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International Conference
«Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, the Present and Prospects for Resolution»
Baku (Azerbaijan) 22-23 October, 2012 and Tbilisi (Georgia) 25-26 October, 2012
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Murat LAUMULIN
Murat Laumulin, D.Sc. (Political Science), chief researcher at the Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Almaty, Kazakhstan)
During 2005, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and its participation in international affairs developed dynamically in all the main traditional areas. This included its participation in international, including regional, organizations, such as the U.N., OSCE, CIS, EurAsEC, and SCO, and its cooperation with such structures as NATO, the OIC, and ECO. What is more, the republic strengthened its bilateral relations with Russia, the CIS states as a whole and Central Asian countries in particular, the U.S., the PRC, the countries of the European Union and the Muslim East, the APR, and Southeast Asia.
But this past year was distinguished by specific features: the domestic political factor had a strong impact on Kazakhstan’s international status. I am referring to the presidential election in the country, which attracted the keen attention of several international organizations and individual states to its domestic policy.
Kazakhstani-Russian Relations
The first half of the year was characterized by unprecedented activity in this area. For example, in January, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a working visit to Almaty. During his informal meeting with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev, a broad range of questions were discussed relating to the development of bilateral relations and preparations for the forthcoming visit of Kazakhstan’s head of state to Moscow. The informal format of the meeting was conducive to discussing the upcoming presidential election in Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation’s support of it. At the same time, this visit was also prompted by the events in Ukraine; in particular, Vladimir Putin and Nursultan Nazarbaev needed to develop a joint stance on the future of the Common Economic Space (CES).
Soon thereafter, Kazakhstan President Nazarbaev made an official visit to Moscow, during which several intergovernmental agreements were signed with President Putin on the results of the talks, including the Treaty on Delimitation of the Kazakhstani-Russian State Border. What is more, an agreement was reached on regulating issues relating to developing mineral deposits and operating engineering structures, supply lines, and other infrastructure facilities which cross the state border or pass along it, as well as resolving problems of storing and using biological resources, water use, and environmental protection by means of separate agreements. An intergovernmental agreement was also signed on creating a Kazakhstan communication and broadcasting satellite called KazSat. Both sides emphasized in particular that Russia was Kazakhstan’s “eternal strategic partner and eternal neighbor, whereby God-given.”
The next meeting between Vladimir Putin and Nursultan Nazarbaev took place in May in Cheliabinsk, where they discussed in particular questions of cooperation within the framework of the SCO and EurAsEC. At the beginning of June, extensive and painstaking work was completed on delimitation of the longest land border in the world of more than 7,500 km in length. Then the heads of the two states held a meeting at the beginning of July after the SCO summit, which ended in the signing of four agreements on power engineering.
Cooperation in the military-strategic sphere also continued. At the end of October, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the Russian government intended to sign new memorandums to the Russian-Kazakhstan intergovernmental agreement on use by the Russian Federation Armed Forces of four test grounds in Kazakhstan.
So Kazakhstani-Russian relations were extremely active in 2005: there were eleven summit meetings, and Moscow rendered full political support to Nursultan Nazarbaev with respect to the presidential election in Kazakhstan.
Admittedly, there were also some sensational events and provocations in bilateral relations. For example, at the beginning of October, a Russian magazine published an article which said that Moscow supposedly had secret plans to create a single state between Russia and Kazakhstan. But both the Kazakhstan and Russian foreign ministries denied this.
Cooperation with Other CIS States
As in the past, the Republic of Kazakhstan took up an active position in the post-Soviet expanse. But the emphasis of the republic’s interests began to shift from the CIS to more compact integration structures, such as the EurAsEC and the CES. Paradoxically enough, the past year was marked by intensive development of relations with the CIS countries which experienced so-called Color Revolutions, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, although Kazakhstan has always been strictly pro-Russian and prone to criticize the color coups. The interest of these and other CIS countries in cooperating with Kazakhstan was aroused primarily by their energy problems. Whereby this was a concern not only of the Orange, but also of the integrationist republics.
In May, Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko visited Kazakhstan. His talks with the leaders of Kazakhstan led to the signing of a series of intergovernmental agreements, including on cooperation in developing the fuel and energy complexes of both countries. But most important, the leaders of Kazakhstan and Belarus made a policy statement to the effect that in the event Ukraine refused to take part in creating the CES, this process would go on without Kiev’s participation. Reporters assessed this statement as a warning signal to Ukrainian President Viktor Iushchenko.
At the end of May, Ukrainian President Viktor Iushchenko made an official visit to Kazakhstan, within the framework of which a series of bilateral documents was signed. Nursultan Nazarbaev gave his Ukrainian colleague the clear understanding that the questions interesting Kiev—oil and gas deliveries—could not be resolved without Moscow. In mid-November, Nursultan Nazarbaev made an official return visit to Ukraine. The joint statement and Road Map signed by the heads of these states were aimed at strengthening cooperation in the transportation and fuel and energy sectors, the agroindustrial complex, and the aerospace industry.
The development of Kazakhstani-Georgian relations was strongly influenced by completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. At the end of March, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili made an official state visit to Astana. Within the framework of this visit, several mutual agreements were signed. At the beginning of October, the Kazakhstan president made an official return visit to Georgia, during which several bilateral documents were signed. Its main outcome was the adoption of a Joint Communiqué expressing a mutual desire to further develop cooperation within the framework of the main export pipeline project, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, as well as regarding deliveries of Kazakhstan gas to Georgia and efficient use of the potential of the Caspian port of Aktau (Kazakhstan) and the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi (Georgia). In addition to the summit meetings, relations between the heads of various departments were also developed, particularly in power engineering. A key issue was the price to be paid for Kazakhstan gas, which required additional agreements between the two sides.
Kazakhstan maintained traditional ties with Azerbaijan. In May, the Kazakhstan president made a state visit to Baku, during which an agreement was signed on strategic partnership and alliance relations, and agreements were amended on the main principles of cooperation in petroleum machine-building and in free trade.
Official Astana’s concern about the situation in neighboring Kyrgyzstan dramatically rose after the March events in this republic. Kazakhstan played an important role in stabilizing its political situation, rendered it urgent economic assistance, and established good relations with the new political leadership of this state. Nursultan Nazarbaev participated in the inauguration of its new president, Kurmanbek Bakiev, who made several visits to Kazakhstan, as did Kyrgyz Prime Minister Felix Kulov. For example, in October, he participated in discussing the bloc of economic issues and, in particular, agreements on cooperation in the fuel and energy sphere and on joint use of water resources were reached. What is more, questions relating to Kyrgyz labor migrants residing in Kazakhstan were resolved.
Official Astana actively participated in multilateral meetings of the leaders of the post-Soviet republics, including in the meeting of heads of EurAsEC member states held in Moscow, at which questions of forming a common customs fee for the community and coordinating viewpoints at the talks on joining the WTO were discussed. In August, Kazakhstan took part in the work of a CIS summit held in Kazan. A controversial issue was election of the new CIS chairman. It was presumed that Kazakhstan President Nazarbaev would replace Vladimir Putin in this post. Perhaps the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan delegations did not support his candidacy. Whatever the case, due to the upcoming presidential election in Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev turned down the offered post.
At the beginning of October, Kazakhstan took part in the meeting held in St. Petersburg of the heads of member states of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, during which a decision was made regarding its joining ranks with the Eurasian Economic Community. What is more, at this same meeting, the Republic of Kazakhstan supported Uzbekistan’s appeal to join the EurAsEC.
Relations with Western Countries
Official contacts between Kazakhstan and the U.S. became more active during the second half of the year. But as early as May, the situation was potentially fraught with deterioration. At that time, talking at an International Republican Institute congress, the U.S. president said that Washington would actively assist the Color Revolutions, whereby two well-known Kazakhstani opposition figures were in the audience, including the future Kazakhstan presidential candidate.
On 22 August, Kazakhstan Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokaev visited the United States, where he held talks with U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice. After expressing satisfaction with the level of cooperation and constructive dialog reached, Ms. Rice declared the White House’s unconditional support of the program announced by the Kazakhstan president of full-scale sociopolitical reforms, which is an optimal development model for other Central Asian countries. In addition, Condoleezza Rice emphasized that Kazakhstan has all that it takes to play a key role in the region. In turn, Mr. Tokaev confirmed official Astana’s fundamental interest in expanding mutually advantageous cooperation with Washington and its adherence to the democratic course of reform.
What is more, during this visit, on 25 August, Mr. Tokaev met with U.S. Defense Minister Donald Rumsfeld and they discussed the development prospects for bilateral relations in the military-political sphere and questions relating to cooperation in settling regional conflicts and strengthening security and stability in Central Asia and the Caspian Region.
In October, U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice arrived in Kazakhstan. During her meeting with Nursultan Nazarbaev, problems of regional policy and economic questions were discussed, and the upcoming presidential election in the Republic of Kazakhstan prompted a discussion of the democratization of Kazakhstan society. As Condoleezza Rice noted, Kazakhstan is in a difficult region, but the U.S. believes that the republic could become a fulcrum for the development of other Central Asian states and expressed the hope that the presidential election in Kazakhstan would be fair and open.
At the beginning of November, a meeting between General John Abizaid, Commander of the U.S. Central Command, and Kazakhstan Defense Minister Mukhtar Altynbaev was held in Astana, during which questions were discussed of international, including regional, security, and the present state and future prospects for bilateral cooperation in the military sphere. The Pentagon representative said that Washington does not intend to deploy a military base in Kazakhstan unless a tense situation arises in one of the Central Asian states and the government of that republic invites the U.S. Armed Forces to come in. And finally, on 20 December, U.S. CIA Director Porter Goss visited Kazakhstan and held a series of meetings with officials.
Unofficial contacts also have great political significance in bilateral relations with the United States. For example, in September, former U.S. president Bill Clinton visited Kazakhstan. During his meeting with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev, the former head of the White House expressed the opinion that Kazakhstan has every reason to accept the post of OSCE chairman in 2009. Analysts evaluated this unexpected visit by Bill Clinton as a signal that Washington supported Nazarbaev’s candidacy at the upcoming presidential election in Kazakhstan. Some time later, in October, former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger made a private visit to the republic. He said that his meeting with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev gave the United States reason to positively evaluate the efforts being made by official Astana to further democratize society, and he emphasized the significant economic and political progress of Kazakhstan’s development.
During the year, several conferences were organized in the U.S. devoted to Kazakhstan, at which extremely well-known U.S. representatives answered journalists’ questions. Among them were former presidential candidate and ex-commander of NATO troops in Europe Wesley Clark, former FBI and CIA director William Webster, former advisor to the U.S. defense minister Richard Perle, first vice president of the National Committee on Foreign Policy Donald Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Ariel Cohen, and others.
As for the other Western states, active relations with Great Britain should be noted. For example, in March, the British Ministry of Trade and Industry assumed responsibility for rendering support to build a nuclear technopark in the town of Kurchatov. In September, a delegation of Kazakhstan parliamentary deputies headed by Majilis Chairman Mukhamejanov went to London, and in October, the British-Kazakhstani Parliamentary Group made a return visit to Kazakhstan.
Contacts were also developed with other EU countries, including Central and Eastern European states. A representative Polish delegation came to Kazakhstan in April. During its visit to Almaty, Kokchetav, and Astana, Kazakhstan-Polish economic forums were held which showed that Kazakhstan is becoming one of this country’s important economic partners in Central Asia. The number of Polish companies interested in cooperating with Kazakhstan is increasing. But at the same time, Polish businessmen have noted several barriers barring their access to the Kazakhstan market.
It should also be noted that Kazakhstan is continuing to develop ties with the European Union as an organization. At the beginning of February, the third meeting of the European Union-Kazakhstan Subcommittee on Justice and Law and Order was held in Astana. At the beginning of April, participants in the 6th meeting of the Republic of Kazakhstan-European Union Cooperation Committee in Brussels discussed the prospects for interaction between the sides in the energy and transportation sphere, as well as regarding TACIS programs. At the end of October, EU special representative for Central Asia Jan Kubish made a working visit to Kazakhstan. During his meeting with the Kazakhstan president, the possibilities were discussed of further developing trade and economic cooperation, Kazakhstan’s membership in the WTO, and issues relating to the upcoming presidential election in Kazakhstan.
On the initiative of several deputies of the faction of the European People’s Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED), on 10 November there were hearings in the European Parliament, which a delegation from Kazakhstan attended, on the upcoming presidential election in Kazakhstan. The ensuing discussion focused on the political situation, freedom of the press, and development of the institutions of a civil society in Kazakhstan. A EU statement was adopted on the outcome of the hearings, which noted in particular that the European Union appreciates the responsibility Kazakhstan has assumed to hold a free and fair election.
Other international organizations were also interested in the course of the 2005 election in Kazakhstan. For example, on 10 November, the Caspian Information Center (CIC) presented a report in London on the election campaign in the republic. Its main conclusion was that Kazakhstan, after achieving success in its economic reforms, has reached an important stage in democratic development.
Contacts with Asian Countries
In May, the foreign ministry representatives of Kazakhstan and China held bilateral consultations and a meeting of the Secretariat of the Committee on Cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the PRC. At the beginning of July, on the eve of the SCO summit, PRC Chairman Hu Jintao made an official two-day visit to Kazakhstan. Key issues of bilateral cooperation, as well as urgent international, including regional, problems, were discussed within a small group and at an enlarged session. Hu Jintao and Nursultan Nazarbaev signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership and several other documents on expanding interstate relations, and came to terms on creating favorable conditions for further intensifying ties in such spheres as trade, the economy, power engineering, transportation, and finances.
On 1 September, bilateral talks on Kazakhstan joining the WTO were successfully concluded in Beijing, and a statement was signed on completion of the talks on access to the Kazakhstan market of goods and services from the PRC under mutually acceptable conditions for both sides.
Cooperation was also continuing with Japan. In November, a statement was signed on completion of the talks between Astana and Tokyo on access to the Kazakhstan market of goods and services, which in itself designated completion of the talks between the two countries on Kazakhstan’s membership in the World Trade Organization.
At the end of May, within the framework of an official visit to Kazakhstan by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, several documents were signed in Astana, including an interparliamentary agreement on cooperation in the struggle against international terrorism. At the end of the official bilateral meetings held in June in Geneva, Astana and Ankara reached agreements on completion of the talks on Kazakhstan’s entry into the WTO.
In November, King of Jordan Abdallah II bin al-Hussein made an official visit to Kazakhstan, during which a decision was made to create a joint economic commission, and bilateral documents were signed, mainly on cooperation in culture. But due to the terrorist acts which took place in the Jordan capital on 10 November, Abdalla II bin al-Hussein cut this visit short.
Development of Relations with International Organizations
An important place in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is occupied by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. As its chairman, Kazakhstan organized a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the member states (CFM SCO) at the end of February to discuss questions of maintaining stability in the SCO expanse, the Organization’s international activity and urgent current problems, and stepping up efforts to advance Tashkent’s initiative to create a partner network of multilateral associations in the Asia Pacific Region. At the beginning of June, the second meeting of the secretaries of the Security Councils of the Organization’s member states on security and stability in the SCO expanse and in neighboring regions, as well as on strengthening cooperation in the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism, was held in Astana.
A major international event was the tenth (anniversary) meeting of the heads of SCO member states held on 5 July in Astana. At this summit, Iran, India, and Pakistan joined the Organization as observers. The participants in the anniversary meeting in Astana signed a total of seven documents, including a conception of cooperation in the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and came to terms on interaction in preparing and holding joint antiterrorist exercises, training, and qualification-raising seminars and on exchanging work experience. The main outcome of this geopolitically significant summit was the SCO Declaration, in which the question was raised of how long the U.S. bases should remain in the Organization’s Central Asian member states.
At the end of October, a regular meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of the SCO Member States was held in Moscow with Kazakhstan’s participation. Several documents were signed on its outcome. Within the framework of this meeting, talks were also held between the delegation heads and Russian President Vladimir Putin. What is more, PRC State Council Premier Wen Jiabao made a statement in which he offered 900 million dollars for carrying out joint development projects. Official Beijing essentially stated its willingness to provide a line of credit for the entire economy of the SCO countries and turn this structure from a military-political into an economic organization. But Moscow and Astana had a cool response to this suggestion.
Kazakhstan has been actively supporting the work of the United Nations. In particular, at the end of January, a meeting was organized in the republic of the Antiterrorist Committee of the U.N. Security Council (ATC U.N. SC). Its participants discussed urgent questions relating to the fight against terrorism: improving the international tools for its suppression, including the interception of illegal financing; putting regional antiterrorist centers to work; combating the illicit circulation of arms and drugs; intensifying cooperation between corresponding national and international structures; and ensuring security of air and sea ports. What is more, within the framework of the ATC U.N. SC meeting, the Kazakhstan government and U.N. Drug and Crime Control Department (UNDCD) signed five documents on technical and advisory assistance in the fight against drug abuse and the illicit circulation of drugs.
At the end of February, the Kazakhstan government, in the form of the country’s Foreign Ministry, and the U.N. departments signed joint action plans for 2005-2009. During this period, the U.N. departments will orient their efforts in three mutually related directions: reducing poverty, improving basic social services, and carrying out democratic state administration. At the end of March, a U.N. International Assembly was held in Almaty, which reviewed the question of the role of international, including regional and subregional, organizations in carrying out the Almaty Action Program (AAP) for the developing countries without access to the sea. On 1 November, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution initiated by Kazakhstan called International Cooperation and Coordination of Activity Aimed at Rehabilitation of the Population and Environment, and Economic Development of the Semipalatinsk Region in Kazakhstan, which called on the international community to render the republic assistance in ensuring economic growth in this area.
As for cooperation with the OSCE, in mid-February, its current chairman, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Slovenia Dimitrij Rupel, visited Kazakhstan and held consultations with representatives of the Senate and Majilis of the parliament, the Security Council, Foreign Ministry, business circles, political parties, and NGOs. In September, high-level consultations were held in Vienna of the OSCE member states, during which questions were reviewed of reforming the Organization and improving its activity. Foreign diplomats supported the initiatives of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev aimed at further socioeconomic and political modernization of Kazakhstan society.
Our republic also participated in drawing up recommendations for the Group of Prominent Political Officials of the seven OSCE countries on a conception of reform for the Organization. Kazakhstani delegation head Rakhat Aliev said at this meeting that the Republic of Kazakhstan is adhering to democratic values and upholds a gradual (evolutionary) liberalization of the political system, closely tying this process with continuing the socioeconomic reforms. Among other important prerequisites, the delegation head named the need to ensure a broad public dialog, including the constructive role of nongovernmental organizations and the mass media during democratic development, and called on the participants of the forum to support Kazakhstan’s initiative to hold an International Conference on an Inter-Confessional and Ethnic Dialog in Kazakhstan in 2006. What is more, Rakhat Aliev directed attention to the need to ensure humanitarian security in the OSCE expanse and observe a rational balance in fighting the terrorist threat, on the one hand, and protecting the fundamental human rights and freedoms, on the other. In this context, he mentioned official Astana’s practical actions which have unilaterally liberalized the visa conditions for several OSCE countries.
Kazakhstan has also been maintaining close contacts with the North Atlantic Alliance. In particular, in February, a conference was held in the republic on planning a Working Program of NATO Partnership organized by the Allied Command Transformation. At the end of June, at a meeting held in Brussels of the North Atlantic Council in the NATO-Kazakhstan format, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Askar Shakirov presented the Presentational Document of an Individual Action Plan of Partnership between the Alliance and the Republic of Kazakhstan. This document set forth official Astana’s conceptual approaches to the development of relations with NATO, including in the sphere of international, including regional, security, and touched on questions of practical cooperation in strengthening Kazakhstan’s defensibility. Representatives of the NATO leadership and member states highly praised the current level of partnership with Kazakhstan, noted its leading role in strengthening regional stability, and expressed interest in closer interaction on urgent problems of international and regional security.
At the beginning of October, NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus Robert Simmons visited Kazakhstan. He met with representatives of government bodies: parliamentary deputies, the secretary of the Security Council, the minister of defense, the minister for emergencies, and the deputy foreign minister. According to Robert Simmons, successful use by Kazakhstan of the Alliance’s experience in training servicemen, as well as in the sphere of improving interoperability is serving a positive example for other NATO partner states. Sending Kazakhstan specialists to work in the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center could be of immense value in this process. What is more, the sides discussed urgent problems of regional security. On behalf of NATO, Simmons expressed gratitude for Kazakhstan’s active support of the efforts of the antiterrorist coalition.
On 26 October, President Nazarbaev signed a Law on Ratification of the Security Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The agreement is aimed at reinforcing the sides’ mutual obligations to protect sensitive information exchanged when interacting within the NATO Partnership for Peace program. And in mid-December, Robert Simmons made a statement that at the beginning of 2006, the Alliance intends to sign an individual action plan with Kazakhstan on this program. In relation to Kazakhstan, special emphasis was made on military reform and raising the country’s combat-readiness.
Kazakhstan also participated in the work of the Asian Cooperation Dialog (ACD) by joining such documents as the Islamabad Declaration and the Islamabad Initiative on Economic Cooperation in Asia in April. What is more, within the framework of his visit to Islamabad, Kazakhstan Minister of Foreign Affairs Tokaev held bilateral meetings with Thai Vice Premier Surakiart Sathirathai and the heads of the foreign policy departments of Pakistan, China, Japan, Vietnam, Oman, Mongolia, and Sri Lanka.
At the beginning of June, a regular meeting was held of the Secretariat of the Congress of World and Traditional Religions, in which 23 members of different religious associations from Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Great Britain, France, Russia, China, Mongolia, Israel, and other countries took part. Kazakhstan and foreign theologians also took part in the meeting.
At the end of September, the Third World Kazakh Kurultai (Congress), in the work of which President Nazarbaev took part, was held in Astana. More than 300 delegates from 32 countries of the Near and Far Abroad came to the congress, including from China, Austria, Norway, the Czech Republic, Italy, Singapore, and Egypt.
On 8 October, an international symposium called Kazakhstan—Strengthening International Cooperation for Peace and Security was held in Ust-Kamenogorsk with the participation of Kazakhstan President Nazarbaev. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Pierre Lellouche, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan John Ordway, Senator Sam Nann, well-known media magnate and founder of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Ted Turner, and member of this foundation Susan Eisenhower (granddaughter of U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower) also participated in this symposium.
During the year, Kazakhstan continued to act as the center for preparing the Conference for Cooperation and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CCCMA). In mid-December, a meeting of the Special Working Group (SWG) for developing CCCMA confidence-building measures was held in Almaty on economic, humanitarian, and environmental dimensions, as well as regarding the new challenges and threats. Representatives of the member states of this organization also took part in its work. The proposals prepared at the meeting on applying confidence-building measures were consolidated and formed the basis of the report for the Committee of Senior Officials of the CCCMA.
The Election Factor and Kazakhstan’s International Status
At the beginning of the year, a discussion was launched in the country on making changes to the election legislation. This problem immediately acquired a clear international context, in particular, the Permanent Council of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe asked the republic’s leadership to bring the new version of the law into harmony with OSCE standards. As for the U.S., it did not have a monolithic position. A split was designated between the State Department, which in the person of Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Laura Kennedy talked about the succession of Washington’s policy toward Kazakhstan, and Congress, which insists on toughening it up. However, when comparing the thematic data presented by various nongovernmental organizations, on the one hand, and by Kazakhstan officials, on the other, the European Parliament deputies gave preference to the NGO data, which were clearly oppositional. As a result, the European delegates called for closer cooperation with the U.S. in drawing up a joint policy in the Central Asian Region.
In April, a law was adopted in the republic on national security. The West retained its critical attitude toward the measures undertaken by the Kazakhstan leadership in this area. According to the OSCE and the European Commission, corresponding amendments to the country’s legislation might violate human rights, that is, not correspond to the international standards of democracy. Kazakhstan’s intention to chair the OSCE in 2009 was also a reason for pressure. Permanent U.S. representative of this organization made it understood that in return for the privilege of occupying this “chair,” Kazakhstan would have to accelerate political liberalization. In May, foreign representatives participated in a discussion of the draft law on the activity of international NGOs in the republic and the reports of these organizations on corruption and freedom of speech in Kazakhstan.
At the beginning of the summer, the policy of the United States and the West as a whole toward Kazakhstan began to gradually, but very perceptibly, evolve toward a softening of assessments and criticism of the existing regime, in particular, Washington confirmed its course toward retaining good relations with Astana. Condoleezza Rice suggested continuing military aid to Kazakhstan, substantiating her initiative with the interests of U.S. national security.
Nor has China remained a neutral observer of the current events. PRC Chairman Hu Jintao expressed his country’s concern by talking about the right “of nations to choose their own development path.”
But a turning point in election history was the visit by Kazakhstan Foreign Minister Tokaev to the United States in August. By that time, it was known when the presidential election would be held. On 19 August, the Kazakhstan Constitutional Council announced its verdict that it should be held in 2005. In this respect, Condoleezza Rice, as was mentioned above, told head of the Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry that the program of full-scale sociopolitical reforms announced by the Kazakhstan president is an optimal development model for other Central Asian states. The OSCE also changed its view. Its leaders stated that Kazakhstan is striving to establish itself as a democratic state. Representatives of the European Parliament and deputies of the British Parliament and U.S. Congress made similar statements.
On 4 December, the presidential election was held in Kazakhstan, at which the country’s current president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, sustained victory. This election campaign aroused a great international response, more than 1,600 international observers and 400 journalists from 27 countries of the world were present at the election. Numerous representatives from the CIS and SCO noted small technical flaws, but admitted that the presidential election took place at a high organizational level. At the same time, observers from the OSCE pointed out that the election did not meet several obligations within the framework of the OSCE and other international standards of democratic voting.
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