created and backed by the government. Uzbekistan’s political regime finally restored its right to fund local civil society institutions to prevent the latter from becoming a Trojan horse of foreign influence. This was what the expert community thought about the planned NNO re-registration.
The announcement that the U.S. Peace Corps was suspending its activities in Uzbekistan, which came on 6 June, confirmed the on-going evolution of the local civil society institutions: the “strategic partner” had obviously altered its priorities under pressure of the changed attitude toward the NGOs in Uzbekistan. (Since 1992, about 700 Peace Corps volunteers were working in the republic; on 6 June, there were 52 of them. It is common knowledge that one of the oldest and largest international organizations was not always welcome in the host countries. This probably happened in Uzbekistan, where local efforts were preferred rather than relying on foreign aid, which is hazardous from the national security viewpoint.) The political establishment avoided using command and administrative methods to bring law and order to the Third Sector—the task was left to the civil institutions themselves.
This explains the visit of a delegation of a group of the best Russian political technologists headed by Viacheslav Nikonov of the Politika Foundation. On 10 June, they were received by the head of state. The local elite and intelligentsia were interested in Russia’s rich experience of beating off information attacks accumulated during the Chechen war. The Andijan riot revealed the faults of counterpropaganda efforts, therefore it was absolutely necessary to explain to the world community the sources, essence, and negative repercussions of the May events, and their connection with international terrorism and religious extremism.
The Special Third LDPU Congress held on 25 June concentrated on agitation, propaganda, and educational efforts among the people in the context of the antiterrorist struggle. The congress outlined the party’s strategy in light of the information hostility against Uzbekistan unleashed after the events in Andijan. It actively discussed functioning of the political education system, organizational work among the masses, cooperation with NGOs, and the need to keep the so-called black opposition (Ozod dehkonlar partiiasi, and others) in check.
The Fifth PDPU Congress held on 2 July was even stormier. The very location— the best hotel in the capital—demonstrated that the people’s democrats were ambitious and determined. The deputies were greeted with huge slogans displayed over the hotel’s entrance: “The Best Social Protection for Our Children!” “The PDPU Fights Unemployment, Social Injustice, and Poverty!” “The NDPU is Resolved to Win the Coming Elections, and Form the Government and Local Administrations!” Experts agreed that the party’s new ideology—“the ideology of social justice, social solidarity, democracy, and freedom”—was the congress’ main achievement. The party described “people who need social support; people with the lowest incomes” as its social base.
Numerous observers found the rivalry between the PDPU and the LDPU demonstrated at the congress fascinating. The congress offered a sober assessment of the LDPU’s ideology and practice. Then PDPU leader A. Rustamov said in particular that his party objected to the way the Liberal Democrats treated “entrepreneurship for all” and their abetting in the spontaneous market processes. He added that his party was against the “ideology of individualism” the LDPU promoted as going against the principles of social harmony and the unique makhalia institution. The PDPU offered its alternative: employment and prosperity for all; fighting unemployment, social injustice, and poverty.
The party also offered its own and fairly daring interpretation of the Andijan events. The main report said that the May riot was caused by “international terrorism” and, to an even greater extent, by gross miscalculations of the local authorities and law enforcement bodies, as well as the administrative methods in which former khokim K. Obidov had indulged. This was why the extremists chose Andijan for their “color” experiments. The reporter severely criticized many of the regional, district, and city PDPU cells for their “double-dealing and lack of vigor, for taking orders from the khokims and waiting at their doors for fear of quarreling with powers that be.” He further said: “We are in opposition to the parliament majority and not only to it; we are against all those who promote destructive ideas, who pretend to be human rights activists, we are against the NGOs bought for petty grants and against corrupt officials of all ranks.”
The party expressed its opinion about the media’s role in the new historical conditions. It described the party periodicals as “too passive” and “unable to rebuff the rude commands coming from foreign embassies” and stated that they “confirmed their cowardice in the information war foreign centers were waging against Uzbekistan.” The party made negative comments on the state TV channels: UzTV did not cover the activity of the newly elected parliament with sufficient professionalism and “left large chunks of the inter-party discussions out of the picture.” The congress spoke disparagingly of the Ozod dehkonlar partiiaisi, which “lived on foreign handouts,” “sold the Motherland short,” and was “very far from its own nation.”
The congress started an ambitious political project: the PDPU engaged in moderate criticism and, guided by the new political slogans, had to launch organizational and personnel reform. On 9 July, the Third Plenary Session of the PDPU Central Council concluded that “the posts of chairman of the Central Council and chairman of the parliamentary faction in the legislative chamber should be filled by different people” to “improve the faction’s performance in the lower chamber and add weight to the grass-roots cells.” Uzbekistan’s largest party set up two organizational levels, viz. the party and the faction, to move closer to the common people. Latif Guliamov, who headed the Tashkent party organization, was elected as the party’s new leader.
The presidential decrees On Abolition of the Death Penalty of 1 August and On Transferring to Courts the Right to Sanction Arrests of 8 August played an important role in the country’s social and political life. These were extraordinary measures not only within the post-Soviet space—the United States, for example, still uses 6 types of death penalty—and were designed to do more than merely improve the country’s international image. (As early as two months before the Andijan events, the president’s expert group proved that such measures were indispensable.) Uzbekistan’s two neighbors, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, declare a moratorium on the death penalty every year, on the eve of the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The decrees passed in Uzbekistan did not coincide with any of the relevant anniversaries, were more radical, and were best adjusted to the judicial reform in the country and humanization of the penalty system.
On 19 August, the head of state met the leaders of the parliamentary factions—evidence of the new relations between the government and civil society. The faction leaders were eager to discuss important issues and become involved in the political decision-making process. Technically, the meeting was a precursor of the Senate plenary session of 26 August, which was expected to discuss withdrawal of the American troops from Uzbekistan. These two meetings defused Washington’s possible move by tapping the legal power of the parliamentary factions and the legislature to resolve this difficult international legal issue.
The annual International “Shark Taronalari” Music Festival which took place in Samarkand on 27 August was intended to improve Uzbekistan’s international image damaged by the information war against it. It attracted much more attention than its predecessors: the president came in person to greet the audience and participants, among whom there were several stars such as famous French singer Charles Aznavour. This was intended to demonstrate that Uzbekistan was part of the international community; that it was a secular state, the official government of which was open to the world. The president’s visit to Malaysia, one of the leaders of the Islamic world, on 2-4 October pursued the same aim and was exceptionally successful from the economic viewpoint.
The Day of the Law on the State Language celebrated on 21 October was ample proof that the reforms would go on despite the changed foreign policy landmarks. It became clear that the ideological values of the independence period had survived intact. On that day, RF Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in Tashkent and addressed the students of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy. This visit confirmed that Uzbekistan’s closest ally respected its political choice and intended to follow this course. (A month later the American military airbase in Khanabad was ceremoniously closed.)
Celebration of Constitution Day on 8 December was used not only to upgrade the nation’s legal awareness, but also to explain to the people what the country’s leaders thought about the key social and political issues. The speech delivered by the head of state at a meeting of members of the Tashkent public was based, according to experts, on six theses: loyalty to democratic principles; gradual transfer to democracy; rejection of the universal democratic model; attention to the country’s historical, national, and religious specifics; and the head of state pointed out that democracy could not be imposed by force and that “export of democracy” was akin to “the worldwide communist revolution.” The president suggested that sponsorship and charity should be developed inside the country to rule out the highly biased “charitable assistance” foreign sociopolitical centers extended to the civil society structures in Uzbekistan. It should be said in this connection that 2006 was announced the Year of Charity and the Medical Profession.
On 17 December, the SDP Adolat conference (congress) confirmed the trend toward more rational activities of the much younger membership of the Uzbek Social Democrats. Party leader Dilorom Tashmukhammedova, who also headed the party faction in the legislative chamber, presented the main report. Her contribution and related discussions confirmed that the party intended to close ranks around the slogans of justice (“adolat” means “justice” in Uzbek). It turned out that the youth wing was no longer satisfied with the party’s traditional image as the “party of medics.” The calls to protect the poor, old age pensioners, and the disabled, as well as to help small businessmen widened the gap between the SDP and PDPU. (Even fiercer rivalry can be expected between them in the second largest Samarkand Region where both parties are very strong.)
It can be said that in 2005, obsolete approaches and the political “golden mean” were competing with new approaches to national security and taking fuller account of the country’s vitally important national interests—this is the philosophical explanation of the sociopolitical changes in Uzbekistan. The country was gradually moving away from its acceptance of Western values as standard and universal, was conceptualizing its own road to democracy, and was looking for new partners abroad. The country’s leaders boldly rejected the strategy and tactics of the Color Revolutions, and initiated a healthy and constructive opposition at home by letting the civil society institutions move closer to the power structures.
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