International Conference

«Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, the Present and Prospects for Resolution»

Baku (Azerbaijan) 22-23 October, 2012 and Tbilisi (Georgia) 25-26 October, 2012

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POLITICS

Erbulat SEYLEKHANOV

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Erbulat Seylekhanov, Ph.D. (Political Science), leading analyst at the Investment Profitability Research Agency (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

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The year 2005 marked a turning point in the country’s social and political life: the systemic disproportions between the levels of economic and political changes brought Kazakhstan to a crossroads. For some time the liberalization rates in the economy outstripped the changes in the social and political spheres, which, in turn, created deeply rooted structural contradictions, having a considerable impact on the stability of the state and society. A visible manifestation of these disproportions was the split inside the elite in power, the appearance of a relatively strong (compared with the 1990s) and well-organized opposition, and the more insistent demands for political liberalization and socialization of the state. Due to certain specifics of the country, which is often described as a “super-presidential republic,” the president was the only political entity able to change the situation. For this reason, in anticipation of the upcoming presidential election, government/opposition relations came to the fore in domestic politics in 2005, while sociopolitical organizations were busy drawing up the country’s future strategies.

By early 2005, the political balance was the following: the parliamentary election in the fall of 2004 brought victory to the pro-presidential parties—the Republican Political Party Otan (Fatherland), the Republican Party Asar (All Together), the election bloc AIST (made up of the Civic and Agrarian parties), and the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan. They took nearly all the seats in the parliament. The moderate opposition represented by the Democratic Ak Zhol Party of Kazakhstan (the Road of Light) received one seat, which it declined as a matter of principle (it refused to accept the election results). The radical opposition represented by the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, as well as political organizations of the intermediary type, such as the Patriots’ Party, the Peasant Social-Democratic Auyl Party, the Rukhaniat (Spirituality) Party, and the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan (CPPK), failed to overcome the 7 percent barrier and were left outside the Majilis. Having analyzed the results of the parliamentary election and in view of the upcoming presidential election, nearly all the parties had to think about election blocs. By the beginning of 2005, three camps had already formed.

In the absence of a common organizational structure, the pro-presidential parties closed ranks around President Nazarbaev who, in 2004, made public his intention to run for a third term. For obvious reasons these parties had the administrative resource at their disposal, money and the media included, and their own organizational potential. The traditionally Oriental respect for state power was on their side as well. It can be said that the pro-presidential camp demonstrated relative unity of its ranks and its ideologies.

Irritated with the results of the 2004 parliamentary elections, the moderate political opponents of the government joined forces with the radical opponents by setting up a Coordinating Council of the Democratic Forces of Kazakhstan (CCDFK) to nominate a single presidential candidate. In this way, the CCDFK concentrated considerable financial and information resources, yet the amorphous nature of the new structure and its inability to work together considerably undermined the bloc.

Two intermediary structures (the Patriots’ Party and the Peasant Social-Democratic Auyl Party) preferred to wait and see, while the other two (the Rukhaniat and the CPPK) moved in opposite directions. The Rukhaniat supported the president, while the CPPK was in opposition to all: they obviously could not join the presidential campaign on their own.

By the beginning of 2005, the not entirely aboveboard parliamentary election of 2004 somewhat lowered the rating of the pro-presidential forces. According to certain sociological polls, at the turn of 2005, President Nazarbaev’s rating dropped to 50-55 percent; according to E. Ertysbaev, the president’s advisor for political issues, by early 2005, Nazarbaev had no more than 4 million staunch supporters (slightly more than 40 percent of the total number of 8,949,199 voters). In this way, early in 2005 President Nazarbaev’s victory at the upcoming presidential election was far from assured, which presupposed uncompromising rivalry.

Under these conditions, the authorities had to work out their election strategy to score an obvious, on the one side, and legitimate, on the other, victory over the opposition. Finally, it was decided to attract the electorate through wide-scale social programs (housing, higher wages, pensions, scholarships, state allowances, broader privileges in medical services and education, etc.) coupled with fairly severe confrontation with the radical opposition, the People’s Party Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (PP DCK) in the first place. The lessons of the Color Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine were obviously taken into account. The authorities decided to snatch the initiative from their opponents, weaken them organizationally, put up legal barriers to keep “revolutionary” sentiments and actions in check, and create a comfortable information agenda and conditions to carry out the election campaign. The people on top counted on international support.

On 6 January, 2005, the people in power made the first move: the Bostandyk Inter-District Specialized Economic Court of Almaty resorted to compulsory liquidation of the PP DCK; on 9 February, the decision was supported by the Almaty City Court. The case initiated by the city public prosecutor’s office was based on the statement issued by the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan of 12 December, 2004 which mentioned the possibility of calling to civil disobedience as a form of mass protest. The court decision elicited a sharply negative response from the majority of political entities at home and a negative reaction abroad. The analysts easily saw through the case: the authorities were resolved to remove all the radical forces from the political scene as a preventive measure to avoid the “Ukrainian scenario.” The court decision was also intended to warn the opposition that the authorities would not allow it to destabilize the situation: civil disobedience and political criticism of the regime were described as destabilization steps. This also explains the court actions brought late in 2004 and in January 2005 against Z. Nurkadilov, one of the most vehement enemies of the ruling top, as well as two opposition papers—Soz and Kazakhstan. At the same time, the authorities brought pressure on the Soros-Kazakhstan Fund, the founder of which was closely associated with the Color Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. In this way, from the very beginning of the year, the regime outlined the space for “manageable democracy,” within which all the political forces were allowed to act.

Compulsory liquidation of the PP DCK yielded several political results. First, it was no longer possible to hold a dialog between the authorities and the opposition: with one of the key opposition parties removed from the scene, the other opposition parties found such contacts impossible. Second, in the absence of the possibility of entering into a dialog with the country’s leaders, the republic’s political forces polarized, thus sending social tension up. Third, the too harsh court decision in relation to one opposition party radicalized the moderate opposition.

Later events, however, demonstrated that by liquidating the PP DCK the authorities acquired certain advantages. On the one hand, the demonstration of force drove some of the less confirmed supporters from the opposition; on the other, radicalization of several leaders of the Ak Zhol Party caused a split in its ranks in February. The split created two political organizations (the Democratic Ak Zhol Party and the still unregistered Genuine Ak Zhol Party) which began a squabble over the party brand, its property, and ideology. The formerly strong political organization with a very good future was as good as dead.

Against the background of the crisis in the opposition’s ranks, President Nazarbaev made another move. On 18 February, he made public his Address to the Nation for 2005, in which he offered a medium-term strategy and attractive promises in the social sphere, some of them earmarked for realization in the same year. These included: in the economic sphere—clusters, support of small and medium businesses, and development of a competitive environment; in the political sphere—adoption of a National Program of corresponding changes, wider functions of judicial structures based on the Constitution’s potential, decentralization of executive power, court reform, and broader democratic rights and freedoms; in the social sphere—higher wages for those earning wages and salaries from the budget (by 32 percent on average), higher pensions (by 3,000 tenges), higher scholarships (2-fold), and higher state allowances (from 1,000 to 4,000 tenges), free medicine and privileges for children, teenagers, and pregnant women (some medical services), as well as realization of the first stage of a state housing program ($350 per sq m of housing).

The propaganda campaign that followed and involved all the state structures and the media, the exact time-span for implementing the program, and the scale of its social component suggested that the presidential election would take place as early as 2005. (The year 2006 was also discussed as an option.) The energetic efforts under the national security banner to push away undesirable opposition organizations and create a legal framework beyond which political activities were prohibited clearly indicated that the next election campaign was around the corner. Not satisfied with the already mentioned liquidation of the PP DCK, the authorities initiated court cases against several opposition newspapers (Soz, Zhuma-Times, DATa nedeli, Ak Zhol Kazakhstan, Dauys DVK): some of them were closed, others barely escaped. Later, this became a norm. Z. Nurkadilov, a prominent opposition member, and several PP DCK regional leaders attracted more than the usual attention. In addition, on 9 February the parliament adopted two laws directly related to national security issues on Opposing Extremist Activities and on Amending and Changing Certain Legal Acts Related to Opposing Extremist Activities. Some of the local and international human rights organizations supported by ODIHR/OSCE and the Permanent Council of the European Union criticized the newly adopted laws and pointed out, in particular, that their vague wording might cause “arbitrariness in decision-making and ambiguity when ensuring national security” and “violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms.”

In view of the above and taking into account expert opinions, the opposition, in turn, launched hasty preparations for the presidential race. It started in February, long before the official beginning, the country’s political actors concentrating on the election campaign.

It should be added that this affected different forces in different ways: while the pro-presidential forces closed ranks, the opposition, as became evident in March, began with settling scores and parting ways.

The republic’s leaders concentrated on purely pragmatic tasks: the people obviously preferred practical results to ideological statements. The government, and all the other power branches, set about creating a mechanism designed to realize the February Address to the Nation. After calculating that the country needed another 100 billion tenges to live up to what the social bloc of the Address promised, the cabinet started looking for additional funding sources and specified other propositions of the presidential Address. The parliament correlated its agenda accordingly. The authorities took measures to prevent the opposition from exploiting the most painful social sores (corruption, human rights, and political reforms) in its interests. As a first step in this direction, the Agency for Fighting Economic Crimes and Corruption was reassigned to the president by a presidential decree of 2 March to upgrade its status and make it independent. The president also met ombudsman B. Baykadamov. Pressure on the opposition press and members of the radical opposition continued—in other words, the authorities emerged as a closely knit organization firmly resolved to support their leader.

The opposition camp was in disarray: by the end of February the squabbles in the Ak Zhol Party reached their peak, making a split imminent. It was extremely important for the opposition to close ranks around a single presidential candidate, a task which was set in the fall of 2004 in the wake of the parliamentary election. This was not done for several reasons, the most important of them being that the 5th Congress of the Ak Zhol Party, which took place in Astana on 13 March, changed leaders. There were no longer cochairmen, while A. Baymenov was elected the only chairman. This not only meant a split, but also spoke of the new party leaders’ fundamentally different approach to a single opposition bloc.

While not rejecting outright the idea of cooperation with other opposition structures, primarily with the CCDFK, Baymenov’s supporters wanted the party to run the race on its own with A. Baymenov as a presidential candidate.

The authorities undoubtedly profited from the lack of unity in the opposition ranks on the eve of the decisive battle for the highest post in the country. The split in Ak Zhol and the year-long information war between the former co-chairmen cost the party some of its members, both moderate and radical, and some of the potential votes.

It was precisely the split in Ak Zhol and the following events that forced the CCDFK to speed up the process of nominating a single opposition candidate. The process ended on 20 March when Zharmakhan Tuiakbay, the CCDFK chairman, was chosen as this candidate, the decision being the result of the first congress of the new public election bloc For a Fair Kazakhstan made up of the Communist Party, the radical wing of Ak Zhol, and supporters of the banned Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan Party.

The events in Kyrgyzstan which brought down President Akaev sent tension up; duly impressed, the united opposition in Kazakhstan finally opted for a non-conformist approach to the regime change. Together with the calls for fair and honest elections within the laws, an opinion was voiced that the “Ukrainian scenario” would be acceptable if the opposition did not agree with the election results. The opposition’s radical part hastened to create an adequate organizational basis in the form of their parties’ structures under new names: PP DCK-PP Alga, DCK!, Ak Zhol-Genuine Ak Zhol.

Having analyzed the events in Ukraine and neighboring Kyrgyzstan, the leaders of Kazakhstan found an adequate response to their own opposition: early in April, the parliament passed a draft Law on Amending and Changing the Constitutional Law on Elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, some time later endorsed by the president to prevent political destabilization during the election campaign. The law banned mass rallies, processions, demonstrations, and all other forms of public actions organized by the candidates or the parties which nominated their presidential candidates for the period between the end of the election campaign and the day the official results were made public. Another amendment, which made it possible to shift the date parliament announced as election day from the second Sunday of August to the first Sunday of September, meant that the time for the election campaign was reduced to six weeks and was also beneficial to the authorities. The Law on Amending and Changing Certain Legal Acts of the RK Related to National Security Issues, also hastily passed in May, limited unsanctioned election propaganda; it also established stricter regulation of activities of international and religious organizations, as well as of local political parties and the media.

In June, the parliament passed two other draft laws in the national security sphere to improve the regulation of activities of republican and international NGOs and their branches on the territory of Kazakhstan. These documents were severely criticized by the Kazakhstani and international public, while the authorities explained their appearance by the potential destabilizing effect of the Andizhan events of 13-14 May in neighboring Uzbekistan. If endorsed by the president, these draft laws would have allowed the state to establish practically complete control over the religious organizations and NGOs operating in Kazakhstan; the laws would oblige them, in particular, to register and supply financial reports. However, public protests, including those of the Asar Party, as well as the threat that many of the NGOs would join the opposition, forced President Nazarbaev to veto the draft laws and, late in August, to reject them. This decision was based on the opinion of the RK Constitutional Council, which ruled that the laws contradicted the Constitution.

A discussion in the parliament and the media to decide the date for the presidential election was another milestone of June 2005. In view of the disagreements among lawyers and the state structures (the Central Election Commission and the Ministry of Justice), it was decided to send an inquiry to the RK Constitutional Council. It was submitted on 7 July; a week before that, on 1 July, wages, pensions, and scholarships were raised according to the promises made in the 2005 Address to the Nation. This meant that the date had been settled at the political level and only required formal confirmation. On 19 August, the Constitutional Council discussed the inquiry and concluded that the election should be held in 2005. On 7 September, the Majilis set the date—4 December; and the nomination process began accordingly on 7 September. There were 18 candidates; the president enjoyed the greatest support among them. In September, six pro-presidential parties (Otan, the Civil and Agrarian parties, Asar, the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, and Rukhaniat) nominated Nursultan Nazarbaev for president at their congresses and later formed an election bloc called the People’s Coalition of Kazakhstan. Trade unions and many public organizations supported the president at their congresses. On 16 September, the Republican Public Headquarters in support of this candidate was set up to coordinate the election campaign.

Starting on 25 October, all registered candidates (five out of the original eighteen: E. Abylkasymov, A. Baymenov, M. Eleusizov, N. Nazarbaev, and Zh. Tuiakbay) were allowed to launch their election campaigns. The RK Central Election Commission weeded out 13 candidates at the registration stage: 4 of them failed the state language exam, 6 candidates failed to gather all the necessary documents, while 2 candidates quit the race for their own reasons.

The race, which started late in October, went relatively peacefully due to the fact that the radical opposition operated within the law (the Ministry of Justice registered its election bloc For a Fair Kazakhstan on time, while the CEC registered Zh. Tuiakbay as presidential candidate); the presidential decree of 9 September On the Measures to Realize the Rights of RK Citizens to Free, Fair, and Competitive Elections also played its positive role. The candidates largely kept within the law, while the official structures responsible for the election did their best to ensure equal rights for all candidates. They were given time on radio and TV, space in the republican newspapers, as well as advertising room in special places. On 17 November, the candidates (with the exception of Nazarbaev, who was in Ukraine on an official visit) met for televised debates. The lull was broken once: on 13 November Z. Nurkadilov, one of the president’s fiercest opponents, was found dead in his home. Late in December, the investigation concluded that he had committed suicide. Wide-scale, but not always justified, use of administrative resources added some tension.

The election of 4 December concluded the political season of 2005. According to the RK CEC, the votes were distributed in the following way: N. Nazarbaev, 91.15 percent of the votes; Zh. Tuiakbay, 6.61 percent; A. Baymenov, 1.61 percent; E. Abylkasymov, 0.35 percent; and M. Eleusizov, 0.28 percent. There was obviously no need for a second round.

According to experts, Nursultan Nazarbaev’s success was predetermined by a number of objective and subjective reasons: the relative social and economic well-being of the local population (especially when compared with the other Central Asian countries), responsible for the conservative choice; the economic upsurge and related optimistic expectations; and the established idea about the president as a guarantor of political stability. The February Address to the Nation and its realization played an important role; the candidate of power was also supported by administrative, organizational, financial, and media resources, which made it possible to consolidate efforts. Nazarbaev’s program was more specific and more impressive than those of his opponents. On top of this, the political technologies his team used allowed him to steadily increase his rating. The opposition, on the other hand, failed to realize its potential, partly because the large-scale brainwashing of the nation in favor of the president discouraged those who planned to vote for the opposition—some of them even refused to come to the polling stations. The fact that there were two opposition candidates also played its negative role; the opposition made a major strategic mistake by relying on the protest electorate, which was obviously in minority. All the attempts of the president’s opponents to contest the election results (they brought over 1,000 claims to courts of various instances about violations of the election laws) could not deprive the president of his victory. Numerous foreign and Kazakhstani observers confirmed the legitimacy of the election campaign. They pointed out that the violations were mainly limited to the election process and only partly to the election results.

It should be said that in 2005 the presidential race was not the only election event; on 12 August, experimental elections of the district akims took place, followed on 19 August by elections to the Senate. With the help of the administrative resource, all unwanted candidates were skillfully removed from the race—in this way, the pro-government candidates scored easy victories. What remained of the opposition was removed from the Senate; the results of the local elections were also predictable. It was the deputies of the district maslikhats who voted at the elections, while the people not supposed to be involved showed little interest in the process.

By way of summary, it should be said that 2005 was rich in political events; its main result was the choice of the evolutionary advance toward democracy the nation made at the presidential election. The configuration of the republic’s political forces changed during the year. The Asar Party headed by the president’s daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva came to the fore in the country’s party and political system. Her party became the main strategic partner of the president’s party Otan by moving aside two previous strategic partners, the Civil and the Agrarian parties. The very fact that the People’s Coalition of Kazakhstan (PCK) was preserved after the election—on 6 December, the leaders of the involved parties set up a Democratic Union as the PCK coordinating structure—means that the ruling elite plans to act together during the reforms. The opposition parties—the Genuine Ak Zhol and Alga!—failed to obtain registration with the Ministry of Justice, which means that a government/opposition dialog will not take place in the near future. We can expect, however, that a new party, the Republican Ecological Party Menin Kazakhstanym (My Kazakhstan) headed by M. Duambekov and K. Satypaldy, Nazarbaev’s nephew, will emerge on the scene. It held its constituent congress on 16 December. Youth and national-patriotic movements which have already set up public and political structures became much more active. The National Commission for Democratization and Civil Society has done a good job. It serves as the main structure within which the parties (with the exception of the opposition parties) can work on a program of political reforms. The State Commission for Drafting a National Program of Economic Reforms, working under the president, will specify their content.

On the whole, the trend toward change in 2005 was obvious, which means that the country is moving toward a new and challenging stage of political transformation.