International Conference
«Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, the Present and Prospects for Resolution»
Baku (Azerbaijan) 22-23 October, 2012 and Tbilisi (Georgia) 25-26 October, 2012
GENERAL OVERVIEW
Agasi ENOKIAN
Agasi Enokian, Assistant professor at the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Erevan State University (Erevan, Armenia)
Armenia acquired its state independence in 1991 at the same time as the country became embroiled in the struggle for Karabakh’s self-determination. This is why the Karabakh problem always features among all the domestic political, economic, and security-related difficulties characteristic of the transition period. And 2005 was no exception. The Karabakh problem made a significant impact on foreign policy, while it also had an immense effect on domestic policy.
Another important aspect of the political processes of recent years is the government’s dubious legitimacy. The current team headed by President Robert Kocharian came to power in 1998 as the result of a coup. Since then, all elections (both presidential and parliamentary) have been held with what local and international observers have registered as grave violations. Today’s regime suffers from a constant dearth of legitimacy, which forces it to intensify the populist component in politics, on the one hand, and not shun dubious methods for fighting the opposition, on the other.
The opposition maintains that it won the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2003 and contended this victory throughout 2003 and 2004 by organizing peaceful mass protest demonstrations. They culminated in the meeting held in the early hours of 13 April, 2004 and its dispersion using troops and military hardware. After 2004, which was full of post-election unrest and various demarches by the government’s political adversaries, 2005 can be described as a period of relative calm and even a year of stagnation in some political respects. This is largely explained by the fact that the opposition parties had most of the wind knocked out of their sails after their consistent attempts to render the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections illegitimate and have their results annulled, as well as due to the unsuccessful demonstration tactics. Admittedly, in 2005, the opposition made several attempts to establish cooperation in other formats, but it was unable to make any significant headway. Of course, the politically active members of society, who played an extremely important part in the demonstration tactics chosen by the opposition, also grew weary of the failures.
The elections to the local power bodies held in 2005 in most of the country’s regions, as well as the Karabakh question and its discussion at the international level might have given a boost to domestic political affairs. However, the opposition either did not see the import of the opportunities opening up, or it decided not to squander its resources, but keep them for some later date. The small number of candidates it nominated did not receive political and moral support from the parties, nor did they achieve any success at these elections. Nor did the Karabakh problem rustle up any action on the part of the government’s political adversaries, since their approaches to the question were essentially the same as the those of country’s leadership, so neither side had any particular reason to come to loggerheads on this problem.
What controversy there was mainly revolved around the referendum held on 27 November regarding amendments to the Constitution. At first, it was presumed that they would be adopted with the cooperation and consensus of all the political forces involved, but at the last moment the opposition again took the path of confrontation. The amendments to the Basic Law were not discussed in any purposeful way. Robert Kocharian’s political adversaries accused him of trying to change the Constitution to create conditions favorable to his running for a third term. What is more, by removing the ban on duel citizenship from the Constitution, he was seen to be preparing the ground, using simple manipulations, for falsifying the election by means of Armenians living abroad (mainly in Russia).
The opposition parties called upon the people in different formats and with different justifications to boycott the referendum. But after it was over, the government, in turn, announced extremely high voter activity, to which not only the opposition, but also international organizations objected. And some representatives of the country’s leadership even agreed with this opinion. But this time too, the opposition was unable to take advantage of the situation which developed—in actual fact very few voters participated in the referendum—to give itself a new lease on life, as the result of which its prestige took a severe blow. It is worth noting that literally two or three weeks after the referendum, the opposition’s “disappearance” had its reverberations in the government’s camp: contradictions between its individual leaders and parties grew, which could be symbolic for the political processes in 2006.
In foreign policy, discussion of the Karabakh question took the back seat. Nevertheless, official Erevan invariably mentioned this problem at all levels. For example, at the beginning of the year, when Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers Oskanian and Mamediarov met in Prague, the so-called Prague Process was launched (admittedly, its essence and details were not revealed). The International Crisis Group (ICG) came forward with its own proposals, but its recommendations aroused a very negative response both in Armenia and in Azerbaijan. According to some experts, the ICG report consisted of the main set of proposals put forward by the OSCE Minsk Group and was prepared only to sound out public opinion on the eve of the January 2006 meeting between Presidents Kocharian and Aliev being prepared at that time.
Along with this, major achievements should be noted in cooperation with international organizations, in particular with the European structures and NATO, which was mainly determined by the region’s significance. The antiterrorist campaign in Iraq and the intensification of European Union integration placed additional, frequently token and deferred, obligations on Armenia, on the one hand, and the West’s accentuated interest in the Southern Caucasus provided all three of its countries more favorable conditions for holding talks on joining the EU, on the other. For example, such important documents as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO (IPAP) were initialed. What is more, the leadership of Armenia moved away from its unilateral pro-Russian orientation, preferring to develop multilateral ties, particularly with the U.S., which was prompted by the impasse that formed in domestic policy, the new realities in the region, and the world trends toward democratization.
The undertakings held in Erevan dedicated to the 90th anniversary of the tragic events of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire should also be noted as events of international significance. They helped many states to recognize and condemn this historical fact. Many high-ranking guests came to Armenia for the events organized in memory of this date. Several meetings were held at the top level, which in addition to everything else helped to enhance Armenia’s ties with its diaspora and develop inter-confessional ties of the Armenian Apostolic Church.
Significant achievements have also been observed in the economy. For example, incomes have risen by 14%, that is, the double-digit growth rates of the past few years have been retained. It is worth noting that the highest growth rates of 54% and 34% were recorded in such material-intensive spheres as the chemical industry and construction, respectively. This shows that Armenia has overcome the problems caused by the blockade of its borders organized as early as the beginning of the 1990s by its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Turkey, which affected 85% of the republic’s state boundaries. What is more, 2005 was also marked by a significant inflow of foreign financial resources. According to the official data, private transfers amounted to 26% of the GDP.
Achievements in the economy led to a substantial reduction in the burden of social problems. Unemployment decreased, while pensions and wages increased to a certain extent. Despite the fact that the economy is of a largely consumer nature (it is fed from abroad), it is still capable of steadily reducing poverty.
When analyzing the noticeable stability in 2005, domestic and foreign observers express the hope that these trends will continue in 2006. What is more, experts believe that since no elections are scheduled in Armenia or in Azerbaijan in 2006, this will bode well for settlement of the Karabakh conflict.