International Conference

«Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, the Present and Prospects for Resolution»

Baku (Azerbaijan) 22-23 October, 2012 and Tbilisi (Georgia) 25-26 October, 2012

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POLITICS

Parviz MULLOJANOV

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Parviz Mullojanov, Director of the Public Committee for Assisting the Democratic Processes in Tajikistan (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

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Certain political events of 2005 will echo for at least ten more years; they will affect the country’s social, economic, and political development.

I have in mind, first and foremost, the Majlisi Oli (parliamentary) election of 27 February, 2005. Six political organizations officially registered with the Ministry of Justice contended for seats: the National-Democratic Party (NDPT), the party in power with the absolute majority in the previous convocation, the Communist Party (CPT), the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), the Democratic Party (DPT), the Social-Democratic Party (SDPT), and the Socialist Party (SPT). It was expected that the NDPT, which wielded considerable administrative resources, the CPT, as the most weathered party with a large following, and the IRPT, which had scored considerable organizational victories, would be the main contenders. Without a leader, the Democratic Party was considerably weakened. The Socialist Party split into two, only one of the new factions being allowed to run. For want of money and time, the SDPT had little chance of obtaining more than a couple of seats. As a result, the NDPT received 74.9 percent; the CPT, 13.64 percent; the IRPT, 8.94 percent; the DPT, 1.17 percent; the SDPT, 0.5 percent; and the SPT, 0.3 percent.¹ It turned out that 0.34 percent of the ballot papers were invalid; and 0.2 percent voted against all the parties.

At first glance, reality looked very similar to the forecasts: the NDPT received about 84 percent of the seats, the CPT, 4 seats; and the IRPT, 2 seats.² The NDPT scored a convincing victory since it not only preserved its domination in the parliament, but also obtained more seats. The deputies of the other two parties could not even unite into a faction—there were too few of them. Thus, their presence in the legislature was purely nominal. In view of the upcoming presidential election, the NDPT’s victory was especially important.

The other parties were disappointed: neither the SDPT, nor the Democrats and Socialists succeeded in overcoming the 5 percent barrier and obtaining at least one seat each. The parties which did overcome this barrier, however, were also displeased with the election results. As soon as the election results were officially announced, Communist leader Shodi Shabdolov resolutely objected to them by accusing the executive power of putting pressure on the voters and the election commissions, which resulted in mass falsifications. The Democratic, Social-Democratic, and Islamic Revival parties sided with the communists. Each of them engaged in independent vote counting, the results of which differed greatly from the official data. IRPT analysts insisted that their party had come in second and that only interference by the official structures had made it possible for the Communists to capture second place. Some of the candidates in the majority constituencies agreed with the critics. Four out of the six parties insisted on another election round under threat of withdrawing from the Presidential Public Council.

The statements issued by CIS observers and members of diplomatic missions and embassies were more positive. The Russian diplomats were especially positive. “The minor shortcomings identified during the election campaign and the voting process did not affect the voters’ free choice,” stated the Russian Embassy in the Republic of Tajikistan.³ International organizations, however, were more critical—the OSCE announced that both the laws and the rights of the voters had been violated. Head of the UNTOP mission in Tajikistan Vladimir Sotirov said in particular: “The elections proved to be a political test for Tajik society, still at the early stage of its democratic development.”⁴ He voiced his concern over the threat of several parties to leave the Public Council: “A discontinued dialog at the Public Council level would endanger national and inter-party efforts to move the country forward after the conflict.”⁵

Criticism notwithstanding, the election results were accepted. Nevertheless, the parties whose demands to revise the results were neglected (IRPT, CPT, SDPT, and DPT) announced that they would leave the Public Council. On the whole, the election campaign demonstrated that most of the opposition parties had overestimated their potential. The so-called right, or democratic opposition was left outside the parliament, while the Communist Party, a favorite, was bumped off at the election. On the other hand, it turned out that the IRPT’s potential was much higher than previously believed.

Now the rapidly increasing number of those who supported the opposition is convinced that in future elections will become even less transparent, while the government will devise new falsification methods. There is a widely accepted opinion, popular even among the fairly moderate opponents of the country’s leadership, that it will be much harder for them to come to power in the legal way. Thus, the parliamentary election of 2005 radicalized part of the opposition. As for the government, it should obviously ponder on the new alignment of forces: in the near future, the IRPT will remain the only influential opposition party.

The election was the only important domestic event; foreign political issues dominated the political sphere. On the domestic scene, several court cases with political overtones resounded across the country. I have in mind the arrest and trial of DPT leader Makhmadruzi Iskandarov, a former warlord who later headed the country’s gas industry. After being removed from this post in 2004, he put up stiff opposition, then he moved to Moscow, from where he was abducted under still unclear circumstances and brought back to Dushanbe. He was accused of several crimes ranging from financial abuses to an attempted coup. Early in October he was sentenced to 23 years in prison.⁶

Before that, in April, Iakub Salim, another former warlord and one of the pro-government Popular Front leaders, was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Appointed head of the RT Customs Service in 1998, he staged an aborted riot. He fled to Russia, which handed him over to the Tajik law enforcement bodies.⁷ Today Gaffor Mirzoev (Gray-Haired), a former Popular Front warlord who for many years commanded the National Guard, is still on trial. Although removed from his post, he refused to vacate it; after long talks he was appointed chairman of the Agency for Fighting Drug Trafficking. Soon after that he was arrested and accused of violating several articles of the Criminal Code. R. Fayziev, deputy chairman of the Tarakkiet (Development) Party was sentenced to five years in prison. In the past, his party competed with the NDPT for influence in the Kulob Region, one of the main bases of the party in power.

These court cases are a direct result of the general trend toward more centralized power. Former warlords and potential political opponents are deliberately pushed to the side: they leave politics, allegedly of their own free will, to start their own businesses or work in other spheres unrelated to politics. Those who find it hard to abandon their political ambitions sooner or later find themselves in the dock. In most cases, the political undercurrent is not obvious: the law enforcement bodies can always find ways to accuse the former warlords of criminal offences.

This year saw a very specific response by the country’s leaders to the Color Revolutions. Nearly all aspects of domestic and foreign policy were affected by the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the events in Uzbekistan resounded across the country. Convinced that the events in Kyrgyzstan were possible because the leaders demonstrated their weakness, the Tajik leaders decided that a strong civil society, Third Sector, and a developed multiparty system threatened Tajikistan’s stability.

The above considerations forced the Tajik leaders to take measures to avoid similar developments in their republic. The parliament initiated amendments to a number of laws to give more power to the law enforcement bodies. It discussed amendments to the laws On the Press and On TV and Radio Broadcasting. Under the amendments introduced into both laws, late in November all publishers were to submit fresh issues of their periodicals (before circulation) for examination by the state structures under the threat of punishment. The obviously oppositional and independent publications were the first to experience strict control.

On the other hand, the government gradually increased its control over international organizations, local NGOs, and foreign offices. The Foreign Ministry, for example, asked international organizations to inform the government about all their planned events; and the local NGOs find it much harder to obtain permission for their events. The Russian and Central Asian press accused Western countries of staging the Color Revolutions, which gave the government structures reason for treating the U.S. Embassy in the Republic of Tajikistan, related agencies (USAID, USAED, NDI), and the Soros Foundation with suspicion. Government structures carried out an inspection of the local office of the Soros Foundation, but failed to find anything incriminating. Tension was relieved on 15 September when George Soros and the Tajik President met in New York during a Tajik delegation’s visit to America.

It seems that, influenced by the events in the neighboring republics, the Tajik government will postpone its reforms and laws designed to create a developed civil society in the republic. The law on decentralization of the system of local self-government drafted with the help of international organizations was put on the back burner.

In 2005, the law enforcement structures carried out several actions designed to neutralize illegal extremist organizations, the Hizb ut-Tahrir Party in particular. In May, seven of its members were convicted in the north of the country; on 17 September, more members were detained; and in October, the head of the party’s regional branch was arrested. In May, several people from the Sogd Region accused of belonging to the underground Islamist organization Baiat were sentenced to many years in prison.

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The parliamentary election intensified the country’s drift toward centralization in evidence over the past ten years. Several years ago there were several centers of influence on the republic’s political scene opposing the central government. Today, some of them have disappeared, while others lost much of their potential. On the whole, at a certain stage of its post-conflict development the country needs centralization as part of the stabilization process. The last election demonstrated, however, that the country has no strong opposition, which is indispensable for democratic development. Today, the government controls the parliament since the opposition parties (if the Communist Party can be considered an opposition at all) have few seats and cannot influence its work.

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¹ Asia Plus Information Agency. Available at [agency@asiaplus.tj]. _{Back to text}
² See: “Parlamentskie vybory,” Varorud, No. 10 (148), 9 March, 2005 (in Tajik). _{Back to text}
³ Ibidem. _{Back to text}
⁴ Ibidem. _{Back to text}
⁵ Ibidem. _{Back to text}
⁶ Tsentrazia, Personalii. Available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/person.php4]. _{Back to text}
⁷ Ibidem. _{Back to text}