International Conference

«Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, the Present and Prospects for Resolution»

Baku (Azerbaijan) 22-23 October, 2012 and Tbilisi (Georgia) 25-26 October, 2012

---

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Archil GEGESHIDZE

---

Archil Gegeshidze, Ph.D. (Geogr.), Senior Fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (Tbilisi, Georgia)

---

2005 saw the onset of a geopolitical shift in Georgia’s most recent history. The country began making efforts to reach a qualitatively new level of development, entailing continuous economic modernization and bringing the country’s political system into harmony with the Western model of democracy. The mid-term strategic goal to be reached by the next presidential term (2009-2014) is to achieve macroeconomic indices which will ensure territorially reunited Georgia the status of an upper-middle-income country (according to the World Bank ratings),¹ while institutionally the republic should integrate into the Western structures, particularly NATO. What is more, it is understood that joining the European Union, in contrast to joining the North Atlantic Alliance, will hinge to a lesser extent on the changes in geopolitical conditions and achieving the level of the Copenhagen criteria will be a challenging task.²

This prospect may seem rather too ambitious to the minds of Western observers, but the country’s authorities are zealously raising the population’s hopes of reaching the indicated goals, and consequently many are inclined to believe that they can indeed be achieved.

Foreign Policy

The country’s foreign policy reference points have not changed, since in the past they were basically defined correctly and subsequently have been based on public consensus. I am talking about Georgia’s pro-Western policy, which is inspired by the striving to: (a) achieve a rational balance of resources among the participants in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflict-settlement process by increasing the West’s role and reducing Russia’s dominating role; (b) integrate into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures; (c) make full use of transit potential; (d) attract primarily Western investments; and (d) further intensify relations with the U.S. in political and economic spheres, as well as in security.

Admittedly, in 2004, the new political elite came up with the illusionary idea of combining the pro-Western vector of development with improvement of relations with Russia. At that time, the Georgian leadership called on the Russian Federation “to start relations all over again from scratch.” It is to the new government’s credit that it rather quickly understood how pointless it was to hope that Russia would voluntarily reject its plans to prevent the West from penetrating into the Southern Caucasus as a result of “Georgia’s surrender to NATO and the EU.” After freeing itself from this illusion, official Tbilisi was able to take sober stock of the situation and begin implementing a principled foreign policy with respect to the Russian Federation.

Relations with Russia

The content and nature of the issues on the agenda indicate unequivocally the unfriendliness, to put it mildly, of the relations between Georgia and Russia, since unresolved problems prevail over issues which have been resolved on a mutually advantageous basis. The most urgent of them is Russia’s lack of desire to take a constructive approach to the settlement of the ethnopolitical conflicts in Georgia’s territory and its continuing attempts to duck out of the obligations assumed under the OSCE Istanbul Agreement on the withdrawal of its military bases from Georgia. After the Rose Revolution, the Georgian government, enjoying the West’s, and particularly the U.S.’s,³ unprecedented blessing, placed its stakes on a policy of diplomatic coercion, including with respect to Russia’s fulfillment of its obligations under the Istanbul Agreement. As a result of this, the Russian Federation adopted a decision to start withdrawing its bases (the first batch of weapons has already been sent to Russia, and the entire process is to be completed by 2008).⁴ If official Moscow indeed fulfills all of its obligations in this sphere, it will be gratifying to say that one of the main thorns in bilateral relations has been removed.

However, the decision on the military bases was not enough to improve these relations in general. The main problem—Russia’s lack of desire to assist in real settlement of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia—continued to make its presence known and required even greater efforts from the Georgian government. A decision was adopted to ensure Russia’s constructive participation in unfreezing the conflict settlement process, particularly in South Ossetia.⁵ With the corresponding support of the international community, which approved the Peace Plan put forward by the Georgian leaders on settlement of the conflict in South Ossetia,⁶ Georgia managed once again to incline Moscow toward supporting this initiative. However, the Russian Federation tried to make adjustments to the overall process in order not to lose control over the situation, in response to which official Tbilisi tried to reduce Russia’s influence by raising the question of the expediency of continuing the peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the current format. In particular, the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution which said that if the Russian side did not take measures to increase the efficiency of the peacekeeping operations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the question of curtailing them should be raised.⁷

Incidentally, Russia is always trying to do Georgia a bad turn. Along with the Russian Federation’s well-known policy in the conflict zones and the visa system it recently introduced, in November it placed an embargo on Georgian agricultural products, primarily on citrus fruits. Its intentions are clear, but not entirely understandable with respect to the political significance of this step—while the processing industry responds to what is going on and readjusts, the Georgian farmer will suffer.

The consequences of Gazprom’s (read Russia’s) decision in mid-December to hike up the price of natural gas could be much more serious.⁸ Taking into account the well-known gas conflict with Ukraine at the end of 2005-beginning of 2006, this decision casts aspersions on Russia’s reliability as a supplier of energy resources. In all likelihood, the Russian Federation is planning to make ever frequent use of levers of economic pressure in its relations with Georgia. Along with possibly repeating its economic sabotage by halting the supply of gas at the drop of a hat, it could also further hike up the price for fuel, which it will justify as being caused by the “laws of the market.”

Cooperation with the U.S.

In 2005, relations with the United States acquired all the features of strategic partnership. Based on the growing compatibility of democratic values and the coincidence of strategic interests in the region, they have reached a qualitatively new level, which was shown in particular by the U.S. president’s visit to Georgia on 9-10 May. The main feature of these relations is the fact that they are no longer strictly humanitarian, but have acquired the nature of systemic support of the development course chosen by official Tbilisi.

In the 2005 fiscal year, Georgia continued to be one of the top per capita recipients of U.S. government aid (a total of $138.9 million). These funds were used not only to develop democratic institutions and implement economic and social programs, but also to continue cooperation in military-building.⁹ In particular, a new program called Sustainment and Stability Operations has begun, one of the important aspects of which is to further bring the Georgian armed forces into harmony with NATO standards.

Talks ended on determining investment programs under the Millennium Challenge Account initiative. Based on the priorities proposed by Georgia, four major projects were identified for a total of $297 million. These projects, which are to begin in 2006, mainly relate to assisting economic growth and the construction and/or rehabilitation of infrastructure.

An important element of political support by the U.S. is intensification of the American-Russian dialog on Georgia’s security problems. This is largely what prompted the withdrawal of the Russian military bases from Georgia to begin.

Tbilisi, in turn, helped the United States by dramatically increasing the size of its peacekeeping contingent in Iraq. In terms of per capita involvement, Georgia, with 850 soldiers and officers, has become the second largest sponsor in the coalition.

Relations with NATO and the European Union

The European and Euro-Atlantic vectors remained dominating in Georgia’s foreign policy. The main efforts were aimed at implementing the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), that is, a program for modernizing the country, particularly its armed forces, coordinated with NATO. In keeping with the integration strategy in the Alliance and on the basis of a positive assessment of the implementation of the IPAP, Georgia will most likely be asked to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) before the end of 2006. In this respect, attention was focused on creating an efficient management mechanism for implementing the IPAP. For this purpose, a mechanism for coordinating and monitoring implementation of the IPAP was created, the main elements of which are a corresponding state commission headed by the prime minister and an interdepartmental coordinating state commission for realizing Georgia’s priorities during integration into NATO and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).¹⁰ Incidentally, a special NATO commission gave a positive assessment of the reforms carried out within the IPAP.

Further rapprochement and eventual integration into the EU are of equal importance. But since possible membership in the European Union is still somewhere beyond the horizon, the intensity and dimensions of activity in this area fell short of the efforts made to fulfill the obligations under the IPAP. Nevertheless, the government carried out the necessary preparatory work for beginning talks on the action plan within the framework of the ENP. On 2 March, the European Commission published its Country Report on Georgia,¹¹ after which preparations began for the talks. In particular, proposals were drawn up on the priority areas in the corresponding vectors. The main priorities for the near future are to ensure active involvement of the EU in political settlement of the conflicts. Important mid-term areas are rehabilitating the energy and transport infrastructure, as well as activating the Four Freedoms principle.¹²

The sides agreed that the first round of the talks held on 29-30 November was on the whole successful.

Relations with the Regional Countries

In the regional dimension, Georgia’s foreign policy activity was dynamic as usual, although the focus and intensity of contacts were largely determined every time by the changes in the political environment. Over the past ten years, due to the energy corridor being built through the Southern Caucasus, in particular the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Georgia’s cooperation with Azerbaijan has developed into a strategic partnership, which was promoted by their historical closeness, the friendship between their political leaders, and other factors. And since the energy corridor will retain its region-forming significance, these relations will continue to be strategic in the future. What is more, after the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku Rail Corridor are launched, bilateral relations will strengthen even more.

In addition, after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, this country acquired a special strategic significance for Georgia. Ukraine is an ideal partner for Georgia as they head toward NATO and the EU. This explains the perceptible intensification of bilateral relations aimed at coordinating efforts to implement the strategy for integrating into these structures. The jointly initiated Community of Democratic Choice is a vibrant example. On the whole, in 2005, Ukrainian-Georgian relations were the most dynamic in Georgia’s bilateral contacts with the post-Soviet states.

The agenda of bilateral relations with Turkey did not undergo any significant changes. The main issues were still building oil and gas pipelines, as well as preparations for building the Kars-Akhalkalaki railroad. An important indication of the growing trust and closeness between the neighboring nations was the agreement reached on eliminating the visa regime beginning in January 2006.

Relations with Armenia have always been civil and imbued with a feeling of mutual respect. The main questions of bilateral cooperation are traditionally related to transport and power engineering. What is more, the year was designated by a significant increase in tourists from Armenia to Georgia, whereby in the near future, this trend is expected to increase even more. It should also be noted that Armenia’s investors are showing an interest in Ajaria’s recreation and transport infrastructure.

Further activation was noted in relations with Rumania. After Rumania and Bulgaria join the EU in 2007, the Black Sea will become a European sea, and Georgia will directly border on the European Union. In this context, expanding comprehensive cooperation with these countries is acquiring increasing significance for Georgia. It is worth noting that in 2005, the Rumanian president came to Georgia twice.

In April, a GUAM summit was held in Kishinev, at which a Declaration “In the Name of Democracy, Stability, and Development” was adopted in the presence of the Lithuanian and Rumanian presidents, who were invited to attend. This declaration stated the Organization members’ willingness for the first time in history to cooperate in the military-political sphere, including in peacekeeping operations. It is believed that as a new vision forms of the strategic significance of the Black Sea Region with respect to security in the Euro-Atlantic space, interest in GUAM will significantly increase.

International Activity

There can be no doubt that main event in the state’s international life was U.S. President George Bush’s visit to Georgia. First of all, this visit showed that the U.S. recognizes the importance of the democratic changes which have begun in the country. Second, Russia was shown that the democratic community was taking Georgia under its wing. Third, the visit prompted donor countries and international organizations to reconsider, in terms of increasing, the amounts of technical and other aid they are granting Georgia.

The beginning of withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory was also of historical significance. This process is mainly important for the fact that its completion will also signify the end of the “Russian boot” era in Georgia. Along with reinforcing the country’s sovereignty and security, it will also have a moral and psychological effect on the nation.

The launching of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is definitely one of the most important events of the year. It is not only significant because of its pioneering nature (it will be followed by a gas pipeline of no less political and economic significance), but also because its launching symbolizes the strong solidarity among three friendly states and nations in the name of victory in a complicated geopolitical game.

The Georgian president’s initiative in January at the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly on peaceful settlement of the conflict in South Ossetia helped to get things moving again. Soon thereafter a three-stage plan was drawn up, which needed international support to be successfully implemented. To the credit of Georgian diplomacy, this support has now essentially been forthcoming. The next task is to put it into action.

In August, in the town of Borzhomi, the Georgian and Ukrainian presidents came forward with a proposal to create a Community of Democratic Choice, which aroused an immediate international response. This structure was created at a founding session organized in December in Kiev, and at that time comprised of Georgia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Rumania, Moldova, Slovenia, and Macedonia.

The beginning of the talks on the ENP Action Plan was also a significant event of the year, as well as the meetings between representatives of the Georgian government and the European Union. Despite the fact that the noted events were only the start of a larger process, they mark the beginning of an important stage in Georgian-EU relations.

Along with this, the year was marked by an unprecedented number of visits by high-ranking delegations of many countries and international organizations, in particular by the U.N. Secretary General, and the presidents of Armenia, Latvia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Finland, Lithuania, Rumania, and Estonia.

The country’s dynamic international life also consisted of conferences and seminars, the number of which was much higher than in the previous period. Among the most important, we will note the international conference called “The Southern Caucasus in the 21st Century,” which was held by the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies with the support of the Japanese Sasakawa Peace Foundation. This was the first large conference on the Southern Caucasus held in the region, which gathered around 150 participants from 34 countries.

The “New Wave of European Liberation: Democracy and Transformation” forum held in Tbilisi with the participation of the Georgian, Ukrainian, Estonian, and Rumanian presidents coincided with the second anniversary of the Rose Revolution.

International Image

The country’s international image generally remained positive largely due to the revolutionary events of 2003. What is more, the reforms in certain sectors of the economy and political life, as well as the events mentioned above made a significant contribution to preserving Georgia’s growing reputation. What is more, international organizations provide interesting information for synthesis and corresponding evaluations which do not always please the patriotic fanatic or self-satisfied bureaucrat. We will present a brief review.

The Council of Europe.¹³ In general, large-scale and long-term reforms have been set on the right track. Georgia deserves praise for the first tangible results in the fight against corruption. The Assembly welcomes the adoption, in cooperation with the Council of Europe, of a Strategy and an Action Plan for the fight against corruption. However, most reforms are still at the very beginning, and much still remains to be done to bring legislation in line with European standards. Not all the European charters and conventions have been signed or ratified, nor have several recommendations from the former resolution (1415) been executed.

International Religious Freedom Report.¹⁴ After the Rose Revolution, the status of religious freedom improved. Attacks on religious minorities, including violence, verbal harassment, and disruption of services and meetings, decreased, but instances still occur. The U.S. leaders repeatedly raised their concern about the mentioned incidents with the country’s leaders, in particular with President Mikhail Saakashvili, senior government officials, and members of parliament.

Freedom House.¹⁵ As a result of the Rose Revolution, the political rights rating improved by one point and is equal to 3; the civil liberties rating amounts to a “4.” The country’s status remains the same: “partly free.” Freedom of confession is largely respected, but there are still certain problems with holding assemblies of representatives of non-traditional religions; under the former political regime, the press enjoyed more freedom. Now signs of inhibition and self-censorship are seen; jurisdiction is not entirely free, courts regularly feel pressure from executive power.

Human Rights Watch.¹⁶ Since the Rose Revolution at the end of 2003, the government has had an uneven record on human rights. In 2005, it continued to prioritize its campaign against corruption and for territorial integrity. Its ambitious reform agenda is supported by the international community. However, at times it carries out reforms hastily, without broad and open consultation and without the thoroughness or detail necessary to eradicate entrenched human rights problems.

Transparency International.¹⁷ The corruption perceptions index (CPI) improved slightly compared with the previous year. On a 10-point scale, the new index amounts to 2.3 (compared to 2 in 2004), which made it possible for Georgia to raise its position from 136th to 133rd (out of 138 countries). The CPI is a “survey of surveys” which reflects the perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts (both foreign and those who represent the countries themselves).

World Competitiveness Report.¹⁸ This is an annual report of the World Economic Forum reflecting indices of competitiveness of 117 national economies. In 2004 Georgia was included in this report for the first time, so it is now possible to make the first comparison. In the table presented below, a certain amount of progress can clearly be seen:

Ranking in 2005	Points in 2005	Ranking in 2004	Change in Ranking
86	3.25	94	+8

Standard&Poor’s International Rating Agency.¹⁹ Georgia obtained an improved long-term credit rating compared with the last period of “B+”, which enhances the country’s reputation in the eyes of its potential investors.

Economic Freedom Index.²⁰ This index, which is drawn up every year by the U.S. Heritage Foundation, is an important indicator for businessmen and investors. For the first time in the 11 years of observations, Georgia obtained 2.98 points, which made it possible for it to occupy 68th place and gain the status of a “mostly free” country. If we keep in mind that certain parameters, for example, the level of economic regulation, were taken from 2004 when the reforms in this sphere had only just begun, Georgia objectively deserves a higher position.

* * *

In spite of all the possible shortcomings in the methodology used by the above organizations to evaluate the situation, other international structures, for example, NATO and the European Union, as well as individual countries and business communities take heed of their opinion. Consequently, these and other resolutions, reports, and indices are of primary importance for forming the country’s international image. A quick analysis of the information presented makes it possible to conclude that on the whole Georgia’s international reputation is on the rise, but certain “defects” remain. Consequently, corresponding conclusions should be drawn.

By Way of Summary

So it can be stated that from the viewpoint of international affairs, 2005 was the most productive year of the recent past.

The main tasks posed and carried out were mainly related to Russia, the conflict in South Ossetia, and integration into NATO and the EU. These areas were all characterized by a dynamic, targeted, and principled approach.

Observers noted the country’s continued inclination toward the West, whereby it retained the geopolitical reference points it chose in the past. The country is moving toward NATO and the EU at a much more intensive and faster rate. At the same time, Georgia’s striving to move closer to Ukraine, as well as to other countries of the Black Sea and Baltic regions, than to the South Caucasian countries, is becoming more obvious. In this respect, the Baltic countries have been particularly active in rendering moral and political support to Georgia and, just as important, in sharing their experience regarding nation-building and integration into Western institutions.

Against this background, certain changes are noted in Russian-Georgian relations. Georgia’s fidelity to its principles and at times lack of compromise in issues to which Russia is sensitive is making the expert community worry about Russia’s likely undesirable response. This applies in particular to the possible escalation in tension in the event of withdrawal of the peacekeeping forces from the conflict zones.

All the same, if the main trends of the year continue, the noted geopolitical shift will become irreversible, which in the near future will give Georgia the reputation of a democratic and stable state.

---

¹ In an interview with Russia’s RTV on 17 December, 2005, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli said that the current rates of the country’s economic development will continue and in 6-7 years, it will be on a par with Russia in terms of per capita GNP. _{Back to text}
² See: S. Kapanadze, “The Paths to Europe,” 24 Hours, No. 26, 9 April, 2004. _{Back to text}
³ As early as the 1990s, the Georgian authorities tried to convince their Western partners to actively cooperate with Russia in order to incline it in favor of a constructive peacekeeping process. The insufficient support rendered to Georgia by its Western partners during conflict settlement allowed the Russian Federation to shy away from carrying out its obligations as an unbiased mediator and conduct a policy aimed at freezing the settlement process. What is more, elements of so-called creeping annexation of the conflict zone were clearly seen in its actions. Only after the Rose Revolution were issues regarding overall security in Georgia, and problems of conflict settlement in particular regularly placed on the agenda of relations with official Moscow. This is being done most frequently within the U.S.-Russia dialog. _{Back to text}
⁴ On 10 March, the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution On Military Bases of the Russian Federation Located on the Territory of Georgia, according to which the Georgian government held talks on and coordinated the deadlines for withdrawal of the bases with Russia. Available at [http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=98&info_id=944]. _{Back to text}
⁵ To unfreeze the conflict settlement process the conflict in South Ossetia, it was suggested a settlement plan be drawn up and the existing conditions of the peacekeeping operation changed. _{Back to text}
⁶ The Peace Plan was drawn up on an initiative put forward by the Georgian president on 26 January at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and supported by the OSCE, EU, U.S. (see, for example, Senate Resolution 344), and others. Available at [www.president.gov.ge/others/initru.htm]. _{Back to text}
⁷ Resolution of the Georgian parliament of 11 On Current Situation in the Conflict Regions on the Territory of Georgia and Ongoing Peace Operations. Available at [http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=98&info_id=7268]. _{Back to text}
⁸ Beginning on 1 January, 2006, the price for the gas delivered to Georgia was raised from $62.5 to $110. Despite the fact that the decision to raise the price of Russian gas was also made for other countries, this is no comfort to Georgia. _{Back to text}
⁹ Within the framework of the Train and Equip program completed in 2004, four infantry battalions, one mechanized battalion, as well as an armored company were trained. _{Back to text}
¹⁰ The commission is headed by the state minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. _{Back to text}
¹¹ Available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/country/georgia_cr_0503.pdf]. _{Back to text}
¹² The Four Freedoms principle means free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. _{Back to text}
¹³ From Resolution 1477 (2006) of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. _{Back to text}
¹⁴ International Religious Freedom Report 2005. Report prepared by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (U.S.). _{Back to text}
¹⁵ Freedom House is a prestigious nongovernmental organization called upon to assist the advance of democracy and economic freedom by means of different programs and publications, in particular, reports on the level of democratic freedoms in 192 countries. Available at [www.freedomhouse.org]. _{Back to text}
¹⁶ Human Rights Watch World Report 2006. _{Back to text}
¹⁷ Available at [http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005]. _{Back to text}
¹⁸ Available at [http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/Growth+Competitiveness+Index+rankings+2005+ and+2004+comparisons]. _{Back to text}
¹⁹ Available at [http://www2.standardandpoors.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=sp/Page/IndicesMainPg&r=1&l=EN&b=4]. _{Back to text}
²⁰ Available at [http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/]. _{Back to text}