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International Conference
«Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, the Present and Prospects for Resolution»
Baku (Azerbaijan) 22-23 October, 2012 and Tbilisi (Georgia) 25-26 October, 2012
GENERAL OVERVIEW
Mukhabat KHAMRAEVA
Mukhabat Khamraeva, Representative of
Central Asia and the Caucasus in Uzbekistan (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)
In his New Year’s Address, Uzbek President Islam Karimov noted that 2004 had been a difficult year: “We had to live through the anxious days of 29-30 March and 31 July, when international terrorism and the bandits who violated our border showed their bestial faces once more and took the lives of innocent people.”
But one of the most difficult periods in the most recent history of Uzbekistan was probably 2005, although its outcome was quite optimistic in essentially all areas of the republic’s life, primarily in the economic and political spheres. As the official documents note, real personal incomes rose by almost 22%, and monthly salaries, pensions, stipends, and benefits rose by an average of 40%. On 1 January, a law on the accumulative pension system came into force. Great hopes were placed on it, but they were far from fully justified.
Another special feature of the socioeconomic sphere was the decrease in the profit tax rate for enterprises from 18% to 15%, in the single social payment from the wages fund from 33% to 31%, and in the marginal income tax rate for citizens from 30% to 29%.
Serious changes occurred in the country’s political life. At the end of 2004-beginning of 2005, elections were held to the new, bi-chamber parliament. One hundred and twenty deputies were elected to its lower, legislative, chamber. According to the Central Election Commission, these deputies constituted lawyers, 18.3%, economists, 21.7%, industrial, construction, and communication workers, 10%, agricultural workers, 7.5%, businessmen, 12.5%, representatives of education, science, culture, and public health, 20%, and nongovernmental and non-commercial organizations, around 16%.
The Liberal Democratic Party, which participated in the elections for the first time, obtained an advantage in this chamber with 34.2% of the mandates. It was followed by the People’s Democratic Party with 23.3% of the seats. The Fidokorlar Party, the most popular at the 1999 elections, was only able to win 18 seats this time. Eleven deputies from the Milliy Tiklanish Party espousing the interests of the national intelligentsia received 11 seats, and ten from the Social-Democratic Party Adolat. Independent candidates received 14% of the seats. In terms of national composition, most of the parliamentary deputies are Uzbeks (91%), while the rest are represented by Kara-Kalpaks, Tajiks, Russians, Tatars, and Ukrainians.
Introduction of the 30% quota for women when nominating candidates from political parties was reflected in the gender composition of the Legislative Chamber—18% of its deputies are now women, which is 2.5-fold more than in the parliament elected in 1999.
A Senate was created for the first time in the country’s history, in which representatives of the regional, district, and city legislative councils (kengashs) of each of the 12 regions of the country, the city of Tashkent, and the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan received 84 seats, and 16 members of the Senate (out of 100) were appointed by Head of State Islam Karimov.
At the first joint meeting of both chambers of the Oliy Majlis, the country’s president made a program speech. He set forth the social development strategy for the next few years in essentially all spheres of life and severely criticized Western nongovernmental and non-commercial organizations working in the republic. Their activity, as the speaker noted, went beyond the framework of their declared programs and pursued specific tailor-made aims.
This theme of the president’s speech is what comes most vividly to mind, keeping in mind the events which happened in May in Andijan. They had a significant effect on all the other important processes which unfolded subsequently.
But before this several other important events occurred which also had some bearing on the situation in Andijan. For example, on 20 April, a press conference was held in the office of the opposition party, Ozod dehkonlar, at which the formation of a new coalition of democratic forces in the country was announced. The participants in the undertaking said that the party’s political platform was to enhance democracy and social progress in the republic. Several human rights activists and representatives of the republic’s economic circles also signed a corresponding statement. What is more, a memorandum on the creation of a democratic coalition called Serkuesh Uzbekistonim was read, which noted in particular that the goal of this structure was to build an open civil society, in which supremacy of the law would be observed, personal rights and freedoms guaranteed, and everything would be underpinned by high socioeconomic indices.
It was also announced again that Uzbekistan was withdrawing its membership from GUUAM. The country’s president noted that the political orientation currently being manifested in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, was compelling Uzbekistan to reconsider its attitude toward GUUAM. We will remind you that in June 2002, a statement by the Foreign Ministry on the same account said that this step had been taken due to the excessive politicization of the union and the fact it had no economic component. Possibly the statement by the Georgian president played a certain role in this decision, which said: “We defeated our enemies in Ukraine and in Kyrgyzstan. Now the turn has come for another country, which I will not name just now, we will announce this on 22 April at the GUUAM summit in Kishinev, where we will also step up our activity to support democracy.”1
During the small hours of 13 May, events occurred in Andijan which had a serious effect on the foreign and domestic policy not only of Uzbekistan, but also of the region as a whole. After making a surprise attack on the officers on duty of an interior patrol battalion and defense ministry military unit, criminals killed several people and seized a large number of weapons. After ramming the prison gates with a truck and entering its grounds, they released 526 prisoners, took the regional administration building by storm and put the captured hostages in it. Then the criminals made their main demand—release of all their ideological leaders from places of imprisonment, that is, members of the Akromiylar radical extremist group, one of the branches of the Hizb ut-Tahrir extremist terrorist organization.
In order to prevent spilt blood, primarily among the peaceful population, the authorities decided to immediately begin talks with the band leaders. These talks, which went on for nine hours, with the participation of the criminals’ relatives and close friends, as well as representatives of the public, did not yield the desired results, although the bandits were asked to leave the building and given free passage to go wherever they wished in the buses provided.
As a result of the measures taken, some of the bandits were killed during their pursuit, and others along with their relatives went into Kyrgyzstan.
During this bandit act, 94 terrorists, 20 law enforcement officers, 11 servicemen, and 57 peaceful residents were killed, and 76 terrorists, 49 law enforcement officers, 59 servicemen, and 91 peaceful residents were wounded.
In order to investigate these tragic events, the Oliy Majlis immediately created an independent commission comprised of representatives of both chambers of parliament, and two weeks later a working group was formed for monitoring the investigation and the government’s measures to stabilize the situation in Andijan and the Andijan Region. It included employees of the Indian, Iranian, Kazakhstani, Chinese, Kyrgyz, Pakistani, Russian, and Tajik embassies accredited in Tashkent. Based on an analysis of the investigation documents and other data, the following conclusion was drawn: the Andijan events were a carefully planned and organized campaign prepared with the direct participation of external forces to seize power in a specific region of Uzbekistan and destabilize the situation throughout Central Asia.
These events themselves had a great impact on the development of the situation in the country and in the world, primarily related to the so-called Uzbek refugees in Kyrgyzstan. For two months, a very serious ideological war was waged, as a result of which the U.N. Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kyrgyzstan violated international law by sending 439 people to Rumania, some of whom were suspected of committing extremely grave crimes. The actions of the UNHCR did not correspond to the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and clearly exceeded the Commission’s powers. After all, in compliance with resolutions No. 1269 of 19 October, 1999, and No. 1371 of 28 September, 2001 of the U.N. Security Council, it was obligated to intercept instances where terrorists abused the refugee status. What is more, the UNHCR received official notification that Uzbekistan was asking only for the return of the people who escaped from prison or committed other crimes: premeditated murder, terrorism, illegal possession of weapons and ammunition, infringement of constitutional order, seizure of hostages, and participation in banned organizations. But the attitude of the UNHCR and several donor states toward the situation could be evaluated as indirectly helping terrorists to avoid being brought to account and encouraging terrorism as a whole.
As a result of the ideological war launched against Uzbekistan, the draft of a resolution on “The Situation with Human Rights in Uzbekistan” (so-called Country Resolutions), submitted mainly by EU countries, was reviewed by the U.N.’s Third Committee. The content of this document was based on the events in Andijan and on the subsequent measures taken by official Tashkent to settle the question. It gave references to restrictions on the freedom of speech and confession, on interception of the activity and registration of NGOs and opposition political parties, and also mentioned the use of torture and persecution of civil society activists. Along with the call to carry out an international investigation of the events in Andijan, the draft also made several other demands on Uzbekistan.
At the same time, the republic’s leadership adopted a decision about the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces contingent from the Khanabad aerodrome within three months, which incidentally, the American side did carry out. But all the same, the tension which subsequently arose in the relations between the West and Uzbekistan has not been defused, and trends toward their improvement are extremely weak.
In the second half of the year, official Tashkent began unwaveringly directing its foreign policy toward Moscow. During President Islam Karimov’s official visit to the Russian Federation, a treaty was signed on alliance relations between Russia and Uzbekistan which the head of Uzbekistan called “unprecedented.” But even prior to this, in order to develop economic integration and assist progress in the Eurasian space, on the initiative of the Uzbek president, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization united with the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), thus making Uzbekistan a member of the EurAsEC.
On the whole, 2005 was a year of change in geopolitical priorities in Uzbekistan’s most recent history, and appears to be the beginning of serious transformations in all spheres of the republic’s life.
1 Available at [http://news.runet.ru/news/14/2005/04/14/425336], 15 January, 2006. Back to text
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