International Conference

«Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, the Present and Prospects for Resolution»

Baku (Azerbaijan) 22-23 October, 2012 and Tbilisi (Georgia) 25-26 October, 2012

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The Cultural-Civilizational Aspect of Central Eurasian Development

When viewing CEA in the geopolitical and geo-economic context as a single region, it should also be analyzed from the cultural-civilizational perspective. Most of its population is Muslim, and Islam plays an important role in the sociopolitical life of the region’s countries due to its broad social base, trans-nationalism, polycentrism, and the vast financial potential of the oil-producing states. The second key religion of the region is Christianity, the followers of which comprise the absolute majority of the population in Armenia and Georgia (see Table 10).

T a b l e 1 0

Confessional Composition of the CEA States in 2005

Index   Country	Islam		Christianity		Other		Total
	Million people	%	Million people	%	Million people	%	Million people	%
Afghanistan	28.4	99.0	0.006	0.02	0.294	1.0	28.7	100
Armenia	—	—	3.199	99.99	0.0003	0.01	3.2	100
Azerbaijan	7.9	95.6	0.35	4.2	0.05	0.2	8.3	100
Georgia	0.473	11.0	3.784	88.0	0.043	1.0	4.3	100
Kazakhstan	10.64	70.0	4.545	29.9	0.015	0.01	15.2	100
Kyrgyzstan	4.415	84.9	0.78	15,.0	0.005	0.1	5.2	100
Tajikistan	6.417	93.0	0.476	6.9	0.007	0.1	6.9	100
Turkmenistan	6.03	90.0	0.663	9.9	0.007	0.1	6.7	100
Uzbekistan	24.154	92.9	1.820	7.0	0.026	0.1	26.0	100
TOTAL:	88.429	84.7	15.623	15.0	0.4473	0.4	104,5	100

Ethnic unity, particularly the affiliation of most of the Central Asian countries with the Turkic world, is an equally important consolidating factor in CEA. This makes the high level of Turkey’s geopolitical activity in the region objective (see Tables 11, 12).

T a b l e 1 1

Ethnic Composition of the CEA States in 2005

Index   Country	Population— total1		Including:
			Titular ethnos2			Other ethnoses
	Million people	%	Ethnos	Million people	%	Ethnos	Million people	%
Afghanistan	28.7	100	Pash-toons	15.8	55.03	Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, etc.	12.9	45.0
Armenia	3.24	100	Arme-nians	3.1	97.95	Yezidis, Russians, Assyrians, etc.	0.1	2.1
Azerbaijan	8.3	100	Azeris	7.5	90.66	Lezghians, Russians, Armenians, etc.	0.8	9.4
Georgia	4.37	100	Geor-gians	3.6	83.8	Azeris, Armenians, Russians, etc.	0.7	16.2
Kazakhstan	15.2	100	Kazakhs	8.8	57.78	Russians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, etc.	6.4	42.3
Kyrgyzstan	5.2	100	Kyrgyz	3.4	64.9	Uzbeks, Russians, Dungans, etc.	1.8	35.1
Tajikistan	6.9	100	Tajiks	5.5	79.9	Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, etc.	1.4	20.1
Turkmenistan	6.7	100	Turkmen	5.7	85.0	Uzbeks, ussians, etc.	1.0	15.0
Uzbekistan	26.09	100	Uzbeks	20.3	78.0	Russians, Tajiks, Karakalpaks, etc.	5.7	22.0
TOTAL:	104.5	100		73.7	70.5		30.8	29.5

T a b l e 1 2

Main Ethno-Linguistic Groups of the Central Eurasian Region in 2005

Ethno-Linguistic Groups	Numbers (million people)	Percentage (in %)
Turkic-speaking (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Azeris, etc.)	55.6	53.2
Iranian-speaking (Pashtoons, Tajiks, Hazaras, etc.)	33.3	31.8
Slavic-speaking (Russians, Ukrainians, etc.)	8.3	7.9
Georgians	3.8	3.7
Armenians	3.1	3.0
Others	0.4	0.4
TOTAL:	104.5	100

The sociocultural features of the region are also shaped by its relations with neighboring states. In the south, the Central Eurasian states border on relatively isolated geopolitical Muslim actors—Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. In the east, the CEA states are contiguous to the Muslim border regions of China (the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region), which play the role of a buffer zone between the Muslim world and the Confucian civilization and Buddhism. In the north, Russia’s southern regions are also populated by numerous Muslim peoples who are under the strong influence of Orthodoxy and the Slavic culture. In the west, after acquiring their independence, the CEA countries gained access to the western civilization.

The special features noted make it possible to view CEA as a special ethno-religious part of the Muslim and Turkic world, where attempts are being made to establish a secular state relying on the spiritual and ethic principles of religion. The religious processes going on here are of global significance, since it is in this region that a new form of religious cooperation is emerging which can be created primarily on geopolitical—the League of Arab States (LAS)—or on geo-economic principles—the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (see Table 13).

T a b l e 1 3

Confessional Composition of CEA and Regional Unions Composed of a Predominantly Muslim Population

Region/ Regional unions	Population (million people)	Including the followers of (in %):			Number of states
		Islam	Christianity	Other
CEA	104.5	84.7	15.0	0.3	9
LAS	326.2	92.9	3.8	3.3	22
ASEAN	570.3	41.7	19.6	38.7	10

As can be seen from Table 13, the percentage of Muslims in the CEA states (84.7%), although less than the corresponding index in LAS (92.9%), is much higher than this index in ASEAN (41.7%). Today, it is difficult to predict which of these factors—geopolitical or geo-economic—or their combination will be pivotal in the CEA integration processes.

Orthodox Georgia and Gregorian Armenia, the percentage of the population of which amounts to 3.7% and 3.0%, respectively, are islands of non-Muslim culture in the Central Eurasian space. Taking into account the geopolitical reality, it should be noted that it is they who efficiently used the religious factor to restore their statehood. They are also gaining political advantages by making use of this factor in international organizations, which is confirmed by the recent European Parliament resolution on the Armenian cemetery in Julfa (Nakhchyvan, Azerbaijan) supposedly destroyed by Azeris in 2005.

In contrast to these two countries, the Muslim states of the region are still trying to define the place, role, and degree of influence of religion on the sociopolitical processes. On the one hand, this is related to the high level of politicization of Islam over the past fifty years, and on the other, by their striving to integrate into the world socioeconomic space.

Among the Muslim republics of CEA, the greatest socialization of religion has been achieved in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, where the authorities are trying to use Islamic values as a component of the conception of the state’s sociopolitical development. For this purpose, religious unions are becoming actively involved in implementing humanitarian and social projects. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, on the contrary, the political activity of extremist Muslim groups compels the government to restrict the rights not only of religious figures, but also of ordinary believers.

The influence of religion on the sociopolitical processes is felt most strongly in Afghanistan and Armenia. In so doing, even in Soviet times the Armenian Church was able to have a direct influence on the public conscience of its people. Among the Muslim peoples of the Central Eurasian region, the Afghanis and Tajiks are traditionally the most religious.

After experiencing a religious renaissance, the Muslim peoples of the region are very vulnerable to transformation. The CEA states located in the post-Soviet space were long under the influence of the communist ideology, which rejected religious values. During this time, a tolerant attitude, bordering at times on complete indifference, toward spiritual dissidence became rooted in the public conscience. Religiosity in this region underwent profound changes, which left its mark not only on the special features of the religious processes going on there, but also on the cultural, economic, and political development of society.

The complexity of the religious factor is largely defined by the numerous ideological trends within Islam, which can provisionally be divided into Sunni and Shi‘a. Despite the unending attempts of several spiritual Muslim leaders to put an end to this division, many Muslim communities are still divided into Sunnis and Shi‘as. This also applies to certain countries of the Central Eurasian region, primarily, to Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. The only Muslim country of the region where Shi‘as predominate is Azerbaijan (approximately 70% of the population). But here the differences with respect to this characteristic are still not having a significant influence on the sociopolitical processes, which is mainly due to the relatively low level of religiosity of society. In Afghanistan, the Shi‘as, who comprise 10-15% of the population, mainly live in the areas bordering on Iran.

However, the diversity which developed in the religious spectrum of the region’s countries at the turn of the 21st century is related not so much to the ideological trends historically existing within Islam, as to the activity of foreign missionary organizations, whereby not only Muslim, but also Christian (mainly Protestant), Krishnaites, Bahais, and others.

Non-traditional religiosity is introducing new elements of self-expression into the sociocultural structure of society, which presuppose not only financial, but also political support. They are finding this in the form of Western human rights organizations and even certain countries. Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Pakistan, as well as several Western countries lobbying the interests of Protestant groups, are the most active in this sphere. In contrast to them, Russia is supporting the traditional clergy, due both to the high number of Russian Orthodox believers in the region, and to the historical relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the religious and state structures of these countries.

But whereas the activity of non-Muslim propagandists is not popular among the broad masses and does not find the desired support in the ruling circles, Islamic groups usually quickly become overgrown with followers. The activity of missionaries often encourages the growth of religious radicalism. In some cases, this happens because of the spread of openly political Islam, and in others, because the moderate views brought in from the outside do not always coincide with sociopolitical reality, which at first pushes believers toward alienation. Consequently, the energy of these closed groups may spill out into radical movements with pseudo-religious motives.

The main factors determining the popularity of radical views in some of the region’s countries, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, for example, include the conservativeness of the traditional clergy and its inability to respond adequately to the challenges of the times, as well as the low level of religious enlightenment. Since the governments are not ready to participate in religious enlightenment, every attempt to find a balance between guaranteeing believers’ rights and methods for fighting religious extremism essentially boils down to restricting religious propaganda and narrowing the sphere of social activity of religious figures. In recent years, cases are being encountered with increasing frequency of compulsory removal of believers from public life and the educational and work process. This reaction only complicates the situation and promotes a rise in religious radicalism. The political struggle going on in several Muslim countries at the end of the last century (including Uzbekistan’s grievous experience) showed that it is essentially impossible to totally eradicate radical ideas. Much will depend on how much the CEA countries succeed in reaching a compromise with moderate groups of believers using mechanisms for legitimizing secular power within the framework of progressive reformatory Islam.

Affiliation with Islam is having an impact not only on the interrelations between most of the CEA states and their neighbors (see Table 14), but also on the interrelations between the former and the countries of the Far Abroad. Neighboring Muslim states—Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey—are interested in religious integration, on the one hand, while they continue to use Islam (the main unifying factor) in their political and economic interests, on the other. The Islamic factor also plays just as important a role in Russia’s religious policy. Taking advantage of the fact that 14% of its population is comprised of Muslims mainly living in the southern regions, and after obtaining the status of observer in the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 2005, the Kremlin is trying to boost its influence on the religious and spiritual life of CEA by shifting the vector toward secular Islam. This development of events also suits China.

T a b l e 1 4

Confessional Composition of the Countries Bordering
on the Central Eurasian Region in 2005

Population   Country10	Total		Including the followers of (in %):
	Million people	%	Islam	Christianity	Other
Islamic Republic of Iran	68.0	100	98.0	0.2	1.8
Islamic Republic of Pakistan	162.4	100	97.0	1.8	1.2
Russian Federation	142.811	100	14.0	85.0	1.0
Turkey	69.7	100	99.7	0.2	0.1
People’s Republic of China	1,306.3	100	2.0	4.0	94.0

The U.S., for which control over Eurasia is the basis of global supremacy, is particularly interested in religious moderation in the region. And whereas the two periphery regional unions of the continent—LAS and ASEAN, where Islamic origins are significant—are under the strong political and economic influence of the United States, in CEA, its influence has still not been defined, which could provoke a shift in the distribution of power at the global level, that is, boost the role of Russia and China. This is also confirmed by the color revolution fiascos in 2005 in Central Asia, which somewhat eroded the U.S.’s regional foothold and thus increased Russia’s influence. Even the global antiterrorist campaign launched by the United States in the region was efficiently used mainly by the governments of most CEA states to stabilize the domestic political situation.

So the ethno-religious structure of Central Eurasia is having a significant influence on the priorities of the main geopolitical actors with respect to the region (see Table 15).

T a b l e 1 5

Priority Levels of the Geopolitical Actors in CEA

Factors   Geopolitical Actors			Priority
			Religious	Ethnic	Economic
States Bordering on CEA	Muslim	Turkey	3	2	1
		Iran	1	3	2
		Pakistan	1	3	2
	Non-Muslim	Russia	3	1	2
		China	3	1	2
States of the Far Abroad	Muslim	Arab countries	1	3	2
		Southeast Asian countries	3	1	2
	Non-Muslim	U.S.	3	1	2
		EU	3	1	2

Among the neighboring Muslim nations, religion for Iran and Pakistan forms the main component of their regional priorities due to the high politicization of Islam in these countries. At the same time, although Turkey has a similar percentage of Muslim population—99.7% (Table 14), in this country economic and ethnic (Turkic) factors dominate over religious. The non-Muslim nations—Russia and the PRC—bordering on CEA continue to define their attitude toward the region through the prism of economic factors, with religious and ethnic elements being secondary. Among the Muslim actors of the Far Abroad, the religious factor is only determining for the LAS countries, while for the ASEAN countries, the economic component dominates in their Central Eurasian policy over the religious and ethnic. For the U.S. and the EU, just like for Russia, China, and the ASEAN countries, economic interests take the upper hand in their regional policy, followed by religious and ethnic. For non-Muslim nations, the importance of the religious and to a certain extent the ethnic factor is determined by the interest in restraining the development of radical Islamic and ethnocentric trends in the region’s states.

As can be seen from the aforesaid, the cultural-civilizational factor in CEA is not only having a tangible effect on the sociopolitical situation in its countries, but is also affecting their foreign policy. Given efficient use of the religious element in CEA, active geopolitical actors will be able to help the region become an important political and economic partner. And whereas spreading the reformatory Islamic idea, which relies on a synthesis of the spiritual and the secular, could be a catalyst for these processes, they might be hindered by conservative and traditionalistic ideas, as well as unresolved armed conflicts in the region.

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In this way, incorporating the region into the world community and creating an efficient regional security system in the region could help to turn Central Eurasia into a single, integral, sustainably developing region with all the necessary conditions for dynamic growth of the economy and successful human development. The prospects for achieving this goal will most likely depend on the rates of corresponding changes in the national economies and the introduction of forms and methods of economic regulation generally accepted in world practice, as well as on the political will of the heads of state and government of the CEA countries. In the next decade, the region could become the reliable and stable core of a new Eurasian continent which is steadily growing in strength.

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¹ According to the CIS International Statistics Board as of 1 January, 2006. Available at (apart from those cases where other sources are given). _{Back to text}
² According to the information on the U.S. CIA website [http://www.cia.gov] (apart from those cases where other sources are given). _{Back to text}
³ According to the information on [http://ru/wikipedia.org]. _{Back to text}
⁴ As of 1 October, 2005. _{Back to text}
⁵ According the data of the Armenian National Statistics Service. Available at [http://www.languages-study.com/demography/armenia.html]. _{Back to text}
⁶ According to the information of the Azerbaijan State Statistics Board. Available at [http:/www.azstat.org]. _{Back to text}
⁷ As of 1 July, 2005. Available at [http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gg.html]. _{Back to text}
⁸ According to the data of the Kazakhstan Department of Social and Demographic Statistics. Available at [http://www.languages-study.com/demography/kazakhstan.html]. _{Back to text}
⁹ According to the data of the Uzbekistan State Statistics Board. Available at [http://www.regnum.ru/news/uzbek/600454.html]. _{Back to text}
¹⁰ According to the information on the U.S. CIA site [http://www.cia.gov]. _{Back to text}
¹¹ According to the data of the Federal State Statistics Service for 1 December, 2005. Available at [http://www.languages-study.com/demography/demorussia.html].
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